

OSAMA W. ABI-MERSHED



APOSTLES OF MODERNITY

SAINT-SIMONIANS & THE CIVILIZING MISSION IN ALGERIA



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Apostles of Modernity

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Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria

Osama W. Abi-Mershed



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For Tata, for helping me keep life in perspective.

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Apostles of Modernity

Republicanism Deferred

> Autonomy agrees with Anglo-Saxons. We, French, are Latin. The influence of Rome molded our spirits during centuries. We cannot escape this obsession and it would be contrary to our nature to depart from the path it has traced for us. We know only to make, and by consequence must only make, assimilation.
>
> —Arthur Girault, *Principes de colonisation*[1]

> [A]ssimilation was a natural part of French intellectual life and as French a doctrine as wine is a drink.
>
> —Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory*[2]

In his *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*, first published in 1895, the prominent French jurist Arthur Girault broached, yet again, the "arduous and daunting" question: "What is to be done with the natives [of Algeria]"?[3] He reflected upon the three propositions his government had historically contemplated in this regard: exterminate or expel them to the Sahara, abandon the colony altogether to them, or, finally, attempt to assimilate them. Girault promptly dismissed the first and second premises. The "monstrous systematic destruction" or eviction (*refoulement*) of indigenous and aboriginal communities—the stamp of Anglo-Saxon colonialism in America and Australia—was clearly abhorrent to the "natural generosity of the French race." By the same token, granting the North African colony any form of autonomy or self-government was the "very negation of colonization" and anathema to the standing of Greater France. He then considered the option of colonial assimilation, and acknowledged even its unsystematic practices in Algeria as the true marker of the French and Latin genius and the unvarying ideological legacy of the Enlightenment and principles of

1789. As doctrine and policy, Girault explained, assimilation had originated in the National Convention's endeavors to grant full civil rights to France's colonial subjects and so raise a national citizenry indifferent to race or religion. Thus, when the Constitution of Year III (1795) integrated all overseas possessions into the egalitarian regime of the republic, French colonial policy entered a "new" era, with assimilation as its clearly enunciated principle.[4]

Girault has sketched here the general historical and philosophical background to France's colonial policy of assimilation, as well as the commonly accepted understanding of its practical objectives. To summarize, the policy of assimilation consists of incorporating colonial territories into the national domain by governing them with uniform political institutions, legal codes, and commercial tariffs. It entails administering the colonies as "overseas departments," subject to the conventions, customs, and norms of the metropole, and without special dispensation, therefore, for their non-European peoples or traditions. The indigenous populations are absorbed, in principle, into the national citizenry, regardless of historical or cultural specificities. Accordingly, the second prong of assimilation, the cultural corollary to the political integration of the colony, envisions remaking its natives, as well as its non-French settlers, in the image of France by propagating among them national education, language, aesthetics, and mores.

Yet, significantly, Girault was critical precisely of the native dimensions to colonial assimilation. He qualified his calls for renewed republican commitments to the incorporation of Algeria with grim warnings for his countrymen to "renounce absolutely" the delusional goal of native acculturation. He found the conventional approaches to the cultural rehabilitation of Algeria's Muslims, whether by religious conversion or secular instruction, fraught with "illusion and peril," and he advocated instead a "moderate" and "eclectic" variant of assimilation, "freed . . . from the exaggerations that compromise it."[5] The government, he asserted, had merely to conciliate the natives with French rule "by striving to make them appreciate its practical advantages and by ameliorating their material condition." In this manner, Girault shifted the efforts of his country's civilizing mission among the Muslims of Algeria from cultural to economic concerns. No longer were the prospects for a "harmony of sentiments" between the French and Muslims to be built upon common morals or shared values but, rather, to be based on mutual worldly interests and pecuniary benefits. "All we are able to do," he concluded, "is to attach the indigenous population to the order of things that will be created by the bonds of material interest."

Girault, in other words, was proposing to circumscribe selectively the reach of colonial assimilation in Algeria. In the dying decades of the nineteenth century, he was not alone in campaigning for "intimate union" (*rattachement*) with Algeria's European settlers, or *colons*, in order to accommodate their increasing demands for self-determination and to stave off the likelihood of their political secession from France. The *colons* themselves understood the term "assimilation" to mean greater legislative representation in Paris and immunity, consequently, from the whim of colonial decrees and the anxiety of metropolitan interventions in favor of the natives. Thus, on the one hand, Girault's repudiation of the traditional scope of assimilation was meant to placate the colonialist establishment and encourage new policies to serve as the "safety valve that prevents the rupture" between France and Algeria.[6] On the other hand, in conceding the necessity for separate rulings and specialized governing bodies for the colony's Muslim majority, he also advanced a calculated argument for excluding the latter from the republican franchise. From the perspective of the native communities of Algeria, therefore, the policy of "association" amounted to republicanism deferred in the name of racial division and colonial difference: as long as they remained culturally, morally, and mentally unsuited for the burdens of modern citizenship, the Muslims were to be subjected (*assujettis*) to extraconstitutional measures and native laws. *Rattachement* thus guaranteed liberties and representation for the Europeans of Algeria without compromising their colonial privileges, while *assujettissement* placed needed checks upon the exaggerated aims of universalism and integration. Together, the two policies—which would come to delineate the basic assumptions and operations of colonial association in the early twentieth century—made it possible to extend full civil rights to French Algerians, while confining the Muslims to auxiliary political, juridical, and economic standing.

Girault's *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*, read widely in official, academic, and journalistic circles, was one in a stream of influential treatises, composed around the turn of the century, that stimulated growing public condemnation of the policies of native assimilation.[7] Contributing equally to the anti-assimilationist din of the fin de siècle was the rising appeal of the sociological inquiries of Émile Durkheim, the ethnolinguistic studies of Ferdinand de Saussure, and the racial theories of Eugène Bodichon and Gustave Le Bon. Finally, the emergence of the Colonial Party (*Parti colonial*) in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as the multiplication of colonialist societies in France, helped propel imperial decision making in novel directions. "In this par-

ticular environment," observed Raymond Betts, "created in the years 1889–1890 and lasting about two decades, a new concern over colonial theory arose." Gradually, the paradigm of colonial association was promoted as the cure to the absurdities of native assimilation:

> At the end of the nineteenth century and more particularly in the first decade of the twentieth century, assimilation was analyzed and widely rejected. Condemned as rigid, unscientific, and harmful, assimilation was considered by most theorists no longer of any value to France's new and highly diversified colonial empire. Arguing in favor of a more realistic and flexible native policy, the new generation of colonial thinkers was desirous of gaining native cooperation and willing to respect native institutions. "Association" was the word most often employed to express the method they desired and the policy of association was offered as the antidote to assimilation.[8]

To this interpretation of the progression of French colonial thinking at the turn of the century, two specific objections may be dutifully raised. First, there are justifiable grounds to dispute the conventional status of assimilation as the dominant colonial practice and policy in Algeria in the nineteenth century. The reputation of assimilation as the mainstay of French colonial governance, I will counter, was largely a by-product of the critical debates of the 1890s and was later cemented in historical representations of the decade in question as a transitional phase, straddling two contradictory doctrinal eras in French colonial policy.[9] Second, the early twentieth century, I will argue, did not inaugurate a new phase in colonial decision making or witness a rupture with an old, established tradition of assimilation. The debate of the 1890s was rather the resumption—after a two-decade suspension following the overthrow of the Second Empire in 1870—of theoretical and practical discussions that had persistently preoccupied French colonial administrators since the conquest of the Ottoman Regency of Algiers in the 1830s. The "new colonial policy of association" in the twentieth century was rather a return to measures implemented systematically from the late 1840s until the military collapse of 1870.

To sustain these claims, I introduce in this book the often overlooked, yet cardinal, influence of France's military Arabists on colonial policy making in Algeria from 1830 to 1870. These specialized officers and colonial administrators, serving in concentrated numbers in the Ministry of War's Directorate of Arab Affairs in Paris and Algiers, were longstanding critics of native assimilation and proponents of "controlled association" with the Muslims of Algeria. Imbued with the teachings of the philosopher Henri de Saint-Simon, the Arabist officers contested the existence of primordial human racial and cultural characteristics and

insisted on the need for societies at different stages of historical development to evolve within their particular institutional structures and cultural traditions. In the 1840s, their endeavors to concretize the associationist agenda of Saint-Simon, especially as rearticulated by Prosper Enfantin and his follower Thomas "Ismaÿl" Urbain, would dedicate France's military Arabists to the reform and reorganization of native activities and beliefs. On several occasions, and particularly in the winter of 1848, the army's Saint-Simonian technocrats would outmaneuver assimilation-minded republican officials and successfully preserve their specialized dual administration over Algeria's Muslim population. Their discretionary control over the "Arab territories" would provide them with the human laboratory for their experiments with Saint-Simonian reforms, as well as the geographic space in which to erect in the 1860s a semiautonomous and protected "Arab Kingdom."

This study of the Arabist followers of Saint-Simon is also meant to illustrate how the unfounded confidence in the assimilationist fiber of French colonialism has become interrelated with three "problems" in writing the history of French Algeria. The first problem springs from the tendency to favor ideology over practice, to consider the former as the source of the latter, while simultaneously entertaining an uneven view of assimilation and association as alternative colonial doctrines that can neither coexist temporally nor be reconciled conceptually. In the following chapters, I argue that historical context, political expedience, and technocratic expertise, more than any ideological clarity, held sway in determining the orientation of French policies in Algeria. Moreover, I will maintain that to regard assimilation and association as doctrinal opposites is only possible when the ideological substance of colonial theory is considered independently of, and superior to, the myriad practices from which it tended to draw its main consistency.

Colonial assimilation and association derived their political logic from the same philosophical and ideological stock. Yet, as I hope to underscore with my brief comparison of Napoleon Bonaparte's pronouncements and actions during his campaigns in Italy (1796–1799) and Egypt (1798–1801), the contingencies of imperial rule occasioned very different cultural discourses and procedures in each setting. As the pivotal figure in defining and propagating France's revolutionary ideals, Napoleon's respective dealings with Italian and Oriental societies demonstrate that his nation's claims to a universal enlightened humanism tended to fade before the political rationalities of racial difference and European exceptionalism. During their occupation of Egypt, the French deployed new forms of power based on the strict policing of the boundaries between the European self and its non-European opposites.

The racial and cultural inferiority of Turks and Arabs, confirmed by the military, economic, and technological preponderance of France, was not only important for buttressing French identity. It necessarily provided the colonial expedition with the humanitarian pretense for its reorganization of Egyptian beliefs and lives. In other words, it was the accepted existence of racial and cultural hierarchies that allowed Napoleon to rationalize his imperial aggression against Egypt with the liberal rhetoric of civilizing obligations and the rule of law. In the aftermath of the direct colonial encounter with the Oriental other, revolutionary notions of the republic as a universal body politic began to make way to more compelling and symbolic conceptualizations of the French nation as a racialized polity.[10] Indeed, upon his return to Paris, after the coup of 18 Brumaire, Napoleon would overturn the egalitarian clauses of 1795, discontinue the assimilation of overseas territories (*territoires d'outremer*), and with the Constitution of 22 Frimaire, Year VIII (December 13, 1799), begin to regulate the latter with separate bylaws.

The second problem concerns the reliability of conventional representations of the colonial state as undifferentiated and uniform. By accepting assimilation as the mainstay of French imperial rule, historical scholarship has tended to depict the colonial bureaucracy as a political monolith and to cloud the presence of ideological subcultures within it, each with a defined sense of group identity, a conspicuous grid of relational solidarities, and very recognizable political practices. This general tendency has complicated our ability to analyze colonial institutions from the standpoint of variable power relations and to appreciate the impact of internal bureaucratic tensions on administrative theory and decision making.

Recent scholarship has certainly afforded greater consideration to the limits of metropolitan directives in regulating or managing the colony and has called into question the validity of the centralized and hegemonic powers of the colonial state.[11] However, as may be gathered from my description of the conflicts and reversals in colonial policy making in Algeria between 1830 and 1870, such political redeployments also bring to light the ways in which the universal precepts of the civilizing mission were themselves conditioned by, or made responsive to, local factors. The following chapters will make clear that, although the definitive concepts and imperatives of the civilizing mission, including the directives for colonial assimilation, may have seemed constant from the vantage points of metropolitan culture and history, they clearly faltered in their encounter with the practical realities of Algeria and soon unraveled into a multitude of competing, even contradictory, proposals, opin-

ions, and expectations. In the absence of a singular colonial strategy or doctrine, public initiatives during the 1830s were reconfigured to reflect political realignments within the colonial administration. Increasingly, "Parisian" decrees came to be governed by intelligence reports from analysts stationed in remote colonial outposts belonging to the military Offices of Arab Affairs (*Bureaux arabes*). As the Arab Bureaux attained administrative prominence in the 1840s, their specialists would redefine the scope and objectives of the civilizing mission with an eye toward securing their executive autonomy over rival factions within the colonial polity. Their growing involvement in the instrumentalities of colonial governance, therefore, was as much a response to native challenges to French rule as it was a symptom of internal organizational struggles for political advantage.

The third problem entails situating the decades of military and imperial rule in Algeria within the traditional historical narrative of the making of modern France. Here again, the emphasis on the assimilationist propensities of French imperialism has exaggerated, to some extent, the centrality of the Third Republic (1871–1940) in the development of the modern polity. In the narrative of the "clean break" of 1870–1871, the policy of assimilation emerges as the redeeming feature in republican imperialism, and France's claims to its own modernity are thus safely relocated to the annals of the liberal and democratic Third Republic. Historians of France, from Gabriel Hanotaux to Alain Corbin and Eugen Weber, have depicted the modern nation as the flower of the democratic and republican state. Despite recent challenges to their particular accounts, the neat delineation between "republic" and "colony" continues to entertain two important occlusions: it closes off the modern republic from its monarchical and imperial predecessors, especially the excoriated Second Empire (1852–1870), and, in so doing, conceals the military and colonial antecedents to the development of the civil political culture of France.[12]

Undoubtedly, the contours of the modern French state were largely codified and consolidated under the Third Republic. But the rationalities of France's modern sociopolitical structures and indicators of culture, the basic parameters of its historical and legal notions of identity and citizenship, were also fashioned in the context of the making of a colonial state in North Africa and in adjunction to imperial policies that sought to define "race" and "nationality" in France as well as in Algeria. Along the way the republic incorporated or prolonged traditions from the authoritarian, illiberal, and archaic colonial state. Its leaders, with regard to the native populations of Algeria, never departed clearly

from the discourses and patterns of the former military and imperial administrators in Algiers. As a point of comparison, the Saint-Simonians themselves did not trace such definite boundaries between metropole and colony and, instead, regarded their modernizing project in Algeria as their transplanted vision for France's own hopeful progress. From the very start of their colonial venture in the 1830s, the Saint-Simonians' alternative modernity in Algeria—with its particular modes for rationalizing and regulating colonial society, its specific understandings of evolution and change, of culture, race, and gender—was meant to reverse the flow of historical development and progress and to radiate from Algiers as a model for Paris to heed. Accordingly, their modernizing paradigms percolated upward into metropolitan thinking and continued to influence colonial theory and policy well past the "rupture" of 1870. Indeed, by the 1910s, the colonial policy of the Third Republic had reverted to practices devised by military administrators in the 1840s, and which had seen their heyday under the associationist regime of the Second Empire in the 1850s and 1860s.

In the remaining paragraphs, I revisit the three historical problems outlined previously and substantiate my arguments against France's tradition of assimilation with an examination of educational reforms in Algeria between 1830 and 1870. Although parallel developments occurred in other domains of colonial policy making, educational reforms offer a particularly rewarding standpoint from which to evaluate the tensions between the assimilationist tendencies in French imperialism and the countervailing associationist philosophy of the Saint-Simonians.[13] On the one hand, assimilation in the realm of education meets few of the semantic ambiguities that usually muddle the term. It implies quite plainly the substitution of indigenous schools with metropolitan academies, and contemporary policy makers emphatically equated the acculturation and civilization of the natives with the dissemination of French learning (*francisation*).[14] On the other hand, educational decision making during the decades under consideration remained the site for protracted political conflicts and disagreements between factions or authorities with weighted concerns. Despite the consensus among French officials on the paybacks of acculturation to their political domination in Algeria, one still comes across repeated instances of dissonance during which the governing guidelines of the colonial state were fundamentally recast, and the networks of contending forces involved in shaping and making local policies were clearly exposed.

A FALSE DEBATE?

In 1919, Louis Vignon, a professor at the famed École Coloniale, tried to put an end to the sterile ongoing political debates on colonial theory.[15] Association, he observed, was merely a "disguised tendency" to assimilation, and certainly, from the vantage point of their objectives, the two policies seemed destined, in principle, to merge at some distant focal point. Indeed, M. M. Knight concluded long ago that the doctrines were "not different . . . in any practical sense."[16] Both were ideological vehicles for exaggerating and imposing the norms of France while discrediting those of Algeria. Both aimed above all to legitimize colonial hegemony, absorb the natives and their characteristics into the superior culture of the colonizer, and thereby secure the colonial dominion and state. The verdicts by Vignon and Knight, however, do not gauge adequately the distance between the directive principles of assimilation or association and the political or institutional processes they respectively invoked. In other words, the apparent intellectual sophistry in assimilationist or associationist arguments is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the practical implications of each. This book will show that assimilationists and associationists were greatly polarized over their preferred methods for carrying out their civilizing mandates in a given colonial situation. In the implementation of educational reforms, specifically, the political operations of assimilation or association demanded different administrative procedures and institutional mechanisms of control, and their concrete policies generated very different local outcomes and responses. My survey of educational initiatives under the regimes of assimilation or association until 1870 confirms that each set of policies created its own specific contradictions for colonial rule, with very real, albeit very dissimilar, consequences for the native and European populations of Algeria.

As mentioned previously, assimilation was conceived as a plausible means to reconcile the fact of colonial rule with the revolutionary slogans of human emancipation and individual equality. Thus, colonial educational initiatives, when operating under the universalist assumptions of assimilation, devised policies that brooked no compromise with extant local institutions and barely countenanced facilitating the anticipated native embrace of French values. Association, on the other hand, admitted the inequalities between human civilizations and was conjured up as a strategy for cadenced progress or as a set of authoritarian guidelines with which to pilot the natives through their long evolution toward integration. The preserved customs and institutions of Algeria's

Muslims competed directly with French traditions and thus necessitated constant monitoring and regular interventions. Accordingly, educational reforms under the regime of association engaged the colonial authorities in recurrent negotiations with native communities. Indeed, for the Saint-Simonians—and here is where they differed most vividly from the "neo-associationists" of the early twentieth century—the social constructivism underlying their program for controlled association was not meant to spare the European establishment in Algeria or, ultimately, the French metropole itself. The successful fusion, under their supervision, of the Oriental and Occidental elements in Algeria was to provide the catalyst and platform for the renewal of France's own sociopolitical elites, and for the eventual inauguration of a new technocratic order dominated by them. No doubt, the appeal of the doctrine of association to Algeria's Arabists was related, to some extent, to Saint-Simon's known antipathy for republican egalitarianism and democratic populism.

THE NETWORKS WITHIN

Exposing the tensions within the colonial administration allows us to discern more clearly the adaptation of the universal notions of civilization and modernity to the particularities of French rule in Algeria and thus to move away from the monolithic analytical categories of "colonizer" and "colonized." The standard descriptions of the self-contained colonial state minimize the array of contending political interests and oppositions that impacted official policy making, and accommodate poorly the social and cultural variations within French Algeria. Likewise, the autonomous category of the colonized conceals the differentiated impact of imperial policies on local communities, the manifold responses to such policies, and the potential for indigenous groups to subvert or gain from the new political order. France's experiences with educational reforms in Algeria between 1830 and 1870 suggest that the colonial encounter did not simply pit a dynamic French "modifier" acting unobstructed upon an unreceptive "modified." Since the colonial archives have retained mainly the government's particular interpretations and handling of native reactions to its decrees, there is much to learn from the examination of modes of resistance that relied on individual or collective disengagement rather than the outright use of force. This study of education in colonial Algeria will show that French intrusions faced a tacit, ordinary, and deliberate defiance that made its impact felt incessantly rather than in intermittent, spontaneous or spectacular outbursts of violence. Cultural initiatives were consistently compromised

by natives who eluded the boundaries of colonial control by refusing to attend France's schools, by mocking or dismissing its cultural claims, by ignoring the commands of its administrators, and, finally, by resorting to brutality when necessary. If school inspection reports are clearly not representative of the entire native population—women, in particular, are largely absent—they nonetheless provide insight into the wide range of local strategies of disobedience or co-optation.

By the same measure, I take these inspection reports as examples of more subtle deployments of colonial power against the natives. Recent years have witnessed a revisionist revival in colonial studies, with books, essays, and even articles of law purporting to reassess the positive or beneficial consequences of European rule for the formerly colonized societies.[17] Coincidentally perhaps, the important contributions of the Saint-Simonians in modernizing the infrastructures of commerce, communication, and transportation in France, Egypt, and Algeria are also enjoying renewed scholarly interest. Several recent studies have revisited the "benign colonialism" (*colonisation en douceur*) of Prosper Enfantin or have celebrated the "Arabophilia" of Thomas "Ismaÿl" Urbain and Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. From November 28, 2006, to February 25, 2007, the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal in Paris, which houses the important records of Enfantin and Urbain, held an exhibition titled "The Century of the Saint-Simonians." It was, in the words of its organizers, an attempt to remind humanity of its debt to these "advocates of progress" who stood at the "roots of French modernity." This book hopes to muddle the picture of Saint-Simonian philanthropy and to moderate the enthusiasm for colonial rehabilitation by illustrating the exploitive assumptions and repressive outcomes of civilizing initiatives, well meaning or otherwise. As the chapters on educational reform will make clear, the Saint-Simonian vision for universal association or cultural fusion accepted at its most basic level French subjugation of indigenous society and the dissolution of the latter's retrograde features to the satisfaction of autocentric sensibilities. Few liberal thinkers or Saint-Simonian doctrinaires considered military conquest and pacification as less than integral to France's apostolate of civilization and modernization. We shall see later that Saint-Simonian soldiers and modernizers such as General Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de Lamoricière saw little but moral righteousness in marshaling extreme force against the enemies of reason and progress, whether insurgent Arab natives or Parisian workers.

UNBOUNDING THE COLONY

I mentioned earlier that the theoretical demarcations between metropole and colony have distorted our understanding of the formative implications of colonialism for the construction of national culture and identity in France.[18] Thus, my focus on colonial education also aims to uncover the practical and theoretical continuities between cultural initiatives in North Africa and developments in the metropole. The colony often served as a testing ground for social policies that were ultimately considered for domestic implementation, and the schooling of the natives of Algeria held important consequences for educational reforms in France proper, especially with respect to the nation's attempts to assimilate its cultural or religious minorities of Breton, Basque, Alsatian, and Savoyard communities. The familiarity of ministers of public instruction, such as Victor Duruy, Albert de Broglie, and Jules Ferry, with the project of acculturation in Algeria was never far removed from their thinking as they attempted to reform and homogenize metropolitan standards of education.

By the same token, the valorization of the Third Republic points to a general bias in the scholarship on European imperialism, which consists of locating the conjunctions between colonial regimes and European modernity in the post-1870 decades of "high imperialism."[19] In the prevailing historical narrative, the last great wave of European expansion in the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century was at once the outcome of the political and economic maturation of the bourgeois nation-state, and essential to Europe's redefinition of its role and power in the world. With structural transformations in the global system of capitalist production and exchange, the colonial powers of Europe abandoned their informal mercantile spheres in Africa in favor of outright occupation and absorption of the continent.[20] The liberal bourgeois regimes, equating their succession to the governing aristocratic order with the advent of a new progressive and lawful society, produced new rationalizations for imperial military ventures and a re-enunciation of the dominant theories of historical and social development. The colonial expansion of Europe was recast as a secular and philanthropic mandate to modernize the non-European world and was justified and legitimated with the Enlightenment ideologies of progress and emancipation.[21] The new criteria implicated Europe's classical imperial powers in projects of state making and cultural transformation in their respective colonies. As Thomas Richards observed, colonies in the late nineteenth century ceased to be regarded as distant outposts held by force alone and became "a sort of

extended nation," where information gathering and intellectual production, as much as compulsion, were involved in actualizing the needs and interests of the colonizing power.[22]

From this perspective and by the standards of conventional scholarship, the colonization of Algeria between 1830 and 1870 should be regarded as the precursor to the modern European colonial systems of the late nineteenth century, and as France's first colonial venture in the dawning age of liberal imperialism.[23] Indeed, the conquest of the Ottoman Regency of Algiers was conceived and launched in the context of rapid shifts in the distribution of material and symbolic power between France's traditional "bellicose landed order" and its modern "peace-loving industrial bourgeoisie, the product of merit, not birth."[24] After the dethronement of Charles X in July 1830, the incoming liberal regime invested the colonization of Algeria with a set of "civilizational" objectives that projected the specific values, interests, and considerations of the national bourgeoisie. Military victory over the Ottoman forces was soon followed by public debates concerning the improvement and development of the newly acquired populations and territories. As early as 1833, a petitioner to the minister of war remarked that colonization was "no longer nowadays what it used to be: the usurpation of the natural rights of a people; the destruction of nations in order to raise others." In fact,

> It is by enlightening the populations; by civilizing them, that we wish to colonize today; and if political necessities sometimes demand the invasion of a new country, it must be done with the object of ameliorating the fate of its inhabitants, or at least to live sensibly with them in order to render them useful to the general welfare; for in this age of positive interests, we feel that we must no longer destroy, but create and preserve.[25]

The day of enlightened imperialism—of colonial possessions ruled by reason rather than by "the savage coercion" of the earlier empires—was breaking.[26]

PERIODIZATION

Finally, in light of the three historical problems discussed above, I will propose a new periodization for the decades of military rule in Algeria (1830–1870), based less on the totalizing official perspective from Paris and more on the particular modalities of colonial rule and the local applications of the civilizing mission. In the initial phase of political uncertainty, extending from the capture of Algiers in July 1830 to the

beginning of the military strategy of "total conquest" in early 1841, France's empirical understanding of North Africa was colored by contemporary national imperatives and predetermined Enlightenment paradigms for Muslim and Oriental cultures. The Ottoman Regency, on the eve of the invasion, was depicted as a welcoming land of opportunity for the idealistic project of civilization and emancipation. Accordingly, colonial policies in the 1830s were designed with no questioning of the local appeal or utility of French initiatives. By 1839, however, the persistence of native anticolonial resistance and the escalation of the conflict with the emir Abd al-Qadir prompted experienced military commanders and Arabist experts to dispute the foundational reasoning of faraway ministers and policy makers. With several Saint-Simonian "doctrinaires" commissioned in the army's Arab Directorates, the anxieties of the military command translated into ideological refutations of the prevailing approaches to colonial pacification. Accordingly, against the backdrop of the uncertain war with Abd al-Qadir in the early 1840s, they began to take the necessary steps to set colonial decision making on a new footing.

The second phase thus opened with the transition toward dual and incremental sociocultural policies and coincided with the authoritative intervention by the army's Arabists to correct the record of the civilizing mission with more practical assessments of local conditions. Beginning with the scientific exploration of 1840–1842 and culminating in the great inquiries (*grandes enquêtes*) of 1846–1847, historical experience and prolonged contact with native society empowered the specialized officers of Arab affairs to articulate new ideological justifications for their alternative solutions. Recruited from the pool of skilled and accomplished graduates of the military academies and motivated by the novel sociological ideas of Saint-Simon, the personnel of the Arab Bureaux attempted to regulate native society with the protective and customized measures of colonial association.

The last phase, extending from 1848 to 1870, marked the apogee of the technocratic administration and disciplinary powers of the Offices of Arab Affairs and the formalization of the categories of knowledge produced by their great inquiries. The implementation of the procedures and institutions for controlled association began in the summer of 1850 and peaked in the early 1860s, when Napoleon III confirmed Urbain's scheme for native governance and endorsed his efforts to finalize the establishment of the Arab Kingdom.

Thomas Urbain provides ideological and political continuity across the three phases and is without doubt the central figure throughout the decades under review.[27] From his modest and illegitimate origins, the

Guyanese quadroon developed into the principal exponent of Enfantin's doctrine of association in Algeria and was the main architect of indigenous policy making in the 1850s and 1860s. Around him rotated the "Arabophile plot" to take control of the colonial administration, and for his lifetime, Urbain remained a fervent advocate of native rights as he understood them. He became acquainted with the Saint-Simonian doctrine and his future mentors in the late 1820s through his friendship with Gustave d'Eichthal, with whom he had earlier coauthored antislavery and antiracist tracts. In April 1833, he traveled to Constantinople, Beirut, Alexandria, and Cairo, where he gained familiarity with the Arabic language, converted to Islam, and adopted the name "Ismaÿl." In 1837, he made his first journey to Algeria, to join General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud's corps of military interpreters. There, he married twelve-year-old Djeyhmouna bent Messaoud ez-Zebeiri (1828–1864) in March 1840, a union that admittedly "strengthened the regard" of local Muslims toward him. "I used to wear the Arab dress then," he would later recall, "and lived *à l'arabe* within my inner self."[28]

From 1837 to 1847, Urbain contributed regular anticolonial articles to various Parisian broadsheets, especially *Le Journal des Débats*, in which he defended Muslim culture and advocated the fusion of Oriental and Occidental civilizations. His editorial verve, familiarity with Islam, and striking appearance brought him to the notice of the Duke of Aumale, who appointed him as his personal interpreter in November 1842. His transfer to the Directorate of Algerian Affairs in the Ministry of War in Paris in January 1845 was a bittersweet promotion due to the ostracism that he and his wife encountered in the capital city. With the discredit of Bugeaud and the rise of Aumale, Urbain was promoted to serve as chief of the political bureau in the Ministry of War. His immediate superior Eugène Daumas, director of Algerian affairs from April 1850 to October 1858, appropriated many of his ideas and research without giving Urbain his due. Still, from his rank, Urbain would oversee the implementation of the Arabophile policies and become the directorate's first specialist on native questions.

With the creation of the Ministry of Algeria in 1858, Urbain authored pamphlets against the rampant dispossession of native lands that not only caught the attention of Emperor Napoleon III but also earned him the fierce enmity of the colonialist establishment. Appointed chief councilor to the restored governor general in December 1860, he was relocated to Algiers to promote colonial reforms before the Government Council. By then, his stature had grown to make him the driving force in a nucleus of Arabophile officers and officials, centered in the Imperial Court around General Émile Fleury and Frédéric Lacroix, the emperor's

main advisors on Algeria after 1861. Urbain's booklet, *L'Algérie française. Indigènes et immigrants*, published in 1862, exerted an immense influence upon Napoleon, who referred to it as the basis for his project for the Arab Kingdom in Algeria. Urbain's documents and works would also inspire the senatus consults of 1863 and 1865, the emperor's main legislation on Algeria. The ascendance of the Arabophiles, however, sparked a vicious colonialist counterattack, abetted and encouraged by the governors general of Algeria, Jean-Jacques Pélissier and his successor Patrice de Mac-Mahon. With the fall of the Second Empire in September 1870, Urbain was forced to flee Algiers for Marseille. He resumed his campaign against the prosettler policies of the Third Republic with letters to *Le Journal des Débats* and the Saint-Simonian *La Liberté* of Isaac Péreire. With his death on January 28, 1884, disappeared the last colonial proponent of the Arab Kingdom and Franco-Muslim union.

CHAPTER ONE

Never the Twain Shall Meet?

> In large measure the history of French colonial theory, particularly in the nineteenth century, might be written as a history of the doctrine of assimilation. Because the concept of assimilation appeared attractive to the French, it found expression as a governing principle, if not a practice, during most periods of French colonial history.
>
> —Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory*[1]

> No nation, therefore, no religion should be so arrogant as to pose itself as the model and archetype for progress; no person can say: My political law, my social organization, my mores, represent for humanity the final expression of progress; all who do not follow my example and walk with me are doomed to error, to barbarism, to immobility.
>
> —Georges Voisin (pseudonym of Ismaÿl Urbain), *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*[2]

This is the account of a departure in France's political decision making in Algeria and, more notably, in the ideological justifications for its colonial rule. The decisive turn occurred in the late 1840s and was driven by the administrative ascendance of a group of colonial officers serving in military intelligence units known as the Bureaux of Arab Affairs (*Bureaux arabes*). During the 1830s and 1840s, these specialized officers would parlay their technical expertise and their competence to speak to security concerns into political clout and steadily position themselves as the government's ultimate arbiters on native matters. By 1848, they were largely in charge of the Ministry of War's Arab Directorates in Algiers and Paris, and, by 1861, they were literally dictating the course of policy on Algeria.[3] In the interceding years, they managed to rede-

fine France's local priorities and interests, articulate a new doctrine and framework for its colonial administration, and overturn the executive procedures for the political and cultural assimilation of Algeria. Their alternative program for "controlled association" with Algeria's Muslims culminated in 1863 with Emperor Napoleon's personal endorsement of a semiautonomous Arab protectorate in the colony's interior. This book traces the political evolution of the military proponents of colonial association in Algeria between 1830 and 1870 and describes the historical circumstances under which they came to appropriate France's civilizing mission in North Africa.

The purpose of my study of the Arab Bureaux is to show that the general theory of colonial assimilation fails to fit the facts of policy making in Algeria, especially during the formative decades of French rule. Political and cultural assimilation, I will argue, was not the undisputed doctrinal lodestar for colonial policies and seldom did it unify the French administration with a bedrock of operative principles before 1870. Instead, for much of the period under review, the nascent colony was governed in fits of political uncertainty or procedural incoherence and with policies of trial and error.[4] Ideological differences and organizational disputes hindered the development of tenable guidelines for the colonial state, and the very need to manage sociocultural conditions in the colony inhibited the local reproduction of metropolitan practices and relations. The "attractive" appeal of colonial assimilation remained, therefore, a function of narrow political interests, and from the first days of the imperial conquest, the doctrine's unrealistic conjectures were compellingly contested by local and metropolitan actors, none more so than the army officers serving on the front lines of France's campaign to "pacify" Algeria's indigenous populations.

On one level, the military's recurrent trespasses upon public policy making after 1830 were strategic reflexes, triggered by the combined brunt of anticolonial unrest and inopportune metropolitan directives. For the inveterate commanders of the Army of Africa—*les Africains* as they came to be known—there was supreme logic and justification in stripping inexperienced Parisian ministers of the treacherous administration of Algeria's Muslims. Yet, aside from their strict concerns with the security of the French enclaves, there was also a doctrinal and philosophical backbone to the generals' grab for political power in Algiers. Many looked upon the new conquests as the chance to restore the army to its former imperial and moral standing. Specifically, the looming expedition to North Africa reverberated with echoes from the Napoleonic mission to Egypt in 1798. Algiers evoked memories of Alexandria or Cairo, and of a young general exhorting his soldiers to realize the na-

tion's manifest destiny on the field of battle. Likewise, in 1830, the commanders of the Army of Africa hoped to replicate the military and scientific feats of their Napoleonic forebears and to galvanize their troops with summons to return civilization and enlightenment to the darkened recesses of Africa.

The iconic stature of Napoleon Bonaparte certainly cast a long shadow over the strategic and ideological calculations behind the invasion of the Ottoman Regency of Algiers. The officers, artillerymen, and engineers in the mustering expeditionary corps had been molded in the elite academies and state-funded lyceums opened in the 1790s by then-consul Bonaparte.[5] His overhaul of military and educational establishments had empowered France's renewed quest for empire at the turn of the century, and it was under his generalship that the universal ideals of 1789 were mobilized beyond the borders of the nation. Napoleon's early victories were cardinal in wedding the rhetoric of civilizational progress to imperial expansion and in vindicating the young republic's claims to a uniquely superior cultural pedigree.[6] French arms became virtuous, if not messianic, in their commitment to forge a higher political and moral order for humanity. The first territorial acquisitions of the Revolution were thus integrated as "sister republics," and their societies improved in the likeness of France. To an incisive observer such as Georg Hegel, the French general on horseback evoked the incarnation of the "world-historical soul," trampling purposefully upon the antiquated polities of Europe in order to elevate them to their next epochal stage.

Hegel's memorable characterization of Napoleon as "Spirit of the Age" is especially resonant in the field of Middle Eastern studies, where it remains academic convention to equate his landing at Alexandria in 1798 with the Muslim world's dramatic initiation to the era of modernity and nationalism.[7] In the annals of Napoleonic glory, the conquest of Egypt is depicted as an unprecedented military-scientific venture, singular in its conflation of imperial and cultural ambitions. Henry Laurens, in fact, credits Napoleon with having coined the notion of *mission civilisatrice* in his proclamations to the Army of the Orient while en route to Egypt.[8] The general's subsequent triumph over the "tyranny of the Mamluks" endorsed the use of physical force to disseminate the achievements of 1789 to Oriental societies and thus launch the latter's political and cultural revival. The 167 scholars, scientists, engineers, and artists attached to the expeditionary corps embodied the synthesis of humanism and militarism in France's mission to civilize. "For our men in Egypt, everyone who was not a soldier was a savant," commented the artist and archaeologist Vivant Denon on his learned peers' prominent profile within the invading force.[9] Their pioneering ethno-

graphic and historical surveys buttressed imperial domination with scientific certainty. The intelligence and expertise they gathered were instrumental in institutionalizing the academic disciplines of Egyptology and Orientalism and would serve thereafter as points of reference for conceptualizing and interacting with the Muslim world.[10] Indeed, for Edmund Burke III, the "French tradition of the empirical study of Muslim societies" was born between the military expeditions to Cairo and Algiers, as its central paradigms were "laid down in the volumes of the *Description de l'Égypte*, and the work of the first generation of Frenchmen in Algeria."[11] "Our sword-bearing scholars" (*nos savants porte-glaives*), Paul Azan would later designate this "first generation" of colonial administrators—the subjects of this book—in recognition of their Napoleonic antecedents.

As significant as its value to French disciplines of learning, however, was the impact of the Egyptian expedition on the nation's imperial discourses and practices. Egypt, in this regard, provided an early showcase for the contextual limitations to the politics of colonial assimilation and the universality of France's mandate to regenerate the non-European world.[12] In Cairo, Napoleon reverted to policies from the bygone era of the ancien régime and bowed to the very institutions against which the citizens of France had risen in 1789. He perpetuated local exceptionalism, tolerated slavery, and confirmed the "feudal" privileges of lords and clerics. The indispensability of French rule to the improvement of the Oriental "other" generated imperial laws to formalize racial difference and entrench the cultural distinctiveness of the French nationality. The cultural "alienness" of the Muslims became the indispensable exception that validated France's perfected civilization. In 1799, Napoleon would break definitively with the republican Declaration of Rights and repeal the political integration of the possessions of *outre-mer*. His encounter with the Muslim heartland, it seems, had tested the utility of the politics of identity and difference to national and imperial ambitions.

EGYPT'S *TRIENNIO*

> To order is always to become the master of others by impeding them. —Denis Diderot, *Œuvres complètes*[13]

> In Egypt, I found myself free from the wearisome impediments of civilization. I dreamed all sorts of things and saw how to realize all that I dreamed. I created a religion; I saw myself on the way to Asia, mounted on an elephant, with a turban on my head and in my hand, a new *Alcoran* [Quran] which I should compose at my pleasure. —Napoleon Bonaparte to Madame Rémusat[14]

Before 1798, Revolutionary France's practical experiences with non-domestic processes of acculturation were restricted, by and large, to its recent territorial acquisitions in Italy, Switzerland, and the Rhineland. Until then, as Michael Broers confirms, the relatively untested modernizing project "brooked no compromise with any *ancien régime* it inherited."[15] The rational initiatives of the "universal nation" were less concerned with accurate readings of local or regional possibilities than with the legitimate discharge of its humanitarian responsibilities and the effacement of local anachronistic particularities. Accordingly, the political, economic, judicial, and educational functions of the sister republics were integrated into the French bureaucracy. Feudal privileges were abolished, religious institutions and orders were restricted, and the properties of the local nobility and clergy were confiscated. Any official indulgence toward local custom and any adjustment in French standards or practices were categorically ruled out. "Of 'adaptive changes' among the French," Broers concludes, "there were none. The very notion of 'borrowing' from Italian culture was unthinkable. . . . Expressed in terms of *realpolitik*, 'horse-trading' was anathema to the Napoleonic regime."[16]

The Egyptian expedition of 1798 was motivated by the same strategic and moral obligations that had sanctioned the "necessary emancipation" of Upper Italy in 1796. "Behave to [the Mohammedans] as you have behaved . . . to the Italians," General Bonaparte counseled his troops as they approached the coastline of Alexandria.[17] But the occupation of the Nile delta and valley did not result in the straightforward application of French administrative norms, as in the case of Italy. More specifically, Napoleon did not follow through with the policies of assimilation he had deemed critical to the enlightenment of the Italians, and he made uncharacteristic public concessions to the very social actors and religious sentiments he was openly combating or debasing in Europe. In addition to his usual warnings to exercise caution and forbearance when dealing with foreign populations, he felt it necessary to advise his staff and soldiers to yield to local conditions: "You will find here customs different from those of Europe; you must accommodate yourselves to them." Unapologetically abhorrent of the traditional and populist festivals associated with the Catholic Church, the general was now seen participating personally in the Muslim celebrations of Bayram and was heard cajoling the religious notability of Cairo with sympathetic professions of faith: "I more than the Mamluks, serve God—may He be praised and exalted—and revere His prophet Muhammad and the glorious Quran." He later confided to Madame Rémusat that he found in the Orient the opportunity to be rid of the cumbersome restraints of advanced civilization and to decree laws as he pleased. He envisioned

himself an "original prophet," come to deliver onto the Muslims sacred scriptures written by his hand.[18]

Political calculations or expedience may account partly for Napoleon's willingness to pervert his republican, secular, and anticlerical credentials in the Land of the Pharaohs. To be sure, Napoleon's emphasis on the cultural and religious alienness of Egypt legitimated its military occupation and rendered his regime of power more intelligible to his soldiers and supporters. By the same token, however, his quick rejection of the possibility of assimilating the Egyptians and his essentialized and Eurocentric pronouncements on Orientals and Muslims also insinuate that Napoleon was ideologically predisposed to break with the Italian precedent. At minimum, the stark discontinuities between the Italian and Egyptian *trienni* should prompt us to examine the intrinsic codification of racial and cultural differences within the discourse of the Enlightenment and to question, from the political perspective, Broers's contention that it was "unthinkable for the French to do anything but impose their administrative system . . . on their non-French possessions."[19]

Since Edward Said's influential critique of Orientalism, the importance of discursive and symbolic representations for the imperial project of Europe is no longer in question. The term "civilization" itself came into usage as the philosophers and politicians of the Enlightenment, in the wake of the Continent's growing contacts with non-European societies, began to draw binary comparisons that invited political interventions. The "despotic" Oriental governments were vilified as a "challenge to political reason" and an obstacle to the generalization of the ideals of the Enlightenment.[20] Laurens has documented thoroughly the formative influence of classical Orientalist tracts on the intellectual development of Napoleon. In his youth, he had read the philosophical treatises of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the historical and political theses of Nicolas de Condorcet and François Antoine de Boissy d'Anglas, and the general studies of François Augier de Marigny and François Baron de Tott.[21] In 1790, he befriended the Arabist scholar Count Constantin-François de Volney and derived from him the historical paradigms with which to comprehend the rising mastery of European science and power. Through Volney, Napoleon became acquainted with the racialized hierarchies that defined the "otherness" of the Orient in terms of political irrationality and cultural stagnation, and hence ascribed a salutary role for French actions in the Arab world.

Egypt thus provided Napoleon with an ideological and epistemological currency that the Italian peninsula, for one, could not match. The conquest of Italy dislodged neither the French nor the Italians from the

familiar continuum of European history and the Enlightenment's conception of a common European refinement. To the contrary, it remained possible for the French administrators to disparage the existing state of affairs in Italy without impugning the country's essential past or their own debt to its cultural legacy. The encounter with Egypt, on the other hand, provided an opportunity to take measure of the superiority of French achievements in relation to the degraded conditions in the Orient. Here too, Napoleon expected to connect seamlessly with Greco-Roman history, to the exclusion of the country's Muslim centuries. "The first town we shall come to was built by Alexander," he informed his soldiers. "At every step we shall meet with grand recollections, worthy of exciting the emulation of Frenchmen."[22] However, as they happened upon a landscape of antique symbols and monuments disfigured in a sea of Oriental decay, the French quickly bemoaned the loss of Egypt's Greco-Roman heritage. Louis-Antoine de Bourrienne, Napoleon's secretary, noted his countrymen's sense of cultural displacement. "Egypt," he lamented in his private journal, "is no longer the empire of the Ptolemies, covered with populous and prosperous cities; it now presents an unvaried scene of devastation and misery."[23]

The grand recollections, in other words, were not forthcoming without historical amendments and elisions. Egypt's Muslim culture was alternately recognized or negated in order to redeem its colonial occupation by France. Scholars and artists purposely featured Egypt's Muslim identity when underscoring the civilizational distance France had covered since the "golden age of the Moors" or the defeat of the Crusades. They did the opposite when tracing continuities between Egypt's pre-Islamic past and their present rule. They oscillated between identity and difference to uphold their conquest as indispensable for the improvement of Egypt, even as its Muslim features were depicted as undeserving of attention or impervious to assimilation. Visually, the imperative to build empirical paradigms based on cultural identity and difference was epitomized by the illustrators of the frontispiece of the *Description de l'Égypte*, where "Napoleon-as-Caesar" is shown before the pyramids, sweeping aside the Mamluk interlopers, "while behind him the nine classically robed Muses return the arts to the land where the Greeks believed they had originated."[24] The instrumentality of manufactured knowledge and representations for empowering France's imperial project was confirmed on August 24, 1798, when Napoleon unveiled the Institut Français d'Égypte to lend

> its varied expertise to the conquerors, so that the French might effectively subdue the local populations and successfully exploit the land. Engineers, Islamicists, printers, natural scientists, artists, mathematicians, and astronomers

were all to study conditions in Egypt, then place their knowledge at the service of the invading generals.[25]

By the time the French army was expelled from the Levant in 1801, knowledge and ideology had become ineluctably linked to the marked ascendance in Europe's global reach. The robust philosophical and moral traditions of anti-imperialism of the eighteenth century gave way to secular and liberal doctrines endorsing colonial expansion in the name of human welfare.[26] The ideological lessons of the American and French revolutions, the technological rewards of industrialization, and the progress of nationalist consciousness were among the factors that awakened in Europe's postrevolutionary elites a heightened sense of providence in their capacity to remake the world. Their newfound power translated into a moral vocation, a "self-inflicted burden," to spread Continental achievements to the rest of the world, through military means if necessary.[27] The philosophical concept of "civilization" had turned into an ideological battering ram in the global projection of the imperial might of Europe.[28]

FROM CAIRO TO ALGIERS

> Africa is returned to the realm of civilization.
> —Raymond Thomassy, *Des recherches scientifiques sur l'Algérie*[29]

> Permit the Muslims of Constantinople to continue to learn French and mathematics, to adopt our theaters and enjoy our distractions, to drink wine even and take but one wife, and they will be ours a thousand times more than if we established garrisons in Cairo, Smyrna, and Scutari, and a thousand times more for us than for the Russians or the English.
> —Enfantin to Arlès, January 25, 1840[30]

The notion of the universal civilizing mission was arguably the sole Napoleonic legacy to be adopted with less than usual trepidation by a resurrected Bourbon monarchy, struggling to contend with the residual populist politics of the Revolution and the ascendance of social strata "grounded in and constitutive of specific relations of production and exchange."[31] Under the Second Restoration (1815–1830), republican institutions were increasingly sanitized to neutralize or mitigate the politicization of the social underclass and reinstill communal dedication to the traditions of inherited or spiritual authority. In time, the monarchy would also look to dilute the social solidarities created in the wake of the Revolution with political diversions abroad. While "empire" was unequivocally banished at home, imperial legitimacy and prestige were

actively pursued in Spain, Greece, and, finally, North Africa. The invasion of Algiers in 1830 was concocted with political self-preservation foremost in the minds of Bourbon loyalists. As it prepared for its first significant clash with a Muslim power in three decades, the government revisited the imperial precedent of Napoleon, deriving even its line of attack from the surviving fragments of plans drawn in 1808 by Colonel Vincent-Yves Boutin, engineer in the Grande Armée. The royalist plan to alleviate the weight of "radical" urban social groups on the inadequate political system backfired, however, and the throne of Charles X was toppled within weeks of hoisting the Bourbon banner over the Turkish Casbah. The military action of 1830 was thus the opening act in a social and economic revolution that culminated eighteen years later with the conclusive triumph of the grande bourgeoisie over aristocratic power in France and other European countries.[32]

The new power brokers in Paris, in turn, recognized the need to "reproduce the social conditions for [their] continued rule."[33] They expanded the political franchise to incorporate larger segments of the popular classes and established uniform institutions through which to disseminate the nation's criteria for citizenship and selfhood. Their notions of liberal society and rule of law necessitated the transfer to the government of all public functions hitherto left to aristocratic, private, or religious agencies. Public institutions and facilities were configured as the space in which to work out "the inclusions and exclusions built into the notions of citizenship, sovereignty, and [political] participation."[34] The extension of state power to encompass the "will of the people" implicated Paris in nationwide projects of political and cultural formation. The ideology and routines of the state radiated throughout the geographic surface of France and wherever the French flag was planted.[35] In the process, overseas possessions, especially settlement colonies such as Algeria, were redefined as territorial extensions of the mother country and administered as such.

The colonization of Algeria, in other words, unfolded in tandem and in mutual relation to the making of the post-1830 bourgeois regime in France. The colony served as a national-imperial laboratory in which to work out the principles of citizenship and foreignness, equivalence and difference, universality and particularity. State governmentality required that, in Algeria as in France, "superior beings . . . assume responsibility for the rational and efficient management of lower creatures."[36] In the 1830s, colonial officials headed to Algiers to resume the "crusade against Oriental futility" and spearhead the dissemination of France's cultural and intellectual standards to Arabs and Kabyles. Colonial assimilation was legitimated by the very "non-Frenchness" of the

Arab race, by "the [alien] elements of which it is composed [and] the character that is germane to it."[37] However, France's administrators and policy makers were soon confronted with the contradiction in seeking to assimilate a colonial polity grounded in and rationalized by the affirmation of linguistic, racial, and religious exceptions. The escalation of the conflict with Emir Abd al-Qadir after 1839 would provide the occasion for the officers of Arab affairs to condemn the impractical assumptions of faraway ministers and politicians.[38] The many Saint-Simonians among them seized the opportunity to discredit the validity of assimilationist measures and to suggest placating the defiant natives with exceptional cultural concessions and joint Franco-Arab ventures. Above all, they endeavored to localize the civilizing mission and to circumscribe some of its universal assertions to immediate contingencies. "Algeria is not France," they declared, and accordingly, they exploited the fierce resistance by Abd al-Qadir to assail colonial decision making to date.

THE POLITICS OF ABILITIES

> We have been told that we would each do well to return to our family and resume our activities of the old society, to become again traders, doctors, engineers. . . . This petty life, this narrow life, this life without poetry was for us an unbearable burden. We dreamed of something better, something great. . . . We no longer enjoy the thrills of the warrior; we have no more crusade to undertake, no new world to discover; the time of Napoleonic expeditions is past; we have no more solemnities, nor temples, nor tournaments, nor songs, nor festivals.
>
> —Gustave d'Eichthal, 1832[39]

The popularity of Saint-Simonian notions of association within the corps of colonial officers predated the invasion of the Ottoman Regency of Algiers and was particularly pronounced among graduates of the École Polytechnique, the premier military academy in Restoration France. Henri de Saint-Simon's (1760–1825) visionary theories for postrevolutionary rejuvenation were bound to attract the young generation of cadets reared on imperial nostalgia and sensitized to the homeland's precipitous fall from the ranks of the powerful in 1815. Saint-Simonian activism renewed their political expectations and provided intellectual escapism from the lackluster reign of King Charles X (r. 1824–1830). After 1825, many Polytechniciens and liberal opponents of the reactionary monarchy rallied around Prosper Enfantin (1796–1864), the charismatic "Supreme Father" of the Saint-Simonian school. However, Enfantin's public denunciations of the nation's antiquated institutions

and mores incurred civic outcry and legal injunctions against his group. The Supreme Father and his followers then set their utopian sights upon more welcoming lands, namely Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. There, with the patronage of local reform-minded potentates, they hoped to cut their teeth on grand modernizing projects of infrastructure, industry, and public education before returning home fully vindicated by their Oriental triumph.[40]

The introduction of Saint-Simon to the inner ranks of the École Polytechnique resulted from his personal association with two of the school's founding fathers: the chemist Antoine de Fourcroy (1755–1809) and the mathematician Gaspard Monge (1746–1818), the latter a veteran of the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt and former director of the Institut d'Égypte. Saint-Simon's fascination with the rarefied atmosphere of the academy was such that, in 1798, he relocated to an apartment opposite its walls in order to mingle more readily with its faculty and students and rekindle his own scientific edification. There, he apparently "conceived and nurtured the thought of a new system and new methods" and regularly debated and shared his ideas with invited lecturers and interns. Holding court in his philosophical salon, Saint-Simon captivated his gifted and restive guests with predictions of a dawning society of "industrialism and science" and seduced them with details of the leading role they were to assume in bringing about its new patterns for human organization, activity, and governance. His standing grew considerably as his political theories were later taken up by generations of eminent Polytechniciens, such as Jean-Baptiste Biot (1774–1862), Edme-François Jomard (1777–1862), François Arago (1786–1853), Augustin Fresnel (1788–1827), Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Michel Chevalier (1806–1879), and Prosper Enfantin.[41]

In his *Lettres d'un habitant de Genève à ses contemporains*, Saint-Simon outlined his project to replace the divisive social hierarchies of France with a more legitimate and conciliatory order, dominated by individuals distinguished by their "industry," a term that signified under his pen any productive activity, "theoretical and practical, intellectual as well as manual," that leads to the social emancipation and organic unity of humankind. The society of the future, he elaborated, was to be raised on principles of productivity and cooperation and governed by a "learned priesthood" (*clergé de savants*) composed of the nation's leading industrialists, technicians, and intellectuals.[42] Unlike the traditional propertied nobles and ruling aristocrats who subsisted on the labor of others, the industrialists and scientists in the Saint-Simonian order toiled for the rational and harmonious reorganization of their society and for a new secular association between its distinct produc-

tive classes. Saint-Simon thus presaged the end of class struggles in the coming "Industrial Age" and the consequent emergence of a modern society, differentiated yet united by the productive associations among its different strata: "All privileges of birth, without exception, shall be abolished. To each according to one's capacity; to each capacity according to its labor." The industrial society would consequently finalize the true promise of 1789 and dispose of the lingering discordant institutions of the ancien régime:

> We exaggerate when we declare that the French Revolution destroyed ecclesiastical and feudal power completely. It did not do away with them; it merely diminished confidence in their basic principles to the extent that today they no longer retain sufficient strength and credibility to bind society together. What [substitute] ideas can [today] provide this [lacking] vital and organic binding force? It is to industrial ideas and to them alone, that we should look for our salvation and the end of the revolution.[43]

Although it attracted scant attention at the time of its release in 1803, Saint-Simon's first pamphlet had advanced nonetheless a positive conception of political equality and rights that deviated from the classical liberal tenets of the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment and their notions of natural and ascriptive laws. Saint-Simon sought to restrain revolutionary universalism with a reformed particularism and, by the same token, to countermand the "excessive materialism" of the English utilitarians with a new spirituality derived from republican idealism: "beliefs *and* results; this is the new cry of the people! . . . bread *and* faith . . . theories that fall into practice, solidarities that lead to welfare, [collective] duties that meld with [personal] interests; in a word: life."[44]

Saint-Simon's rehabilitation of "individualism" and "faith" was bound to attract the interest of the discontented intelligentsia of Restoration France and the new generation of social elites, exhilarated and exhausted by the historical cycle of national glory and defeat. For the postrevolutionary leaders of France, fearful of ideological populism and the power of social movements, Saint-Simon had painted an alternative cohesive society, organized according to personal merit and governed by eminent men of letters, art, and science. Scientists, moreover, held place of pride in his hierarchy of capacities. Their competence to foresee and meet social needs made them "superior to all other men." As icons of social utility and change, it fell to them to educate their fellow countrymen, shape their public opinions, and endow their society with its essential moral fiber.

Saint-Simon's interest in harmonizing the actions of individuals with the needs of society was reflected in his educational doctrine and its insistence on diversified curricula, tailored equally to current individual

aptitudes and future societal functions. Individual merit was the basis of his distinction between general and specialized instruction: the former "distributed by the teaching corps to all future citizens according to their predilections and aptitudes"; the latter "dispensed with full respect for both the vocation of individuals and the needs of the social body."[45] Thus, when Saint-Simonians spoke of harmonizing education, they were referring to an educational system considerate of the capacities of individuals. By the same token, disharmony resulted from imparting to individuals an education that did not square with their aptitudes. In this manner, Saint-Simon thought he had solved the problem of individualism and banned forever the "horrifying atrocities that follow the application of the principle of equality and thus place power in the hands of ignorami."

For the average cadet in the prominent military schools of the 1820s, such proposals bordered on revelation. Confident in their superior erudition and faculty, yet starved of their destiny with patriotic greatness by the recalcitrant Bourbon regime, the young mandarins of the celebrated academies heard at last their grievances brought to public debate in the Saint-Simonian journals *Le Producteur* and *Le Globe*, where stentorian articles by Comte, Enfantin, and Saint-Amand Bazard (1791–1832) equated social renewal with the progress of science and learning and the political empowerment of France's intellectual elite:

> We loudly affirm that science can only advance with greatness and dignity on the condition of a new association of the intellectual corps, on the condition of a new dogma, of a new faith that unites the savants among themselves and connects them to all other men.[46]

The nation's scholars, in other words, were key to the genesis of Saint-Simon's industrial society, and they were to fulfill a prime function in its subsequent organization. "The union of men," he proclaimed, "constitutes a veritable being," and no collective action was therefore possible without common ideas and the necessary associations between them and the material aspirations of French society. To the top intellectual cadres fell the executive authority to modify the public mores and institutions of the land and to raise the nation toward its common interest and corporate welfare "by insensible degrees"—Saint-Simon's aversion to the a priori, the unpredictable, and the impulsive was notorious and brings to mind Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Savants and scientists were to irrigate the nation's "pastures of knowledge" and dispel popular ignorance, while industrialists tackled poverty and discrimination and brought every productive activity to its full potential.

Saint-Simon's Promethean elite derived legitimacy for its political,

economic, and cultural supremacy from its commitments to scientific and industrial progress, social improvement, and public service. In *Le nouveau christianisme*, the philosopher promulgated a transcendent universal faith with which to regulate the conduct of the industrial leadership of the future and, more important, to shield "the wealthy and the governments" from acts of violence perpetrated by the poorer classes: "The new Christian organization will develop temporal as well as spiritual institutions from the principle that all men should act as brothers towards one another." Fraternal and spiritual solidarities tied the leaders of the industrial state to its poorest social classes and curtailed any propensity toward the exploitation of the disenfranchised. As an organic entity that transcended its individual members, industrial society was subject to its own laws and was thus freed from the tyranny of generic individuals seeking to satisfy their senses. Rather, all members labored interdependently toward a collective rational ideal, creating, in the process, mutual and synergistic associations between the different strata of society. The proletariat was lifted through its contacts with the unified elites, whereas the industrial commitments of the latter prevented them from regressing to the idle or predatory tendencies of the old aristocracy.

If the lower classes of French society were thus perfected through their association with the industrial elite, so, too, were subordinate races or nationalities redeemed through contact with technologically advanced cultures. In *Sur la réorganisation de la société européenne*, written with Augustin Thierry in 1814, Saint-Simon expanded the historical mission of his industrial vanguard to include a humanist interest in "advancing the well-being of all peoples" and "civilizing the world materially and morally." Echoing the prevailing civilizational paradigm of the time, the Saint-Simonians argued that the continued progress of humankind as a whole stipulated the thorough modernization of primitive organizations and mentalities through their association with the best equipped European polity:

> All physical circumstances being equal, the best organized species or race civilizes itself first, and henceforth arrests the development of inferior races and species until general association is understood and accepted by all.[47]

Association with Europeans was therefore indispensable for the lesser races to "unmire" their history. Colonial association, indeed, brought mutual opportunities and rewards. It replenished Europe's industrial capacity and material well-being and ensured the peaceful extension of its cultural radiance to the unenlightened regions of the world, a causality frequently brandished by Saint-Simon's disciples when emphasizing the

undeniable virtues and benefits of their civilizing tasks. Comte, for example, would remark that colonial expansions implicated the European powers in a universal contract and thus lessened the chances for internecine wars.[48] Likewise, for the Enfantinistes, the "ancient Orient" was where their social utopias were destined to bloom in view of all. The reforms of the "industrial pasha" Mehmet Ali of Egypt had proved that association with French technology and learning would prompt even "a barbarous despot . . . [to] improvise suddenly and in the midst of ruins, the marvels of modern civilization."[49]

Still, Saint-Simon's acceptance of a common human nature and fraternity disputed the racial or biological determinism that typified Enlightenment attitudes toward non-Europeans in the early nineteenth century. Physical, moral, and cultural differences among individuals, according to the doctrine, resulted from specific sociohistorical conditions that may be acted upon and, in time, improved. This conception of human societies fragmented Condorcet's continuous line of regular and simple historical progression into a series of concurrent evolutionary states—later reworked by Auguste Comte as the "law of the three estates" (*loi des trois états*)—distinct from one another to the extent that each represented a different level of maturity in intellect and industry.[50] For Saint-Simon, humankind had proceeded at unequal pace through three historical stages: theological, metaphysical, and, finally, scientific or positive.[51] Each historical transition had resulted from the breakdown in the ideological and spiritual certainties of the ruling age. Thus, Catholic Europe had parted ways with the Muslim Orient when positive thinking overthrew metaphysical speculation during the seventeenth century and came to govern the abstract European sciences by the late eighteenth century.

The dissolution of previous sociointellectual regimes, however, was inescapably the occasion for uncontrollable political upheavals and dislocations. To this extent, the antecedents of advanced nations such as France entitled, even obligated, them to bank on the sum of their historical experience and intelligence and assist less polished societies to transition with minimal disruption to their next developmental stage. Colonial association was thus made possible by the coexistence of asynchronic civilizations and justified by the moral duty for superior nations to pilot less virile races safely to the harbor of modernity. Until their fateful introduction to the positive age, immature societies were to be regulated provisionally by laws of their own, making way only gradually to newer measures closely calibrated to their particular moment in history.

"To each according to his capacity." In the North African colony,

the Saint-Simonian dictum implied grafting a French cultivar onto native hosts, animating them with its unique spirit, ethics, and habits, and fusing with them to create in the end a more robust and vigorous civilization. The Arabs of Algeria became the colonial foil to the proletariat of France, and the very association that was to obviate class conflict at home was sure to induce the pacification of primitive nativist impulses. Accordingly, in *Colonisation de l'Algérie*, Enfantin intended to involve all the inhabitants of the colony in its experimental development and modernization by juxtaposing two domains of primary economic interests, working in conjunction, and each suited to the respective abilities of the European and Arab races. To the modern *colons*, he allotted industrial, commercial, and infrastructural developments, while traditional natives were to engage peaceably in fieldwork and pastoral agriculture, farming, or the breeding of livestock. Once again, profitable association in the colony was merely propaedeutic praxis for the eventual rejuvenation of the metropole's own outmoded customs and irresponsive laws:

> If we could make Algeria the testing ground (*lieu d'essai*) for this organization; if we could carry out such invaluable innovation in this country where *all remains to be done*, and realize it far from the obstacles that would be raised to it in France by the archaic laws of our old society or the exaggerated pretenses of our youthful dreams for the future, what acts of grace would we not owe God for this happy outcome to our improvident conquest![52]

The summer of 1830 thus opened a critical phase in the Saint-Simonian apostolate of Enfantin. With a new political regime in Paris and a French force in Algiers, the prospects for completing the French Revolution and ushering the positive phase of modernity seemed suddenly less remote. Moribund, aimless France was to be revived in its association with Algeria, but an Algeria itself transformed and remade in economic and moral terms. From the coupling of Orient and Occident, the Saint-Simonians envisioned the birth of the modern society: technological and industrial in its economic enterprises; peaceful and spiritual in its sociopolitical relations. In 1839, the Supreme Father headed for Algiers to participate in the commission for scientific exploration. There, he could rely on a supporting cast of Saint-Simonian disciples and admirers, superimposed upon a larger partisan community of Polytechnicien public servants, to channel the essence of the doctrine to the inner sanctum of colonial decision making in Paris and Algiers. Slowly, the ideological vocabulary of the Saint-Simonians entered the official discourse on Algeria and found its echo in the dissenting opinions of the security-minded officers of Arab affairs. The latter would prove indispensable

to translating the ideals of Saint-Simon into colonial policy. As military administrators, they were responsible for putting policies into effect. Moreover, as experts and technocrats in their own right, they were able to shape official and public perceptions of Algeria as well, and to generate information that lent credence to their policy recommendations.

The growing clout of the Arab Directorate after 1844 was thus facilitated by the unmatched intensity and purpose with which Saint-Simonian convictions and paradigms circulated within a political environment that was all but settled. With political uncertainty afflicting all levels of the colonial government in the early 1840s, intelligence reports issued by the Arab Bureaux chiefs became the basis for more salutary proposals. Starting in 1844, colonial authorities began to adjust to the pressures exerted by groups united in their opposition to extant practices, and more so in their determination to supplant them with more provisional and incremental measures.[53] Current policies were revisited to rescue native institutions from disregard or absorption and to effect the desired associations between French and Muslim jurisdictions. As they percolated through the chain of command of the Ministry of War, the reports infused policy making and local expertise with Saint-Simonian premises on cultural conciliation and historical progress. The reciprocal ambitions of Algeria's military specialists and Saint-Simonians culminated in December 1848, when the army's separate executive command over the natives was formalized, despite the political integration of the colony into the French domain. Thereafter, the processes of native assimilation were terminated or progressively reoriented to conform to the Saint-Simonian agenda for reform. Association became the colonial doctrine of choice and remained so until the collapse of the Second Empire in September 1870.

CHAPTER TWO

The Moral Conquest

> When one seeks to conquer a country, in the true sense of the word, one must accomplish two types of conquest: that of the terrain, which is the material conquest, and that of the population, which is the moral conquest. The first is carried out by the force of arms, and at times lasts little more than four to five great battles . . . ; the second is achieved by the force of ideas, and it may require centuries.
>
> —Captain Charles Richard, Arab Bureau, Orléansville, 1846[1]

> France upbraids us with the misgovernment and oppression of India: we should be curious to know how she would govern Algeria. —*The Times*, July 14, 1830

"We dance on a volcano," commented Count Salvandy on May 31, 1830, as he reflected on his government's calculated gamble to stave off a deepening political crisis.[2] *He had learned, a week earlier, of the departure of the expeditionary contingents for North Africa, mustered since April in towns and cities across southern Provence. King Charles X was staking his throne on a risky and dubious military action against the Ottoman Regency of Algiers. Old diplomatic grievances were revived to defend the French monarchy's just war against the Turkish rogue and "enemy of Christian civilization." In the cabinet, Minister Jules de Polignac spoke less of national honor or civilizing goals, but, rather, enumerated to his peers the many strategic and political gains to be had with the taking of Algiers: returning France to the premier ranks of European power, frustrating British ascendance in the Mediterranean, distracting the restless army from domestic politics, and boosting the sagging popularity of the government. With the survival of the current regime in the balance, the planned invasion of North Africa became "the object of such detailed studies that its execution should have been relatively facile."*[3] *Certainly, the govern-*

ment and military high command predicted only minimal opposition from the regency's disorganized Ottoman forces and passive Arab tribes. Appropriately, for a shrewd political observer such as Salvandy, the real struggle would be waged closer to home, its ultimate success gauged with the redemption of the unpopular monarchy in the eyes of its unhappy subjects.

Weeks into the invasion, however, the Army of Africa was largely immobilized by unanticipated obstacles and challenges. Misguided by the unwarranted speculations of policy makers, unable to communicate with the locals, and cut off effectively from Paris after the fall of the Bourbons in late July, the military high command began to shun the directives of the discredited government. Untested rules were improvised to secure the army's tenuous foothold in North Africa and overcome the incoherence and inertia of the new public powers. Yet, ideological incentives also factored in the generals' expedient commandeering of policy making in Algeria, especially in the case of Polytechnicien and Saint-Simonian officers who saw in the political vacuum the opportunity to determine the conduct of the colonial campaign. To be sure, France was no longer the revolutionary polity that had launched the Egyptian expedition in 1798, but for these elite officers, the monarchy's sudden endorsement of civilizing missions and military adventurism in 1830 had rekindled their corporate ambitions to retrace the steps of their Napoleonic forefathers and reclaim imperial grandeur under the arduous African sun.

The French expeditionary corps to North Africa, 37,000 strong, began winding its way to embarkation points in the Mediterranean naval base at Toulon in late April 1830. In mobilized barracks and staging grounds, commissioned officers exhorted daily the marshaled soldiers and marines to restore the sullied honor of France. Royal dispatches acclaimed the impending punishment of the "rapacious and cruel" Turks, to be dispensed in the name of humanity and for the salvation of their enslaved Arab subjects.[4] France's fervent yet erratic pace toward conflict with the Ottoman Regency of Algiers was set formally on March 2, when King Charles X—his cabinet's initial overtures to Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt notwithstanding—promised his countrymen a redemptive victory "to the profit of Christianity."[5] The repeated exaltations in these assorted declarations of war of France's righteous and humanitarian obligation to rid the Mediterranean of Turkish barbarity and malfeasance heralded the role that civilizing ideology would play in sanc-

tifying the colonial occupation of Algeria. Indeed, the French public in the spring of 1830 was fed a steady diet of reported outrages against Christian civilization by Moorish corsairs, slavers, and ravishers. Past triumphs of European arms against "Orientals" were trumpeted regularly in public pronouncements and royalist gazettes. Allusions to the faded glories of the Roman Empire and the Crusades abounded. When at last the expeditionary fleet sailed onto the open sea on May 25, the French monarchy had done its best to supplement favorable tailwinds with the crusading spirit of Saint Louis.

By the same token, one detects in the various belligerent proclamations of 1830 a profound unfamiliarity with actual conditions in the regency—misrepresentations all the more striking in light of the recent exigencies of war and the breadth and closeness of long-standing commercial and diplomatic exchanges with North Africa.[6] "The Frenchman cooks his soup at home, and sups it hot in Algiers," claimed a local seventeenth-century proverb to allude to the immediacy of relations with France. Indeed, the government's protracted political and military buildup to its offensive against the pashalik of Algiers was often marked and hampered by a dearth of reliable insight on the local inhabitants and their beliefs and manners. Studies and surveys produced by and for the military command between 1828 and 1830 were less grounded in up-to-date reconnaissance than prejudiced by antiquated and hackneyed portrayals of Turks and Muslims as antitheses to all things European. Even the Ministry of War's stated effort to "confront fallacies with truth" resulted in the publication of the largely propagandist *Aperçu historique*.[7] As he waited to set sail from Toulon, the military intendant Paul de Raynal seemed to yearn in equal measure for his beloved wife and for trustworthy bulletins about the state of affairs in North Africa. He decried the demoralizing effects on the troops of the many fabrications and inanities of the Parisian press and admitted unhappily that his most dependable source of information was Thomas-Xavier de Bianchi's recent translation and annotation of William Shaler's *Sketches of Algiers*, originally published in 1826.[8] It is difficult to indict Raynal with the sin of embellishing his correspondence. Had he consulted the latest issue of the learned journal *Revue des Deux Mondes*, he would have been apprised of "the most likely outcome" for the looming invasion of North Africa and assured of brilliant military feats to come, of victories without adversity or hardship for France, with nothing but endorsement from scarcely identifiable Arab tribes:

> Constantine and Trémécen, open cities, will not put up resistance. . . . Gifts and the elimination of all [Turkish] imposts will without doubt bring into al-

liance with us the powerful and numerous tribes of the Béni-Albas and the Coulos, which are established between Bugie and Constantine. We shall deal in the same manner with the Henneïschas, [who are] cantoned in the Atlas; they will even supply us with horsemen in return for minimal pay. The small and lightly fortified settlement of Tifseh, fifteen leagues further towards the orient, is worth occupying and encircling with solid earthen works; it is a barrier against possible attacks by Tunisians.[9]

Ill served by such faulty intelligence reports and negligent predictions, the French landing forces were soon discomfited by the unforeseen perils of an unknown shore, with disobliging locals and a nonconforming sociopolitical landscape. To the French, the apparent lack of national uniformity in North African institutions and customs signified chaos and archaism. One of the first self-appointed tasks of the high command was to rectify its imprecise knowledge about the territories and populations it still hoped to pacify in short order, and bring method and purpose to its ongoing efforts of reconnaissance. But having irrevocably desolated the Ottoman establishment and the bulk of its central records in Algiers before evicting the Turkish "squatter" from the regency, the new conquerors had to resign themselves to the task of rebuilding the local administration and rediscovering Algeria on their own.[10]

Paris resolved eventually to dispatch a fact-finding committee to the new colony to compile fresh data and realistic figures and to lay an empirical foundation for future policy making. The first official on-site investigation was organized and carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of War in September 1833.[11] The special commission was composed of two peers of France, four high-ranking deputies, a field marshal, and a naval captain. Its members were to assess the practicality and profitability of France's territorial acquisitions around Oran, Algiers, and Bône, and to determine whether the government should abandon its new installations there, enlarge its zones of occupation, or restrict its presence to commercial bastions and maritime enclaves. The commission returned to Paris in November with the recommendation that the coast of North Africa be "occupied conclusively . . . for diverse motives of utility, convenience, [and] necessity," despite the lamentable chronicle of the first three years of colonial rule. Persuaded by this verdict, the government followed up swiftly in December with the Superior Commission of Africa, composed of the eight members of the special commission, in addition to five deputies, the king's aide-de-camp and military intendant, and the maritime prefect for the Mediterranean Sea.[12] They were enjoined to enlighten the king's ministers, peers, and deputies on the bureaucratic organization most suitable for the nascent colony. Appropriately, their findings, released in March 1834, composed

the core substance of the royal ordinance of July 22, 1834, which at last provided the French outposts in North Africa with their first permanent executive and legislative structures.[13]

Of more relevance to the substance of this book, however, is the indispensability of military strength and personnel to the success of the scientific investigations of 1833 and their ability to secure useful information about the colony for the sake of sound public decision making. Military conquest and pacification made possible the systematic exploration of provinces otherwise inaccessible, and with greater contact with the locals, intelligence about the latter improved qualitatively. The Special Bureau of Arab Affairs, launched in February 1833, began to generate a formal record of information about Algeria, which the commission members consulted freely during their North African stay. With the benefit of more cogent assessments of the colony and its inhabitants, the commissioners opened their eyes to the pitfalls in official a priori decision making, and indeed, they returned to Paris with conclusions that countermanded the dispatches and studies of 1828–1830. By advising the royal government to abandon the "dangerous illusion" of assimilation in Algeria, the commission reports of 1833–1834 hinted at dissension within the emerging colonial edifice and growing dissatisfaction with the imprecise, totalizing imperatives of the civilizing mission. More significantly, they also pointed to the implication of military intelligence gathering in securing the administrative autonomy of the Army of Africa. In the context of France's uncertain imperial conquest, the value of intelligence on the North Africans would confer an unquestioned advantage to the military administrative units that controlled the flow of information.

The inquiries of 1833–1834 would thus inaugurate the methodological precedent and executive rationale for the Ministry of War to mold or minimize civilian input in colonial affairs. As the army tightened its hold over the Algerian territories, the high command orchestrated on-site investigations to prevail in the balance of opinions within the colonial administration. With the concentration of specialized knowledge in its Arabist agencies, the military authorities were able to challenge the existing modes of understanding or representing the natives and thus gradually commandeer colonial legislation. In the following chapters, I will suggest that French political and cultural discourses about North Africans varied often in response to such "internal" bureaucratic tensions between agencies with differing interests or conceptions of their mission in Algeria. In the 1840s, the rise of the army's Arabist agencies would prompt a revision of the civilizing objectives of France and bring to an end the program of assimilation in Algeria. In the process, the

rationalities of the colonial state and its rules of cultural differentiation were reinterpreted in ways to legitimize and consolidate the army's control of native affairs.

Accordingly, the importance of the military Offices of Arab Affairs for sociocultural approaches to the history of European colonialism lies precisely in the fact that their enterprise originated in and occupied the frequent points of intersection between the political and cultural ambitions of France in Algeria, between the universal claims of the civilizing mission and the particularities of the colonial situation. Their staff personified the intimate reinforcement of practical power with the command and dissemination of imperial knowledge. In the early decades of the occupation, the Arabist officers were often competent scholars in their own right, and their intellectual and administrative output provided much of the basis and substance for the political making and ordering of French Algeria.[14] The surveillance routines of the learned officers of the Army of Africa included compiling comprehensive sociological and scientific data on the colony. Their observations were then applied methodically, on the one hand, as the "raw material" for the development of general frameworks for the study of North African history, cultures, and societies; and on the other, as rudimentary instructions for the empowerment of colonial policies.[15] In the 1840s, their meticulous analyses rectified official guidelines on native affairs and, by 1847, were informing and governing the very demeanor of the civilizing mission in Algeria.

It bears emphasizing, however, that, for all his methodological rigor, the empirical discoverer remained a colonial publicist: deep complicity with imperial domination continued to taint the intellectual engagements of the officer of Arab affairs. Even his deliberate efforts to inject colonial decision making with more realistic reflection or expectations were repeatedly circumscribed, if not overwhelmed, by the need to adhere to the cultural wish list of French imperialism. In practice, his prescriptions translated into colonial policies that tended to sidestep the local context in order to find solace in broad civilizational paradigms. The latter, however, were drawn up long before the military landings at Sidi Ferruch on June 14, 1830, and their autocentric constraints go a long way toward explaining the consistent distance between the sociopolitical realities of North Africa on the one hand and French epistemic or discursive representations of them on the other. Historicizing these early accounts of conditions in the Ottoman Regency of Algiers allows us to identify the role of the civilizing imperative in shaping metropolitan predispositions and value judgments toward North African society and culture.

BARBARY'S DEN OF THIEVES

French antebellum assessments of the advanced state of disarray in the Ottoman Regency of Algiers would have been nearer the mark in the early years of the Bourbon Restoration than in 1830. In any event, they pertained almost exclusively to the Mediterranean provinces of North Africa, because the government entertained only faint notions about the territories beyond or nominally under central Ottoman control, a sore realization for the colonial command after July 1830. The pashalik had indeed entered a prolonged cycle of economic degradation and social upheaval in the final decades of the eighteenth century.[16] The crises, provoked first by a succession of ruinous agricultural harvests and fatal epidemics after 1786, were compounded by the structural frailties of the regency's political economy and, lastly, by the disruptions to inter-Mediterranean commerce during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. By the onset of his diplomatic quarrel with Charles X in 1827, however, the durable ruler Husayn Dey (r. 1818–1830) had managed to steer his troubled dominion toward a promising political recovery that was ultimately dashed in the punishing artillery fire of June–July 1830.

The demise of the last regent of Algiers brought to a close the sociopolitical reformations that had distinguished his turbulent reign. In the 1820s, new political associations and public structures had emerged in response to a culminating, century-long process of relocation of power among Istanbul, Algiers, and the provinces of the regency. Indeed, as the political autonomy of the pashalik appreciated steadily during the eighteenth century, the Ottoman sultan retaliated by curtailing human and material allowances to his North African viceroys. In time, local Arab and Kabyle notables were granted improved access to the upper echelons of the short-staffed and underfunded provincial bureaucracies. Intermarriage between Turkish elites and prominent Arab households became more common, especially in the prosperous eastern provinces of the pashalik, where, by the turn of the century, quasi-hereditary governorships had been founded by enfranchised Kulughlis (*al-karaghila*), the male descendants of local women and Turkish officials or soldiers.

The sociopolitical empowerment of provincial Arab and Kulughli households defied the traditional power holders in the central government of Algiers, particularly within the exclusive military establishment, where rigid ethnic and vocational hierarchies refused to bend to the increasing social and cultural hybridity among the regency's foremost families. Still, by 1816, the internal realignments in political and economic power had prompted the incumbent viceroy Ali Khodja to recon-

sider his chances for political and physical survival. In an effort to break free from the grips of his Turkish praetorian guard, Ali Khodja rallied the support of local Arab and Kulughli troops and transferred the public treasury to the steadfast citadel (*al-qasba* = *casbah*) of Algiers.[17] In the following year, the forces of the new political alliance composed primarily of Arab, Kabyle, and Kulughli auxiliaries, broke the ranks of the janissaries and selected their candidate Husayn to succeed Ali Khodja. The regency seemed on the threshold of dynastic monarchism—not unlike the Turco-Arab regime in neighboring Tunis—when the masts of Bourbon warships broke the horizon line of Algiers.

Indeed, whereas colonialist historiography denies categorically the existence of an "Algerian" identity or polity before the French era, nationalist historians, on the contrary, have emphasized the abortive impact of the French invasion on the embryonic Turco-Algerian nation-state. They counter with a narrative that detects in the last decade of Ottoman rule in Algiers the emergence of "protonational" political and social solidarities of the type that had evolved in Tunisia.[18] The colonial conquest, according to this view, interrupted a gestating process of state formation and centralization and postponed the emergence of a national Algerian identity until the first half of the twentieth century. Admittedly, between the extremes of colonialist and nationalist apologetics, there are grounds, conjectural as they may be, to maintain that the downfall of the Algerine janissaries in 1818, paired with the annihilation of their imperial counterpart by Sultan Mahmud II in 1826, did ease the way for more organic associations between the regency's social classes and for the development of endogenous political institutions in the final years of Turkish rule.

Since its inception in the early sixteenth century, the pashalik of Algiers had counted on its ability to exploit external sources of revenue, maritime trade, and privateering for the replenishment of its state coffers, as well as on the goodwill of the Sublime Porte for the continued renewal of its administrative and military personnel. The political and fiscal health of the Turco-Algerian state, in other words, was tied to the relative efficacy of two purely military institutions: the resident contingents of Turkish janissaries (*ujaq*) and the corporation of the captains of the fleet (*taifa*). The Algerine *ujaq* was sworn, in principle, to uphold the laws of the imperial sultan in this most distant of his territorial possessions, but was just as likely to redirect local taxes and resources to its own ends. Its militiamen formed an acutely cohesive political faction in the government of the regency, and, until the early seventeenth century, their specific ambitions dominated the supreme executive council


(*diwan*) of Algiers. As elite members of a highly restricted ethnic and military caste, the janissaries were expected to remain celibate, and their ranks were entirely replenished with new arrivals from the empire's Balkan or Anatolian provinces. They jealously safeguarded the rights and perquisites of their grade, especially from their illicit and adulterated Kulughli offspring.

However, the overall economic welfare of the regency and the ability of the *ujaq* to remunerate its stalwart janissaries hinged upon the continued success of the *taifa* in shielding Algerian commerce and shipping and in securing a supplementary inflow of capital, captives, and spoils from its daring raids on European harbors and merchant vessels. Thus, when in the course of the seventeenth century, the effectiveness of the Algerine fleet was steadily diminished by the ascendance of European navies and commercial concessions in the western Mediterranean, the economic solvency of the regency was correspondingly exposed. The subordination of political considerations to the financial predicament of the pashalik culminated in 1671, when the *ujaq* seized control of the *taifa*, transferred supreme executive power to its admiral, and conferred upon him the title of "dey." The rule of the deys witnessed systematic attempts by the government to develop and enforce more diversified policies of fiscal extraction, until a modicum of budgetary equilibrium was attained by 1750—at the cost, however, of considerable reductions in the manpower of the *ujaq* and the *taifa* and a concomitant erosion in the regency's regional strategic standing. The recovery, moreover, was short lived. At the turn of the century, deteriorating diplomatic relations with the European powers and the imposition of the Continental blockade created new financial difficulties for the deys, which were aggravated by the government's levying higher domestic taxes. Unprecedented encroachments by public tax collectors were met in the provinces with stiff popular and Sufi-led resistances that paralyzed the fiscal operations of the state and factored ultimately in Dey Ali Khodja's show of force in 1817.

The nature of the relations between the Turkish elites and the indigenous populations of the regency has yet to be researched in full. The bulk of our current understanding of Algeria's Ottoman past is, to some degree, still drawn from sources produced in the nineteenth century and burdened accordingly with the particular perspectives and epistemologies of the dominant colonialist and Orientalist schools of historiography. A pervasive Orientalist paradigm is the depiction of the Ottoman regimes in North Africa as despotic and predatory, ruling arbitrarily over detached or supine Arabo-Berber populations. More recent studies

have downgraded the weight assigned by earlier scholarship to political coercion in dealings between Algeria's Turkish rulers and their Arab subjects.[19] These studies have underscored the level of political accommodation required between parties unable to impose their respective will uncontested upon others. It is estimated that the Algerine janissary corps never exceeded 15,000 men at the height of its power and had declined after 1817 to a mere 3,700 foot soldiers.[20] The fortitude of native anti-French resistance after 1830 suggests, therefore, that the Turkish military would not have controlled even its coastal confines without political concessions to or cooperation from local groups. Through the long centuries of Ottoman rule, according to this school, Turks, Arabs, and Kabyles learned to negotiate and redefine their interactions, and the economic frailties of the regency in the late eighteenth century—its traditional overreliance on external sources of income—were not entirely unrelated to the power-sharing arrangements that characterized its management of the provinces.

The authority of the dey was as centralized and concentrated in the coastal districts of Algeria as it was restrained and diffuse in its highlands and remote expanses (Map 2.1). The contrast in administrative patterns was dictated by the sociocultural variations within the country and perpetuated by the numerical weakness of the Turkish rulers and the regular rotations of the janissary corps. The rugged geography and punishing climate of the region, however, were not without a hand in defining the contours of the Ottoman bureaucracy as well. The central government in Algiers, lacking the resources and political will to defy local ecological or topographical constraints, opted pragmatically to conform its procedures to the particular contingencies of the southern Mediterranean landscape. Like every foreign conqueror of North Africa up to the modern age, the Ottoman Turks established themselves most purposefully in the Mediterranean lowlands (Sahel), where the principal agricultural plains (*fahs*) and urban conglomerations of Oran, Algiers, and Bône are located. The regents ruled directly over the sovereign domain (Dar al-Sultan) of the greater environs of Algiers and the plain of the Mitidja, and they delegated the administration of the outlying precincts and provinces to Turkish governors (beys), who were responsible for preserving the law and collecting taxes in their respective protectorates (beyliks) of the west (Mascara and Oran), of Titteri (Médéah), and of the east (Constantine). Small garrisons (*nubas*) helped the beys maintain order in the towns, and every spring and fall, a military column, or *mahalla*, was dispatched from Algiers to the three beyliks in order to gather the levies and convoy them to Dar al-Sultan.



MAP 2.1 Ottoman Regency of Algiers. Source: *Encyclopédie Larousse*.

Thus, the catchall French colonial category of "native" tended to lump together urban and rural communities that remained largely self-regulated and culturally distinct under Turkish rule, even within the areas under the direct control of the regents. The social hierarchy in the main cities and towns of the pashalik consisted of a dominant and relatively small Turkish military caste, ruling over Arabo-Berber taxpayers (*hadara*). The class of *hadara* was represented before the central and provincial authorities by dignitaries, *qa'ids* or *hakims*, whose functions included inspecting local markets, collecting and remitting taxes, policing neighborhoods and quarters, and enforcing local regulations. In the mountain fastness of Kabylie, dwellings (*dechera* or *taddert*) were organized into village communities (*kharouba*) governed by assemblies of notables (*jama'a* = *djemaa*). The Arab or Arabized urban elites of the regency were in the main the literate, classically trained notables and functionaries of the legal and religious Maliki establishment, in addition to the affluent practitioners of the major trades, arranged in commercial corporations or guilds. In the fabric of the urban middle classes also figured the descendants of resettled refugees from the Iberian Peninsula

and Balearic Islands. The "Moors" of Algeria worked predominantly as skilled artisans, traders, or shopkeepers. Likewise, their Jewish counterparts integrated relatively well with their North African co-religionists and found some degree of prosperity in vocations that were forbidden to Muslims or eked out a living as translators and scribes to the Ottoman administration. The lower urban strata comprised small communities of workers, journeymen, shopkeepers, gardeners, or peddlers, usually outsiders (*barraniyun* = *Berranis*) to the city, yet indispensable to the transfers of income and produce between town and country. Finally, the regency was home to an important number of Europeans: consuls, diplomats, merchants, as well as Christian renegades or slaves who toiled in the docks and shipyards of the *taifa*.

Aside from the biannual fiscal ritual of the *mahalla*, the central authority had limited or indirect contact with populations beyond the natural barrier of the Mediterranean foothills (Tell), inhabiting the high plateaux, mountain ranges, or desert steppes of Algeria. The beyliks themselves remained largely self-governed, and their distance from Dar al-Sultan obliged the beys to administer their vast outlying territories with the help of willing local clients. Recognition of Turkish suzerainty by the elders (*shaykhs* = *cheikhs*) or leaders (*qa'ids* = *caïds*) of the surrogate groups entitled them to fiscal exemptions and to a share of the taxes they raised on behalf of the state treasury (*al-makhzaniya* = *mekhaznia*). It was mainly through these tributary, or *makhzan*, clans that the sovereignty of the dey was extended indirectly to the interior of the country and its productive communities (*al-ra'aya*) of peasants, farmers, shepherds, and pastoralists. The jurisdiction of the Turkish rulers and their local proxies rarely reached beyond the confines of the beyliks and the tributary *makhzan* and was decisively checked at their boundaries with the territories inhabited by itinerant communities that did not submit to Ottoman laws. There, on the fringes of the great Sahara, nomadic clans roamed between the high plains and the desert in search of grazing lands and forage. When they settled temporarily, they practiced subsistence cultivation, harvested fruits and vegetables in the shade of desert oases, and traded with caravans plying their goods and wares across the parched sands. According to French estimates, almost 45 percent of the regency's three million inhabitants in 1830 were nomadic or transhumant, with another 50 percent living as settled or semisedentary cultivators in its rural and pastoral regions. These seemingly innocuous ratios bring forth a challenging contention in Orientalist accounts of Ottoman Algiers according to which the Turks, having failed to occupy militarily a geographic space consistent with the subsequent perimeters of French Algeria, settled for a truncated polity that resorted to ma-

nipulating the threat of the "destructive" and "irredeemable" nomads of the interior to keep in check its cultivated Mediterranean domains. In other words, in addition to isolation by geography and distance, large numbers of provincial natives were also cut off from the Turkish state by ideology and culture.

Unfortunately, hard historical evidence fails us most manifestly when we seek to shed light on diplomatic or commercial exchanges between Ottoman Algiers and the vast regions to the south. We are told that, although they traded and interacted regularly, the two political and sociocultural realms remained nearly autonomous for the duration of Turkish rule. But the scholar of Ottoman North Africa has yet to identify convincingly the factors involved in demarcating the tributary provinces from the seditious interior. In the prevailing school of thought, a Turkish military regime, predatory in every respect, failed to subjugate the pre-Saharan territories due to combined environmental, institutional, and political impediments.[21] The "unfinished Ottoman conquest" resulted from a straightforward economic calculation: military advances into the south were halted at imagined fiscal isohyets beyond which brutish societies and primitive economies yielded only inconsequential returns. The Turkish regents consequently exploited the coastal plains, whereas the communities of the interior were forsaken to their desolate and unruly existence. Thus, adding depth to the geophysical divide between Mediterranean and pre-Saharan North Africa were cultural hierarchies informed by state-centered notions of political allegiance and historical progress. This particular historical interpretation, however, tends to burden the tribes of the interior with excessive unruliness and alienation from Dar al-Sultan and the beyliks, and judges Turkish rule in central North Africa from the vantage point of modern colonial and nationalist narratives. As noted by Richard Lawless, the division of the region into juxtaposed yet discrete Mediterranean and Saharan spheres "involves a value judgment made in modern times and colored by a European appraisal of the possibilities which the region offered for human settlement."[22]

To be sure, the communities of the pre-Saharan steppes and highlands had meager resources or manpower to relinquish to state officials, and they tolerated no encroachment upon their liminal environment. Internal or external trespasses upon their grazing grounds or way of life were met with forceful, at times desperate, collective resistance, and the agents of the pashalik did opt to tread lightly in their limited dealings with the defiant and warlike tribes of the south. Likewise, to the townspeople and plain dwellers of the Mediterranean districts of the regency, the wandering Bedouins lacked all the necessary emblems of a mature

society, and they regularly disrupted the cultured regimen of the coastal plains as their springtime pursuit of evasive water sources or downpours carried them to the very perimeters of farming settlements. Yet, there are still reasons to believe that the borders between "the sown and the barren" were less pronounced or discordant than is generally assumed, and the numerous overlaps between them are key to understanding the depth of Muslim resistance to French rule in the nineteenth century. Few French chroniclers of the period were willing to entertain the notion of legitimate native defiance and preferred to see religious extremism and tribal dissension in the place of deep-rooted communal, even patriotic, responses to the upheavals caused by the foreign invaders.

Yet, the absence of robust institutions of state does not preclude the existence of sociopolitical constitutions or codes of conduct. The clans of the Algerian interior were not without either, and their lineal, social, and commercial networks flowed freely into territories under Ottoman control and linked them to affiliated communities and traditional market outlets therein. Indeed, Fernand Braudel's "second face of the Mediterranean," the wide and varied ecological habitat extending between the relatively well watered Tell and the arid desert plateaux of North Africa, encompassed large areas of the historical beyliks and territories of the interior. Inconstant natural conditions within this arc of Mediterranean highlands and Saharan steppes fostered the development of shared political associations and economic planning determined less by the availability of agricultural surplus and public institutions and based more on kinship, pastoralism, and subsistence production. Still, these lineal relations predetermined the socioeconomic organization of the kin-ordered communities of the central Maghrib and regulated their political rules and norms of behavior, independently of the administrative hierarchies or logistical demands of the deylical state and with little regard for the exaggerated dichotomies between Bedouin and farmer. Small consanguineous and economic households (*'arsh*), grouped in movable encampments of approximately twenty tents known as circles or *douars* (*duwar*) and headed by family elders (*shaykhs*), were connected by bloodline to wider extrafamilial solidarities such as the clan or faction (*firqa* = *ferka*), supervised by tribal chiefs (*qa'ids*), and, finally, to confederations of clans ruled by commanders (*emirs*, *aghas*, or *bash aghas*).

Finally, there is methodological inconsistency in ascribing to the Turkish rulers of Algiers an imperial or expansionist ideology that surpasses their own obvious acceptance of natural limits to their North African stronghold. The Ottoman regents were content to forgo when possible the nuisance and costs of subjugating or assimilating by force

communities that they could co-opt by political and economic means. They mediated their control over the provinces of the beylik with local tributary groups and, through them, normalized political and commercial dealings with clans subsisting outside their geopolitical realm. To the imperial ethos of France in the early nineteenth century, on the other hand, the Turkish precedent was ideologically unsavory. The ecumenical pale of French civilization dictated the political and cultural absorption of the North African natives, especially the errant nomad who, by his very mobility and natural existence, tested the nation's utmost certainty in its own modernity and progress.[23] Contrary to Orientalist wisdom, therefore, the cultural condescension with which the French authorities beheld the "primitive and lawless Bedouin" translated into colonial operations that were far more brutal and callous in comparison to Turkish rule, with ultimately devastating consequences for the tribal communities of the interior. In the annals of French colonialism, the military pacification of the pre-Saharan tribes was waged against an incompatible and retrograde civilization.

To this end, the members of the scientific missions of the 1830s were especially mindful to emphasize the fragmented social order in the Ottoman Regency and the lack of political unity among its inhabitants so as to portray it as an undeveloped entity that invited and justified colonial intervention.[24] Political and cultural decline in the region was attributed to the inorganic and disinterested relations between despotic Turkish governors and fatalistic Arab subjects. The full measure of Turkish rule, according to their observations, was evident in the lack of technological achievements or improvements in the pashalik, in the weakness of its social and economic infrastructure, and in the promotion of religious solidarities at the expense of national cohesion. These features were naturally contrasted with the liberal, representative, and progressive system of governance in France, where modern society and polity were coterminous. From this equation, later commentators would look increasingly upon North Africa as an arrested contemporary version of medieval France, with religion central to social and political life and feudalism the primary mode of economic organization.[25]

Autocentric analyses of this sort would feature prominently in the colonial verdicts concerning the "irrational" hold of religion on North African lives and mentalities. As the unique bond among disparate and inchoate populations, Islam, in the eyes of European observers, permeated all aspects of North African development and, therefore, was to blame for the cultural degradation of the region. Given the derelict state of Muslim culture, the civilizing mission could then proceed with little regard for native religiously inspired sensibilities or aspirations. As ma-

terial remnants of a spent historical force, the extant institutions of Algeria were, in fact, detrimental to the social and cultural advancement of the natives, whereas, conversely, the dynamism and vitality of their French counterparts were elemental in their political and moral rejuvenation. Such impressions of North African society dictated many of the primary and recurring principles that guided the colonial administration's educational projects in the 1830s. They are key to understanding the unwavering commitment by colonial policy makers to replicate in North Africa the specific historical experiences of the French nation and to raise upon the ruins of the Turco-Algerian state a sociopolitical, cultural, and, at times, architectural mirror image of the home country. Cultural policies and schools were rarely removed from the state's attention to reconfiguring the material life of the colony in order to make it a profitable concern, to compel the natives to adopt not only French ideas and manners, but also European means and modes of production. Colonial education was, from the start, a bifurcated program of instruction designed, on the one hand, to Gallicize a minority of Arab urban elites, and on the other, to create a sedentary and more controllable population of industrious laborers and productive peasants:

> Should we decide to maintain the indigenous population of Algeria on its lands; should we aspire to guarantee its material interests, develop them, [and] bind them to our own through [a shared sense of] community, [then] there can be no doubt that overseeing the public instruction of this population is, in this as in any other instance, a powerful means of government.[26]

For the project of colonial instruction to be fulfilled, however, the French authorities first had to denigrate the current social, educational, and legal institutions of the regency and, in the process, find excuses to ignore or dismantle them.

EDUCATION UNDER THE OTTOMANS

The political uncertainties of the fifteenth century and ensuing Ottoman-Hapsburg wars of the sixteenth century dislocated the traditional and often lineal associations between notable households and institutions of learning in the main towns and cities of central North Africa. The new Turkish overlords were more reluctant to patronize local Arabophone learned elites (*'ulama*) or cooperate directly with the indigenous Maliki legal-religious establishment.[27] They delegated benefaction for homegrown schools and mosques to civic, communal, or tribal leaders and maintained Hanafi courts to deal with legal cases involving

members of the ruling Turkish class. Indeed, for much of the eighteenth century, the educational obligations of the dey of Algiers seemed limited to reviewing the recommendations of the official director of religious endowments (*hubus* = *habous*) before endorsing the appointment of qualified instructors to the leading urban academies. In the countryside, religion, justice, and education remained the concern of tribal elders and councils.[28] Thus, Abdelhafid Khellout accuses the rulers of Algiers of wide-ranging indifference toward the regency's religious and educational establishment, and tells us that the mosque of Sidi el-Kittani in Constantine was the lone school to be commissioned officially by the central government in three centuries of Ottoman rule.[29] Yet, the countless mosques, schools, and pious foundations erected during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with Anatolian architectural designs and motifs testify to a degree of Ottoman patronage, or at least to the significant "subsidies from [Turkish] piracy" to the local economy. Moreover, Algiers's celebrated "New Mosque" (al-Jamiʿ al-jdid = La Pêcherie) for the Hanafi rite was itself funded by the janissary corps in 1660.

On the whole, then, the attention of the Turkish dey to Muslim education in his realm seemed more fortuitous and unstructured than deliberately uninterested, with ample evidence of public subventions through the offices of the *qa'id dar*, the Ottoman head of the urban administration, for the maintenance and upkeep of mosques, schools, shrines, guilds, and baths. These provisions tended to remain partial, however, and, as a result, in less prosperous times the regency's institutions of learning were indeed pushed into greater dependence on private sources of funding and remuneration. In the eighteenth century, reliance on religious endowments, private donations (*sadaqat*), and alms (*zakat*) became critical to the survival of educational establishments, especially in rural areas where communities with limited means and resources were expected to supplement the teacher's allowances. Invariably, remuneration was left to the discretion of concerned parents or was made in kind, most likely in the form of food bartered for pedagogical, religious, or legal services. It was not uncommon for families to compensate their children's tutor with room and board, and school terms often ended with local harvesting seasons to allow a teacher to earn his keep elsewhere.[30]

The precariousness of the teaching profession and the increasing fiscal dependence on private donations generated curricula that had to cater to the immediate needs of the benefactors and their communities. Yet, this did not imply, as colonial observers were wont to conclude, that education in the regency was entirely reduced to unregulated and ritualistic instruction. If, by the late eighteenth century, the educational

system had grown largely independent of the political discretion of the dey, it still consisted of interconnected networks of primary schools (*kuttabs* or *msids*), formalized by their annexation to mosques and feeding into a more structured self-governing complex of secondary academies (*madrasas* = *medersas*), funded largely, but not exclusively, with private endowments and mortmain or other inalienable assets. In 1830, the renowned schools in the pashalik were almost always urban and concentrated in Constantine, Algiers, Milianah, Oran, and Tlemcen, although a number of "rural" *madrasas* also attained respectable standing under the patronage of prominent clans: Sidi Akhdar and Sidi ʿUqba in the province of Constantine, Ibn Muhiy al-Din in the province of Algiers, or Sidi ibn al-ʿArabi (Sidi Larbi) near Tlemcen.

The average *kuttab* was run by an educator (*muʾaddib* = *moadeb*), responsible, in general, for classes of twenty to thirty male pupils aged between six and ten years.[31] The duties of the *muʾaddib* also involved calling the faithful to worship as *muʾazzin* and leading the congregation in prayer as *imam*. Primary education comprised learning the rudiments of arithmetic (*hisab*) and acquiring basic literacy by studying the Quran and the popular fourteenth-century grammatical primer of Muhammad ibn Ajurrum (1273–1323). The *madrasa*, on the other hand, was headed by an instructor (*derrer* or *mudarris* = *modarès*), who could also fill the office of judge (*qadi* = *cadi*) or jurisdoctor (*mufti* = *mouphti*). At this level of learning, students, now aged between ten and fifteen years and called *tolba* (sing. *talib* = *thaleb*), studied the sciences of the Quran, tradition (*hadith*) and exegesis (*tafsir*), jurisprudence (*fiqh* = *foqh*), and the medical treatises of Abu Ali al-Husayn ibn Sina (980–1037). At the end of their instruction, the *tolba* received a license (*ijaza*) to perform, in turn, the duties of the *muʾaddib*, join the Maliki legal establishment as *qadis* or *muftis*, or enter public service as secretaries (*khawajas* = *khodjas*). Students wishing to pursue their education beyond the secondary level were more likely to contemplate relocating to one of the more renowned universities in North Africa, such as al-Qarawiyyin in Fez or al-Zaytuna in Tunis, or even travel as far as Cairo and al-Azhar. There, the *talib* was expected to spend seven more years honing his skills in arithmetic and astronomy (*tanjim*), grammar and rhetoric (*nahuw*), jurisprudence, theology (*kalam*), and *hadith*. According to French sources, the number of *tolba* in the regency in 1830 ranged from 6,000 to 9,000, with another 1,200 to 2,400 undertaking more specialized instruction in theology and law.

Operating alongside the various *kuttabs* and *madrasas* was a distinctly North African tradition of learning that traced its roots to the reign of the Almoravid (al-Murabitun; 1056–1147) and Almohad (al-

Muwwahidun; 1130–1269) dynasties. As a region on the frontiers of the Muslim and Christian worlds, and one in which the institutions of state were confined to towns and plains, provincial North Africa invited the proliferation of popular and localized forms of worship, practiced in remote military outposts known as *ribat*. By the fifteenth century, the culture of the *ribat* had spawned a highly variable and mainly rural constellation of Sufi confraternities (*tariqas*), to which were often attached small elementary and secondary teaching circles known as *zawiyas* (= *zaouias*).[32] The *ribat* and *tariqas* became vital to provincial communities left exposed by the disintegration of Almohad power. They formed the political and religious nucleus around which was mobilized local resistance against the surging Spanish and Portuguese crowns, and where Islam was defended militarily and doctrinally; not unlike the Frankish and Teutonic military-religious orders of the Crusades.

From the experiences of the *ribat* and *zawiya*, there appeared, by the thirteenth century, religious figures known as *awliya'*, who were referred to in Western literature as marabouts or saints. The *awliya'* integrated the scientific rigors of classical Islamic scholarship with sacred lineage and a special initiation in Sufi mysticism and esoteric practices.[33] The spiritual and communal responsibilities of the marabouts were fundamental to the prosperity and well-being of provincial and Saharan North Africa. They dispensed religious, legal, and medical advice in return for alms and donations, which they then expended to maintain their *zawiyas* and to help the less fortunate members of society. Their centrality to the cycle of *zakat* was recompensed with divine grace and benevolence (*baraka*), which they were also able to channel directly to their communities. The miraculous skills of these popular saints were interpreted as manifestations of their intimate communion with the divine power, a notion sustained by popular rituals and legends concerning the ability of the saints to interpret dreams, answer prayers, and converse with nature and the Creator.

Needless to say, the members of the first colonial investigative commissions were mystified by the wide religious and educational variations within the regency. They admitted to local rates of literacy that matched or exceeded metropolitan scales, but still found in the general absence of European scientific disciplines in the curricula of the *madrasas*, as well as in the bewildering popular veneration of "holy men," proof of the credulous and superstitious North African mind. They disparaged the utility of schools that were corollary to a decrepit religious establishment, inherently hostile to categories of knowledge without an absolute connection to the sacred scriptures of Islam. Their skepticism was most flagrant in regards to the local *zawiyas*, which they were quick to

discount as Muslim "oratories" or "chapels." They deplored the lack of public involvement or subscription in education and conceded that native institutions of learning were neither interested in nor wedded to the practical needs of their contemporary societies—an outlook that finds its distant echo in the concentration of French archeological excavations in North Africa on Greco-Roman vestiges to the detriment of more recent "irrelevant" historical layers.[34] Consequently, the initial impulse of the colonial authorities, as we shall see, was to circumvent Muslim institutions "with their corrupt and corrupting clergy" and supplant them with more rational French models. For the time being, the conquerors of Algiers continued to fundamentally misunderstand the centrality of *ʿulama*, marabouts, and *zawiyas* to Muslim instruction and to underestimate their proven historical capacity to mobilize their communities in resisting foreign encroachments. By abandoning the *madrasas* and *zawiyas* to their fate, the colonial policy makers afforded these institutions the opportunity to reconstitute themselves as new centers for anticolonial activity following the collapse of the Turco-Algerian state.

MUTUAL STUPEFACTION

> [Once] educated, the Moors will be more apt to serve us, and the different [colonial] administrations will soon realize the immense advantage of employing natives who can read and write in French.
> —Auguste-Alexis Lepescheux, Civil Intendance, Algiers, 1838[35]

The fall of the government of Prince Jules de Polignac on July 29, 1830, mere weeks after the French seizure of the Casbah of Algiers, threw the nation's latest imperial conquest into doubt. Citizen King Louis-Philippe (r. 1830–1848) wished no association with the discredited policies of his deposed predecessor, especially the politically motivated and controversial invasion of the Ottoman Regency. The problem of how to dispose of the suddenly improvident conquest dominated public and private debates in the summer of 1830 and generated much turmoil for the budding colonial administration in Algiers.[36] Yet, while the fate of the Army of Africa was being mulled over in the Chamber of Deputies and in the reinvigorated liberal press, one argument for retaining the new possessions remained constant and unquestioned throughout: France would provide for the moral improvement of the native populations of the former regency.[37] Public, philanthropic, and journalistic circles hailed the historical opportunity and principled obligation to reform the conquered lands and win Arab hearts and minds to the cause of France. Transporting French schools was touted as the best chan-

nel for spreading "reason and enlightenment" to the southern shores of the Mediterranean and forging "natural ties" with the locals, founded on a shared appreciation for the historical achievements of *la grande nation*.[38]

In light of the highly unsettled prospects for the continued French presence in North Africa in late 1830, the statements of faith in the regenerative function of colonial schools are exceptionally arresting and, therefore, salient for appreciating the weight of civilizational ideology in mobilizing and justifying French imperial expansion in the early nineteenth century. Whereas the political rewards of schooling the natives were relatively assured, there was far less consensus in Paris or in Algiers on how to translate the civilizing ideals into a practical course of action. There were, for all intents and purposes, two categories of public officials in France's North African outposts: civilian bureaucrats and military commanders.[39] Relations between the two were, to say the least, antagonistic. Worse, they were ill defined and blurred. Paris had yet to demarcate clearly the margins within its colonial administration, and, for the time being, the military, having taken Algiers by force of arms, held enough latitude and pretext to shape the ground to its advantage. The generals of the Army of Africa articulated authoritarian policies without consultation with or recourse to the home government, much to the resentment of civilian agents.

The contentions, latent or otherwise, between military and civilian jurisdiction in North Africa in the early days of the conquest were arguably intensified by royalist policies that had aimed since the Hundred Days to demilitarize national politics and restore governance to the rightful alliance between throne and altar. Returned to a deeply politicized and divided nation, with public and military establishments that were generally loath to substitute the royal cockade for the imperial eagle or republican tricolor, King Louis XVIII (r. 1814–1824) prioritized reforms that extricated his reign from the ideological and institutional legacies of the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. His measures succeeded to some extent in reaffirming royal and civil sovereignty over the army command, but they still fell short of making its ranks impermeable to political activism or revisionism.[40] In the 1820s, the rank and file swelled with enlisted *Bousingots* and *Carbonari*, while Saint-Simon's doctrines on social and political renewal gained currency among the generation of officers "conceived between two political exiles or two military battles," born around 1800, and reared in the eminent academies (*grandes écoles*) that were founded by the National Convention or by the emperor.[41]

The École Polytechnique (1794), École d'Application de Metz (1811), and, to a lesser extent, École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr (1802)

weathered as best they could the counterrevolution of a monarchy in crisis. Their curricula continued to cultivate allegiance to military service and public instruction as crucibles in which to forge the national citizenry and inculcate the educated with unifying patriotic ideals. This was especially true within the walls of the École Polytechnique, where still could be heard choruses of *La Marseillaise*, peppered with boisterous toasts to Robespierre or Saint-Just.[42] Overall, the military academies did not cease to supply the lion's share of the scientific and technical cadres of the post-Napoleonic state and army, and it remained customary for the Ministry of War to requisition directly, *à la sortie de l'école*, the brightest cadets for careers that spanned all branches of the "learned armed services" (*armes savantes*) and which included directing research programs or overseeing public works and projects of civil or military engineering (*ingénieurs d'État*).[43] Trained to be carriers of the national genius, destined by merit to modernize their polity under the patronage of the state, the graduates of the *grandes écoles* were particularly receptive to the sirens of social and political change, especially at the foremost Polytechnique academy, where the notoriously "liberal and Jacobin spirit" of the curriculum produced a restless and frustrated student body "in permanent opposition to the [Bourbon] regime."[44]

To be sure, the growing political rigidity of King Charles X did not sit well with the Polytechniciens. They derided the outmoded conservatism of his reign and bristled at his attempts to revive the hereditary privileges of the ancien régime:

> *Notre vieille cour espère*
> *Revoir ses anciens beaux jours;*
> *Elle reste dans l'ornière*
> *Et le peuple va toujours.*[45]

And who better to lead the people forward in a new universal association, a new *levée en masse*, than the bold Polytechnicien disciples of Saint-Simon, the apostle of the new social utopia, made possible in this critical phase of human civilization by the rise of a heroic scientific autocracy in France?[46] The Master's death in May 1825 galvanized his followers to popularize his message and create colleges of Saint-Simonian friendships and relations. Illustrious alumni of the École Polytechnique, such as Henri Fournel (1799–1876), François Talabot (1799–1885), and Prosper Enfantin, distilled and publicized his "prophetic passions and theories" and militated for supplanting traditional politics with scientific and technical competence.[47] Enfantin and Saint-Amand Bazard (1791–1832), the future "popes" or "supreme fathers" of the movement, founded a Saint-Simonian school. Gathered around their broadsheet *Le Producteur* (1825–1826) and superimposed upon the filiations of the

École Polytechnique, it dedicated its members to spreading the doctrine through academic channels: "it is the milk that we have suckled at our dear *École* that must nourish the generations to come," confided Enfantin to Bazard in 1827.[48] The latter's 1828 cycle of lectures on Saint-Simon, well attended by Polytechniciens, was promptly published in collaboration with Enfantin, Fournel, Olinde Rodrigues (1795–1851), Charles Duveyrier (1803–1866), Gustave d'Eichthal (1804–1886), and Hippolyte Carnot (1801–1888), among others.[49] In August 1829, the new Saint-Simonian journal *L'Organisateur* picked up the banner from its defunct precursor. France, on the eve of Sidi Ferruch and the Trois Glorieuses, was in the throes of its "Saint-Simonian moment," fueled by the pairing of present national frustrations and future universal expectations. As Eichthal was to testify at the August 1832 trial of the Enfantinistes, in disenchanted and downsized post-Napoleonic France, his Saint-Simonian co-disciples had dared to dream of "something better, something great":

> Life today is monotonous and dull. . . . Yet we have been happier than most . . . [because] we had met a Man who beckoned us to him, and revealed a new life to us. . . . Our lives have since become one; our destinies the same; we feel that we have been designated to achieve together something glorious, Holy, divine.[50]

Little wonder, then, at the relief of the Bourbon government in being able to distract its army's restive "guardians of the revolutionary spirit" with an imperial adventure to North Africa. The sociological doctrines of Saint-Simon were thus carried to Algiers by partisan officeholders, cadets, and Polytechniciens recruited expressly for the colonial administration by the Ministry of War. Here, in the "New Atlantis" of North Africa, they would seek to seize the helm and compass of official policy making to actualize the will of Saint-Simon and bring about "something glorious."

The uneasy and uncertain relationship between civil and military powers in North Africa was not effectively resolved until 1871, but, in the interim, the standoff between the two local representatives of the civilizing mission opened a window of opportunity for private or semipublic individuals to submit to colonial and metropolitan authorities their respective proposals for educating the natives. These unsolicited and untimely schemes warrant attention for a variety of reasons. On their face, they give ample contemporaneous evidence of the commonness and pervasiveness of Enlightenment values, infused in many instances with Orientalist or Saint-Simonian convictions. They also profess a firm confidence in the superior virtues of liberal education in guaranteeing the well-being of humankind and defining the rights and

obligations of the members of society. Less directly, they allude to the growing institutionalization of French education and to the anxieties of the state and church concerning their respective influences upon it. Finally, in the specific context of colonial Algeria, they provide a foretaste of the tensions that would separate civilian from military plans for the instruction of the natives and almost predetermine their distinctive approaches to it. To this extent, they also demonstrate the impulsive and experimental, if not unintended, nature of colonial policies that aimed to convert the sociocultural paradigms of the French civilizing mission into an operative reality in the 1830s.

The first petitions to reach the Parisian Ministry of War, Ministry of Public Instruction, and Ministry of the Navy and the Colonies were submitted individually in January 1831 by the Protestant minister Costes and by Edme-François Jomard (1777–1862), distinguished member of the Institute of Egypt and director of the Egyptian School of Paris and of the Society for Elementary Instruction.[51] Both men offered ad hoc suggestions based less on realistic assessments of North African societies than on their personal experiences elsewhere: France, England, and Egypt in the case of Jomard; the Louisiana Territory and United Provinces of Central America for Costes. Jomard's recommendations reflected his utmost regard for mutual primary instruction, otherwise known as the Bell-Lancaster method. He had observed mutual teaching firsthand in England in 1814, and, in his capacity as chief of the Bureau for Public Instruction for the Prefecture of the Seine from 1815 to 1823, he had been instrumental in popularizing its routines as a means to redress the "derelict state" of national primary education and impart a liberal curriculum to France's unschooled multitudes.[52] Remarkably, his letters to the ministries make implicit correlations between the coarse natives of North Africa and the illiterate working classes of France. Mutual teaching, he explained, was dispensed with the help of intermediary "student monitors," usually the most capable and advanced pupils in the class, who assisted the teacher in supervising the progress of their peers. The teacher coached the tutors, who, in turn, transmitted his instructions to their assigned group of students. Jomard proposed initiating Arab pupils in the rudiments of the French language with the help of French monitors, starting with the letters of the alphabet before progressing to syllables, then words, and, finally, phrases. The process would then be reversed to achieve the same results with French students and Arab tutors. Mutual teaching would thus enable the public authorities to hold large, but disciplined and well-organized classes, and move swiftly toward raising a bilingual society in the North African possessions.

The Costes proposal, on the other hand, embodied the ambitions of private evangelical missions that recognized in the fall of the Turkish Regency an opportunity to convert quietly its Muslim denizens. Costes envisioned establishing missionary schools dedicated to teaching Arab children French grammar, mathematics, and a variety of ancient and modern languages. His fanciful plan was promptly disregarded by all contacted parties with the exception, it seems, of an assiduous civil servant in the Ministry of Public Instruction. Ostensibly alarmed by Costes's guarded silence on religious subject matters, he appended a note to the minister of war, Nicolas Jean-de-Dieu Soult, calling his attention to the likelihood of ulterior motives on the part of the good pastor:

> It is important that we point out to the Field Marshal [Soult] . . . that in light of the notorious spirit of proselytism among ministers of the Reformed faith, and of their use of certain mystical phrases, which are even found in the present request of Mr. Costes, it is not far-fetched to presume that his intention is to convert the Muslims. His petition then raises the important question whether His Majesty's government will encourage, or even tolerate, missions in the region of Algiers.[53]

Still, the various ministers dithered, while Costes forged ahead and, with the support of European evangelical associations, opened a handful of private schools in the vicinity of Algiers. The spread of missionary schools drew the ire of local security-minded commanders as well as "Voltairian" commissioners who jointly opposed such initiatives for reasons that ranged from interference with the strict prerogatives of the army to incompatibility with the worldly civilizing tasks of France.[54] The opposition of the military authorities to proselytization among the colony's Muslims remained constant throughout the period under consideration, and the royal ordinance of July 22, 1834, would later forbid the establishment of any Christian congregation without the consent of the governor general of Algeria. Indeed, in November 1848, the bishop of Algiers would incur the wrath of the governor general for having "sung without [his] authorization" a Te Deum to consecrate the new republican constitution of France:

> A Te Deum is a religious act that may be linked essentially to a political event. It behooved the Bishop, especially in the current circumstances, to concert with the Governor, and not only with regards to the Church of Algiers, but to all the parishes in his diocese as well. Certainly, the precise instructions by the Ministry of Public Instruction and Cults made it his duty to do so.[55]

Furthermore, because the monarchs of France could not well countenance the conversion of the former regency to Protestantism, Costes ultimately produced the fleeting requisite consensus among concerned

ministries to give fresh impetus to the opinions of Jomard. Unwittingly, Costes had spurred a dithering government to finally devise an official educational policy for its possessions in North Africa and to promote more public efforts to acculturate the natives.

In March 1832, Pierre Genty de Bussy, the chief governmental representative (*intendant civil*) in Algiers, began preparations for the inauguration of public mutual schools.[56] He secured the appointment of Auguste-Alexis Lepescheux as inspector general for public instruction, and enjoined him to evaluate the potential and applicability of the plan put forth by Jomard. The director of the Egyptian School himself—ostracized perhaps for his continuing outspoken admiration and support for Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt, who had fallen out of French favor after his invasion of the Morea—was neither consulted nor invited to participate in the proceedings. The inspector general conducted a wide survey of educational establishments in Algiers and concluded that Turkish oversight had brought "to naught whatever traditions of higher learning the *madrasas* may have once possessed."[57] The extant primary schools and *msids*, he continued, could scarcely be reconciled to metropolitan notions of public instruction. He bemoaned their narrow curricular concern with religious topics and their pedagogical methods that valorized memorization over analysis, "without imagination or reflection, without experimentation or discovery, or any concept of verification; just chaos and everyone reciting the Quran" in a mode not of mutual instruction, but of mutual stupefaction (*un mode d'étourdissement mutuel*). With conditions as they are, Lepescheux reasoned, French schools could but bring immediate and tangible benefits to the locals.

On October 20, the inspector general presented Genty de Bussy with two pillar considerations for any future educational policy making in North Africa. The guidelines merit comparison with Thomas Macaulay's more notorious *Minute on Indian Education* of 1835.[58] First, Lepescheux maintained that primary instruction in the preeminent language of France was essential and necessary for the intellectual and rational progress of the natives, given that the religious and archaic nature of Arabic learning was itself, as far as he could see, a prime ingredient in the decline of their civilization:

> The Arabs, Moors and Jews will not become civilized but by the use of the French language; they will not be useful to us, and will not be sincerely gained to our cause until our idiom has become familiar to them.[59]

Accordingly, he suggested that the Arabic curriculum of the mutual schools be limited strictly to language and grammar courses, as these were the only subjects of any utility for France. "Beyond the study of

Arabic," he reported, "there is nothing but language," whereas the study of the French tongue provided access to "all the progress in human intelligence that has accumulated over so many years, all the learning that this nineteenth century in which we live has so majestically crowned, and to which nobody is entitled to set limits."[60] The intendant was also asked to initiate French language courses for Arabs in the service of the colonial civil bureaucracy and to counter eventually with Arabic language courses for its European functionaries and employees.

Second, confident in the superior appeal of the French curricula, Lepescheux surmised that mutual schools should expect little competition from obsolete indigenous academies—assurances based on a misreading of the public dimensions of Muslim instruction and the communal embeddedness of local *zawiyas*. Inevitably, he insisted, the natives will flock to the mutual schools and their own extant institutions will collapse from desuetude. Already, according to figures compiled by the Civil Intendance, the eighty or so *madrasas* that were operating in Algiers in the summer of 1830 had dwindled by half by late 1832.[61]

Genty de Bussy approved the recommendations of his subordinate and advised the Ministry of Public Instruction to fund without delay a mutual school in each of the three former beylical seats, to be managed by European instructors and to offer three-year intermediary courses on French vocabulary and grammar, arithmetic, geography, and history. Clearly, the immediate and utilitarian objective sought by Lepescheux and Genty de Bussy was to raise a solicitous class of Francophone Arab intermediaries with which to staff the lower rungs of various civilian and military bureaucracies. Little attention was given to practical training or the long-term material prospects for "educated" natives to earn their living honorably and to participate fully in the economic development of the colony. Rather, the curriculum of the mutual schools was expected to impart to the natives skills useful to the imperial arrangements of France and thus produce a bilingual colonial subaltern rather than a fully assimilated French subject. This modest agenda, perhaps reasonably so in view of the unprecedented nature of the venture and the limited resources at hand, still marked a significant declension from earlier oracular and grandiose pronouncements on the capacity of French culture to spark the moral renewal of North Africans and foster "benevolent and ineradicable links" with them.[62]

Instead, the proposed curriculum disregarded local sociocultural necessities or expectations and expressly disallowed all religious or theological content that Genty de Bussy and Lepescheux considered incompatible with rational instruction and detrimental to the enlightenment of the natives. They may have also hoped to avoid in this manner the

ardent debates being waged concurrently in the Chamber of Deputies with regard to the place of religious thought in modern public curricula. The parliamentary deliberations eventually yielded the Guizot Law of June 28, 1833, which obligated every French commune and department to maintain, respectively, a public elementary school for boys and a teachers' training school (*école normale*).[63] Named after François Guizot (1787–1874), minister of public instruction from 1832 to 1837, the law increased state supervision over primary education, but left intact the communal budgets for religious instruction as well as the network of congregational schools already in place. Thus, the Guizot Law admitted a moralizing role for religion in national primary instruction at the very moment when Genty de Bussy and Lepescheux were precluding a similar concession to the Muslim or Jewish communities of North Africa. The first civilian blueprint for public instruction in Algeria gave early indication that colonial policy making, even when assimilationist in spirit, would show a propensity to abuse or deviate from metropolitan standards.

On June 1, 1833, the first mutual school was inaugurated in Algiers with an enrollment of approximately 200 students consisting of 100 French boys—approximately half of whom were sons of military officers posted to North Africa—20 Germans, 15 Spaniards, 5 Italians, 2 Maltese, and 58 mostly Jewish natives.[64] Similar schools soon opened in Oran and Bône, and, in 1835, the Council of Algiers voted to fund a secondary college to accommodate the needs of the small European settler community. Attendance by Muslims in the various colonial academies was negligible and consisted mainly of sons of urban notables or of employees in the colonial bureaucracy. By November 1838, enrollment in the mutual school of Algiers had risen to 1,316 students, of which 251, or 19 percent of the total, were Jews, and 110, or slightly more than 8 percent of the total, were categorized as "Moors" (Table 2.1). These numbers must be considered in relation to the total native population in Algiers, which, in February 1838, stood at 12,322 Muslims, 6,065 Jews, and 4,487 *Berranis*.[65] The sitting civil intendant imputed the distressing reluctance of Muslim parents to send their offspring to French schools to native "prejudice, ignorance, and obscurantism." In later memoirs, Genty de Bussy was more circumspect and blamed the failure of his opening efforts on the unavailability of qualified native instructors and French specialists in "Arabic, Turkish, and lingua franca."[66]

In the heady 1830s, few colonial officials bothered to delve into the rationales for local dispositions, yet Muslim families were undoubtedly wary of the cultural impact of French schooling and were convinced that the goal of the authorities was to wean their children from their

TABLE 2.1

Enrollment in the Mutual School of Algiers, November 15, 1838

Number of Students	Europeans	Jews	Moors	Total
Boys	580	165	110	855
Girls	375	86	0	461
Total	955	251	110	1,316

SOURCE: Genty de Bussy, *De l'établissement des Français*.

own social values and religious beliefs and convert them to Christianity or, worse, atheism. Their fears were not entirely unfounded: public pledges to safeguard the culture and faith of the Muslims did not prevent frequent requisitions of mosques, shrines, and cemeteries—and their subsequent demolition or conversion into French establishments, as in the case of the landmark Ketchawa Mosque of Algiers, appropriated in December 1831 and consecrated the following Christmas as the Cathedral of Saint Philip.[67] Arriving in Algiers in April 1837 to take up his post of military interpreter, the convert Ismaÿl Urbain searched in vain for a congregation with which to pray. The two mosques referred to him, La Pêcherie and the Great Mosque (al-Jamiʿ al-kbir), lay in the heart of the new French quarters and were disrupted constantly by the noise, business, and trespasses of Europeans. Even the hour of the midday prayer, he noted, had been changed to one-thirty in the afternoon—possibly in adjustment to the new rhythms of the city. The apprehensions of a beleaguered community were summed up by the Algerine notable and scholar Si Hamdan ben Othman Khodja (ca. 1773–1842) who, having witnessed the desecration of Muslim graveyards at Bab Azoun, lamented to the civil intendant: "Soon, we shall no longer know where to live nor where to die."[68]

Still, native attitudes toward French schooling were far more deliberate than were willing to admit colonial officials who seemed wired to detect proof of the "religious fanaticism and zeal" of the Arabs in every act of defiance. The archives record various incidents in which Arab parents substituted menservants for their children in the classroom or avoided public recruiters by disguising their sons as daughters. In some instances, the locals even posed—to borrow a term made popular by Homi Bhabha—"sly" challenges to the French decrees: when a local principal offered remuneration to Muslim boys who reported to class, the school grounds suddenly filled with girls in male garments.[69] The more regular attendance by pupils from urban notable households further suggests that Algerian Muslims and Jews were able to gauge dispassionately the practical merits of a Gallic education. Families without a

stake in the colonial system found little incentive to enroll their children in the mutual schools. The Muslim and Jewish communities of Oran and Bône, for example, were equally disapproving of French schooling, whereas the Jewish minority of Algiers, strongly involved with the local colonial administration, sent its children more routinely and voluntarily to French classes.[70]

Still, native refusal was not the lone source of opposition to the educational ambitions of the Civil Intendance. For the military command, cultural policies constituted a fundamental strategic concern that France could not afford to relinquish to civilian parvenus, ill equipped to deal with unwelcoming Arab clans and harmful therefore to the ongoing pacification of North Africa. An indecisive government, we will recall, unwilling until 1833 to settle the fate of its imperial conquests, had opted for a bifurcated bureaucracy whereby civilian responsibilities, such as finance, justice, commerce, and customs, were discharged through the offices of the intendant, whereas supreme executive authority was vested in the commanding general of the Army of Africa and included custody of all military and policing operations, general security, and public safety.[71] The commanding general and civil intendant coordinated their activities through the Council of Administration, in which the former and latter served in the respective capacities of president and vice president. The first step toward centralizing the colonial administration was taken in 1834, as the findings and prescriptions of the scientific commissions became available. These were incorporated into a legislative bill and enacted as the royal ordinance of July 22, 1834, regarded as "the birth certificate of French Algeria."[72] The ordinance declared the French possessions in North Africa a military colony under the purview of the Ministry of War and ruled by the governor general in charge of the army and the high administration. It preserved the Council of Administration, but the governor general was no longer bound by its decisions. The latter was now appointed directly by the king, and his military authority was to be exercised by executive decree—again, in contravention to the charter of 1830 and the constitutional separations of powers:

> Clearly, this is the most advisable procedure to follow in Algiers. What in France would pertain to the domain of the law, in Africa must be governed—without question—by royal decrees, and these are prerogatives of the Governor.[73]

Hereafter and until 1871, supreme executive power in French Algeria was exercised by the governor general in the name of the minister of war. The former supervised all civilian functions and orchestrated the colony's external relations. He appointed justices and lawyers, enforced

martial law, controlled the colonial budget once approved by the minister of war and Parliament, and enjoyed important fiscal leverage due to his authority to collect and disburse the "Arab taxes." The ordinance, however, preserved the jurisdictional overlaps between civilian and military ministries, specifically between the Ministry of War on one side and the governmental cabinets of the interior, of finance, of justice, and of public instruction on the other. Moreover, by subordinating the civil intendant, general prosecutor, and director of finance to the executive powers of the governor general, it legitimated the rights of each party to intervene in the prerogatives of the other. To illustrate, whereas the Government General of Algeria and the Ministry of War were responsible for preparing and authorizing the colonial budget, its maintenance and the justification for its expenditures remained within the duties of the civil intendant and the director of finance, who reported directly on such matters to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance, respectively.[74]

Similarly, the ordinance did not disentangle the civilian mandate over educational matters from military considerations. For the time being, the legislators had to admit that the inspectors of public instruction could not realistically discharge their duties without the assistance or protection of French troops. In 1833, military disinclination had already curtailed the original scope of Genty de Bussy. The intendant, who had projected mutual schools "in every population center large enough to provide thirty or forty pupils per year," was forced to downgrade the number of proposed locations to three when the governor general declined to guarantee the safety of a larger tally. More conspicuous still, whereas Article 14 of the ordinance empowered the governor general to "supervise all things related to public instruction," Articles 29 and 32 provided loopholes for the intendant and his inspectors to keep the "European" components of the educational portfolio within the purview of the developing municipal councils, on the grounds that the minute and culturally diverse populations of French, Spanish, Italian, and Maltese petty settlers (*petits colons*) were entitled to primary instruction on par with metropolitan benchmarks.[75] It is fitting that the birth certificate of French Algeria should already bear the imprint of the burgeoning communities of European settlers, for, in time, they would tread very heavily upon colonial policy making, especially as it pertained to native affairs.

In the first decade of French rule, "settler opinion," as far as it can be discriminated at this early stage, was particularly wary of colonial administrators who deferred to the sociocultural peculiarities of North Africa. Wealthy and prominent settlers (*colons en gants jaunes*) such

as Max de Tonnac and Augustin de Vialar, along with their metropolitan publicists, lobbied the home government to remove all restraints to colonial exploitation and development and to regulate its North African possessions uniformly as it would any national department.[76] In the Lower Chamber, their views found political support among the proponents for the total integration of the colony, headed by the prominent deputies Alexandre de Laborde and Gaëtan de la Rochefoucauld, who advised their peers repeatedly to "let Algiers become France."[77] Underlying the endorsement by the *colons* for the political absorption of North Africa, however, was a racial ideology that refuted the notion of the perfectible native and ascribed the retardation of local Muslims and Jews to immutable traits rather than to historical or institutional circumstances, an outlook later validated "scientifically" by Arthur de Gobineau (1816–1882) with the publication of his *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* in 1853.[78] As the sphere of colonial control expanded dramatically in the 1840s, settlers became more vocal in their opposition to costly and futile schemes to ameliorate the moral and intellectual levels of Arab populations destined to die out with the implantation on their soil of superior European races. Beginning in the mid-1840s, radical *colon* constituencies led by the influential lobbyist Eugène Bodichon (1810–1885) campaigned for driving (*refoulement*) the Arab tribes into the worthless Sahara or even liquidating them outright along the same lines as the aboriginal Amerindian cultures, a genocidal scheme far too frequently raised in the Algerian Assembly after 1848.[79]

For the time being, the demographic hopes of the likes of Bodichon were buoyed by the precipitous decline in Muslim numbers after the French conquest. As a rule, colonial censuses must be handled with caution because the reported welfare of the Muslim population tended to reflect directly upon the balance sheet of the civilizing mission. Moreover, the dearth of detailed surveys from the period under review makes it difficult to discern demographic declines due to flight or exodus or, conversely, increases that reflected the expanding geographic space of the colonial jurisdiction of France. Finally, colonial census takers were notoriously diffident in reporting hard figures for what they termed the "floating" or "mobile" populations of North Africa, composed of the nonsedentary groups and the *Berranis* who circulated between the towns and their hinterlands.[80] Still, Xavier Yacono has subjected to rigorous critical revision the statistics produced by the military count of 1845 (2.85 million) and the quinquennial censuses of 1851 (2.174 million), 1856 (2.347 million), 1861 (2.583 million), and 1866 (2.524 million), and has substantiated the demographic narrative plotted in Figure 2.1.




FIGURE 2.1 Muslim Population of French Algeria, 1830–1872 (in millions)
Source: Yacono, *Revue Africaine*.

The Muslim population declined catastrophically between 1834 and 1837, "an era of calamities . . . , anarchy, internecine wars, conflict with the French, and epidemics."[81] A slight recovery after the peace treaty of Tafna in 1837 was soon undone by the resumption of large-scale operations against Abd al-Qadir between 1839 and 1847, as well as the military assaults on the pre-Saharan communities in 1845–1849. Another recovery was registered after 1851, and, despite the setbacks experienced during the wars of Kabylie in 1856–1857, the 1850s—the decade that coincides with the maturation of the administrative apparatus of the Arab Bureaux—witnessed relative stability and advances for the Muslim population. It must be added, however, that the decade also marked the advent of "capitalist colonization" in Algeria, and subsequent increases in its European population became overwhelmingly urban. In 1857, more than 60 percent of Algeria's Europeans, or 112,000 of a total of 181,000, resided in the colony's main cities.[82] The 1860s, however, were once again cataclysmic, following the systematic sequestration (*cantonnement*) of Muslim populations after 1857, and marked by the outbreak of epidemics in 1861–1862, the implementation of the

senatus consult of 1863, the insurrections of 1864–1866, and the great famine of 1868.[83] By the end of the military regime in 1871, the Muslim population of French Algeria was at its lowest ebb, registering at 2.134 million in the aftermath of the paroxysmic revolt of Muhammad al-Muqrani. Thus, for the period under consideration, the Muslim population of the colony declined by an aggregate 29 percent, which amounted to a net loss of some 866,000 lives.

In the 1830s, the more aggressive strains in procolonial activism had yet to flow freely into the mainstream of public thinking or parlance on French Algeria. They did, however, add to existing tensions between the civil intendant and the military governor general, and clashed most distinctly with the perspectives of specialized officers known collectively as the "Africans" (*les Africains*) and serving in the different native agencies or on the frontlines of the wars of conquest. For many officers in Arab affairs, the ways of the conquered peoples were not undeserving of public attention. The relative success of French arms, they maintained, had momentarily obscured important failures in official predictions about the former regency. Beyond the noise and smoke of battle lurked unexpectedly resilient native institutions and ideologies. Their routine surveys and daily contacts with the natives had made these officers cognizant of the need to come to terms with resistant Muslim beliefs and values. The civilizing mission, in their view, would not fulfill its objectives without first securing a point of entry to the "Arab mentality" that it hoped to shape and mold. The *Africains* tended, therefore, to rebuke the foolish civilian decision to neglect Muslim legal, religious, and educational establishments, as these were considered ideal gateways to the local communities. Some even questioned the wisdom of pacifying Muslims with metropolitan laws and argued for an autonomous administration, under specialized military oversight and removed from the zealous pace of colonial expropriations, a proposition that earned the incipient Arab Bureaux the everlasting enmity of the *colon* establishment.

By late 1837, the dissenting views of the military Arabists were nonetheless gaining wider acceptance in Parisian circles, as a rising number of officials was forced to acknowledge the dismal record of educational initiatives and mutual schools and began to dread the very collapse of the native administration.[84] Even the indefatigable Lepescheux was by then despairing of Arabs attending willingly the courses offered by the intendance. The inspector general found Muslim students inexplicably indifferent toward the unique opportunity presented to them and vented his frustration upon learning that adult Moors in the service of the intendance remained incapable of understanding the language of their

employers.[85] He became ever more convinced of the need to prescribe stronger, even punitive, measures to drive Muslims of all ages into his classrooms. In his report of December 9, Lepescheux conceded that "the assiduity of the Moors leaves much to be desired"; yet, he continued to misread the impulse behind their disinclination. He blamed their lack of enthusiasm for French language instruction on "negligence, apathy, idleness, indifference, boredom, and the weariness of studying," dispositions that he appreciated as "quite understandable," but which also spoke to the extent of his own incapacity to ruminate over more legitimate grounds for the Muslims' mistrust of the colonial schools:

> The Moors can no longer defer studying our French language with excuses drawn from their religious beliefs. In the seven years that they have been under our domination, experience can only have shown them that we intend to respect the ~~touchiness~~ scruples of their conscience and protect the exercise of their faith.[86]

Lepescheux bid the civil intendant to make compulsory the daily attendance of classes by "all Moors under the age of thirty" and the continued employment of native subordinates contingent upon their ability to obtain a certificate of proficiency in the French language.[87] To ensure the proper enforcement of the latest decrees, he demanded updated lists of all Muslims attending the courses. The new measures, later extended to natives in the service of the judiciary and military bureaucracies, were a far cry from the notices that the inspector general had posted in the streets of Algiers as recently as June 1837, inviting Muslims to attend his schools in the most nonchalant terms:

> Know ye, Muslims, that whosoever among you wishes to learn to read, write, and speak French, may proceed daily at the sound of the midday canon to No. 7, Rue de la Fonderie.[88]

Unsuspectingly, by admitting the need for compulsion in the implementation of educational decrees, Lepescheux and the Civil Intendance were conceding a larger role for the military authorities in supervising the attendance and performance of their schools.[89] Slowly, the avenues for a more decisive intervention in colonial instruction by army specialists were unfolding. There was yet time, however, for a final demonstration of how far the perspectives of Parisian ministries had strayed from the priorities of the military circles in Algeria.

In 1838, the French monarchy breathed new life into its long-cherished ambition to establish a secondary school in Paris for the sons of Algeria's most influential or popular notables. Clearly inspired by Jomard's once-thriving École Égyptienne and its indelible association with

Mehmet Ali Pasha and scholars such as Rifaat al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), the initiative was spearheaded by Antoine-François Demoyencourt (1797–1857), a longtime associate of Jomard at the Egyptian School and the Society for Elementary Instruction.[90] On questioning the minister of war, Amédée Despans-Cubières, as to "the fertility of such a measure," King Louis-Philippe was reassured that "Muslim parents would fearlessly entrust their children to the generous protection of France."[91] In Algiers, Governor General Sylvain-Charles Valée was less impressed and demurred. He did not concur with Despans-Cubières's opinion that "the Arabs of Algeria [were] now ready to mix with us." Nor did he detect among the scions of the Algerian notability luminaries of the caliber of al-Tahtawi. It is also likely that the promotion of cultural and scientific exchanges was not foremost on the mind of Despans-Cubières. His letter of April 16, 1839, to the governor general offered an oblique suggestion that Muslim students in the capital city might well serve as "hostages of some sort" should the need arise.[92] Paying no heed to the reservations of Valée, the minister of war ordered French and Arabic recruiting announcements for the Collège Arabe de Paris to be circulated and posted in the principal cities of Algeria.

The local response was immediate and clear. Fearing the abduction of their sons, Muslim parents removed the latter from school and disguised or hid them. In several districts, the appearance of French agents provoked near uprisings.[93] Despite assurances that the Parisian college would deliver a curriculum "always in harmony with the future situation [of the natives], and not alarming to their religious beliefs," only eleven Muslim boarders attended the academy between its inception in 1839 and its demise in 1847.[94] The French archives have preserved the generally uncomplimentary synopses of the project to educate Algerian Muslims in Paris, but they are regrettably and perhaps tellingly silent in regard to its ultimate benefits to the eleven schoolboys and how or in what capacity they were reintegrated to their communities upon their return to North Africa.[95] At best, as Yvonne Turin concedes, the inflated budget and middling demands of the Collège Arabe had rewarded its director Demoyencourt with habitual sojourns in Algiers in pursuit of obligations that were neither strenuous nor tedious.[96]

In any event, more pressing matters were soon preoccupying the French government. Its armistice with the emir Abd al-Qadir (1808–1883), proclaimed ruler of the western beylik (*Sultan al-gharb*), was broken on November 20, 1839, and the alternative proposals of the army's Arabists began to receive even stronger public scrutiny.[97] As the army escalated its counteroperations in Algeria, native governance and in-

struction moved inexorably toward militarization and into the hands of officers with particular ideas on how to inculcate the native mind with admiration and respect for their opinions and worldviews. The first decade of French rule had demonstrated that the colonial school would inevitably be the focus of political debates and maneuvers by different interested parties seeking to influence the overall scope and progress of the civilizing mission to North Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

Impermanent Monstrosities

> [T]his state of anarchy . . . was not only the inevitable result of the decline of the old social system, but also an indispensable condition for the establishment of the new one. . . . [I]f it should appear as a revolting monstrosity when conceived as a permanent state . . . , it is not at all the case when it is regarded as a purely transitory state.
>
> —Auguste Comte, *Considérations sur le pouvoir spirituel*[1]

The frustration of general cultural expectations in Algeria in the 1830s prompted the French army's Saint-Simonian officers, concentrated in the various agencies for Arab affairs, to push through their alternative project for pacifying the colony with specific and customized civilizational schemes. Relying on their direct access to indigenous communities through the Arab Bureaux and capitalizing on the vitality of Polytechnicien and Saint-Simonian filiations in Paris and Algiers, they advanced specialized policies to redress the cultural setbacks in North Africa, while ensuring, at the same time, the supremacy of the Directorate of Arab Affairs over rival colonial or metropolitan agencies. Their project to realize the Saint-Simonian vision for "colonial association" targeted in the main the assimilationist tendencies of the French government and civil authorities, as well as rival military factions with contending views on colonization and pacification. Starting from the lowest levels of the military administration in the early 1840s, these officers would expand their power base in the Arab Bureaux to take gradual command of the native portfolio and control by the end of the decade the two main decision-making bodies for indigenous affairs on both sides of the Mediterranean: the Arab Directorate of the Government General in Algiers and the Algerian Directorate of the Ministry of War in Paris. This chapter reviews the origins of the Offices of Arab Affairs and traces the connections between the intellectual formation

and training of their serving officers and the ideological tenets behind their drive to take over cultural policy making in Algeria.

By 1840, official confidence in the predictable success of colonial acculturation and French instruction in Algeria was fading fast. Slashing intelligence reports from Algiers briefed the minister of war on the foundering educational initiatives of the Civil Intendance (renamed the Directorate of the Interior on October 31, 1838): Muslim attendance remained reluctant and negligible, satisfactory instructors elusive, adequate textbooks unobtainable. Worse still, the military leadership was now confronting a swelling anticolonial uprising under the command of Abd al-Qadir in the western provinces of the former beylik. Pronounced popular enthusiasm for the cause of the Muslim emir confirmed the miscarriage of colonial practices to date and corroborated the military's repeated censure of government policies that discounted the resilience of indigenous communities and institutions to cultural imperialism. The beleaguered minister of war turned to the army's specialized bureaux and pressed "their men of good faith" to propose or reconsider measures with which to quell the Arab insurgency.

As early as 1834, an alternative path to cultural pacification in North Africa had been signaled to the government by Henri Dutrône, royal counselor from Amiens.[2] Dispatched to Algiers to appraise the performance of the mutual schools for Muslims and Jews, Dutrône had met with the inspector general for public instruction, Auguste-Alexis Lepescheux, in early October 1834. He gave his deposition a month later in Paris before an oversight committee composed of the former civil intendant Pierre Genty de Bussy; Edme-François Jomard and Antoine-François Demoyencourt, both from the Society for Elementary Instruction; and Georges Fellmann, chief adjunct of the Bureau for Political and Civil Affairs in the Ministry of War.[3] Dutrône presented the committee with the singular prescription that current administrative procedures in the colony be revoked or made to conform to the explicit circumstances of Muslim society. Local ways, he chided, were not about to be amended, as believed his "compatriots in Africa," with the simple and indiscriminate "transplantation of Parisian manners to the perimeters of Algiers." He therefore recommended transferring the native portfolio to more solicitous and experienced agents, "fluent in the scriptures, habits, and mentalities of the Muslims." Turned down

formally by the minister of public instruction in 1835, Dutrône's memorandum was nonetheless kept in circulation by Fellmann and his like-minded colleagues in the Government General of Algeria. They now capitalized on the deteriorating state of affairs in the western beylik to urge Paris to revisit the counselor's petition and consign at long last the surveillance of Muslim establishments to the competence of the Special Bureau of Arab Affairs.

Moreover, in late 1837, the minister of war, ever more cognizant of his imprecise intelligence on the colony, had authorized the Academy of Sciences to assemble a commission for the scientific exploration of Algeria.[4] The list of twenty-five expert members, including fourteen military specialists, was finalized in 1839, and the commission began operating in early 1840 under the directorship of the celebrated naturalist and former head of the 1829 scientific commission to the Morea, Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bory de Saint-Vincent (1778–1846). Its task, in the words of Bory de Saint-Vincent, was to "clear up the woolly thinking concerning the colony and present the French public with an accurate picture" of it.[5] Several Polytechniciens and Saint-Simonian luminaries took part in the explorations, including the economist and engineer Prosper Enfantin; the ethnographers Édouard de Neveu and Ernest Carette; the physicians Jean-Louis Guyon and Auguste Warnier; the geographer Émilien Renou; the Arabist Édmond Pellissier de Reynaud, former military director of Arab affairs and author of the seminal *Annales algériennes*; and the archaeologist Adrien Berbrugger, founder of the Library and Museum of Algiers and editor of the first Algerian historical journal, *Revue Africaine*.[6]

The results of the scientific exploration, published from as early as 1842 until 1867, helped consummate the shift in public thinking on Algeria in the mid-1840s.[7] Enfantin, in particular, delivered an authoritative dissenting commentary on the course of the colonizing mission in North Africa. Initially reluctant to participate in the commission, Enfantin, according to Marcel Emerit, progressively imposed his will upon its agenda, until he breathed "the Saint-Simonian spirit into the souls of most of [its] members."[8] His critical observations, compiled and edited in 1843 as *Colonisation de l'Algérie*, upbraided his government and countrymen for pursuing in North Africa "absolute policies . . . that did not concede or compromise," when, in fact, they had much to learn from local ways and traditions. In the communitarianism of the Arabs and their notions of collective ownership, Enfantin detected at last the elusive elemental bonds for the social order that he hoped to inaugurate in France proper.[9] To his mind, the successful colonization of Algeria was "foremost, a means for the civilization of the French,"

and, echoing Dutrône nine years earlier, he subsequently insisted that "metropolitan conventions be modified, and their procedures adapted to [conform to] the new needs of the conqueror, as well as the old habits of the conquered."[10]

Enfantin did not doubt the superiority of his own civilization over that of the Arabs, but, according to his "less than universal" understanding of human history—elaborated, in fact, by his follower Olinde Rodrigues—the "primitive needs" (*besoins primitifs*) of the Orient were indispensable to the modernizing impulses of the Occident.[11] In the sensual soil of the Orient, in the collective adventure of social transformation, the Saint-Simonians believed they would "bury their utopias" and help France shed its political inertia. The conquest of Algeria was to be made "legitimate and irrevocable" by the movement of humanity toward modernity rather than by feat of arms alone. By implication, the colonization of the country, according to Enfantin, amounted to more than mere military pacification. The long-term security of the French presence was to be based on sound and interrelated policies of settlement and development, and the social affairs of the North Africans were to be regulated according to the higher rationalities of France.

Enfantin's emphatic indictment of the policies of assimilation throughout the scientific exploration vindicated the reservations of local army commanders toward official prophecies forecasting the imminent melting away of obsolete Muslim traditions. To the contrary, their regular contacts with native communities had left them with little doubt that anti-French sentiments were congealing directly as military operations and colonial expropriations escalated. Their scouts reported ever more organized and daring acts of defiance centered on religious or sociocultural filiations.[12] Leading generals such as Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de Lamoricière (1806–1865), already amenable, if not deferential, to the doctrines of Saint-Simon, found within the pages of *Colonisation de l'Algérie* systematic validation for their own thoughts on the profitable economic and demographic development of the colony, with autonomous and dedicated military supervision over the natives.[13] Some heard even their own echo in the Supreme Father's call for a salutary corps of colonial "soldiers of industry" to deliberately reform local institutions and modes of production to the mutual benefit of the French and Arab races. Enfantin had intimated as much by singling out a handful of *Africains* as the lone French agents to have "laudably and unequivocally understood how to govern the Arabs."

The rudiments and advantages of cultural association, to which many Arabist officers subscribed, were thus channeled into a wider pub-

lic and private readership through the exhaustive studies of the scientific commission and the pointed interventions of "Père Enfantin." The second decade of colonial rule in Algeria opened with the promise of fundamental philosophical and political reorientations in native governance. The military agencies, however, had yet to recover fully from the suspension of the Directorate of Arab Affairs between 1839 and 1841, and the progress of the scientific exploration was itself temporarily hindered by a skeptical director of the interior, who was still clinging to a hopeful reversal in the fortunes of his educational ventures.[14] For the time being, the cultural calendar of the civilian directorate continued to prevail in Paris and Algiers, despite the accelerating momentum of Abd al-Qadir's revolt and the growing number of traducers within the military bureaucracy.

THE GILDED PRAETORIANS

> Many people in France suffer to imagine officers with tanned complexions, growing long beards and turning pale [from poring] over books, [and] engaging in scientific research or literary pastimes. Nothing is nevertheless more accurate: it is even one of the particular characteristics of this Army of Africa, where intelligence and affairs of the mind play so great a part.
>
> —Pierre de Castellane, *Souvenirs de la vie militaire en Afrique*[15]

> There may be armies that are able to inscribe in their annals battles more memorable than yours. But none has combated as much or carried out as many work projects.
>
> —General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, Address to the Army of Africa, 1847[16]

The military intelligence units that came to be known as the "Arab Bureaux" were inaugurated in 1831 and underwent several organizational permutations before assuming a definitive form in 1844.[17] Ironically, the origins of the agency that embodied in many ways France's civilizing mission to Algeria in the nineteenth century lie in the military's independent attempts in the summer of 1830 to fasten its tenuous foothold in North Africa by embracing local conventions as far as possible or by resurrecting the defunct institutions of the regency. Among the hard lessons learned by the generals of the Army of Africa during the long summer months of 1830 was the realization that their victories over the regular forces of the dey of Algiers did not spell the comprehensive surrender of the Ottoman realm. The tributary clans, for example,

remained defiant, and insurgent tribesmen, sometimes in alliance with local remnants of the Turkish regime, were soon confining the invaders to the perimeters of Algiers.

France's military triumph was moreover tempered when Charles X was emphatically dispatched from power and forced to follow Husayn Dey into exile in the early days of August. In the political vacuum and uncertainty that followed the successive dethroning of dey and king, the commanders of the French expeditionary force were compelled to discard any remaining illusions concerning an uncomplicated pacification of North Africa and to resort increasingly to local resources and customs in governing their new possessions. They restored Ottoman public functions and recruited Arabs and Kabyles to mediate as auxiliary linguists and interpreters or even serve under the French flag in the newly formed Zouaves Battalion, modeled after the native *zwawa* contingents in the dey's army. Accordingly, the Algerine merchant Hamdan ibn Amin al-Sikkah was assigned to the direct supervision of the local French commander, and was asked to assume the former functions of the agha of the Arabs (*agha al-ʿarab* = *Agha des Arabes*), whose tasks under the deys had involved arbitrating between the ruling Turks and their Arab or Kabyle dependents.

As the range of French operations expanded along the Algerian coast, the importance of gathering reliable information about the recalcitrant natives began to dominate and overwhelm the preoccupations of the high command. In September 1832, the responsibilities of the agha were transferred to the headquarters of General Anne Jean Marie René Savary, Duke of Rovigo, who supplemented the position with an Arab cabinet, staffed with his personal secretary and a handful of interpreters. This meager—and, by some accounts, ineffectual—crew was commissioned to oversee and conduct "all diplomatic affairs relating to the indigenous peoples of the former regency."[18] In the following year, Savary's interim successor, General Antoine Avizard, sought to unify the disparate activities and functions of the Arab cabinet. He entrusted the army's leading Arabist, Captain Lamoricière, then serving in the Zouaves Battalion, to establish and administer the Special Bureau of Arab Affairs (*Bureau particulier des affaires arabes*) in order to monitor "with certainty and success [the army's] relations with the Arabs."[19]

In redressing the shortcomings of Savary's cabinet, Lamoricière instituted practices and procedures that would become standard features of the military's colonial administration in general and of the Arab Bureaux in particular. Seeking to promote sincere cooperation with local clans, he delegated managerial responsibilities to their notables and leaders and improved the army's channels for direct communications

with them. He also instituted a centralized archival service to provide senior commanders with a repository for all documents related to indigenous affairs, as well as a running historical record of official acts or directives.[20] In April 1837, responding once again to the increasing scale and complexity of its dealings with the native populations, the French command abolished altogether the functions of the agha and converted Lamoricière's Special Bureau of Arab Affairs into the broader Directorate of Arab Affairs (*Direction des affaires arabes*), headed by Captain Pellissier de Reynaud and under the direct authority of the governor general of Algeria. Plagued by recurrent shortages in resources and personnel, the directorate was eliminated in March 1839, and its responsibilities then devolved to individual chiefs of staff. This situation endured until the return to Algeria in February 1841 of General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud who in the middle of his arduous campaigns against Abd al-Qadir realized the need for a central and permanent agency to rule effectively over the pacified populations and territories.[21] On August 16, Bugeaud reinstated the Directorate of Arab Affairs and invested its commander, Colonel Eugène Daumas, with executive jurisdiction over all subjugated tribes.[22]

The appointment and tenure of Daumas coincided with the official abandonment of the policy of limited colonial occupation and the extension of military offenses under the generalship of Bugeaud into the provincial strongholds of Abd al-Qadir. Charged with the task of devising the methods with which to oversee the ever-expanding areas of military control, Daumas investigated the sources of the emir's resilient sovereignty in the western beylik and opted to emulate what he deemed to be the constituent unit in his rival's "tribal estate": the *douar*, or circle of tents. He proceeded likewise to group clans within specified districts into administrative circles and to station within each a bureau for Arab affairs, staffed with French officers and local indigenous delegates. The circle bureaux (*bureaux de cercle*) then coordinated their surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities with a central office in the Government General. In February 1844, the Ministry of War upheld Daumas's proposed organizational scheme and began to deploy the Arab Bureaux in accordance with its reconfiguration of the military territories into divisions, subdivisions, and circles.

The ministerial order of February 1, 1844, popularized as the "Charter of the Arab Bureaux," paved the way for the eventual disengagement of native affairs from civilian jurisdiction or oversight.[23] It established divisional directorates (*bureaux de province*) in the provinces of Oran (Oranais), Algiers (Algérois), and Constantine (Constantinois), each operating under the direct authority of the respective commanding gener-




FIGURE 3.1 Government General of Algeria, 1834–1867: Structural Organization and Chain of Command

als (Figure 3.1). Subdivisions, the subsequent administrative level, received first-class bureaux headed by a colonel and answerable to the divisional commanders, whereas second-class offices, under the supervision of an army lieutenant or captain, were instituted in every circle. Finally, larger circles were granted an auxiliary bureau (*annexe*) to facilitate the control and taxation of outlying or sparsely populated areas, such as oases or pastoral plains. Article 3 of the charter confirmed the direct authority of the Ministry of War and the Government General of Algeria over the divisional directorates and their subdivisions, but conveyed open-ended functions and responsibilities to their officers. It made the Arab Bureaux responsible "specifically . . . for preparing and

expediting all orders or documents related to the conduct of Arab affairs, . . . , and briefing the governor general on any issue related to the political and administrative situation in the territory." Moreover, the Divisional Directorate of Algiers was to serve as the Central Directorate of Arab Affairs (*Direction centrale des affaires arabes*) and "operate under the direct authority of the Governor General." The governor general, in turn, addressed his reports and accounts to the Directorate of Algerian Affairs in the Ministry of War.

To fulfill these various assignments, the charter assigned thirty staff officers to the Central Directorate of Algiers, and ten to each of the divisional directorates of Oran and Constantine. However, it appropriated funds only for personnel on the army's payroll. As a result, the full-time staff of the Central Directorate—who also took on the responsibilities of the Divisional Directorate of Algiers—was limited to nine salaried officers and clerks: a director, an adjunct officer, an archivist (civilian or military), a medical officer, a tax assessor, two principal interpreters, an auxiliary interpreter, and a copyist. The French personnel were assisted by twenty-one native adjuncts: a judge (*qadi* = *cadi*), two secretaries, a foreman (*wakil* = *oukil*), six orderlies (*shawishs* = *chaouchs*), and eleven horsemen (*mekhalias*, also known variously as *mekhazenis*, *déïras*, *kriélas*, or *asker*). The divisional offices in Oran and Constantine each employed six French officers and four native assistants: a director, a medical officer, a tax assessor, two interpreters, a copyist, an Arab secretary, a *wakil*, and two *shawishs*.[24] As to the bureaux themselves, each seat was to be staffed by three or four servicemen, depending on the importance of its location: first-class units (*bureau de première classe*) retained a chief officer (*chef de bureau*), a noncommissioned officer to serve as secretary and copyist, an interpreter, and a *shawish*, while second-class seats (*bureau de deuxième classe*) did without the noncommissioned officer, whose duties were assumed by the bureau chief.

As shown in Table 3.1, in 1847, fifty-eight officers were distributed among twelve bureaux in the province of Algérois (Algiers, Dellys, Blidah, Milianah, Médéah, Aumale, Orléansville, Bougie, Cherchell, Teniet el-Had, Boghar, Ténès); ten in the Oranais (Oran, Mostaganem, Mascara, Tlemcen, Nemours, Ammi-Moussa, Tiaret, Saïda, Sebdou, Lalla Maghnia); and eight in the Constantinois (Constantine, Bône, Sétif, Batna, Guelma, Philippeville, La Calle, Biskra). The commissioned officers were generally young, averaging, according to Montauban and Frémeaux, twenty-seven years of age in 1844 and thirty-three in 1856. Consequently, they tended to serve relatively long terms: between eight and nine years on average. By 1864, the number of officers had increased to 182, serving in fifteen bureaux in the Algérois (with the elimination of

TABLE 3.1

Strength of the Arab Bureaux, 1841–1881

Year	Officers	Bureaux (including annexes)
1841	N/A	21
1847	58	30
1853	93	32
1864	182	46
1867	198	50
1881	85	28

SOURCE: AOM 8H/1–3.

Algiers and the addition of Tizi Ouzou, Dra al-Mizan, Fort Napoléon, and Laghouat); an equal number in the Oranais (with the addition of Sidi-bel-Abbès, Aïn-Temouchent, Zamorah, Daya, and Géryville); and sixteen in the Constantinois (after the elimination of Guelma and the addition of El-Miliah, Collo, Djidjelli, Aïn-Beïda, Tébessa, Souk Ahras, Bordj-ben-Areridj, Bou Saada, and Takitount).

Graduates from the national *grandes écoles* formed the backbone of the French personnel of the Arab Bureaux. According to Kenneth Perkins, roughly 60 percent, or 403, of the 632 officers who served in the Algerian circles between 1844 and 1870 graduated from the leading military academies of Polytechnique, Saint-Cyr, Saumur, or Fontainebleau.[25] On one level, the preponderance of Polytechniciens and Saint-Cyriens in military service in Algeria testifies to the exceptional capabilities and aptitudes of these cadets and their recognized proficiency in collecting intelligence and disseminating it in the form of expedient reports to relevant colonial and metropolitan echelons. At the same time, their career in the Offices of Arab Affairs draws attention to the often-overlooked input by military agencies in devising the main theories and instruments of colonial governance in Algeria.

Indeed, a survey of the documents produced by and for the Ministry of War between 1844 and 1858 confirms that the mainstays of the colonial administration did not necessarily evolve from the planned initiatives of Parisian ministries, but increasingly from the individual routines and reported experiences of bureau operatives in the field. More often than not, public directives targeting the natives resulted from contingent arrangements or improvised responses to developments in the subdivisional circles. France's indigenous policies in Algeria, in other words, were not only drafted and implemented by a small number of army specialists and captains but also derived largely from incidental encounters with native communities at the lowest levels of the military bureaucracy.

As the bureau captain Charles Richard would later observe, the fruition of France's cultural aims in Algeria dictated propinquity with the Arab natives: "To dominate a country and govern its men, we must come to know them perfectly; we must necessarily live among them. . . . Politics here must forcibly be local; the nature of our goals dictates it."[26]

The trend toward the localization of native governance and policy making after 1844 is borne out by the sizable growth in the number of second-class bureaux and annexes from twelve in 1847 to thirty-two in 1864 and the concomitant reduction in first-class units from eighteen to fourteen, despite the considerable geographic expansion of the French colonial domain after 1848 (Table 3.2). By virtue of his unique skills and the nature of his post, the *chef de cercle* was empowered to exercise a high degree of personal initiative in carrying out his military, investigative, and clerical obligations. Indeed, senior commanding officers (*commandants supérieurs*) were rarely compelled to deal with natives and often preferred to act on the mere recommendations of their better informed, more attuned subalterns. For the army and its security apparatus, information was indeed a most prized commodity, and the centrality and indispensability of the second-class bureaux to the cycle of gathering, filtering, and disseminating intelligence elevated these units to the status of ultimate arbiters for native concerns. Bureau captains were expected to be cognizant of all that transpired or conspired within their circles and to recommend the most productive recourse to a given situation, grievance, or predicament.

The expertise thus garnered by the African officers further reinforced their executive license in Algeria, as well as their intellectual and learned credentials at home. A few became knowledgeable in the history, sociology, and ethnology of their respective districts, and the accounts that they compiled for the edification of their superiors sometimes made

TABLE 3.2

First- and Second-Class Bureaux, 1847 and 1864

	Year							
	1847				1864			
Province	First Class	Second Class	Annex	Total	First Class	Second Class	Annex	Total
Algiers	8	4	0	12	5	8	2	15
Oran	4	6	0	10	5	7	3	15
Constantine	6	2	0	8	4	10	2	16
Total	18	12	0	30	14	25	7	46

SOURCE: Guizot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps*, 7:538–39.

their way into academic journals or were reprinted on their own. We learn from the archives of the Arab Bureaux, for example, that Jules Duval (1813–1870) compiled his "monumental" geographical dictionary of Algeria, *Tableau de l'Algérie, annuaire descriptif et statistique de la colonie pour 1854*, from the "most complete and most exact documents," which he requisitioned directly from the Ministry of War.[27] So valued were the analytical briefings by circle chiefs that, in 1855, the governor general, Jacques-Louis Randon, decreed each bureau to "keep on file a complete set of its official reports, any historical, geographical, geological, or sociological studies made by officers or civilians in the area, and biographical notes on important men in the *cercle*."[28]

The standard annual statistical report (*renseignements statistiques*) filed by the second-class bureau of Biskra in late 1844 exemplifies the methodical rigor and inclusiveness with which officers gathered, ordered, and presented their findings to their superiors (Table 3.3). As outlined on its cover sheet, the report tabulates wide-ranging statistical and historical data according to thirty headings, ranging from supervisory or strategic concerns to primers on the ethnography, history, and industry of Biskra. Its pages document the relentless reconnoitering of assigned precincts by bureau agents in an effort to maintain current assessments of the dispositions, resources, and relative prosperity of resident communities.

To illustrate, Section 24, "On property," is the most substantive chapter in the report and proffers a thorough inventory of local assets, residences (including diagrams of floor plans as well as details of building methods and material), livestock, palm trees, water resources, and projected harvests—all produced for the benefit of the Central Directorate of Arab Affairs and supplemented with statistical tables for the calculation of projected remittances. This and other sections of the statistical record identify the names, whereabouts, and social standing of local notables entrusted with the collection of dues on behalf of the military authorities.

The document also attempts to ascertain the state of mind of the locals and delivers moral assessments of Biskra's most influential political and religious leaders: *khalifa*, *qa'id*, *qadi*, and *mufti*. It opens with biographical profiles of these individuals in which their qualities or flaws are judged in terms of their respective posture toward France. These striking psychological evaluations are then amplified in Section 12, "State of submission to France," which ponders Biskra's overall capacity for sedition or intrigue. To this extent, the report from Biskra puts on display the imbrications alluded to earlier between strategic priorities and scientific or sociological investigation. For example, Section 5

TABLE 3.3

Cover Sheet for Annual Statistical Report, Circle of Biskra, August 1844

1. Name of the *Khalifa*
 —— of the *Qa'id*
 —— of the *Qadi*
 —— of the *Mufti*
2. Diverse factions in the town of Biskra, long. 5°44'12" east; lat. 34°50'3" north
3. Distribution of the population
4. Ethnic groups
5. Topography of the town
6. Mountains
7. Waterways
8. Thermal springs
9. Suburban boundaries
10. Demographics
11. Number of infantrymen and horsemen
12. State of submission to France
13. Town notables
14. Principal military and religious families
15. Wealth of the inhabitants
16. Windmills or manorial estates
17. Markets
18. Names of men in custody and reasons for their detention
19. Number of mosques and marabouts
20. Number of cattle, sheep, goats, horses, etc.
21. Total capacity
22. *Melk* lands (may be alienated)
23. Property to be exempted from taxation
24. On property:
 — Houses
 — Animals
 — Palm trees
 — Lands
 — Water
25. On taxes
26. Tariffs due from *Shaykh al-'Arab*
27. Internal administration of the town; justice; actual organization
28. Of money loans
29. Ancient routes
30. Historical background

SOURCE: AOM 10H/18.

presents exceptional topographical and pedological data for the town, but its meticulous maps also pinpoint the most propitious sites for the establishment of military strongpoints, chart the shortest access routes to indigenous population centers, and submit blueprints for strategic roadways. Likewise, the rich historical overview of Biskra from prehistoric times in Section 30 culminates with an account of military tactics deployed in the past by the Biskris against the French army. These surveys evaluate the martial qualities of the local men and their preferred

offensive or defensive battle plans, and conclude with informed predictions on the manner in which future insurrections might unfold, along with proven countermeasures for effectively putting them down.

Finally, the annual report makes clear that the charter's prescription to brief "the Governor General on any issue related to the political and administrative situation in the territory" was parlayed into significant discretionary powers by and for the Offices of Arab Affairs. Indeed, by the late 1840s, the functions of the bureau captains had become far broader than the margins of the charter of 1841. In describing the attributes of the typical bureau chief in the 1850s, Claude Collot identified extensive administrative, legal, financial, cultural, and military ranges to his jurisdiction over the natives:

> In the administrative field, he supervises the conduct of the [tribal] chiefs, recommends dismissals and nominations, settles disagreements between tribes, directs public works, reports on the condition of lands and properties. On the legal level, the officer adjudicates all civil cases and superintends the *qadi* in the performance of his duties. Criminal cases fall under the auspices of military tribunals, but the officer of the Arab Bureau acts as the examining magistrate. In the event of lawsuit between Muslims and Europeans, he serves as lawyer to the Muslim party. The officer also has financial attributions: he determines the sum of the tribute to be paid by each tribe and to be collected by the Muslim chiefs, and who dispatches to the French Treasury the collected fees. He is the director of all instruction and worship in his district, and thus, is responsible for inspecting the Quranic schools and supervising the religious leaders. Finally, he also holds military attributions: he commands the *goums*, organizes them, supplies them, and leads them in time of war.[29]

In time, the "limitless powers" of the captains of Arab affairs became a rallying cry for politicians, settler constituencies, and even military detractors who questioned the decisive clout of the Ministry of War in the life of French Algeria. Opponents of the military regime routinely ascribed any hardship or setback in the colony to the failure of the government in Paris to clearly delimit the prerogatives of the Arab Bureaux and restrain their staff from looking into matters beyond their fief.[30] For their part, the officers insisted that their conduct was sanctioned overall by the charter and their executive supremacy justified by their proximity to populations hostile and rude, forever anticipating the occasion to overthrow the reviled rule of the French.

Military omnipotence and ubiquity were thus essential to the survival of the colonial state and necessary for the continued intimidation and deterrence of Arab tribesmen with a deep-rooted penchant for political duplicity and a high regard for warlike qualities. Civilian pencil pushers, the Arabists complained, were plainly not up to the task. "What is a

Prefect in France?" Urbain would ask his readers in 1861, "nothing but a mailbox. . . . Is this the sort of functionary we want to place above natives used to obeying, not written laws, but a chief who is for them the living word?"[31] It was, admittedly, the intention of the high command that the natives should conflate its martial apparatus and the colonial state. Native communities, far more than the European *colons*, bore the brunt of the army's heavy-handed laws and routines in French Algeria. The majority knew no other colonial authority than the all-powerful Arab Bureaux, and it naturally came to regard all things military as the most tangible source and expression of France's irresistible domination. According to an anecdote related by Alphonse Daudet in *Tartarin de Tarascon*, "the magical *képi* . . . glistening atop any numskull" was plenty enough to rule Algeria and strike Arab hearts with terror.[32]

In the rare instances when bureau officers were interpellated for exceeding the terms of their mandate, they also explained that their improvisations were dictated by the absence of political, procedural, or cultural precedence. The breadth of their functions was unavoidably amplified in their attempts to circumscribe broad governmental directives to diverse and immediate local needs and thus derive more useful guidelines for the future. In a context where "everything had yet to be done," overstepping the executive boundaries initially assigned to them was a simple matter of expedience, so that "by the force of things, [the Arab Bureaux] came not only to supervise, but to sanction as well."[33] As a rule, the Ministry of War tended to concur:

> The difficulties and uncertainties inherent to an unknown and new country, the variability of things, the suddenness of needs, the unpredictable and the urgent, war, distance, all have long demanded that a great latitude be granted to local authorities.[34]

Still, the political cover enjoyed by the officers of Arab affairs was only as helpful as their access to the means with which to exercise such wide-ranging powers. Their autonomous command rested on their capacity to assess and collect taxes from the native inhabitants of their districts and thus to dispose of significant discretionary funds. The involvement of bureau specialists in colonial fiscal policy began in the late 1830s, when they carried out the extensive cadastral surveys to identify the different categories of Muslim landholdings and verify the validity of indigenous proprietary deeds and claims. As of January 1845, the Arab Bureaux were permitted to collect in their districts the Arab taxes (*impôts arabes*), which comprised the tithe (*'ushr*), alms (*zakat*), a levy on livestock, compulsory labor obligations (*corvées*), and tariffs for the maintenance of public services and facilities (*prestations*), as well as the

direct French imposts on property, rent, or livestock; customs duties; trade licenses; and market usage fees.[35] The fiscal leverage of the Arab Bureaux was further augmented in 1856 when circle chiefs (*chefs de cercle*) were granted authority to meet their expenses with supplementary levies (*centimes additionnels*) on Muslims. The ledgers for the *centimes additionnels* were maintained independently of the master budget for the allocation of Arab taxes, and bureau captains enjoyed complete discretion over unused *centimes* in any budgetary period.

The structure of the Central Directorate of Arab Affairs remained basically unchanged until the collapse of the Second Empire in 1870, although Paris amended the mandates of its offices on three occasions during the final fifteen years of military rule in Algeria, convulsions not without an impact on colonial cultural policy making. In August 1854, yielding to appeals by European speculators, agriculturalists, and settlers, the government instituted the Departmental Arab Bureaux (*Bureaux arabes départementaux*) as civilian counterweights to the military offices.[36] The Departmental Bureaux were, in principle, expected to oversee the growing number of Muslims falling within the expanding jurisdictions of French municipalities and communes. They were manned by civil functionaries who answered directly to the mayors or prefects, and who lacked, on the one hand, the linguistic skills and accumulated expertise of their military peers, and, on the other, the ability to resort to coercion or force in the exercise of their duties. As a result, the responsibilities of the Departmental Bureaux were practically limited to managing the remaining Muslim endowments in civilian districts and collecting their revenues as well as other Arab taxes on behalf of the prefectural Office of Indigenous Administration (*Bureau d'administration indigène*). The rationale for the civilian bureaux disappeared with the creation of "mixed communes" (*communes mixtes*) in 1866, but, until then, the army command continually deplored their blatant infringement on its executive and fiscal domains and denounced them for diluting its integral authority in the eyes of the Arabs, especially after the departmental personnel were authorized to impress the latter by donning "a kind of military uniform" patterned on that of the Arabist officers. Of his first sojourn in Algiers in 1860, Emperor Napoleon III recalled how "truly odd" he found "these little gentlemen disguised as soldiers" (*ces petits messieurs déguisés en militaires*).

In June 1858, mounting pressure by the settler constituencies and their metropolitan lobbyists compelled the imperial government to eliminate the office of governor general and incorporate the functions of the Arab and Algerian Directorates into the incipient Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies. Indigenous instruction was likewise detached from the Min-

istry of War and conveyed to the new department, thereby momentarily removing Muslim establishments and schools from the purview of the Arab Bureaux and exacerbating native concerns and suspicions. Land expropriations and settler excesses under the auspices of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies unleashed powerful anticolonial responses in 1858–1859, with collective uprisings spreading throughout the civilian and military territories.[37] The spiraling unrest prompted the personal intervention of Napoleon III, who voyaged to Algiers in September 1860 to see and hear for himself. Swayed by the arguments of Arabist officers in his entourage, Napoleon resolved to abolish the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies upon his return to Paris, and, in November, he restored the colonial portfolios of the Ministry of War and Government General.

By 1864, the Directorate of Arab Affairs had recovered, by and large, from the temporary exile of the Government General, and, sustained by Napoleon's vision of an "Arab Kingdom" in Algeria, which Saint-Simonian Arabists—Thomas "Ismaÿl" Urbain cardinal among them—had inspired and were slated to bring forth, its executive oversight was even expanded at the expense of European communes. Now, vigorous defiance of the government's reforms came from the civilian and settler quarters and, ultimately, prompted the emperor to make sure that the operations of the Arab Bureaux "accorded with the principles that were laid out in the imperial letter of June 20, 1865, on the policy of France in Algeria."[38] The gubernatorial circular of March 21, 1867—known as the Mac-Mahon Circular or the Great Charter of the Arab Bureaux (*Grande Charte des Bureaux arabes*)—restated the necessity "to regulate with precision the different branches of the administration of Arab affairs" and to take stock, in light of decades of valuable concrete experiences, of the divergences in practice from the original prescriptions of February 1844.

The new charter attempted also to abridge the administrative autonomy of the Arab Bureaux by confirming again the supremacy of the Central Political Bureau (*Bureau politique central*) over a fixed organizational structure that prioritized vertical flows of information along the chain of command over lateral communication between the divisional and subdivisional units (Figure 3.2). The officers of Arab affairs were reminded of their absolute dependence, "everywhere and at all levels," upon the chief of staff, "who alone was qualified to sign orders and correspond with his immediate superior, his subordinates, and the different services according to the rules of the [military] hierarchy." The tripartite structure of the military bureaucracy was maintained, but the administrative personnel were set at eleven French and five native agents




FIGURE 3.2 Military Administration of Arab Affairs, 1867–1870

in the Central Political Bureau, nine French and three native agents in the divisional directorates, six French and three native agents in the first-class bureaux, and five French and two native agents in the second-class bureaux and annexes.[39] In 1867, this allocation of personnel translated into 198 French officers serving in 3 divisional offices (5 superior officers, 12 captains, and 5 lieutenants), 12 subdivisional offices (25 captains, 30 lieutenants, and 10 sublieutenants), and 35 first- and second-class circles (33 captains, 63 lieutenants, and 15 sublieutenants).

The special regime of the Arab Bureaux was toppled in 1870–1871 as the leaders of the Third Republic assimilated French Algeria politically and juridically into the mother country. Beginning in October 1870, a series of decrees and orders decommissioned the military bureaux and substituted civil institutions. The Government General and its Central Political Bureau were eliminated and substituted, respectively, with the Civil Commissioner and the General Staff's Subdivision for Indigenous Affairs (*Section des affaires indigènes de l'état-major général*). Henceforth, the operations of the former bureaux were confined to precincts that were far removed from European population centers and relatively unimportant to the colonial economy. By 1881, only twenty-eight offices remained in operation, with first-class units located exclusively in remote pre-Saharan and Saharan districts.[40]

INCONSPICUOUS REVOLUTIONARIES

> Far from advocating insurrection and revolt, we are putting forward the only way to prevent the acts of violence which threaten society and which will only be averted with difficulty if the industrial power remains passive amid the factions struggling for power. . . . THE PRESENT EPOCH IS AN EPOCH OF TRANSITION.
>
> —Henri de Saint-Simon, *The Catechism of the Industrialists*[41]

> We do not presume to achieve everything in one fell swoop, we are men of progress; we want evolutions, not social revolutions: similarly, we do not limit ourselves, like revolutionaries, to criticizing what is, but also point the way to what must be.
>
> —Prosper Enfantin, *Le Globe*[42]

> Any people is perfectible, on the condition that its progress is sought in accord with its line of normal development, on the condition of binding its past to its present and its future. Progress is an evolution, not a revolution.
>
> —Georges Voisin (pseudonym of Ismaÿl Urbain), *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*[43]

The small circles of specialized officers garrisoned at the crossroads of colonial encounters between native and French Algeria represented a distinctive trait in the composite sociointellectual profile of early-nineteenth-century France. Until 1848, many were of middle- or lower-class origin and belonged to the first generation of Frenchmen to benefit fully from the liberalization and nationalization of an educational system once reserved for the scions of the landowning nobility.[44] In the *grandes écoles* of post-Napoleonic France, especially in the École Polytechnique, they had acquired basic training and instruction in academies that stood apart from their domestic or European counterparts, and this at a time when France was fast rising to international prominence in scientific research and innovation.[45] Indeed, the political and social upheavals that swept away the French monarchy and clergy in 1789 left in their wake, among other things, growing ideological and institutional correlations between citizenship, public instruction, and military service.

The École Polytechnique, founded by the National Convention in 1794 and militarized ten years later by Napoleon I, epitomized the educational aspirations and reforms of the revolutionary age.[46] Its pedagogical aim was to subsidize the formation of a cohesive, learned vanguard dedicated to advancing the scientific and technical achievements of the

nation, while strengthening its processes of sociopolitical and cultural integration, a vocation encapsulated by the school's Napoleonic motto: "For the Homeland, Science and Glory." Their common social background, academic formation, and professional upbringing imparted on the Polytechniciens a ritualistic esprit de corps and a proud sense of exceptionalism that were carried after graduation to the various branches or sectors in which they served.[47] Enfantin did not think he was exaggerating when he labeled his former schoolmates "the premier scientific corps in the nation," or when he boasted publicly of their unmatched flair to "unify, associate, and sanctify" (*moraliser*) the theoretical and practical disciplines of French learning.[48]

As we have already seen, on the eve of the occupation of Algiers, Polytechniciens were well represented in national civil and military agencies, public and private enterprises, and state-run infrastructural development projects, including the improvement of roads and railways, the modernization of cities and towns, the advancement of medicine and sanitation, and the application of scientific innovations to industrial or agricultural methods, occupations that prepared them for a primary role in organizing and governing France's new conquest after 1830.[49] By amply populating the different echelons of the military establishment in French Algeria, and especially its Arab Directorate, the former cadets infused standard bureaucratic routines with their particular economies of thought and, in time, triggered procedural as well as substantive changes in official decision making. For Lorcin, Polytechnicien officers, more than their peers, were responsible for no less than "creat[ing] the intellectual framework on which the scientific evaluation of [Algeria] proceeded."[50]

The framework in question, however, was buttressed in many places with the philosophical and political conventions of Henri de Saint-Simon. In the late 1820s, his theses, collected, reformulated, and disseminated by the doctrinal school of Enfantin and Bazard, caused great ferment in the *grande école*, and many of its faculty, students, and graduates joined the nucleus of devotees congregating around the two Supreme Fathers.[51] Their disciples and apprentices pledged to propagate the Saint-Simonian doctrine at home and abroad and to hasten the Master's prophecy of "the golden age for humanity lying ahead." The fall of Algiers and the Bourbon king in July 1830 buoyed the messianic expectations of the Saint-Simonian family, although these were soon dashed by the accession of a "new French gerontocracy incapable of any ideas, any resoluteness, any creative ardor."[52] A dejected Enfantin turned his eyes toward the Muslim Orient: Egypt once more; then eventually the

budding colony in North Africa, whose sun-swept interior appeared to him as a vast, unspoiled canvas on which to create fresh social realities. There, as a member of the scientific commission and with the help of well-placed Saint-Simonian sympathizers, he hoped to set the course for "a new future for France . . . a thousand times more glorious."

Father Enfantin's unbridled optimism reflected the long reach and vitality of the Saint-Simonian filiations in French Algeria, layered over the careers of fellow alumni prominent in the military colonial administration. Among the distinguished Saint-Simonian Polytechniciens serving in the bureaux or Directorate of Arab Affairs in 1839, Enfantin could count Ernest Carette, Lamoricière, and Charles Richard, to be joined in 1843 by Henri Fournel and, in 1845, by Adolphe Hanoteau. With their help and support, his political prospects seemed secure. "First Algiers, then Paris!" The clarion call of the Enfantinistes in the late 1830s summed up Father Enfantin's pledge to raise a colonial phoenix from the ashes of the discarded contract of the Three Glorious Days. "Africa," he informed his benefactor, Jean-Barthélémy-François Arlès-Dufour, in June 1840, "is destined to shame us for the absurdity of our politics [at home]." To this extent, the appropriation of native affairs by the Polytechnicien-laden Arab Directorate after 1844 was akin to injecting the very body of colonial administrative theory and practice with the conceptual and methodological strains of the Saint-Simonian doctrine. Accordingly, tracing the "ideologizing influence"—to borrow the terminology of Karl Mannheim—of Saint-Simonism on the officers of Arab affairs is key to identifying the determinative concepts that shaped and informed their intellectual predisposition toward the politics, culture, and society of North Africa.

The Polytechnicien captain Charles Richard, a prominent advocate for Saint-Simonism despite his intensifying commitments to Fourierism after the revolution of February 1848, provides incomparable samples of the doctrinal flavor and pedigree of Arab Bureaux reports issued between 1844 and 1850. His writings, like those of Lamoricière, may be considered individual expressions of the larger collective ideas held by the military doctrinaires of the 1840s and 1850s. Richard's influence on colonial legislation became manifest after the resignation of his antagonistic superior, Governor General Bugeaud, in 1846. Yacono, for one, regards him as the "architect of France's policy of sedentarization."[53] In two policy papers authored while he was bureau chief for Orléansville between 1846 and 1849, Richard formulated a logical and persuasive defense for the patient reconfiguration of the colony's institutional and cultural landscapes through military control and political association.[54]

True to Saint-Simonian teachings, and borrowing ideas and style from Augustin Thierry's *Lettres sur l'histoire de France*, he opened his treatise on native governance with an acknowledgment of the historical parallels between contemporary North African communities and French feudal societies in the late tenth century. In various passages, he likened Algeria's tribal and religious leaders to the corrupt aristocrats and clergymen of the ancien régime and the natives to the benighted *paysans* from the Middle Ages. Such anachronistic analogies had the virtue of placing the future development of native Algeria on a historical path once trodden by France, thus making patently reasonable the imposition of French oversight upon the Arabs until a new generation of leading families had supplanted the old. The civilizing mission, according to Richard, entailed assisting a medieval Arab society to navigate wisely through the eight centuries of cultural and material progress separating it from its modern French counterpart:

> [O]n the staircase that [the Arab] must climb towards the future, several steps separate him from you, and none of your efforts can spare him the ascent. You may, nevertheless, extend him your hand from your superior position, and help him scale the rungs more quickly, even skip a few; it is, in fact, your duty, your providential mission [to do so]; but I dare you to achieve anything practical beyond this end.[55]

Richard, however, wished his tale to be above all cautionary, and he punctuated his chapters with harrowing episodes from his nation's recent string of sociopolitical tremors. Familiarity with the course of events in France after 1789, and the radical corollaries to the abrupt dismantling of its traditional powers, all but dictated controlled and measured change in Algeria. From Saint-Simon, he had gathered that deliberate and balanced reformation was best channeled through institutions or laws germane to the historical context of the society in question. From Comte, he understood the "absurdity of seeking the best possible government in abstraction of the state of civilization of the society over which it must rule."[56] Thus, deliberate and temporary association with the current indigenous political and religious leadership remained for the colonial authorities the most propitious avenue "for applying the necessary [cultural] adjustments to the vanquished populations . . . whilst converting them little by little to the ideas of morality which they lack."[57] "In a word, to make him Christian, [the Arab] must first be made Muslim."[58] To this end, Richard envisaged nothing short of a heroic leap onto the "scorching terrain of religious beliefs and prejudice" in order to exhume the sacred laws of Islam from the "moral anarchy that stifles them" and to last until France had bestowed upon

them "the baptism of [its] sanction."[59] It was a staple argument among France's Arabist soldiers that they better than the Muslims understood the true meaning of the sacred scriptures. According to Lapasset: "The law of Muhammad, if well understood, is not as hostile to us as the ignorant commentaries of fanatical self-claimed scholars."[60]

To ensure a gratifying outcome for this most precarious of tasks, while sparing the natives "unnecessary screams and protestations," Richard buffered Saint-Simon's three stages of human development with four supplementary transitions through which Arab society was to be lifted very gradually and unknowingly from the "confused barbarism" (*la barbarie confuse*) to which Turkish rule had relegated it, through succeeding phases of "feudalism" and "communalism," until its final political and cultural amalgamation with France.[61]

The success of the cultural reforms therefore hinged critically on vigilant guardianship by specialized military agents. Richard dedicated his *Du gouvernement arabe* to his talented peers serving in the Arab Bureaux, who alone possessed the necessary training and arsenal "to give legs to [his] ideas" and avert a native storming of the colonial Bastille. Nothing was more dangerous to the security of French rule in Algeria than rapid and wholesale attempts to transform Muslim society into a replica of the European:

> The confused society in which [the Arab] lives is held together only by extremely fragile artifices. They are the traditions, the habits, the respect for numerous prejudices, the fear of certain religious influences, and unfortunately, the terror imposed by a pitiless authority. Eliminate in one swoop all these ill-defined bonds; proclaim at once all the rights that the Christian idea granted us finally after eighteen centuries of labor, and you will witness with your own eyes the eruption of a catastrophe similar to the one that brought down the empire of the Caesars. . . . Tell the Arabs: you are all equal before the laws that we bring you; your marabouts, who frighten you with their threats, are impostors you need no longer heed; the old line of chiefs, who used to govern you, do not deserve the respect you extended them, for it is only merit that gives men their worth; the soldier and the *colon*, who represent your conquerors, are not worth more than you for you have the same rights as they; add to this a few more truths, equally trenchant, and you will see what will ensue. All the subversive elements contained within this malformed society, as soon as they are no longer checked by any restraint, will hurtle towards one another in appalling disorder, and will eventually stampede toward you as well.[62]

Richard thus arrogated to the officers in the Arab Directorate, "these poor little hidden wheels who make turn the great machinery," the leading conciliatory role that Saint-Simon had slated for men of science and industry. Admittedly, his debt to Saint-Simonism did not preclude con-

juring the Master in order to substantiate his own designs. He deftly couched his strong advocacy for the militarization of native affairs in terms calculated to cajole or cow any ambivalence toward the rule of captains and generals—though he clearly had little reason to be concerned with the alleged hostility of the Saint-Simonians toward the military. In his final years, Saint-Simon himself had struggled to find a place for France's proud martial legacy in the pacified industrial society of the future. In collaboration with Auguste Comte, he noted that the French military had by no means remained impervious to the important sociopolitical transformations in recent decades.[63] To the contrary, the metamorphosis of the military establishment had been essential to the consolidation of temporal over spiritual power in the late eighteenth century and thus to France's gradual transition under the Bourbon Restoration to the preeminent order of industrialism in the early nineteenth century.

From a venal force devoted to securing the longevity of theocratic monarchs, the French army had matured by the late 1790s into a professional corps of conscripted citizens who "take up arms only with reluctance and as a temporary obligation." Consequently, the nation now waged its wars in defense of revolutionary gains and for the ideals of human progress and emancipation. Internally, the revolutionary wars had cemented social and national cohesion; battles had "stimulated and developed men's faculties, habituated them to collective action, and hence to social solidarity and discipline."[64] Imperial campaigns in Europe and the Levant had helped propagate the superior political system and cultural values of France, further its strategic and commercial interests, and emancipate fettered societies from the tyrannies of despots and priests.[65] The success of French arms under the Revolution and Napoleon confirmed the effectiveness of a military apparatus wedded to national renewal, scientific organization, and industrial planning. Henceforth, postulated Saint-Simon, supremacy on the field of battle would revert to "a function of industrial theory" (*un produit de l'industrie théorique*), prompting Ghita Ionescu to speculate whether the philosopher had anticipated the rise of the modern military-industrial complex.[66]

It was no surprise, then, that Richard should tout with the same breath the centrality of military authority to the progressive development of the colony of Algeria. Like Saint-Simon and Comte before him, Richard sanctioned military rule or coercion as long as it was deployed in the name of progress or as a stopgap measure to stave off social anarchy. During the sixteenth century, France's own transition from feudalism to modernity had been assured by the armed superiority of temporal monarchs over spiritual prelates. So, too, in Algeria, the

autonomous supremacy of the Arab Bureaux was indispensable to the historical advance of the primitive and perfectible natives. Historical inevitabilities were mainstays of Saint-Simonian thinking, and liberties, according to the eloquent political theoretician of the doctrine, Adolphe Guéroult, were never absolute: it stood to reason that "sober, ordered, industrious, and educated peoples were able to tolerate larger doses of freedom."[67]

Comte had reassured his "democratic" readers that any repulsive monstrosity would cease to be regarded as such when understood as purely transitory. Likewise for Richard, the impermanent tenure of the bureaux—all but guaranteed by the synchronization of military oversight to the evolution of Arab society through the required seven historical stages—was to be gauged as much by benefits delivered as by ills averted. In due time, he conceded, all philosophical or moral contradictions with national norms would be resolved: finally, Arab society would mature into an assimilable "democratic civilization," and the bureaux would revert to civilian functions. Only then would the commanding officer "hang his saber on the wall, and mutate into an administrative or municipal agent."[68]

The "prophet" Saint-Simon had redefined the modern mandate of the civilizing mission as an apostolate of the industrial spirit. With his disciple Comte, he conceded a central yet transient role to France's military in carrying it to the farthest reaches of the world. Finally, the conquest of Algiers and the fall of the Bourbon monarchy gave license to the Army of Africa to reclaim the nation's revolutionary and Napoleonic antecedents and, with Saint-Simonian officers at the helm of its Offices of Arab Affairs, to transform the utopian regeneration of Orient and Occident into a political reality.

CHAPTER FOUR

Lights Out

> Muslim society, in Africa, was not uncivilized; it was merely a backwards and imperfect civilization. There existed within it a great number of pious foundations (*hubus*), the aim of which was to provide for the needs of charity or public education. Everywhere we have laid our hands on these revenues by diverting them partly from their former usages; we have reduced the charitable establishments, neglected the schools, dispersed the seminaries. Around us the lights have gone out, the recruitment of men of religion and men of law has ceased; in other words, we have made Muslim society much more miserable, more disordered, more ignorant and more barbarous than it was before it came to know us.
>
> —Alexis de Tocqueville, *Études économiques, politiques et littéraires*[1]



As the Arab Directorate asserted control over native affairs in Algeria, and with association becoming the doctrinal mainstay of official policy making after 1845, the face of the colonial administration was correspondingly transformed. The customary divide between civil and military jurisdictions in Algeria was complicated by new ideological alignments between the detractors and proponents of colonial association. At one end stood the champions of outright civil and democratic rights in the colony, and, in the late 1840s, assimilation for them signified putting an end to the army's privileged rule in Algeria and integrating the public institutions of the metropole. Their opposition to the rule of the generals led them to resist any political measures aiming to improve the conditions of Arab society. At the other extreme, therefore, were military leaders such as Field Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, who strongly countermanded any concession to republican rights or to civilian input in the administration of Algeria's natives. Although not an ideological believer in colonial association,

Bugeaud tended to promote native exceptionalism as far as it helped him ward off civilian encroachments on military oversight.

The proponents of colonial association occupied a variety of positions between the binary civilian and military poles, and, as such, they presented a mixed bag of Saint-Simonian ideology, civilian entitlement, and military privilege. In general, the Saint-Simonians opposed excessive dispossession or exploitation of the natives and endeavored to establish distinct semiautonomous economic and cultural zones in Algeria, one reserved for European settlement and under the administration of public officials, the other governed by military officers on behalf of the indigenous communities and tribes. In the Arab zone, native lands and mores were to be safeguarded from colonial intrusions, while customized, modernizing reforms produced the conditions favorable to the long-term assimilation or fusion of the two realms. In the meantime, the respective aptitudes of the Arab and European races were to be commonly associated by "industry" or economic and cultural ties, mediated by specialized institutions and laws and reconciled to the requirements of a modern society.

While the Saint-Simonian "family" of decision makers seemed to hold the upper hand in Algeria by 1845, their inherent disagreements were nonetheless pronounced and related primarily to the degree and duration of military involvement in the development of the colony. One camp, dominated by Prosper Enfantin, conceded a temporary role for the army, to last only as long as military pacification remained incomplete. For Enfantin, patriarch of the Saint-Simonian movement in Paris, long-lasting military rule was detrimental to the industrial and political maturity of the colony, and as the din of battle receded, he expected generals and captains to yield to prefects and mayors. General Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de Lamoricière tended to agree with Enfantin, his former mentor, and in the 1840s, he earmarked specific colonial zones for civilian self-rule, capital investment, and industrial development. In time, however, Lamoricière would become less convinced of the utility in associating the "sparse and unproductive" Arab population of Algeria and would grow increasingly tired of Enfantin's sermonizing and turn to mysticism. Eventually, he would break ranks with the Father and spearhead his own modernizing enterprises in the western province of Oran. Ismaÿl Urbain, finally, synthesized the positions of Bugeaud and Enfantin and, unlike Lamoricière, regarded the participation of the natives as key to the improvement and progress of the colony. He worked to establish a rehabilitated Arab dominion in the interior, safe from colonial trespasses during the phase of reform and under the direct command of specialized officers and agents. By 1847, Urbain had gained a powerful ally and convert in the Duke of Aumale, governor general of Algeria, and his particular "Arabophile" vision of co-

lonial association would come to prevail after the political convulsions of 1847–1849 had cast aside Bugeaud, Enfantin, and Lamoricière. The indigenous policies of France in the 1850s remained Saint-Simonian in their orientation to the extent that they were inspired by Urbain, who never forgot his debts to Enfantin, Lamoricière, and Aumale.

☽

On March 23, 1843, the Ministry of War ordered the transfer of thirty-four Muslim religious endowments in the city of Algiers to the public domain.[2] The decree soon provided the statutory template for similar injunctions targeting all the *hubus* and culminating with the royal ordinance of October 1, 1844, which subjected all realty transactions in Algeria to metropolitan regulatory codes.[3] To the French state and its civil laws were assigned the lands and properties attached to mosques, marabouts, *zawiyas* or "any Muslim religious establishment still operated by [independent] *wakils*." Moreover, the inalienable legal standing of the *hubus* was revoked retroactively in transactions involving European individuals or corporations: "Nevermore can a sale between Europeans and natives, at any time and in any form, be annulled on the basis of the inalienability of the *hubus*."[4]

In the heat of its brutal contest with Abd al-Qadir, the French government had opted to break the financial backbone of Muslim institutions by confiscating their revenue-generating assets. In various subdivisions, the measure was roundly criticized as self-defeating and counterproductive, and soon enough, large-scale insurrections rippled unabated throughout the Algerian Tell. In April 1845, the rebellion of Sharif Bou Maza, "garlanded with prophecies and miraculous legends," engulfed the Dahra, Chélif, Ouarsenis, Titteri, and Hodna.[5] In May and July, insurgencies spread from the plains of Titteri to the approaches of Kabylie. In September, Abd al-Qadir went on the offensive again, his operations culminating with the siege of Qubbat Sidi Brahim, south of Oran. Deprived of the material sustenance of the *hubus*, local courthouses, schools, and mosques were closed as their personnel migrated in droves seeking livelihood or patronage in the faraway cities of Fez, Tunis, or Cairo. Circle captains were deprived of their most capable native aides or informants and watched anxiously as their Arab interlocutors were reduced to "the destitute, the infirm, and the decrepit; all with the least appreciation for the values and mission of France, and all asserting themselves purely by preaching . . . a fanatical rejection of them."[6]

TABLE 4.1

Indigenous Primary Schools and Students in Algiers, 1837–1850

Year	Primary Schools	Students	Students per School
1837	25	695	27.8
1841	24	600	25.0
1845	14	230	16.4
1850	15	N/A	N/A

SOURCE: AOM 22S/1.

The colonial takeover of the *hubus* resulted from a swell of legal and political injunctions passed between 1839 and 1844, largely in response to the rekindling of Abd al-Qadir's anticolonial struggle. Although first sanctioned by the royal ordinance of August 21, 1839, and subsequently by the ministerial decree of December 9, 1841, the confiscation of Muslim endowments was not directly or completely implemented until the amplifications of March 23, 1843.[7] The numerous rulings on the *hubus* between 1839 and 1843 were then consolidated by the royal ordinance of October 1, 1844. The immediate impact of the events and rulings of 1839–1844 on Muslim educational establishments is made evident in Table 4.1, which tallies native primary schools and pupils in the city of Algiers between 1837 and 1850. It shows that, whereas their numbers had held steady from 1837 to 1841, primary schools and students declined precipitously between 1841 and 1845, before appearing to stabilize again after 1845, albeit at far lower levels. The statistical distribution implies that an otherwise constant count of Algerine primary schools, with near zero growth or decline from 1837 to 1841, experienced severe disturbances between 1841 and 1845, causing their numbers and student bodies to decline by 42 and 62 percent, respectively.

A comparable glance at educational trends in the city of Constantine on the eve of its conquest by the French army in 1837 and following a decade of colonial rule further suggests that the institutional setbacks in Algiers were not isolated, but related to wide-ranging deterioration at all levels of Muslim schooling. Table 4.2 reveals that, between 1837 and 1847, primary (*kuttabs* and *msids*) and secondary (*madrasas*) schools in Constantine declined by 65 and 86 percent, respectively. The number of *zawiyas*, which were more dependent on the material support of local communities and heavily discriminated against by the colonial authorities after 1845, decreased by 91 percent, in direct relation to the drastic reduction in their total membership from 583 in 1837 to 50 in 1847. In aggregate, nearly three quarters of the city's primary and secondary

TABLE 4.2

Indigenous Schools and Students in Constantine, 1837 and 1847

	Year			
	1837		1847	
School Level	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
Kuttab/msid	86	1,350	30	470
Zawiya	35	583	3	50
Madrasa	7	117	1	10
Total	128	2,050	34	530

SOURCE: AOM 22S/1.

establishments were abandoned during the decade in question, with a proportionate decline in the total number of students.

The statistics in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 relate only to developments in Algiers and Constantine and cannot fully explain on their own the sudden collapse of Muslim institutions of learning in Algeria in the mid-1840s. They nonetheless corroborate testimonies by bureau agents imputing the general ruin of native societies to the immoderate scale of colonial expropriations in the wake of the military campaigns and legal enactments of 1839–1844. Furthermore, we know from the trends profiled previously in Figure 2.1 that the colony's Muslim population declined steadily between 1830 and 1856, thus suggesting that the swift demise of indigenous schools had less to do with abrupt demographic fluctuations than with a systemwide assault on their supporting institutional infrastructure. *Hubus* records detailing the changing rates of revenues funneled into Muslim schools—indispensable for a complete picture of the state of native education between 1839 and 1844—are regrettably lacking. Yet, the systemic dimensions of the adverse trends charted by Tables 4.1 and 4.2 may be substantiated by a closer examination of the colonial inventory of productive lands, which catalogued all income-generating realty transferred to the French public domain, including the former *hubus*.

Colonial censuses and cadastral surveys recorded important increases in European demographics and landholdings in Algeria in the 1840s. Between 1843 and 1850, the European population more than doubled from 56,800 to 120,962, whereas the area of French-held productive lands expanded fivefold from 28,000 to 138,000 hectares.[8] To relativize these broad statistical trends and attempt at least a partial outline of their consequences for native landholders, Table 4.3 calculates the rates of change in European demographics and public or private land acquisitions over the same period of time. It reveals that the remarkable 24.8

percent growth in the size of the European population in 1843–1844 was still far outpaced by the staggering 75.0 percent increase in French holdings of productive lands for the same year. Put differently, the land area transferred to the colonial public domain (measured in hectares) relative to the population of *colons* increased by 40.2 percent in 1843–1844. The scale and pace with which productive assets were placed at the disposal of the *colons* leaves little doubt that such resources were made immediately available through summary seizures or confiscations rather than by the patient development of fallow, uncultivated, or unclaimed tracts of land, although all these had also been declared vacant and transferred to the state by the ordinances of October 1, 1844, and July 21, 1846. The scale of land transfers to the public domain was not dampened until passage of the law of June 16, 1851, which restored the inviolability of certain tribal assets or holdings.

Clearly, the initiation of "total warfare" against Abd al-Qadir had afforded the colonial state the opportunity to displace or dispossess Algeria's natives on an extraordinary scale and to expedite the transfer of tens of thousands of productive acres to the public domain. A similar dramatic expansion in the ratio of land tenure to population was not approached again until 1849, when the passage of the National Assembly bill of December 1848 and the integration of the colony into the French patrimony opened up once more vast territories to European settlers and investors. In 1849 and 1850, despite a strong rise in European demographics, hectares per capita still increased by 29.8 and 42.3 percent, respectively, more than doubling the area of productive lands available for settlement, cultivation, and speculation. The decrees of 1839–1844, ratified in conjunction with a massive colonial land grab

TABLE 4.3

Annual Percentage Changes in Total European Population, Public Ownership of Productive Lands, and Hectares per Capita, 1844–1850

Year	Annual Percentage Change in Total Population	Annual Percentage Change in Total Hectares Held	Annual Percentage Change in Hectares per Capita
1844	24.8	75.0	40.2
1845	34.4	12.2	–16.5
1846	2.6	9.1	6.3
1847	4.2	3.3	–0.8
1848	6.4	8.1	1.6
1849	10.4	43.3	29.8
1850	1.1	43.8	42.3

SOURCE: AOM F^{80}/1087; and F^{80}/1108–1109.

and enacted to break the self-sufficiency of rural communities and reduce their ability or willingness to sustain the resistance of the emir, must thus be regarded as dimensions of France's policy of total occupation after 1840. While traveling through the Algerian countryside in 1846, Alexis de Tocqueville recounted coming across indigenous communities disoriented by the lack of leadership, compressed by the loss of their lands, famished by the destruction of their harvests, and scorched by the flames of war. In an oft-quoted passage from his *Rapport du 24 Mai 1847*, he recalled an institutional infrastructure extinguished by the spoliations of 1843–1844, too enfeebled to carry out the most basic social, legal, and economic functions.[9]

Remarkably, in voicing similar objections to the colonial excesses of 1843–1844, the officers of Arab affairs touched upon the fundamental incompatibilities between France's cultural mandate in Algeria and the stark economic logic of settler colonialism. The committed Saint-Simonians or Enfantinistes among them could not overlook the economic dimensions to the seemingly irreducible conflict of interests between colonizer and colonized. By clamoring for a segregated indigenous realm, sheltered from the basic drives of the settler economy and regulated by exceptional and customized decrees, they implicitly acknowledged the threat of the colonial thirst for native resources to the enduring pacification of local hearts and minds. Independent of doctrinal convictions, however, the notion of an Arab protectorate in the Algerian interior may have equally appealed to colonial agents who sought merely the fair medium (*le juste milieu*) between the extreme political options of exterminating or expelling the natives. In May 1844, Enfantin attempted to rationalize a more balanced approach to native governance in *L'Algérie*, his latest Saint-Simonian broadsheet:

> For the colony and for our own affairs to prosper, the indigenous population must first be destroyed, or evicted (*refoulée*), or pacified and administered. We must necessarily choose between these three solutions. The first is so repulsive to our conduct that it has never been proposed; the second was long attempted and the man who had most widely proclaimed and practiced it, Field Marshal Bugeaud himself, has now declared it impossible and absurd. Therefore, it is with the third option that we must actively busy ourselves.[10]

Regardless, the demands of the Arab Bureaux for an end to land expropriations provoked the enmity of the *colons* and catalyzed civilian demands for political integration into the metropole. In time, the polarized tensions between the civilian and military mandates would fracture the very family of Saint-Simonian disciples, but, for now, the unraveling of indigenous educational and religious structures after 1843 had hastened

the administrative maturation of the Arab Bureaux and helped open the door for their subsequent appropriation of indigenous affairs.

In November 1844, Eugène Daumas, director of Arab affairs, issued supplementary guidelines to the Charter of the Arab Bureaux in which he renewed the call for a rethinking of colonial governance more in line with the changing Muslim realities.[11] Sensing the impending defeat of Abd al-Qadir following the seizure of his roaming capital, or *smala*, on May 16, 1843, and the victory of General Bugeaud over the sultan of Morocco at Wadi Isly on August 14, 1844, Daumas asked Field Marshal Nicolas Jean-de-Dieu Soult, the incumbent minister of war, to empower his directorate to initiate its own comprehensive surveys of the internal workings of the Muslim faith and the private and protected lives of its adherents.[12] Daumas's stated aim was to reassess the remaining potential for Muslim defiance and devise novel approaches for "bringing the natives to accept [French] domination . . . with the least possible repugnance."[13] The new political itinerary bore the unmistakable, but unaccredited, imprint of Ismaÿl Urbain, who had supplied Daumas with elemental historical and sociological material for his report, in addition to its Saint-Simonian frame of reference.[14]

The initiatives of Daumas were further bolstered in 1845 with the timely publication of a bureau study that made a great impression on official perceptions of popular Islam in North Africa.[15] The analysis of Muslim confraternities (*ikhwan* = *khouan*) by the Saint-Cyrien captain Édouard de Neveu created a sensation in official circles and at the higher echelons of the Ministry of War.[16] Field Marshal Soult found the work particularly persuasive and offered to subsidize the costs of publishing a revised edition. Like Daumas, Urbain, Carette, and Richard, Neveu remains a key figure in the repertory of Arab Directorate officers who contributed to the development of the French "colonial vulgate on the nature of North African society."[17] His work on the native confraternities, *Les khouan: Ordres religieux chez les musulmans d'Algérie*—a title that to French ears could only evoke the terrible Vendéan insurrection and *Chouannerie* of 1793—warned Paris that the character of the Muslim challenge in Algeria had undergone substantive transformations since 1842.


According to Neveu, the military reversals suffered by Abd al-Qadir after 1841, combined with the gradual disintegration of his sultanate, had prompted the emir to rally to his cause more populist and clandestine forces, the *khouan* prominent among them. Centered around Sufi orders (*tariqas*) and lacking any proper patriotic definition, these unfamiliar confraternities were led by spiritual caliphs (*khulafa'* = *khalifas*) and, claimed Neveu, were thus mobilized by the most rudimen-

tary religious impulses. Consequently, Abd al-Qadir, who, until 1841, had carried out his struggle in the name of "Arab national" autonomy and sovereignty, had since declared holy war (*jihad*) against the colonial state and was appealing to his co-religionists on promises to overturn the intolerable dominion of Christian interlopers.[18] The colonial conflict, Neveu concluded, now pitted France against populations whose religious passions had been inflamed and energized by the manipulations of "the marabout" Abd al-Qadir. This "sort of Muslim Cromwell," as Tocqueville had concurrently taken to calling him, had transformed Islam into a political and military weapon:

> For [Abd al-Qadir], Arab and French are no longer on the scene; it is rather Muslim and Christian beliefs that preoccupy his mind; the national war dies out and disappears, the true religious struggle expands and develops.[19]

In retrospect, and despite his erroneous assumptions, Neveu had sensed correctly that the ideological stakes in the colonial war in Algeria had changed between 1841 and 1842. The intensification of the conflict with Abd al-Qadir came on the heels of the official decision in October 1840 to discard the limited colonial occupation of Algeria's coastal plains in favor of outright conquest (Map 4.1). In 1841, Bugeaud launched his campaign of scorched earth and "methodical devastation" to undercut the popular base of the emir's resistance and bring the war to a favorable decisive end. "One does not wage war with philanthropy," he informed the Chamber of Deputies. Henceforth, the Arabs must "never sow, reap, nor put to pasture without our permission."[20] Mobile warring columns (*colonnes guerroyantes*), led by generals Lamoricière, Louis-Eugène Cavaignac, Armand-Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, and Jean-Jacques Pélissier, were ordered into the heart of the beylik and, by 1844, had skirted the northern rim of the Sahara and entered the territories over which Ottoman sovereignty had rarely extended in the past and where local populations tended to match or exceed the productive capacities of the soil.

The advance of French troops proved cataclysmic to the political and moral economies of pre-Saharan Algeria and to the liminal existence of the pastoral and nomadic communities therein.[21] The invasion disrupted the seasonal activities and migrations of local groups, curtailed internal commerce, and interfered with religious pilgrimages and the social functions of the popular *tariqas*. By the same token, the campaign of colonial pacification now entered one of its most horrific chapters, with the extermination of the defenseless Sbéah tribes between June 1844 and August 1845 and of the Ouled Riah at the caves of the Dahra in June 1845.[22] What appeared to Neveu as rising religious fanaticism



MAP 4.1 French Colonial Expansion, 1830–1870. Source: *Encyclopédie Larousse*.

concocted by the marabout emir was, in reality, the desperate response of the tribes of the high plateaux and the pre-Sahara to the scale of colonial dispossession and destruction brought against them and their livelihood by Bugeaud and his generals.

Nevertheless, in identifying the culprits behind France's recent misfortunes in the colony, Neveu helped convince Minister of War Soult and other department heads of the wisdom in actively engaging the "intolerant and ignorant brand of religion" being practiced and preached in local mosques and *zawiyas*. Neveu warned the readers of *Les khouan* that military victory over the forces and allies of Abd al-Qadir would amount to naught if not attended by comprehensive efforts to mollify current Muslim beliefs, control the undergirding networks of institutions and confraternities that nourished them, and oversee the future moral development of Muslim children. To this end, he offered

his booklet as a first step toward the thorough investigation of the religious doctrines of the Sufi confraternities and their channels of dissemination. He advised his peers in the Directorate of Arab Affairs to establish a "system of constant surveillance" operating above a network of "trustworthy spies" who were to infiltrate the subversive confraternities, render to the officers "accounts of the opinions or counsels given to the *khouan* by the *khalifa* of each order," and thus enable the authorities to "elevate obstacles before the diffusion among the populations of the seditious ideas fomented by these chiefs."[23]

Finally, Neveu requested that the Ministry of War redirect, with the help of the Arab Bureaux, the goals of colonial education toward developing and training an alternate religious leadership with which to oversee the Muslim communities. With this, Neveu had advanced a basic component of the Saint-Simonian hopes for cultural association: the making of a new, more amenable Muslim elite, formed in the colonial schools and "raised in the care" of the Arab Bureaux. The officers of Arab affairs were to draw the necessary conclusions from their upcoming investigations and devise "a common belief" with which to indoctrinate the soon-to-be formed corps of '*ulama*:

> Let us oppose these fanatical impostors [the *khalifas*] who exploit the ignorance of people, with other Muslims raised in our care, and who, having gained the confidence [of the native population], will speak to it in the name of a common belief, and initiate for it an era of peace and tranquility. We thus express the hope that the education of Muslim children will become the constant object of our perseverance and efforts. Education destroys prejudice, prevents the thoughtless adoption of the ideas of others, returns things to their rightful place, provides the means to compare and comprehend; it will make fall—let us not doubt this—the many absurd beliefs that the Arabs maintain simply because they are not allowed to debate them.[24]

Accordingly, after 1845, the attitude of French officialdom toward Muslim religious and educational institutions turned from calculated disregard to near obsession with their role in disseminating subversive doctrine and mobilizing anticolonial sedition. More significantly, such reevaluations of the effective means with which to dominate Muslim society proved decisive in augmenting the executive autonomy and authority of the Arab Directorate. On the ideological level, the primacy of Saint-Simonian notions of political association and social reform among the corps of colonial officers, with their commitments to Enfantin's injunctions to "re-organize Arab society in a grand *lieu d'essai*," were essential in motivating them to trespass the initial parameters of their license to operate among the natives. However, without the evident

bankruptcy in France's colonial practices to date, the occasion would not have presented itself for the Arabist officers to seize the reins of native governance after 1844, redesign the necessary instruments or structures for their controlled experimentations with colonial pacification, and, finally, apply their theories within the geographic laboratory of the Arab territories.

In February 1845, the Central Directorate of Arab Affairs was instructed to initiate the extensive and far-reaching surveys or *grandes enquêtes* called for by Daumas and to recommend solutions and means for correcting the government's "closed ignorance on Algeria." On April 15, the "birth certificate of French Algeria" was amended to institute distinct colonial and native administrative jurisdictions. By royal ordinance, the colony was divided into civilian, mixed, and military territories. The military territories were to be ruled exclusively by the army and its Arab Bureaux. Europeans were barred, in principle, from settling in these districts, except with special dispensation from the military authorities, in which case they were expected to abide by the executive prescriptions of local bureau chiefs. The mixed territories contained a significant number of European *colons*, although not enough to warrant providing the complete range of municipal services.[25] As such, they were regarded as transitional administrative districts and were governed exceptionally by army commanders acting in the capacity of civilian commissioners. Finally, territories where Europeans enjoyed numerical superiority were regulated by French law and fell under the authority of the new Directorate General for Civil Affairs, which amalgamated the portfolios of the general prosecutor, the director of the interior, the director of finance, and the civilian director of Arab affairs.[26] The minister of war expressed the hope that with these amendments would finally shine "the light of experience [upon] the nights" of colonial governance and dispel "all the uncertainties and difficulties" that had plagued Paris until then.[27]

The Central Directorate of Arab Affairs now had its "zones of control," but the official launch of its "great inquiries" was momentarily delayed by the last-ditch effort of Antoine-François Demoyencourt, director of the Arab College of Paris, to revive his moribund establishment. In August 1845, he sent the minister of war a petition with the unwieldy title "Project for a General Educational Plan for the Use of the Young Indigenes from Algeria Being Raised in France" (*Projet d'un plan général d'éducation à l'usage des jeunes indigènes de l'Algérie élevés en France*), in which he proposed a new curriculum of general studies, geared to dispense to his Muslim interns "all the essential knowledge that any choice of career should require them to possess."[28] Among the

general topics of study, he listed "French grammar and vocabulary, European history and geography, elementary mathematics, the rules of accounting, linear and figurative drawing, some notions of hygiene and practical medicine, elements of general and experimental physics and chemistry, and, finally, written Arabic." Completion of this program of studies, he reasoned, would enable his Muslim students to pursue careers in industry, manufacturing, or agriculture or to serve in the colony as indigenous instructors or informants for the military authorities.

The response of Field Marshal Soult to Demoyencourt's latest proposal captured the sea change in the military's attitude toward unmitigated educational ventures involving Muslim Algerians and provided a starting point for the counterproposal of the Central Directorate of Arab Affairs. Indeed, while Demoyencourt had regularly benefited from the support of the Ministry of War since 1839, his ideas were coolly received by the same body in 1845 and were forwarded to Georges Fellmann, now head of the First Bureau in its Directorate of Algerian Affairs, for a final word. Fellmann, who we will recall had served with Demoyencourt eleven years earlier on the jury receiving the deposition of Henri Dutrône, found the plan of the director of the Arab College "defective and incomplete," as it failed to offer any realistic assessment of the social conditions, mental capacities, and cultural habits of the natives. He now seized the opportunity to reprove Demoyencourt in a report that introduced in most emphatic terms the new directives for indigenous instruction in Algeria.[29]

THE DIRECTORATE STRIKES BACK

> As to the indigenous instructors currently in function, we have no hope of attaching them to our cause. Imbued with their false principles, animated with a relentless hatred for Christians, and blinded by fanaticism, they will always endeavor to alienate from us the incipient generation, when in reality it is only on [this generation] that we can rely today.
>
> —Directorate of the Interior and of Colonization, August 22, 1846[30]

As expected, Fellmann reiterated the memorandum of Daumas, laced with the admonitions of Neveu. He warned of the risks involved in confronting the realities of Muslim society without a deeper understanding of the inner workings of its governing institutions. The French army in Algeria, he stressed, was presently locked in murderous contest with "an ignorant, suspicious and ferocious fanaticism," bred and bolstered by

long centuries of political neglect and moral decline. Viable policy making in the present context therefore should seek to reform native mores in "the mildest, most indirect manner" (*un développement gradué*), by professing outwardly to protect the religious concerns of the Arabs, while, in effect, "modifying imperceptibly their moral dispositions" toward the society of France. Fellmann understood civilization to mean "opening [the] minds [of Muslims] to the marvels of modernity . . . , and thus affording them the opportunity to come to know themselves, their past, and their present [free from the fetters of] religious superstitions."

Yet, as a first step, Muslim legal, religious, and cultural establishments were to be restored to their traditional functions by the Directorate of Arab Affairs and introduced incrementally to changing local conditions and aptitudes, until a "genuine desire" to embrace French mores had been gently instilled in the natives. In other words, Muslim Algerians first had to evolve within their own customs and structures, until their association with French culture had elicited a sincere determination and willingness on their part to raise themselves from their moral and intellectual abasement:

> By protecting religion and mores through a skillful and generous silence, and by leaving the emancipated spirit to decide the form and the moment of the religious and social reaction, one can avoid all dangers. There is a veil to tear; a veil that for many, covers the most cherished illusions: familial traditions, respect for the ancestors, pride for the faith; the Muslims should be made to raise it by themselves; for if we were to place our hand upon it, our intervention would be declared profane and sacrilegious by all. This indirect way that shall make us prevail over mores and ideas, is education.[31]

Taken as a whole, the Fellmann directives advocated a complete reversal in France's cultural policies to date, and, as such, they were not without their public detractors, with strong criticism coming especially from the nearby headquarters of the governor general of Algeria, Field Marshal Bugeaud, Duke of Isly.[32] Indeed, at the same time that the minister of war was yielding to Fellmann's denunciations and discarding the petition by Demoyencourt, Bugeaud was placing his considerable political and military clout behind the alternative political program put forth by his principal assistant and interpreter, Léon Roches (1810–1901).[33] Bugeaud, France's inveterate warrior, subscribed to a politically constricted view of the civilizing mission, and, as governor general, he occasionally inveighed against the growing tendency in the Arab Directorate toward self-determination and unilateral supervision over the natives. Deeply suspicious of intellectualism as a rule and never a proponent of Enfantin's "detestable schemes and illusions," the royalist general and

hero of Isly preferred to base the security of the French presence on military intimidation and continuance of his "great families policy" (*politique des grandes familles*), with which he assigned limited administrative and policing duties to traditional Muslim chieftains and relied on them thereafter to control and regulate their kinsmen or followers in conjunction with military superintendents.

Between January 1844 and March 1845, and through the pen of his trusted aide Roches, the governor general lobbied unremittingly for restricting cultural association and French instruction to the scions of the "Arab nobility of the sword," with the aim of imparting to them the language skills needed for them to serve as "specialized indigenous functionaries" or "mere cogs in the wheels of the administration of the land":

> It is the sons of the great families alone that we must educate and attach to our cause since for a long time to come, we will still need to control the country through its aristocracy. Many people accept with eagerness the idea that there is among the Arabs a reaction of the people against the nobility, and that the hands of the nobles are now too weak to rule. It is a great error; the bonds which link the vassal to the lord still hold all their sway; it is in response to the voice of this aristocracy of birth and holiness that all Algeria raised itself and supported against France a struggle that will long amaze posterity; . . . and it is to the call of this same aristocracy [that the tribes] will rise again en masse against us, should we cease to be just, strong, and vigilant.[34]

At the basis of Bugeaud's reasoning was his belief that attempts to educate the natives "en masse," even in the most distant future, constituted a threat rather than a pillar to the colonial regime. France, he insisted, had "never obtained anything from these people [the Arabs] save by force; in vain, have we often attempted . . . to use means of persuasion."[35] To make the point with his critics, Bugeaud frequently brandished the historical example of Jugurtha, Rome's great Numidian adversary and graduate of the republican academies.

The disparaging of the Roches project by the specialists for Arab affairs, despite the sponsorship of the powerful Duke of Isly, was indicative of the newfound powers of the Central Directorate and the propagation of Saint-Simonian principles throughout the Ministry of War. Roches's petition, in the eyes of its censors, was too impetuous and fell far short of the stated moral *œuvre* of France in Algeria. For Arabist and Saint-Simonian officers, oppression and ignorance in the colony were directly related to the feudal nature of the Muslim polity. To recommend, as did Roches, to preserve Arab society indefinitely in its current moral slavery and to regard its archaic "aristocracy of holiness and

birth" as the cultural keystone in future relations with the natives was therefore a nefarious proposition:

> The project of Mr. Léon Roches appears to me to start from error to the extent that it does not concern itself by any means with *primary* education, which in Algeria as in France must form the basis for all instruction. To be sure, we must aspire ultimately to assimilate the French and Muslim races, but independently of the inherent difficulties in such a task—the successful achievement of which we can only entrust to the passage of time, we must not lose sight of the fact that our primordial goal is not to extend the benefits of instruction to a few Algerians, who will subsequently become *de-nationalized* in the eyes of their co-religionists, but to steal from ignorance the rising future generations.[36]

For these officers, the "inducement" of a new colonial reality was the most dependable yardstick with which to measure the progress of their mission, and it primarily implied success in "beckoning the Arab population *in its entirety* onto the very terrain of French society's interests and labor."[37] Roches had therefore ignored a vital detail made amply clear by Fellmann: for the Arabs to discern on their own the benefits of France's civilization, they first had to be properly educated and freed from their moral prejudices and old social hierarchies.

The repudiation of Roches—and, by extension, his powerful patron—was thus the first salvo in a series of maneuvers instigated by officers associated with the Arab Directorate to evict Bugeaud from the governorship of Algeria.[38] With the waning of the war with Abd al-Qadir, the renowned absolutism and dogmatism of the field marshal fell quickly out of favor with politicians in Paris and grated on a growing number of generals in Algeria: Lamoricière, Cavaignac, Marie-Alphonse Bedeau, and Nicolas Changarnier were united mostly by their common abhorrence of the imperious governor general.[39] "Sniping everywhere. Our generals do not get along," complained Lieutenant Colonel Montagnac to his nephew on July 22, 1845.[40] In Paris, meanwhile, Bugeaud's Saint-Simonian and liberal opponents alike voiced outrage at his destructive *razzias* and premeditated massacres of Arabs. During the next two years, the unseating of Bugeaud was orchestrated quietly and for a variety of personal motives by Soult, Lamoricière, Urbain, and Changarnier in military circles, in timely concert with more voluble and stinging public tirades against the governor general by Tocqueville and Alphonse de Lamartine in the Chamber of Deputies and by Enfantin in the pages of *L'Algérie*. Its issue of July 12, 1845, dedicated to exposing the morally reprehensible extermination of the Ouled Riah on the orders of General Pélissier, thundered its disapproval of the current regime in Algeria and captured the sentiments of the colonial and metropolitan opposi-

tion to the graphic methods of pacification of "Bugeaud and his sect of ravagers": "Will the government understand at last that the labor of France in Algeria must be a labor of civilization, and not an act of barbarism?"[41] Growing political pressure in Algiers and Paris constrained the governor general to announce in August 1845 his decision to abdicate his office prematurely.[42] Replaced in the interim by Lamoricière on September 1, Bugeaud eventually returned to France and retired definitively from politics in June 1847. The supremacy of the Directorate of Arab Affairs seemed certain, and Enfantin congratulated his Saint-Simonian brethren in the military bureaux for the fact that "no longer would anyone be allowed to direct the affairs of Algeria, unless in accord with us."[43]

Yet, all did not sit well between Enfantin and his Saint-Simonian colleagues in the directorate. The royal ordinance of April 15, 1845, had failed to meet the Father's full and great expectations. His military disciples, he noted, had abjured his grand economic vision for Algeria for the sake of a more practical undertaking of colonial association. He publicly indicted the ordinance for having sired a "confusing [administrative] monstrosity," a label taken up with relish by later commentators to denounce the general regime of the Arab Bureaux.[44] Where he had hoped to associate European and Arab interests through racialized divisions of land and labor, where he had dreamed of integrating colony and metropole in a wide network and infrastructure of communications and finance and thus create the economic and historical prelude for the transformation of the mother country itself, Enfantin now saw only bifurcated and dissociated military and civilian reservations. In his letter to Carette of April 25, he lashed out at the military authorities in general and bemoaned the betrayal of friends who had ostensibly forgotten "how they had suckled our milk." Enfantin was specifically irritated with Lamoricière, whose quest for the governor generalship he had repeatedly championed in the editorials of *L'Algérie*. His disenchantment with the military would only grow stronger in the following years, and his differences with Lamoricière would come to a head in July 1848 when the general, then serving as interim minister of war, rebuked the Supreme Father for apparently angling for an appointment in the new government in Paris.[45]

Enfantin's inconstant views on the military regime in Algeria and his convoluted relations with Lamoricière require further elaboration. For the Father of Saint-Simonism, with the steady pacification of the colony, the necessary but temporary rule of the military was to make way for the industrialists and financiers who were to develop and improve the land and bring about the associated union of the French and Arab zones.

To this end, he long held that ideally the colony might be set up by a special civil ministry or as a semidependent vice royalty. His attacks on Bugeaud, therefore, must not be construed as a principled objection to military authoritarianism. Decidedly paternalistic and antiparliamentarian himself, Enfantin was forever seeking an "enlightened despot" to nurture his doctrines to fruition in Algeria.[46] He was supportive of Bugeaud when he believed the governor general sympathetic to his particular thoughts on colonial development. In truth, Enfantin's *Colonisation de l'Algérie* shared more in common than the title with Bugeaud's own *De la colonisation de l'Algérie*. Both men were equally incensed by the ordinance of April 15, and Enfantin manifested his displeasure with the governor general only when the latter impudently mocked his utopian schemes before Carette. The Father then set his hopes on Henri of Orléans, Duke of Aumale (1822–1897), cut from the same authoritarian cloth as Bugeaud, but with the added advantage of being a prince of the blood. Governor General Aumale, however, displayed the same lukewarm support as his predecessor and preferred to confer with Urbain—his political advisor on Arab affairs since November 1843—than with Enfantin, the publisher, in Aumale's opinion, of "a decidedly mediocre newspaper."[47]

In late 1846, Enfantin returned to Lamoricière just as the general's star was fast rising in the constellation of celebrated *Africains*. A steadfast Saint-Simonian and former student of Auguste Comte, Lamoricière seemed destined to satisfy the Father's criteria for the colonization of Algeria by the "association of capital with labor." The general looked particularly intent on polishing his public image and playing up his historical destiny after the personal surrender of Emir Abd al-Qadir to him on December 21, 1847, and his accession to the Ministry of War in June 1848. But Lamoricière harbored political aspirations of his own and was unwilling to chain his distinguished career to lesser fates. Fifteen years of direct contact with the natives, with near continuous campaigning against them, had grizzled the former Enfantiniste, and he believed that his grueling experiences of war trumped the bookish wisdom of the Father. Having long struggled for restricted jurisdiction over the Arabs, the "implacable and exclusive" Lamoricière was now loath to offer unconditionally his hand in equal partnership to the "revolutionary mania" of Père Enfantin. According to Charles-André Julien, the Parisian workers' uprising during the bloody "days of June" (*les journées de Juin*) 1848 had stripped the "old Saint-Simonian" soldier of any remaining liberal pretenses, although Tocqueville had long before observed that "not an atom of liberalism" was to be found in the vast, but "bizarre and incomplete" intellect of Lamoricière.[48] From his interview with the general

in 1841, the author of *Democracy in America* recalled encountering a man "certainly not to be accused of exaggerated philanthropy," with "great faults, and even greater vices . . . an ambition without bounds or limits, an extreme disdain for human life, . . . [and] yet the only officer . . . who understands that a civil society cannot be governed by the sword alone." Lamoricière's mobile views on the army's rights in Algeria stirred acrimony among his African brothers in arms, especially among Bugeaud loyalists who resented his popularity in journalistic, parliamentary, and royal circles as much as his opposition to the colonial projects of the Duke of Isly.[49] "The man [Lamoricière] believes in the power of the press and manipulates it; thinks the civilian will kill the soldier in Africa and sides with the civilian," hissed Bugeaud's protégé Saint-Arnaud in January 1846.[50]

Indeed, Lamoricière was immersed in his own experiments with capitalist colonization in the western province of Oran, where he hoped to attract enough investors and settlers to found fourteen civilian communes within the triangle of Oran-Mostaganem-Mascara.[51] Thus, in 1848, when Enfantin seemed to press the resourceful general for a ministerial post, Lamoricière hinted that, in trying times, governments had little use for defrocked apostles. Grievously injured by the cold shoulder from a former ally, Enfantin turned away from the colony to refocus his interest in the old Saint-Simonian project for a canal in Egypt between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. He would turn his attention to Algerian matters anew in the late 1850s, when Napoleon III appeared to him for a moment as the long-awaited savior. By 1849, however, the Father had effectively exited the Algerian scene, leaving behind a Saint-Simonian current more firmly in the hands of the officers of Arab affairs. With Saint-Simonian *Africains* at the helm of colonial reforms for much of the 1850s and 1860s, ironically, the presence of Enfantin in Algeria was never greater than when he was absent.

In their moment of triumph, the military Saint-Simonians may well have been justified in paying no heed to the Father's prescient warnings. In 1845, few bureau chiefs were disposed to appreciate the administrative monstrosity with which, Enfantin believed, they sooner or later would need to contend. In *Colonisation de l'Algérie*, he had anticipated that preserving the status quo in the Arab territories, without associating their economic development with that of the European sector, would only facilitate their takeover by one-sided colonial interests. To make matters worse for the prospects of association, the royal ordinance of 1845 had rearranged the military domain according to a criterion that was open to variability and change and therefore prone to generate jurisdictional overlaps between two authorities with very disparate rules

of conduct. As long as European settlements on the fringes of the military territories were unimportant, the administration of the Arab Bureaux remained relatively unified. However, as the scope of colonization expanded and greater numbers of Europeans poured into the mixed or the Arab territories, the changing demographics on the ground obviated the very precondition for military rule. Faced with a growing and inimical settler population, as well as a relentless drive to endow European Algeria with metropolitan institutions, the perimeter of the Arab territories seemed constantly on the defensive after 1845.

As early as September 28, 1847, convinced by the *colon* lobby of the military obstructions to the civic and commercial development of Algeria, Paris created municipal councils in six population centers that were "sufficiently developed" to warrant the application of civil law: Algiers, Blidah, Oran, Mostaganem, Bône, and Philippeville. Thus was the way opened for the removal of mixed territories from the purview of the army and for the creation of large colonial estates and settlements that invariably spelled the dissolution of the very indigenous social groups and structures upon which the jurisdiction of the bureaux depended and was based. What, then, was the use for Arab Bureaux without Arabs to administer? This question would preoccupy the Central Directorate to the very end.

BUREAUX OF INQUIRY

> The exact analysis of the Arab is a dark labyrinth that is never lighted but by weak, accidental gleams, and in which it is almost impossible to walk without missteps.
>
> —Captain Charles Richard, Arab Bureau, Orléansville, 1848[52]

For the Ministry of War, the main concern behind the great inquiries of 1846–1847 was to update its intelligence on the natives and prepare its files for the post–Abd al-Qadir era in Algeria. With the fading power of the emir, commanders on the ground hailed the opportunity to push military reconnaissance and scientific exploration into hitherto uncharted districts or realms and enhance the nature and quality of their information on the colony. Governor General Aumale, the fourth son of King Louis-Philippe and to whom Neveu had dedicated *Les khouan* in 1845, hoped also to annul the devastation wrought by the recent campaigns and return to the overarching imperatives of durable pacification. Aware of the potential for the new inquiries to validate once and for all the proficiency of the Central Directorate to preside over native affairs, he enlisted his most capable lieutenants to contribute authorita-

tively to the proceedings and commissioned them to fashion from their collected data the common procedural and intellectual framework for future Arab policies. In Paris, the scientific undertaking was coordinated and supervised by Daumas, Urbain, and Alexandre Bellemare, working in regular consultation with divisional directors Lamoricière in Oran, Bedeau in Constantine, and Jean-François de Bar (succeeded in October 1847 by Changarnier) in Algiers. Submitted to the governor general between February and December 1847, the officers' final reports seemed to complete the executive appropriation of the native portfolio by the Directorate of Arab Affairs. Their examinations of the current cultural predicaments of France and unique attention to the inequities in its colonial rulings would ground military policy toward the natives until 1870 and inspire directly the fundamental reforms of Napoleon III in the 1860s.[53] At the very least, as Governor General Viala Charon testified before the Council of Government on December 24, 1849, the "invaluable content" of the reports of 1847, "conceived in the most wise and liberal spirit," confirmed that the "military chiefs who conquered Africa . . . were no less skillful . . . in the labor of peace as in the art of war."[54]

To be sure, the investigations of 1846–1847 pioneered more lucid assessments of native defiance and occasioned critical diagnoses of the conduct of policy in Algeria and the usefulness of French customs for the Muslim populations. Due in part to the input of Saint-Simonian thinking, the surveys introduced new cultural referents with which to represent and rationalize native behavior. Largely downplayed in the documents of 1847, for example, are the irrefutable faith in the universal validity of secular instruction and the pseudoscientific canon on the unchanging predetermined nature of the Arabs. Racial or moral differences, in this case, were attributed to historical impediments or sociological customs that could be confronted or reformed in the *longue durée*. Lamoricière even commended, "but without envying," the Muslims for their religious fervor and laid blame for the recent political setbacks at the feet of officials who had failed to negotiate the cultural distance between France and North Africa. He vilified such colonial administrators who had "behaved as if the Arabs wished only to secularize [Muslim] justice and public instruction, and when none proved true, decided to preach their doctrine through the barrel of a gun."[55]

In addition to any decidedly Saint-Simonian cultural impulses, the great inquiries were also motivated by the internal reconfigurations of executory powers within the colonial government between 1844 and 1846. More specifically, because they were conducted under the aegis of the rising Directorate of Algerian Affairs, the scientific surveys were

especially attuned to consolidating the authority of the latter in opposition to other colonial or metropolitan agencies and putting into place untested colonial structures, policies, and routines. The priority of Fellmann, Daumas, and Urbain during the investigations of 1847 was to prepare the institutional mechanisms—that is, public instruction, land and tax laws, divisions of labor—with which the Arabs were to be administered henceforth, but also to dispose them in ways that formalized the control of their agents over native governance. Accordingly, discursive representations of the natives were also changed to reflect the new priorities within the colonial government, and redeployed in support of specific policies largely without administrative precedence and, at times, even at odds with the prerogatives or procedures of other governmental departments. In the end, the reports of 1847 substantiated Fellmann's appeal for the discontinuance of prevailing routines and the dismissal of their incumbent sponsors. Yet, in light of the experimental quality of the new procedures, the reports also included startling comments by Lamoricière to "expect nothing for the foreseeable future," as well as recommendations by General Ferdinand Lapasset to undo the harm inflicted upon Muslim establishments since 1830 by restituting to the *hubus* their assets and "rebuilding the edifice that our presence or clumsiness has torn down."[56]

To this extent, the verdicts that issued from the great inquiries challenge the appropriateness of ascribing an immutable ideological spirit and content to the French civilizing mission in Algeria. Clearly, the political rationalities of France did not operate consistently across the length and breadth of its colonial rule. Nor did its cultural discourses commit unwaveringly to shared and fixed ideological referents, as contends, for example, James Malarkey in his study of the Archeological Society of Constantine.[57] To be sure, the clatter of departmental infighting and internecine dissension tends to get muted in historical analyses that concentrate exclusively or unduly on the "implicit value judgments" or the "extraordinary redundancies" within civilizational ideology and discourses. The story of Saint-Simonism in Algeria shows, however, that colonial policy and imagery were equally inflected by the variable and fractional practices of colonial rule and the competing and changing networks of solidarity within, each with its particular perspective and understanding of the colonial condition. The Polytechnicien Charon seemed to argue the point again in February 1850, when he was called upon by the military command to obstruct the repeated interventions in colonial matters by the Republican Assembly. The governor general and his supporter, Gustave Mercier-Lacombe, cited the drawbacks of "business as usual" in the colony and, with measured scorn, highlighted the

standards that had set apart the divisional surveys of 1846–1847 from the previous a priori analyses by the civil authority. They warned the parliamentarians of the imprudence and irresponsibility of returning to the uniform template of assimilation:

> We could have enacted, based on the reports published [since the inauguration of the Second Republic in February 1848], still newer rules, more in line with the perspectives of individuals who judge questions a priori, and without sufficient understanding of the context in which we are placed; but these provisions would have been inapplicable or dangerous. We cannot delude ourselves into thinking that the natives, even the most devoted to our cause, do not loathe our education. Many examples have proven it in obvious ways. We would thus set ourselves up for failure if we were to introduce in the Muslim schools, as a matter of principle, elements other than those which they practice today. It is under this acute angle that we must approach this delicate matter; the angle will widen gradually, and we will later arrive at the goal which we are able to foresee, but cannot as of yet realize.[58]

Indeed, only the investment of the Arab Directorate in ensuring its own political stake in the colonial regime can begin to explain the contradictions in a program of reforms that aimed to enhance and invigorate the political and cultural autonomy of native Algeria merely to reduce it more completely in the end. As we shall see, the various guidelines issued after 1848 purporting to pacify the Arabs with a semblance of protected sovereignty over their own affairs were never to lead to an effective government by the Arabs and for the Arabs, but only to tighter control by France. Thus, when Fellmann and others contradicted the gist and logic of colonial assimilation and worked to preserve the Muslim social order, it was to better immerse and dissolve the latter in the cultural norms of France. Traditional mosques, courthouses, and schools were to endure until the Arab Bureaux had created the colonial counterparts in which to train an alternative generation of Muslim preachers, jurists, and instructors. In the same vein, none other than Urbain, leader of the Saint-Simonian "Arabophiles" and champion of Muslim rights, spearheaded the efforts to reconstitute indigenous lands and properties with the ruinous intent to convert their pastoral inhabitants into sedentary agriculturalists. Somehow, Enfantin had correctly surmised that, in the hands of bureau officers, colonial association would remain a mere façade of restored native customs and procedures, concealing and facilitating the exercise of military command. Indeed, by then, a series of insurrections had been raised in the provinces under military control in response to France's broken promise to respect the traditions, institutions, and faith of the Muslims. In 1845, Abd al-Qadir, for one, had stirred much trouble in the pacified territories when

he pleaded with his coreligionists to open their eyes at last, and to judge the French by their long list of empty vows and perfidious deeds:

> [H]e has put your mosques to profane use; he has taken your best lands to give them to his own; he has purchased with his treasury the virtue of your women; he has enlisted your children in his abominable cohorts; he has freed the slaves whom God allows you to possess; he has arrogated for himself the right to render justice upon you; he has persecuted your noblest families; he has removed your chiefs and replaced them with vile Muslims in his pay. Your noblemen and your marabouts, who were foolish enough to serve them, have been rewarded with an eternal exile in the land of the Christians. You are now commanded by the *Roumis* (Christians), judged by the *Roumis*, administered by the *Roumis*."[59]

THE REPUBLIC AT BAY

> We cannot conceal that the officer, once he has adopted Africa and turned it into his theater, will soon contract habits, ways of thinking and behaving that are dangerous everywhere, but especially in a free country. He will pick up the practices and tastes of a hard, violent, arbitrary, and coarse government. Here is an education that I care not to generalize and extend.
>
> —Alexis de Tocqueville, *Travail sur l'Algérie*[60]

The general accounts of Changarnier, Bedeau, and Lamoricière were synthesized by the Duke of Aumale and published coincidentally within days of the official surrender of Abd al-Qadir on December 24, 1847. On January 15, 1848, the governor general forwarded to the minister of war his "Study on the Education of the Natives" (*Étude sur l'instruction des indigènes*), in which he emphasized the wisdom in placing colonial education under the supervision and control of the Arab Bureaux.[61] The study delivered the final verdict on the causes for France's cultural mishaps in Algeria and remained a standard reference on colonial educational policy until 1870. In terms that strongly echoed Tocqueville's report of May 1847, Aumale imputed native restlessness and despair to the scale of colonial confiscations in 1843–1844 and singled out the "harmful and disastrous consequences" of the sequestration of the *hubus*, which had also denied French officials a powerful moral leverage (*la puissance de la parole*) over local opinions:

> [We were] barely installed in Algiers, and what did we do? Not content to convert *madrasas* into shops, houses, stables or barracks, we laid our hands on all assets belonging to mosques, especially those assigned to public education. [Such actions] were no doubt needed to provide for the material and financial

needs of the occupation. Unfortunately, the Muslims saw in them only our lack of faith, a brutish, forceful assault on their religion, and one can show with many examples that our conduct has singularly aggravated the difficulties that we have encountered for the last 17 years.[62]

Aumale concluded his report with stipulations that were fast becoming the catechism of the new cultural regime. He championed "reorganizing" Muslim society under the purview of the Directorate of Arab Affairs and requested that civilian ministries desist from encroaching upon or appropriating any part of the portfolio for Muslim primary and secondary instruction.

Aumale's final clause became especially pressing when popular insurgency toppled his father, King Louis-Philippe, on February 23–25. In Algeria, the mandated resignation of the governor general threatened to unhinge the beginnings of colonial association. Indeed, on March 2, the provisional government in Paris solicited the political integration of the colony and, in the following days, passed measures to terminate its exceptional institutions and hold general elections. On June 23, however, Parisian workers and artisans, angered by the closure of the National Workshops, began to take to barricaded streets. Repression by government forces was swift and cruel. In his accounts of the June uprising, Friedrich Engels noted that, at the end of the day, the Second Republic was saved by energetic and determined action on the part of hardened veteran officers of the North African campaigns: Lamoricière, Cavaignac, and Fleurus Duvivier—Polytechniciens all. Their indiscriminate use of "grenades and incendiary rockets . . . against barricades and against houses," Engels claimed, was devastatingly effective and without precedent: "Until then, the people had no idea that this brand of Algerian warfare could be used right in the centre of Paris."[63] The historian and legislator Charles Forbes René de Montalembert acknowledged similarly the critical role of the "African generals" in safeguarding the republic and assembly, but praised singularly the decisive intervention of Lamoricière in turning the tide of battle against the insurgency. The importance of martial skills and tactics acquired during the conquest of Algeria was not lost on Montalembert. In his view, punishing *razzias* against Arabs and Kabyles had well prepared Lamoricière for his showdown with the rabble of Paris, and the general's latest actions were identical triumphs for the forces of enlightenment and civilization. The methods and rhetoric of colonial pacification had come home to roost:

This army, in the hands of the National Assembly and under the orders of African generals, would become the supreme boulevard for European civiliza-

tion. . . . Lamoricière, more than any other, was the man for the task (*l'homme de la situation*) . . . ; by charging headlong against barricades defended by adversaries as redoubtable as the Arabs or Kabyles; in carrying the fight with a resolve more dogged than that of the insurgents, Lamoricière seized Paris from them. . . . It was then, thanks to this victory and to it alone, that France was pulled from the abyss and preserved from barbarism.[64]

With the quelling of the June insurgency, the Constituent Assembly renewed its efforts to integrate the mixed territories of Algeria into the public domain and arrange the colony into departments, districts, and communes administered, respectively, by prefects, subprefects, and mayors.[65] The inclusive assimilation of Algeria was nonetheless foiled by Lamoricière, who was "rightfully compensated" by becoming the minister of war on June 28 in the executory presidency of Cavaignac (June 28–December 20, 1848). From his powerful tribune, Lamoricière made no qualms about obstructing any "dangerous" motion by the government to divest the office of the governor general of Algeria "of a fraction of its right to intervene in all that relates to Arab affairs, no matter how negligible."[66] Disinclined to cross the hero of the *journées de juin*, a grateful government recanted, and Lamoricière then elicited from Cavaignac executive orders, signed on July 22 and August 16. These were subsequently incorporated into the Constitution of November 4, which instituted a clear separation of powers between the military and civilian ministries in Algeria.[67] In the realm of education, the needs and facilities of the colony's European and Jewish communities were transferred to the Ministry of Public Instruction, while the Ministry of War retained its exclusive responsibility for Muslim education, civil law, and justice. Political maneuvering by the African Polytechniciens Lamoricière and Cavaignac had effectively thwarted the complete attachment of governmental functions in Algiers to the appropriate republican ministries in Paris and had maintained special privileges for the army in the conception, development, and direction of colonial affairs. In the span of three years, beginning with the campaign to unseat Bugeaud in 1845–1846, African officers and veterans of Arab affairs had twice staged a show of strength to maintain the particular and extraconstitutional status of French Algeria.

Nonetheless, the Constitution of 1848 marked the beginning of the entry in force of Algeria's European settlers into the arena of local and metropolitan politics.[68] Civilian territories, now transformed into French departments and subdivided into *arrondissements* and *communes*, were greatly expanded, and their European constituencies empowered to elect municipal councilmen, mayors, and other civil functionaries. Four seats in the Constituent Assembly were now reserved for representatives

of French Algeria, and the governor general's previous powers over the civil administration were effectively reduced. The *colons*, according to Julien, seemed to be in an "effervescent" mood.[69] Not for long. In June 1849, the partisans of colonial integration in Paris were undone by the government purges that followed the attempted insurrection by Alexandre Ledru-Rollin and his "Montagnards." In the following month, violent anti-French uprisings in the oasis of Zaatcha in the Ziban reminded Algiers and Paris of the unfinished business of military pacification in the interior.

Quickly, the African command moved to reclaim the upper hand against civilian authorities. Divisional chiefs such as General Jean-Baptiste Blangini in Algiers complained to the government that their unity of command had been broken by "the insertion [since March 1848] of ad hoc Europeans to our routines." He requested their recall and the removal of the army's political, religious, administrative, and educational responsibilities "from the crosshairs of public policymakers."[70] Generals were returned to the defense of the civilian realm, and, within days, the Arab Bureaux were granted additional latitude to supervise mosques, *zawiyas*, and schools; to recruit their native personnel; to define the curricula of instruction; and to monitor and evaluate the performance of Muslim teachers and students. The last responsibility entailed routine visits to these establishments and the drafting of comprehensive biweekly intelligence reports (*l'obligation des rapports de quinzaine*) briefing the governor general on the state of native affairs.[71] A satisfied Blangini reported to Urbain that conditions were once again ripe for extending "a new branch of influence" to the Arabs. With the support of Lamoricière, Tocqueville, Daumas, and Bedeau, among others, Urbain was by then well entrenched within the Ministry of War's Directorate of Algerian Affairs, with uncontested access to the files of the Arab Bureaux. As chief adjunct of the First Bureau, working directly under the supervision of the bureau chief Georges Fellmann and the directorship of General Jean-Marie de La Rüe, both strongly devoted to his views on native government, Urbain received and summarized the *rapports de quinzaine* from the Government General before forwarding his annotated comments to his superiors. As Michel Levallois observed, Urbain was thus able to endorse reports with which he agreed, while simultaneously insinuating his own beliefs into political summaries intended for the eyes of the minister of war.[72] Despite the forced retirement of Aumale and the self-imposed exile of Enfantin, Urbain retained his unique position to put into practice the vaunted benefits of controlled association. Algeria in the autumn of 1849 was about to embark upon a Saint-Simonian moment of its own.

CHAPTER FIVE

Raised in Our Care

> Since, after twenty years of conquest, we finally wish to concern ourselves with the vanquished population, with its governance, let us not approach this grand question with our French ideas; in one word, let us not seek to administer the Muslims as we would want, but rather as they wish to be [governed]; let us not apply to all, like a universal panacea, both our mores and our institutions. The one and the other *would be rejected in this country.*
>
> —Captain Ferdinand Lapasset, Arab Bureau, Ténès , 1850[1]

> But what does this mean: to govern the Arab people? Govern what, which elements? I will try to explain this to you, and you will see how, in the current state of things, applying to these people our social form, in one piece, is like beating the sea with a stick.
>
> —Captain Charles Richard, Arab Bureau, Orléansville, 1850[2]

In the late 1840s, the military authorities in Algeria began to liquidate the assimilationist policies of the first two decades of French rule. The conclusion of the army's specialized surveys of 1846–1847 occasioned reformulations and redeployments of knowledge about the colony, as Governor Aumale's Arabist experts devised new incentives and concessions for the pacification of the native populations. Their cultural initiatives, enacted into law in the summer of 1850, were to unfold in three phases. In the first, the colonial authorities would set about creating an urban zone of controlled cultural and economic contact, an environment relatively protected from colonial predations, in which "restored" Muslim institutions interacted with, learned from, and emulated French establishments. The two sociocultural realms, "traditional" Arabo-Islamic and "modern" French, were to associate through educational channels, tailored to produce Francophile natives to aid in the remaking of their immediate communities. The second phase consisted of widening the circle of condominial contact and

extending its patterns of collaboration and exchange to rural and tribal areas, where, with the help of the acculturated natives, French norms would be replicated on a large scale, Muslim institutions or traditions would be absorbed, and a new Franco-Algerian civilization would be created. Key to the construction of the Arab-French condominium were plans to sedentarize the pastoral natives and engage them in economic activities suited to their natural aptitudes. The Land Law of June 1851 was thus meant to buttress the educational initiatives of the Arab Directorate by reconstituting and regulating tribal lands according to French notions of tenure and property. However, the premature removal of Aumale in early 1848, along with the ensuing marginalization of Prosper Enfantin and Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de Lamoricière, weakened the Saint-Simonian platform and would eventually split the family in two parties. The first, according to Ismaÿl Urbain, "expected the desired reforms [to stem] from the action of power and authority," whereas the second, to which he belonged, "awaited progress [to result] from an impulse from below, under the influence of liberty and individual initiative."[3] *After 1850, Urbain and his supporters would expend prodigious efforts to preserve their vision for Franco-Muslim association against a host of internal and external rivals, in addition to defiant natives who never failed to adapt their strategies of resistance to the changing colonial realities after the defeat of Abd al-Qadir.*

On June 11, 1850, General Jean-Jacques Pélissier, divisional commander for the province of Oran, brought to public light a political cabal concocted by "bad citizens entertaining the impious thought of laying a parricidal hand to the bosom of the fatherland." Within days, the clandestine Society of Good Cousins (*Société des bons cousins*) was dismantled and its sixty-six members arrested, with no denunciation spared by the local police authorities. Furthermore, the "Oran Intrigue," according to Pélissier, infected the very corridors of the province's civil administration as several of the accused were found to be employees of the municipality and familiar faces to the incumbent prefect Charles Garbé. In truth, the Society of Good Cousins consisted of local petty bourgeois, socialists, and *Carbonari*, or Freemasons, who gathered in semisecret to ponder an insurrectionary response to their dampened dreams for political integration into the republic.[4] Their conspiracy to overturn the exceptional military regime in the colony and "kill the president

if needed" was hatched in retaliation for the reigning in of democratic liberties in France and Algeria following the electoral victory on December 10, 1848, of the candidate of the Party of Order, Prince Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte.[5] Fittingly, the minister of war, Alphonse Henri d'Hautpoul, opened the trial of the Bons Cousins with accusations linking the proliferation of internal agitators in the colony to recent public campaigns to "disarm or weaken the powers of the army." Invoking the specter of radical "Reds" and armed socialist gangs, the military command stepped up its constraints on civilian self-rule. By September 1850, it had successfully "sanitized" the Algerian departments of subversive elements and purged their respective administrations of all negligent or sympathizing officials such as Garbé. The *colons* watched half-helplessly, half-tacitly as their republican hopes were rolled back in the face of the new security threats and countermeasures.

Yet, more was at stake at the trial of the relatively innocuous Bons Cousins than a mere stand by the army against civilian challenges to its rights to govern the colony. The unraveling of the Oran Plot also provided political cover for adversaries to diminish the seemingly unstoppable Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de Lamoricière and defeat his motions to enfranchise civilian authority in the pacified districts of Algeria. Since June 1848, by combination of political clout and electoral meddling, General Lamoricière had steadily primed the triangle of Oran-Mostaganem-Mascara for the settlement of experimental communities and enterprises, solicited specifically for their potential to modernize the local economy and "demolish and remake the old society."[6] As minister of war, he increased his commitments to private initiatives that promised to integrate local farmsteads with metropolitan industries and infuse both with entrepreneurial skills and capital. He raised government subsidies for the Saint-Simonian and Fourierist agricultural concession of Saint-Denis-du-Sig, founded near Oran in 1846 over the objections of then-Governor General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud. On September 19, 1848, the National Assembly funded with a budget of fifty million francs Lamoricière's plans to relocate 13,500 Parisian artisans and factory workers to forty-two model colonies in the vicinity of Gdyel (Saint-Cloud), midway between Oran and Arzew. Shortly before stepping down from his ministerial post on December 20, the Saint-Simonian soldier approved the appointment of like-minded officials to head the newly created prefectures in Algeria: Ernest Carette in Constantine, Frédéric Lacroix in Algiers, and Garbé in Oran. Finally, in his farewell speech before the National Assembly, Lamoricière announced formally his defection from the camp of the old-style *Africains*, and delivered a parting shot to his detractors within the military bureaucracy:

Our generals, and I am first to confess my faults and errors, saw in the tribes enemies to combat, to dominate by force, rather than new children to gain to the fatherland with good institutions and a wise administration. The special legislation in Algeria reflects to a high degree a facet of our oblivion of Arab interests.[7]

With his preferred candidates ensconced in the three Algerian prefectures, Lamoricière was poised to see his personal *lieu d'essai* in the western triangle replicated throughout the colony. The systematic settlement and capitalist development of the colony seemed at hand. At last, Algerian wheat would grow in fields no longer darkened by elevated blockhouses or fortifications.

The presidential ballots of December 1848, however, clipped the public career of Lamoricière and started his gradual fall from the heights of power toward a humiliating imprisonment and exile. Under the guise of security operations against political sedition at home and in the colony, the increasingly Caesarean government of Louis-Napoleon clamped down on republican opponents and all-too-powerful officers such as Louis-Eugène Cavaignac, Marie-Alphonse Bedeau, and Lamoricière. The Bugeaudiste generals Armand de Saint-Arnaud and Pélissier seized upon the new political winds in Paris to take matters in hand and "earn their grades" at the expense of the "enemies of the interior" and the proponents of civilian enfranchisement in Algeria. "Our Africa is fading away," wrote an anxious Saint-Arnaud to his brother in the following April, "we no longer weigh in the balance. . . . The ministers refuse us everything. One might think they were planning to abandon Algeria."[8] The presidential decree of May 6, 1849, however, restored the governor general's oversight (*droits de regard*) of the prefectures, and Lamoricière's appointees, Lacroix and Carette, soon resigned in protest, both to be replaced by legatees "shamefully" compliant to the will of the army. Their homologue Garbé, last of the "Three Prefects of 1849," was removed from office with the undoing of the Bons Cousins. Then came Lamoricière's turn, beginning with the constitutional and legal amendments in January and February 1852, which eliminated colonial representation in the French legislature and granted the Senate the right to govern the colonies by executive senatus consults. Finally, with the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly on December 2, Lamoricière and other military or parliamentary leaders hostile to the proclamation of the Second Empire were rounded up and "locked away like common criminals." By then, Algeria had been largely restituted to the command of a new generation of African generals.

The successive demise or downfall of Bugeaud, Aumale, Lamoricière, Nicolas Changarnier, and Bedeau between 1847 and 1852 eliminated

several of the most decisive political actors in French Algeria since the conquest, and set the prospects for future Saint-Simonian initiatives more squarely in the hands of Arabist bureaucrats such as Thomas "Ismaÿl" Urbain who, while able to influence the government's deliberations, did not carry the same influence in the execution of policy. The dramatic events of 1849–1850 had shown that the surrender of Abd al-Qadir in December 1847 and the triumph of the *Africains* in June 1848 did not translate for long into supreme or unmitigated power for the Central Directorate of Arab Affairs. To the contrary, its colonial ambitions were still prone to subversion from within the ranks of the Ministry of War itself, with General Pélissier, as we shall see, continuing to frustrate the Arabophile project of Urbain until 1864. More immediately, it was in this context of heightened political volatility, with ministerial rivalries given free rein by the resentful indifference of Louis-Napoleon toward his disobedient colony and cornered between European and indigenous communities set on edge by the recent fluctuations in the colonial regime, that Urbain and his acolytes began devising their keystone policies for the cultural and economic renewal of Muslim Algeria.

SEPARATED AT BIRTH: *MADRASAS* AND *ÉCOLES*

> We are convinced that we should enter a disastrous path if we were to entrust the surveillance, and in particular the public inspection of schools, to a European.
>
> —General Jean-Baptiste Blangini, Divisional Directorate, Algiers, 1849[9]

> Now that the work of conquest is done, it is important that we re-establish Muslim studies on a new footing, that we appropriate them, and give them a proper direction in order to civilize the populations that we must administer.
>
> —Captain Julien-Charles Pechot, Arab Bureau, Algiers, 1849[10]

The Central Directorate of Arab Affairs submitted to the governor general its timetable for restructuring indigenous education on June 5, 1849, as rumors of brewing insurrection in the Algerian region of Ziban started to reach Paris. The Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction (*Projet d'organisation de l'instruction publique musulmane*) incorporated with very minor alterations the "intelligence collected in the various accounts and periodic reports" of 1847.[11] Its direct references to the syntheses of Georges Fellmann and Aumale leave little question of Urbain's part in shouldering the project after the abrupt departure of the princely duke in March 1848. Certainly,

as Turin observes, there is sufficient documentary evidence to suggest that the "totality of the dossiers relating to public instruction passed through [Urbain's] hands" after 1847.[12] Continuity with the working framework of Aumale's team of Saint-Simonian advisors is moreover evident in the graduated, three-sequence timeline for the implementation of the reforms.

In the opening phase of the reforms, the architects of the bill looked to accommodate colonial policies to realities on the ground and promote "with the necessary precautions" the changes to which native society in its present situation was "likely [to] respond." They acknowledged the urgency of repairing Muslim learning "in a broad way," but proposed modest confidence-building measures to begin: the inauguration of one *madrasa* or *école supérieure musulmane* in each of the three provinces; tolerance for the few *zawiyas* still extant; and course offerings limited to Arabic literature, jurisprudence, and theology. Furthermore, because they saw no wisdom yet in revising the content of the Muslim curriculum, they recommended preparatory steps toward more uniform control over the sources of funding for schools and their personnel.

The reforms, launched with a start-up budget of 40,000 francs, were to be subsidized and paid for by the native communities. Local families were to supplement the incomes of their children's instructors with additional monthly levies in cash or in kind and to cede voluntarily the tracts of land needed for the construction of new schoolhouses. It was within the discretion of the Arab Bureaux officers to assess the paying ability of the locals and to fix the individual rates of taxation and compensation. The funds and assets thus collected would then prescribe the upcoming regime of teaching incentives and restrictions, from rewards, prizes, and stipends to permits, commuting licenses, and routine inspections. Circle captains were trusted to monitor the moral rectitude, competence, and movements of the native instructors and, on this basis, ensure that "even the humblest . . . who submit to [France's] influence are protected, honored, and adequately remunerated." The inspecting officers were to be assisted by two salaried professors appointed to each *madrasa*, the more "devoted and energetic" of them to serve as inspector of zawiyas as well, until European agents were able to relieve them of their functions:

> The appointment of an indigenous agent to fulfill this post [inspector of zawiyas] will remain necessary for a long time still. It is sound policy that it be so, but our efforts must tend towards diminishing his importance in time through the gradual involvement of a European who, by principle, will avoid presenting himself in any official capacity. This way of transitioning will allow us later to

entrust to Europeans exclusively the inspection and monitoring of all Muslim schools.[13]

The intermediate phase, during which "little by little" Arabic traditions were to be modified and French practices introduced, constituted the core of the Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction. The staggered approach was to guarantee acceptance of the reforms "in the long run, [even] by the most zealous Muslims." The first track, building upon the achievements of the earlier phase, aimed to nurture extant Muslim instruction with "good methods" and supplement its time-honored curricula with officially sanctioned elemental textbooks from which will have been judiciously put aside "all that could maintain [Muslim Algerians] in their ideas of religious intolerance." The second track consisted of establishing an indeterminate number of new primary Arab-French schools (*écoles primaires arabes-françaises*), operated directly by the Government General and projected to initiate the natives "in the knowledge constituting the subject-matter of teaching in [France's] advanced primary schools." The Arab-French curriculum included French vocabulary and grammar, the rudiments of arithmetic and the natural sciences, along with some concepts of geography and history. Officers of the Arab Bureaux were to monitor the newly created primary schools, with the assistance of European inspectors in the civil territories and the intercession of Muslim judges in the tribal areas. Thus, although it confirmed the undivided authority of the bureaux over schooling in the military territories, the project left the door open for other provisions to be taken in the cities and townships of French Algeria.

Moreover, the dual institutional framework prescribed by the Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction did not rest upon a balanced pedestal. By insisting that the novel Arab-French schools be established "wherever an Arabic chair exists already, and if possible within the *madrasas* themselves," the authors of the bill divulged their intention to displace local houses of learning in enrolling young men "belonging to indigenous notable families, as well as all . . . who exhibited signs of intelligence, of happy disposition, and had already attained a certain level of education." Redirecting Muslims away from the *madrasas* and toward the writing desks of the dual schools was the precursor to the formation of acceptable learned natives, able and willing to shoulder the burdens of colonial association. Indeed, in a departure from the prevailing policy of colonial patronage, the project aimed to dissolve Bugeaud's tribal "aristocracy of the sword" and supplant it with urbane "men of words," scholars, jurists, petty clerks, and scribes

with whom to staff the various native agencies: "the purpose of the Arab-French schools and the *madrasas* is precisely to form individuals able to fulfill [the] important functions" of *talib*, *qadi*, and *khawaja*. The renewal of Algeria's Muslim cultural elite thus formed the capstone of the Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction, and made possible the graduation to its closing stages, in which the transformation of native institutions and practices was completed and the need for *madrasas* and *zawiyas* ultimately obviated.

The final chapter in the educational reforms, in other words, remained open ended, awaiting the materialization of Muslim functionaries "sufficiently formed" in French practices to aspire voluntarily to modify their traditional methods. Urbain's profound dislike for unpredictable "frontal assaults" against the edifice of Muslim learning transferred the onus for cultural transformation to the natives themselves. "We are too impatient," he repeatedly chided his superiors as he explained his estimates for the duration of the temporary dual institutions. He envisaged the new measures as indispensable for the deliberate cultivation of the next generation of Muslim leaders, and expected the latter to guide, by example, their co-religionists to "overcome the abhorrence in which they hold all that deviates from their antiquated routines."[14] Only then would the students and personnel of the *madrasas* become integrated with the Arab-French academies, and their inspection get delegated to a European inspector of indigenous instruction, supplemented, as always, by the administrative oversight of the Arab Bureaux.

Not surprising, Governor General Viala Charon considered the Central Directorate's Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction a weighty concession to Muslim society and momentary acquiescence to the resilience of native cultures. However, in seeking to reconcile "the most prudent" measures with "the most favorable to [French] interests," Urbain and his colleagues had glossed over inconsistencies bound to become more pronounced in time. As a first hurdle, the proper functioning of the dual schools demanded linguistic aptitudes and levels of political goodwill not readily manifested on either side of the colonial divide. The calculated indifference of Algeria's Muslims toward European instruction had factored prominently in the failure of previous educational initiatives, and still the reformers planned to reverse negative trends and spread French methods with courses conducted "only in the Arabic language." Similarly, and by many accounts, few French officials had taken great strides in acquiring the language of the people they had to govern. After fourteen years of service in the native administration, the specialist Charles Richard saw no discredit in

his persistent ignorance of Arabic. "I know not one word of this detestable language," he boasted, "and my faithful assistants even less."[15]

More paradoxical was the reformers' plan to enhance local tolerance for French practices while purifying Muslim learning of elements distasteful to the colonial palate. In the initial stages, this inherent incongruity was to be moderated by circumspection and dexterity on the part of the concerned officials. Indeed, the scrutiny of military officers was to be cushioned, at first, with the intercession of influential *aghas*, *qa'ids*, and *qadis*. In time, however, as French-trained natives graduated and matured, they would be responsible for the management and inspection of Muslim schools. Thus, the Central Directorate would temper its cultural intrusions with mediation by Muslims protected, honored, and remunerated by the colonial budget, yet somehow still acceptable to their communities.

For these reasons, the reformers stopped short of restoring to Muslim institutions their income-producing assets. They maintained the remaining *zawiyas* at current levels of revenue and upheld the appropriation in 1847 of 40,000 francs from the budget of the Ministry of War to fund the new schools. In 1849, the apportionment of these funds "according to the relative educational and institutional needs of each province" amounted to 11,400 francs for Constantine, 10,150 francs for Algiers, and 9,350 francs for Oran, with the remaining 9,100 francs absorbed by expenses related to the production and publication of Arabic textbooks and primers.[16] The amalgamation of colonial finances into a single account after 1845 makes it difficult to measure the 40,000 francs against comparable line items, but total expenses incurred by the Army of Africa in 1849 amounted to 59,977,556 francs, whereas the colonial budget recorded a deficit of 16,044,635 francs for the year.[17] On a smaller comparative scale, in 1865, the start-up budget for the teachers' training school (*école normale*) in Algiers amounted alone to 55,000 francs.[18]

Urbain spoke of feeling compelled to settle for the project's meager budget, as the recent political tribulations in France produced an urgency to move ahead. In its haste to consolidate its leverage over Muslim revenues and assets, the Central Directorate now muted its earlier objections to the wide-scale confiscation of the *hubus*. Moreover, any prospect for greater budgetary appropriations was quelled by the keenness of the reformers to hold the Muslim revival to the strictly necessary, an objective predicated on discrediting rather than augmenting local institutions. Had not Urbain himself described the reforms of 1850 as steps taken against rather than for higher Muslim learning?[19] For the

military command, therefore, calming native anxieties was only secondary to catering to its own political and cultural concerns. In December 1847, General Changarnier, then chief of the Central Directorate, had acknowledged as much to Aumale when conceding that the draconian elimination of the *hubus* had nonetheless afforded the army an exceptional free hand (*champ libre*) to modify indigenous education at will.[20]

In preparation for the enactment of the Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction, bureau chiefs were enjoined to "concentrate all present resources towards establishing *madrasas* and Arab-French schools" in their precincts. On July 12, General Blangini, commanding the division of Algiers, instructed his captains to ascertain the feasibility of the new measures in their circles on the basis of four criteria: the viability of "one school per tribe or great fraction of a tribe," the nature of the examinations to be administered to the pupils, the value of the stipends and rewards to be offered to the instructors, and the means to ensure the regular inspection of the schools by "three natives under the authority of the local Arab Bureau."[21] With the Zaatcha insurrection raging in the background, Blangini reminded his officers of the importance of assessing carefully the routines of the army's hired native instructors. By his account, the establishment of schools solved "only half the problems" for which the military command had been seeking solutions. There remained the irritation of civilian attempts to encroach upon the army's oversight of native instruction. "Our mode of surveillance," he clarified, "must be our greatest concern, [for] nothing would lead us down a more disastrous path than to surrender our control, especially of public instruction, to a European."

Throughout the summer of 1849, circle chiefs forwarded to the Central Directorate their individual prognoses for the proposed reforms. The majority returned very positive responses, expressing relief that things were about to change and brimming sometimes with overconfident predictions. The bureau chief for the circle of Dellys, for example, with a total population of 904 Muslims in August 1849, projected supplementing the lone existing *madrasa* with eight first-degree schools within the year. Another officer, taking Blangini's cautions to heart, extolled the absence of European influences in his circle of Orléansville. He even regretted the resolution to build schools in the "entirely French cities" of Médéah and Blidah, and proposed instead the "thoroughly Arab" town of Djedida or other localities "not yet daubed with Christianity" (*entachées de christianisme*), where "complete isolation from Europeans offered better guarantees to the susceptibilities of the most conscientious believers." Negative reviews or differences of opinion, though not entirely absent, were rare and related more to the scope of the re-

forms than their utility. The bureau chief for Algiers, for one, found the projected intrusions in Muslim jurisprudence and theology "bad for [France's] domination" because they were sure to alarm the natives. He countered with "modern apprenticeships" that offered the latter occupational or vocational skills (*arts et métiers*) rather than a pointless liberal education.[22] "Have the higher authorities been fully apprised of what passes for education among the indigenes?" he wondered:

> [It] is not an exact science of facts and things, but to the contrary, the crudest and most unreasonable explanations, based on fables and prejudices. . . . The best policy for us would be to leave Muslim studies as they are, do nothing for them, nothing against them . . . , [and] rally the natives to us by teaching them our arts, our trades, our culture, our industry. Nothing in these occupations or in their required studies would shock their ideas.[23]

The Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction and the bureau surveys were forwarded to the Ministry of War's Advisory Committee in late 1849. In the Algerian Directorate, Urbain celebrated the opportunity to ratify finally the ideas of Aumale. "The die is cast," he reported to Eugène Daumas, "let us now hope for happy consequences." On December 24, the draft bill was deliberated by the Executive Council in Paris, where its provisions were summarily diluted in fundamental ways.

OFFENDING THE GOD OF PATIENCE

> Let us admit that we are in agreement on the principles, we hope then to put ourselves to work; but still, at the moment of passing from theory to practice, several questions of the greatest importance will arise. The presence of the Muslim population on the lands to be invaded; the various rights it enjoys therein and which it will be necessary to regulate with selflessness; its deportation to other chosen sites, to dispose freely of the land . . . : all these questions demand time, this invaluable element, which, were we to lack it, would change a future based on a thousand sacrifices, but rich in hopes, into a catastrophe.
>
> —Lieutenant Colonel Édouard de Martimprey,
> Divisional Headquarters, Oran, 1846[24]

The Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction was enacted into law by presidential decrees issued on July 14 and September 30 of 1850.[25] Together, the decrees would shape colonial education in Algeria for the next twenty years. The overarching authority of the Ministry of War over the new educational framework was confirmed,

but separate bylaws were instituted for Arab-French *écoles* and Muslim *madrasas*. The July decree did not adhere faithfully to the progressive procedures or timetable of the bill of 1849. It conferred supervisory prerogatives to the prefectures and sanctioned the immediate opening of five French-Muslim primary schools for boys, four for girls, and three secondary academies for adult males. The concession to civil powers flowed from the decision to locate the dual schools in the coastal "zone of uncontested supremacy" in order to allay the security concerns of the high command and ensure meaningful levels of enrollment.[26] The prefects were authorized to consult with the governor general in nominating the instructors, joining the surveillance committees for the institutions for boys, inspecting the learning establishments for girls and adults, and prescribing the schools' internal routines and disciplines. In return, all related expenditures were debited to local municipal or departmental budgets. Instruction was to be delivered by French directors, assisted by Muslim adjuncts, and to include the rudiments of the Arabic and French languages, basic arithmetic, and weights and measures. Needlework and elements of history and geography supplemented the education of girls and adults, respectively. Certificates or brevets were to be conferred upon male pupils demonstrating competence in these disciplines, with future employment opportunities reserved in priority for candidates holding the highest degrees. The graduates, it was hoped, would then disseminate French practices to other levels of the educational establishment, to other layers of the native administration, and to other regions of Algeria—in many ways, an early preview of Louis Hubert Lyautey's "oil stain" policy (*politique de la tache d'huile*) in French Morocco in the 1910s.

The amendments were ratified on January 24, 1850, despite the reservations of the Central Directorates about European participation in the schooling of Muslim girls.[27] Urbain found the legislative revisions "too great an innovation," whereas Daumas sensed ministerial maneuvering behind them.[28] Indeed, since getting wind of the Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction, the minister of public instruction, Alfred de Falloux, as well as his successor, Félix de Parieu, had insisted the new schools come under civil purview by virtue of their French curricular component. The Advisory Committee acquiesced to the ministry's responsibility to educate Algeria's Europeans, but upheld the Government General's "fundamental rights of oversight" in the civil and military territories. Parieu then parried with the contention that the omission of primary female schooling in the *Projet d'organisation de l'instruction publique musulmane* amounted to abdication by the Min-

istry of War of lesser educational obligations that it did not consider as "a political factor."

The agents of the Central Directorates, of course, thought otherwise. Urbain emphasized again the importance of proscribed change and warned against "consequences most disastrous" should the "delicate and difficult question" of native schooling pass into irresponsible hands.[29] Primary schooling for Muslim girls, a worthy objective in itself, constituted "a veritable revolution within the Muslim family" and thus required meticulous prefacing. For Urbain, the nature of the amendments to the July decree underlined very clearly the dangerous immaturity of official civilian thinking on native education. Indeed, the Executive Council had initially slated male instructors to take charge of the girls' Arab-French schools before quickly recanting in the face of the directorate's disapproval and assigning French headmistresses and native female assistants. Likewise, in the circles, officers related to their superiors the heightened apprehensions of local husbands and fathers, fearful of colonial efforts to "reach into the interior" of their families and bring their wives or daughters into contact with European males. In his *Aperçu sur l'organisation des indigènes*, Lapasset summed up emphatically the rationale behind the officers' objections to female instruction: "We have not talked at all about creating schools for young girls, and for good reason—should we seek to foment an insurrection, this would certainly be an excellent means."[30]

The civil ministry, in return, impugned the retrograde passivity of the military in extending the salutary benefits of French learning to women who suffered disproportionately from war, dispossession, and displacement. Yet, as Urbain's comments show, the directorate's lack of enthusiasm for female schooling pertained more to its commitments to cadenced intermediate procedures. As with all issues concerning the Arab populations and the general workings of the colonial state, the military command subsumed its decision making to practical or expedient calculations that frequently trumped priorities deemed unequivocally moral by the civic authorities, from the emancipation of local women to the prohibition of polygamy or slavery. The colonial archives make clear, however, that France's agents in Algeria did not hold to monolithic impressions of their civilizing tasks. Although bureau officers did occasionally accuse prefects of infringing upon their cultural domain through the door of girls' education, one also finds ample evidence of collusion and concurrence across the administrative fault lines.[31] For example, despite the colonial rhetoric, both military officer and civil servant were in agreement that the education of Muslim girls was to

be restricted to the primary level and to workshops on embroidery and needlework. Until the 1880s, the public schools made available to Muslim girls in the civilian territories consisted effectively of workshops (*ouvroirs d'apprentissage*) or orphanages delegated to Catholic missions rather than to the departmental Arab Bureaux.[32]

Moreover, in raising common questions about the social value, appropriate content, and specialized nature of schooling for Arab girls in Algeria, colonial administrators, armed or civil, paralleled metropolitan concerns about the participation of women in public life in the early nineteenth century. The deliberations of the ministers of education and war are exceptional illustrations of how metropolitan notions of citizenship, equality, and enfranchisement intersected with local colonial contexts to produce negotiated, but approximate policies. French officials in the mid-nineteenth century subscribed to a common ideology of women's domestic destiny and feminine character, which they deployed internally to marginalize French women in the public sphere, or externally to subdue traditional Arab society as a whole, and thus assert the superiority of the modern French nation. Female indigenous instruction, in other words, was twice burdened with the gendered discourse of French republicanism and with the racial discourse of French imperialism, and, as such, it tended to showcase the proximity of colonial rhetoric and metropolitan praxis.

The political, cultural, and moral arguments of the European imperial discourse on gender are too well known to warrant much elaboration here. In Algeria, the Muslim customs of polygamy, female veiling, and seclusion were unambiguous cultural markers with which to differentiate the modern civilization of France from the baser society of the natives. Indeed, colonial representations of Arab women seemed to encapsulate all the imperfections that warranted civilizing the natives in the first place: frivolity, bigotry, immorality, dissipation. The social and legal standing of Muslim women was moreover explained in cultural, even racial, terms to reinforce the separateness of colonial identities. The following notes from the civil inspector of public instruction in Algiers could well serve as the colonial template for explaining the essential causes for female inequality in Muslim society as well as the moral justifications for schooling and emancipating local women:

> To date, the life of the Mooresques (*Mauresques*) has been one of idleness (*désœuvrement*). The ideas and customs of the Moors interdict their wives and daughters from dedicating themselves, apart from ordinary domestic chores, to any honest work. Rendered incapable of any serious occupation by their education, and raised without the principles of morals and decency which in Europe

constitute the first basis for the education of girls, they are easily seduced by vice. Any attempt to change these ideas and mores, improve the morals of the Moorish population and make it accustomed to our habits is a worthy enterprise that deserves the support and encouragement of the government.[33]

The officers in the Central Directorate propounded similar lofty aspirations as they defined their educational mission in the 1840s. They also regarded Muslim women as icons of male oppression and societal backwardness and viewed their education as a positive development for France's long-term prospects in North Africa. By their very nature, Muslim girls were afforded an essential role in raising the future assimilated progeny, as their own pedagogization determined irrevocably that of their children:

One cannot doubt the advantages which the Government will derive from educating the Arab woman. It is from her that the child receives his first impressions and one knows the degree of influence she will exercise upon him for the remainder of his life. By regenerating the Arab woman, one regenerates society in its entirety, not immediately, but by the second generation at the latest.[34]

As noted previously, in the uncertain climate of the early 1840s, the conservative approach of the military establishment to colonial decision making began to merge purposefully with the functional reasoning of resident Saint-Simonian ideologues to dictate a more deliberate timetable for potentially jarring policies and for reforms touching upon matters clearly identifiable as essential to Muslim tradition. Moreover, the swing toward guarded conservatism in the colony was not divorced from similar developments in the metropole. There, too, the political activism of the 1820s to improve the lot of French society's most vulnerable members through primary schooling had receded from its former liberating positions in the years following the convulsions of 1830. Radical groups, Saint-Simonians at the forefront, joined conservatives in insisting upon separate and unequal schooling for girls. Women, Prosper Enfantin now argued, were entitled only to "moral equality," conveyed to them by a diversified curriculum, "monitored carefully and adapted to suit [their] current aptitudes . . . and their future role in society." The young circle gathered around the Supreme Father seemed to reflect national trends as it became more hierarchical, patriarchal, and exclusively masculine, after it moved into the Parisian "convent" of Ménilmontant. Sure enough, the Guizot Law of 1833 dropped the legal requirements for communes to maintain schools for girls, thereby confirming the continued preference among France's upper and middle classes for "entrusting girls' instruction to Catholic schools . . . [or] old

fashioned . . . boarding schools . . . not meant to change women's lot." It was not until the Falloux Law of 1850 that the rights of women to primary education were recognized. Thus, Grew and Harrigan concluded that "before 1850 public primary instruction for girls did not really exist" in France.[35]

Likewise, in Algeria, the corps of Arabists, with countless Saint-Simonians and Fourierists in its midst, fielded the strongest proponents for cultural and racial fusion in the 1830s. Daumas, Urbain, Carette, Édouard de Neveu, Adrien Berbrugger, and Richard, all fantasized about emancipating the Muslim woman through "her union with the conqueror himself."[36] "The marriage of Arab women with Frenchmen," intoned Richard, "carries within it the most powerful seed for the fusion of the two races. It must be taken seriously, and encouraged by all means."[37] Richard also saw in miscegenation a practical step to enfranchise Muslim families, cement new colonial alliances, and eliminate traditional leaderships. By the late 1840s, however, Urbain, Carette, and Lapasset had backed away from Richard's proposals and espoused a more guarded attitude toward female emancipation and "other blatant violations of Muslim customs." The disagreements consummated Richard's break with Saint-Simonism and also led Neveu, Berbrugger, and Carette to abandon their dreams of Franco-Arab union in favor of a more limited association between French men and Kabyle women. The emancipation of Muslim women, as far as Urbain was concerned, had to be addressed as part of larger legal and social reforms targeting private Muslim practices. Reverting to the preferred botanical referents of cultural fusionists, he exhorted the Advisory Committee to consider its revisions to the July decree:

> [I]s it not preferable for the administration to take a more modest position to allow it to await and observe the effect and the produced result? Let us allow the skillfully planted seed to germinate.[38]

For Lapasset as well, dual instruction for girls transgressed the strictly utilitarian objective of forming indigenous subordinates for the native administration. In terms reminiscent of the concurrent debates in France concerning the access of women to the public space, he questioned the value of a Gallic education for Muslim women categorically forbidden from interacting with men in general and Europeans expressly. The entangled metropolitan and colonial parameters for the education of native girls were illustrated by the experiences of Madame Véronique Allix, founder of a model school in Algiers. According to Turin, it was the very record of Allix's establishment that prompted the Executive Council to push for the inclusion of Arab-French schools for girls in

the July decree. By the same token, however, her experimental methods challenged both military and civil conceptions of female instruction and, in the end, legitimated the disinclination of the Arab agencies toward premature adventures in colonial schooling.

CONCUBINES, NOT WIVES

> The most powerful of all influences in Africa, as in Europe and even more than in Europe, is the woman. If you convert to our civilization one thousand indigenous girls taken from all classes of society and all the races of Regency, these young girls having become by the force of the things, the privileged spouses of the most important men of their class, will guarantee you the everlasting submission of the country and irrefutable guarantee of its future assimilation.
>
> —Véronique Allix, Headmistress, Algiers, February 1846[39]

In July 1845, Véronique Allix opened with personal funds a school for Muslim girls in Algiers and started an official correspondence with the local authorities in view of receiving public subsidies for her establishment.[40] She claimed herself an "apostle for female education," expert on Islam and Algeria, and devoted since 1832 to providing schools and workshops for poor Muslim and European girls. By December 1845, thirteen girls were enrolled in her school, where they were sheltered, fed, and taught "French, Arabic, the Quran, and needlework."[41] Allix maintained her institution with the proceeds from the sale of the girls' craft and forwarded two francs per month to their families.

In February 1846, she requested from the Ministry of War a governmental grant to accommodate "between 100 and 500 girls," and projected that her unique access to Muslim families and female society would, within a decade, render dispensable 95 percent (nineteen out of twenty) of the military troops in North Africa. In addition to her patent appeals to the strategic sensitivities of the minister of war, Alexandre Moline de Saint-Yon, Allix punctuated her description of the program with formulaic representations of gendered colonial identities, especially appealing to bourgeois sensibilities concerning human perfectibility, work ethics, domesticity, and female virtue:

> To teach them all the tasks which are the exclusive prerogative of the woman: needlework, household chores, grooming. To inspire them with love for the beautiful and the good, for the habits of cleanliness, moral well-being, and the instinct of refinement [typical] of their gender. To establish later with these regenerated young women, legitimate workshops for dressmaking, for embroi-

dery, for drapery, for linens; to make them appreciate the value of labor by placing in their hands the returns of their day's work. To keep the majority of them in this way out of the prostitution in which poverty would have infallibly engaged them; and to hand them back to their grateful families one day, as made women, hard working, domesticated . . . , and thus the natural intermediaries for the civilization that has conquered them, and the mothers of a new generation that will belong to us by heart and by mind.[42]

Intrigued by the opportunity, Saint-Yon sought the opinion of Alexandre Bellemare, Urbain's colleague in the Algerian Directorate, who, upon review, found Allix's project to educate Muslim girls untimely, and her particular workshop altogether unsuitable for the task.[43] Moreover, Bellemare reported, the military budget would not accommodate her request for an annual grant of 33,500 francs when the entire budget for boys' schools amounted to 10,000 francs. The requested amount confirmed to him the financial insolvency of her establishment, and he added, for good measure, that Allix appeared less interested in the welfare of the local girls than in the prospects of a handsome profit from their labor and from government subvention. Ellen Rogers, who interviewed the headmistress in April 1864, found the prices for her costliest items "alarming," and requiring "a well stocked purse."[44] Bellemare's damning review closed off Allix's access to the Ministry of War, but her workshop endured nonetheless, mainly with monetary backing from the Prefecture of Algiers. In the following year, it was granted the status of a public school, which qualified it for fiscal relief and an average subsidy from the prefecture in the sum of 7,000 francs per year, in addition to student merit prizes and individual premiums of up to 25 francs.[45]

The promulgation of the July decree of 1850, however, empowered the governor general to supervise Allix's institute, and the prefect was instructed to supply periodic reports on the number and status of her students, the attitudes of their parents, the applied modes of instruction, and the general results obtained.[46] The rounds of inspections were carried out under the auspices of the rector of the Academy of Algiers and included lady examiners (*dames inspectrices*), who objected to the schooling of Muslim girls on the same grounds as their male colleagues.[47] Allix, for her part, resisted the attempts to modulate her activities more closely, thus exacerbating the contentions between the governor general and the prefect.[48] In 1852, the Algerian Directorate revisited the issue and pressed Governor Jacques-Louis Randon to redefine the legal status of Allix's public establishment in accordance with Article 19 of the relevant decree. The institute was formally declared an Arab-French school for Muslim girls in 1855, thus becoming subject to the trimestrial examinations by the Government General. With reports

now reaching the Algerian Directorate periodically, a series of "disconcerting rumors" about the lifestyle of Madame Allix and the activities at her school began to surface and were brought to the attention of the minister of war.

Rumors of impropriety and scandalous gossip about her uncertain marital status and identity had dogged Madame Allix since the summer of 1846. For years, her live-in mate was presumed to be her legal spouse, but shortly after Bellemare's review, the authorities learned of her journey to France to dispose of the affairs of her recently deceased husband. The Government General subsequently withheld payment of further subsidies until Véronique Allix, née Eugénie Berlau, had normalized her marital status and legalized her relationship with her companion, Napoléon Luce.[49] Thereafter, her family name appears in the records as Luce-Allix or Luce. Still, the Government General continued to receive tactfully worded reports insinuating that the boarding school did not hold to the segregation of the sexes, with European men wandering freely about the establishment and in the midst of female students. It reacted with a battery of corrective measures. In late 1855, in an effort to reduce the number of boarders at Luce-Allix's establishment, nonresident workers were prohibited from overnight stays in Algiers without military authorization. In 1858, the Government General banned the use of *femmes conductrices*, hired by the headmistress to escort her female students to and from the school, and ordered the cessation of paying the students a monthly gratuity of two francs. Finally, on August 21, 1861, Minister of War Randon, very familiar with the case since his days in Algiers, instructed the governor general to direct a new investigation of the establishment before approving further subsidies.

The Du Manoir Commission, composed of two *dames inspectrices* and five officials from the Prefecture of Algiers and Directorate of Civilian Affairs, investigated Luce-Allix's unconvincing claims to have advanced the work of the civilizing mission in Algeria. It concluded instead that she had merely managed to provide "a few native girls with some manual and artisanal skills."[50] Moreover, the headmistress was not able to produce upon request any records pertaining to the quantities of needlework manufactured and sold or the source and amount of profits made. Public subsidies received by her institute had paid, according to the records, for the education of 1,035 Muslim girls since 1845, yet she could not document her claim that all but fifteen of her former students were "currently earning their living honorably and with the skills learned at the institute." More damaging was the commission's related contention that graduating girls were rarely taken back by their families and were instead abandoned to the streets of Algiers, where

they often fell victim to local procurers. Commission member Adolphe Michel accused the workshop of producing not the mothers and wives of the future Algerian race but mere "concubines for European men."

Finally, in defending her methods of instruction, Luce-Allix had unwittingly substantiated her own shortcomings and inadequacies. For the members of the commission, her experiences attested to the folly of extending the education of Muslim girls beyond the limited aptitudes of native individuals and society. They concluded their report on the activities of the apostle for female education with an ill-concealed sense of justified triumph:

> Madame Luce has recognized apprenticeship in a useful and remunerative work as the only real practicality in all the systems of education which have been conceived for young Arab girls. It is the only effective element for the regeneration of this urban Muslim society which is increasingly debilitated and degraded by poverty and corruption; bitter fruits of idleness. It is thus in sewing rooms or houses of apprenticeship, and not in schools, that the Administration should apply its means of compulsion and emulation, if one wants to well arrive at positive and real results.[51]

On October 10, 1861, all Arab-French schools for girls were discontinued or transformed into workshops following the negative deposition of the Du Manoir Commission.[52] The establishment of Luce-Allix itself was stripped of its public status under circumstances that lent further credence to the colonial views that proper schools for native girls were inopportune, if not threatening, to Muslim traditions. It was left to Michel to draft the sentence on the fate of dual schools for girls:

> One must well recognize that the decree of 14 July 1850, which created for the Muslim populations of the cities Arab-French schools for girls parallel to those for boys, was misguided. This elementary instruction, more French than Arab, that we wish to impart to indigenous girls will for a long time still remain irreconcilable with the role to which domestic prejudices, mores and practices assign the woman in the Muslim family. Let us apply ourselves first to fighting misery at its source, which is idleness: let us germinate the taste for, the need for and the practice of work in natives of both sexes, and we will be on the true path towards this social transformation that we seek and have such great interest in finding. The rest will come of its own.[53]

The civil authorities had finally come around to seeing Urbain's point. When she visited Algiers a few years later, Ellen Rogers found Luce-Allix at her "celebrated *ouvroir*"—the products of which had been recently displayed at the Great London Exhibition of 1862—motivated by her usual "indomitable energy" and never despairing, despite countless adversities, of her mission to convince French officials that "it was in

vain to hope to rear a better, a more rational and civilized race of Mussulmen, so long as their wives and the mothers of the next generation were left in worse than the ignorance of the brutes."[54] Still, the French government did not again broach the education of Muslim girls in any systematic way until the Camille Sée Law of December 21, 1880.

AN OCCULT RESISTANCE

> One of the first mysteries to breach is that which still surrounds the organization of the religious sects that we have seen constantly play the principal part in revolts since our conquests, and which by the solidarity that links their scattered members in all the Muslim countries are the most serious obstacle we must overcome to establish ourselves properly in this country.
>
> —General Viala Charon, Government General of Algeria, Algiers, 1849[55]

> The major importance for any government is to supervise public education and prevent that it be given a direction that spreads hostile feelings among the masses.
>
> —Captain Ferdinand Lapasset, Arab Bureau, Ténès, 1849[56]

The enactment of Arab-French schools was followed by the presidential decree of September 30, 1850, regulating primary, secondary, and higher-level Quranic schools in the three Algerian provinces. The main intent of the legislation was stated in its "Aumalian" preamble: to remedy the deficiency in Muslim specialists trained to work in the various colonial agencies. As a result, the document dealt with primary and secondary schools in two brief clauses calling for the usual enhanced supervision over them, while making "no modifications . . . to existing conditions and to the modes of instruction currently in use." The high surveillance of the governor general was to be mediated by divisional commanders in the military territories, and prefects in the civil.

Little else was said about these schools, and the attention of the legislators moved quickly to the creation of certified *madrasas*, over which the divisional commanders were to exercise direct and exclusive control. Bureau chiefs were to inspect these *madrasas* and recommend to the minister of war the appointment and remuneration of their personnel. The officers were also charged with licensing all prospective Arabic instructors and making their accreditation a condition for employment. It was hoped that the graduates of the *madrasas*, once properly instructed in Arabic grammar and literature, law, jurisprudence, and theology, would then join the religious, legal, and cultural services as jurisdoctors,

judges, clerics, and secretaries, or find employment in official mosques, schools, law courts, or the Arab Bureaux. On ratifying the bill, Minister of War Hautpoul commented that its skeletal provisions should pose far less difficulties than the maintenance of Arab-French schools.[57] In reality, fulfilling the stipulations of the September decree would bedevil the military authorities for the remainder of the decade.

To begin, the provisions of the September decree did not present clear criteria for recruiting the needed corps of Muslim instructors. The latter were referred to indiscriminately as *tolba*, although the candidates were expected to fulfill the specific functions of *mudarris* or *derrer*. In his prefatory notes to the minister of war, Urbain had warned repeatedly against "all-embracing measures" (*mesures d'ensemble*) introduced "all at once" (*tout d'une pièce*), but his admonitions translated into a legislative bill, minimalist in its means and processes.[58] Its terse clauses offered little guidance on how to staff the new schools or monitor the old *msids*, *madrasas*, and *zawiyas*. Nor were the necessary incentives to sustain the reforms made available. Like the Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction before it, the bill did not seek additional funds for the maintenance of the new *madrasas*. Bureau captains later complained of inadequate resources to induce instructors and *derrers* to submit to French influence or postpone their exodus toward neighboring Muslim states. According to Turin, the average bureau circle in 1851–1852 employed approximately eight Muslim instructors, with annual stipends from a low of 300 to a high of 1,500 francs—well below the decree provisions of 1,500 to 3,000 francs, yet not far from the median range for entry-level wages of 1,000 francs annually for European professors.[59] By way of comparison with metropolitan standards, the Falloux Law of 1850 had fixed the guaranteed minimum salary for elementary school instructors in France at 800 francs a year. By late 1851, two secondary-level *madrasas* had been established in the mosque of Sidi el-Kittani in Constantine and the Great Mosque of Tlemcen.[60] The third, slated originally for Médéah, was transferred to Blidah in January 1855.[61] All three experienced difficulties in recruiting satisfactory instructors and students.

Well before then, however, Hautpoul had begun to question the lack of compunction in the September decree. Within weeks of its ratification, he accused Daumas and Urbain of "exaggerated diffidence" toward the natives. Upon his appointment to Algiers as governor general in late October, he put forth a motion to "specify explicitly the mode of surveillance over Muslim primary and secondary instruction."[62] He proposed a law (*Projet de circulaire gubernatoriale No. 408*) to prohibit teaching in or operating a Muslim school without "special cer-

tification of the aptitudes and morals of the candidate in question by the divisional generals, in consultation with the local council" (*majlis* = *medjlès*). The factors behind Hautpoul's sudden endorsement of more aggressive surveillance are not entirely clear. Turin has related them to pressures exerted upon him by the local civil service.[63] Her conclusion, however, does not sit well with Hautpoul's renowned intransigence with regards to the plenipotentiary powers of the Army of Africa, a stance that he defended again in his later recollection of the episode. "In the interest of the colony," he wrote in his memoirs, "the Governor General must assume for his post all responsibility for the administration of Algeria . . . [he must] be given the widest powers, and the greatest freedom of action; all functionaries and all agents must be under his immediate orders. Above all, it must be made clear that no decisions may be taken without his presence."[64] Arriving in Algiers a few months after the enactment of the interventionist Falloux Law, and within weeks of the verdict in the trial of the Bons Cousins, Hautpoul explained his change of heart as the result of his awakening to the myriad challenges faced by the military government:

> After an in-depth study on the ground (*sur les lieux-mêmes*), I became convinced that to renounce a serious control over the personnel and the doctrines of Muslim instruction, was to abdicate a large share of our sovereignty, and compromise the future of our colony.[65]

Indeed, the ratification of the Falloux Law, also known as the Freedom of Instruction Act (*loi de la liberté d'enseignement*), had abrogated legal precedents concerning primary and secondary instruction in France, and raised the possibility of implementing the same provisions in the colony. The rise to power of Louis-Napoleon in late 1848 boosted the spirits of political and religious parties striving to arrest the laicization of the educational system and break the monopoly of state universities. They rallied around the conservative platform of the ultra-Catholic deputy Alfred de Falloux (1811–1885), who campaigned for the post of minister of public instruction on the slogan: "God in education. The Pope leading the Church. The Church leading civilization." As minister of public instruction, Falloux strongly supported the passage of legislation sanctioning his cabinet's rights to regulate all forms of private instruction. In June 1849, he secured the legal privatization of secondary instruction, and in the following March, his successor Parieu succeeded in passing the law that bears his name. Among other things, its articles permitted French communes to transfer their public colleges to the clergy and enabled religious congregations and male citizens to found and operate private institutions of learning on the mere presenta-

tion of a letter of obedience. The French state conceded to the church the institutional right to conduct private classes, whereas the church confirmed the state's rights to supervise public education.[66] As a result of the Falloux Law, enrollments in ecclesiastical schools and religious establishments for girls expanded dramatically, as did proportionately the demands for similar concessions in Algeria.

Although the forceful measures of Project Circular 408 may have been Hautpoul's response to the Falloux Law and the Oran Plot, what is more certain, with hindsight, is that his intercession in the winter of 1850 marked a turning point in the operations of the September decree, beyond which the Government General began to move away from Urbain's cherished latent methods and toward increasingly coercive dispositions. For the time being, Urbain was still able to object persuasively to Governor General Hautpoul through the accommodating minister of war, Randon. The latter's note of May 14, 1851, authored, in fact, by Urbain, rebuked Project Circular 408 in no uncertain terms.[67] Hautpoul was reminded of past ordeals wrought by heavy-handed and unqualified intrusions upon weakened Muslim communities and of the unmitigated advantages in "observing the greatest precautions with regards to religious prejudices."[68] Although he agreed that the colonial state had "every interest in seizing control of the [Muslim] schools and placing them under [its] patronage," Randon saw no credible success until France had secured "a marked preponderance" over the Arab tribes. Shortly after his exchange with Hautpoul, Randon was transferred to the Government General in Algiers following Napoleon's coup d'état of December 2, 1851, while Saint-Arnaud, strongman of the new regime, acceded to the Ministry of War. With Randon in the gubernatorial seat, Urbain expected noted improvements in his communications with Algiers, and indeed, until June 1857, indigenous policies in Algeria were conducted largely by the conservative concert of Randon in the Government General and Urbain in the Directorate of Algerian Affairs.

NOTHING BUT THE QURAN

> In general, the less the Arabs are instructed, the less fanatical they will be, and the easier to control. This way of seeing may not be very moral, but it is in accordance with our interests.
>
> —Captain Fauvelle, Arab Bureau, Milianah, 1851[69]

Much as he may have resented the unexpected turnaround by Hautpoul, Randon did grasp from the incident the need to fill the gaps in the

September decree. On January 29, 1852, he supplemented his ministerial note of May 14 with gubernatorial instructions to systematize and give direction to the surveillance routines of the Arab Bureaux. Borrowing from Project Circular 408 and the Falloux Law, he introduced a brevet of aptitude and morality (*brevet de capacité et de moralité*) to be delivered to deserving instructors by a council (*majlis*) of local notables, headed by a Muslim judge, or *qadi*.[70] The latter was to assist in inspecting the schools, assessing the performance of the instructors, and adjusting their remuneration accordingly. The *qadis* were to be designated by the Arab Bureaux based on their personal initiative in meeting the new guidelines "as effectively and with as little direct guidance as possible." Preference was to be given to local men embedded in their communities, who were thus less prone to condone or support anti-French activities warranting harmful reprisals against their kin. Their local connections, Randon reasoned, would also lessen the influence of the roaming or foreign *tolba* who skirted the watch of the army.

The judge, in conjunction with the local bureau chief, was to rate the instructors according to their demeanor in addressing or responding to officials, their command of the curriculum of instruction and subject matter, their record-keeping habits, their personal appearance and hygiene, the maintenance and cleanliness of their classrooms, and, lastly, the progress of their students. Satisfactory teachers were to be rewarded with monetary prizes, exemptions from certain tax or labor obligations, and "promotion of their standing within their communities." The *chef de bureau* and the *qadi* were to act as the conduits for reconciling the natives to the enhanced military controls. Two heads thus supervised the governor general's new framework for forming Muslim teachers and functionaries: first, the circle captain, attentive, yet patient and effaced; then the Muslim *qadi*, competent, upright, and devoted. However, both parties, as we shall see, failed to live up to the trust Randon had placed in their ability or willingness to play their parts.

Once again, there was little in the gubernatorial circular of January 29 to elicit cooperation from the Muslim instructors and *qadis*. From their perspective, and contrary to colonial affirmations, a program of instruction designed to suborn the teachings of the Muslim faith to the high surveillance of the governor general presented an obvious cultural and ideological dead end. Weak pecuniary incentives did not convince otherwise. More significantly, Randon's confidence-building measures did not necessarily commend accommodating Muslims to their respective communities. To the contrary, meeting the very requirements of the circular—that is, displaying personal initiative in complying with

TABLE 5.1

Sample Entries in Bureau Inspection Reports on Muslim Schools

a. September 30, 1852

Tribe	Location	Instructor	Comments
Beni Slimane	Mosque of Beni Souba	Ahmed ben Hammadi	This teacher is of good appearance, but does not conceal the fanaticism that animates him. He responds with ill will to the questions addressed to him and appears to find extraordinary our involvement in [Muslim] education. He has taught his pupils nothing but the Quran. He has been warned that he will be dismissed by the next inspection if his pupils still do not know how to count and are not in better shape.

b. August 19, 1853

Tribe	Instructor	Classes Given	Comments on Manner in Which Teachers Hold Their Classes	Comments on the Aptitudes and Progress of the Pupils
Aïn Madhi	Mohammed ben Aïssa	Reading and writing, verses of the Quran, fundamentals of arithmetic	Rude and savage instructor; denies the benefits of teaching his students anything but the Quran. Does not himself know how to enumerate. A fanatic, recommended officially to the bash agha.	Hardly remarkable pupils: of absolute ignorance aside from reading the Quran. They all are savages and not at all accustomed to seeing a French [military] uniform.

SOURCE: AOM 71MI/147.

colonial authority—rendered these individuals locally suspect, and from the vantage point of the Arab Bureaux, ineffectual partners.

Table 5.1 reproduces Randon's criteria for determining local aptitude and morality as entries in Arab Bureaux inspection reports from September 1852 and August 1853. The instructors Ahmed ben Hammadi (Table 5.1a) and Mohammed ben Aïssa (Table 5.1b) were evaluated based on their physical appearance, their disposition toward French authority, their competence, and the progress of their students. Judging by the comments of the inspecting officers, both unquestionably resented the extraordinary and disruptive intrusion of French representatives into their classrooms. They, in turn, were upbraided for their attach-

ment to traditional methods of tutoring and recitation. In the instructor's very discharge of his sacred obligation to teach the Quran to Muslim children, the inspecting officers saw only fanaticism, savagery, and animosity. The comments of the inspecting officers suggest, moreover, that military surveillance was not only short on discretion but lacking in viable options as well. How were the colonial authorities to overcome "fanatical" dispositions that were, in reality, conventional, if defiant, expressions of the intellectual heritage of Islam? There was little the bureau officers could do to persuade instructors such as Ben Hammadi and Ben Aïssa to abide by the new curricular standards, except to have them dismissed outright and, in the process, further postpone their bid to raise men of their making.

Intelligence reports from 1851 to 1853 document the growing frustration of bureau officers with Muslim "obduracy." They tell of *qadis* actively countermanding directives, whereas *tolba* and *derrers* ignored prescriptions and reverted, between rounds of inspections, to their "nefarious habits and teachings." More alarming, the flight of learned locals toward Qayrawan or Fez continued unabated, whereas marauding "vagabonds and swindlers" traveled in the opposite direction, taking advantage of the absent religious leadership to "hastily abet the instigators of sedition, flatter the pride of the true believers, and prophesy a nearby deliverance with help arriving from the east, the west or the south."[71] In December 1851, Antoine Alfred Chanzy in the circle of Milianah confirmed the closure of all local *madrasas* and *écoles* as *tolba* "seeking to acquire some sciences" migrated to the *zawiyas* of Kabylie—not conquered by the French until 1857—or, more often, "to the schools of Tunis or Morocco, and sometimes all the way to Tripoli," more than 670 miles to the east.[72] Likewise, in the circle of Teniet el-Had, Édouard Sériziat marveled at the tenacity of local students who risked everything by departing for Tunis without official authorization:

> We have observed a very remarkable tendency among the *tolba* to go to Tunis under the pretext of [continuing their] studies, and although we always denied every [*tolba*] in the circles the necessary permission to voyage, several have still managed to get there either by land or by sea.[73]

At the same time, whereas Chanzy, Sériziat, and others bemoaned the disappearance of indigenous literacy in their circles, their informants hinted at the existence of important clandestine networks of *zawiyas*.[74] Lapasset estimated that upwards of eighty *zawiyas*, with more than seven hundred students, evaded his surveillance in the circle of Orléansville in late 1851.[75]

In June 1854, with the attention of his government turned toward

the Crimea and fearing local repercussions, Field Marshal Jean-Baptiste Philibert Vaillant, the new minister of war, moved to correct the nonperforming state-sponsored schools in Algeria. He presented a plan to formalize the employment of *qadis* and school inspectors, paid from the budget of the Arab Bureaux. Vaillant's edict also prohibited Muslims from maintaining private schools, or *zawiyas*, or exercising their functions without official accreditation from the bureau chiefs, in consultation with the local councils. Captains were ordered to maintain updated lists of instructors to sanction their continued access to *madrasas*.[76] In September 1855, enforcement of the Vaillant ruling was extended to the civilian territories of Oran and Constantine, where Arab-French schools remained "stagnant [due to] the victorious competition by indigenous schools under the direction of fanatical and ignorant instructors."[77] By then, it had become clear to Urbain that his ministry was moving inexorably in the direction of the once-spurned premises of Project Circular 408. During the following months, as the Arab Bureaux continued to prove powerless in imposing their standards in a consistent manner, the march of the military administration toward stricter, more centralized forms of control over indigenous instruction accelerated.[78] Randon's departure in June 1857 to lead military operations in Kabylie, followed by Daumas's appointment to the French Senate in August, added to the general sense that the current regime was waning.[79]

Indeed, on October 6, 1857, Gubernatorial Circular 171 prescribed the strictest conditions to date for the employment of *derrers* and, in breach of the first article of the September decree, repealed the right of primary and secondary schools to operate "without modifications to their conditions of existence or to their established teaching routines."[80] Meeting the criteria for the *brevet de capacité* was extended to all levels of instruction, and the mediating role of the *qadis* was annulled. Bureau officers were themselves empowered to issue the certificates in consultation with the *majlis*, to inspect and evaluate the aptitude and morality of their holders every trimester, and to revoke the licenses in case of nonsatisfaction. The criminalization of subpar performances by Muslim instructors was later confirmed with penalties for infractions ranging from fines (fifty to one hundred francs) to jail sentences (fifteen to thirty days), with similar powers assigned to the civilian departmental bureaux. Furthermore, the circular instituted a pass system for the *tolba*, whereby the official authorization to teach also served as the necessary permit to travel between communities. Finally, the inspectors of the Arab Bureaux were enjoined to fathom the "mentality and inner thoughts" of the instructors under review. Within a span of eight years,

the military authorities had abandoned all pretenses of prudence and tact in favor of incessant supervision of the routines and opinions of Muslim instructors:

> This surveillance must be ceaseless and must extend to the ideas professed by the teachers as well as to the management of the school and the adequacy of the locale from the hygienic point of view. The chiefs of the military or departmental Arab Bureaux, depending on the territory, are the natural inspectors for the schools: they will need to visit them at least four times per year.[81]

Circular 171 sparked an immediate surge in the exodus of *tolba*. Within months of its issuance, inspection reports from military and departmental bureaux, now with a novel column for observations concerning the "moral disposition" of the instructors, were relating precipitous declines in their numbers.[82] To illustrate, by March 1858, only four of the initial eighteen *tolba* had stayed put in the circle of Boghar (Algérois). In Saïda (Oranais), seventeen of the original twenty-two had "vanished overnight," as had all but seven of the thirty-nine in Sétif (Constantinois). Countless teaching certificates were moreover retracted for insubordination or noncompliance with the new requirements. In the military circle of Dellys, eight of the original eighteen certificates issued in the first trimester of 1858 were revoked in the second.[83] The Central Directorate's general reports (*rapports d'ensemble*) for 1858, increasingly reminiscent of the circle reports from 1844 to 1846, depicted countless communities unable to discharge their most rudimentary societal responsibilities on the morrow of the disappearance of their *muftis*, *ʿulama*, *qadis*, and *imams*.

Table 5.2 shows the repercussions of Circular 171 on private *madrasas* in the circle of Teniet el-Had in the division of Algiers. I have selected Teniet el-Had specifically in order to single out a community that experienced, according to inspection reports, only minimal disruptions to its population of instructors, functionaries, and notables. Indeed, the quarterly rounds in April and July 1858 quoted a constant number of students, 174 and 178, respectively, with a slight reduction in instructors from thirteen to ten. Moreover, in April 1858, six years after Sériziat's account of the remarkable migration of the *tolba* for Tunis, the thirteen local instructors averaged fifty-five years of age, with six of them aged seventy or more. By July, the average age of the teaching corps had dropped to fifty years, and one must note here the absent generation of men who would have been thirty to fifty-five years old in 1843, when Teniet el-Had was first seized by Bugeaud's soldiers. Thus, at first glance, trends in Teniet el-Had appeared to hold steady between April and July 1858, with a relative rejuvenation of the teaching corps.

TABLE 5.2

Instructors in the Circle of Teniet el-Had, April and July 1858: Age, Familial Status, and Number of Students

Instructor	Age	Marital Status/ Children	Number of Students (April 1858)	Number of Students (July 1858)	Variation
El-Houaichi	80	Single	12	8	−4
Ben Cheikh	80	Single	8	14	+6
El-Smaïli	70	Single	11	24	+13
Ben Ali Khodja →	70	3	2	—	−2
El-Akhdar →	70	2	8	—	−8
Ben Sidi Driss →	70	Single	12	—	−12
Ben Madani	45	4	32	41	+9
Ben Ali →	44	1	16	—	−16
El-Cormnadi	42	Single	17	21	+4
Ben Ameur	40	3	18	20	+2
Ben Lamri	35	4	12	10	−2
Ben Mohamed →	35	Single	12	—	−12
Ben Tobal ←	35	0	—	17	+17
Ben Saad ←	33	0	—	6	+6
El Ouzzan	32	2	14	17	+3
Total			174	178	+4
Average			13.4	17.8	

SOURCE: AOM F^{80}/1573.

Closer examination of the statistical breakdown, however, reveals important variations in the composition of the classes and their levels of enrollment. The average class size in Teniet el-Had in 1858 was eighteen students, compared to the provincial average of seven or eight students. The instructor Ben Madani presided over forty-one pupils, even as newly installed Ben Saad ran a class of six. More noteworthy, the five instructors who departed (→) the circle after April (Ben Ali Khodja, El-Akhdar, Ben Sidi Driss, Ben Ali, and Ben Mohamed) averaged fifty-eight years of age and provided for an average family of 2.4 children. The report does not specify if they had migrated or were expelled, but by July, they had been substituted (←) with two lecturers (Ben Tobal and Ben Saad) averaging thirty-four years of age, both married and childless, suggesting perhaps a vulnerable pecuniary situation. Thus, despite the appearance of stability in Teniet el-Had, the statistical interpretation in Table 5.2 still corroborates bureau accounts of a generalized exodus by the more capable and determined *tolba* toward Morocco or Tunis, whereas the remaining instructors tended, in general, to care for smaller families, with less at stake therefore in settling for the educational regime of France.

As to conditions in the three official *madrasas*, in November 1857,

the Ministry of War engaged the renowned Orientalist Louis-Jacques Bresnier (1814–1869), chair of the Arabic Department at the Imperial College of Algiers, to conduct on its behalf a series of qualitative examinations of their student bodies. Bresnier rated the progress of the sixty-six students on a scale of 1 to 20 and assigned four possible grades: bad, mediocre, good, or very good (Table 5.3).[84] He noted significant disparities in individual aptitudes, due to the random grouping of students of differing ages and from dissimilar backgrounds in order to populate adequately the three classrooms. The aggregate performance of the students in the *madrasas* of Constantine and Blidah was particularly poor, with 88 percent and 58 percent, respectively, qualifying as "mediocre" or "bad." Bresnier informed the military authorities they could at best rely on twenty-seven "good" or "very good" students as potential candidates for their various administrations.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide small snapshots of the overall deteriorating socioeconomic conditions of the educational reforms of the 1850s, and account for the progressive hardening of the attitude of the military Arabists toward their native charges. With the youngest and ablest *ʿulama* departing to friendlier confines, circle chiefs lamented the dearth of "worthy indigenous associates." Their inspection notes from the late 1850s demonstrate an escalation in their references to "the most decrepit and infirm, ignorant and fanatical" instructors; derogatory adjectives used freely to deny the natives rational agency or legitimacy and to avoid a reconsideration of the realities of the educational reforms. The circle reports also record a communal lack of acceptance of the certified schools and *madrasas*. A decade of associative measures had failed to earn the Arabists the trust of their native subjects. Muslim families continued to regard colonial education as paltry compensation for their loss of land or income, with limited prospects of improvement

TABLE 5.3

Findings of the Bresnier Inquiry of March 25, 1858

	Number of Students			
Grade Received	Constantine	Blidah	Tlemcen	Total
1–5: Bad	13	4	0	17
6–10: Mediocre	10	11	1	22
11–15: Good	1	8	11	20
16–20: Very good	2	3	2	7
Total number of students	26	26	14	66
Average grade	6.50	9.80	12.00	

SOURCE: AOM 24S/1.

or opportunity for their children. At worst, the French establishments were seen as little more than recruiting boards for replenishing the military ranks with their sons, and European brothels with their daughters.[85] More frustrating, the officers had little choice but to bolster their unsuitable crop of *tolba* for lack of a better alternative. As shown in Table 5.1b, Mohammed ben Aïssa's utterly discredited performance did not deter his promotion and official "recommendation to the bash agha." By 1858, the continuing elusiveness of the desired "community of minds" (*communauté des esprits*) with the natives was fraying the internal cohesion of the Arab Directorate, with rising defections from the organizational and cultural course it had charted with the decrees of 1850.

RACIALIZING THE LAND

> Engage yourselves, with energy and intelligence, in agriculture and commerce; establish villages, build good houses of stone and covered with tiles to avoid having to suffer so much from the rains and the cold in winter, the heat in summer; make beautiful gardens and plant fruit trees of very kind, especially grafted olive trees and mulberries to make silk. . . . Once you have meditated soundly upon this friendly advice and have begun to practice what I have recommended to you, I shall tell you other things, always for your own good, because we love you as brothers, and we are saddened every time you force us to do you harm.
>
> —General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, Government General of Algeria, July 1845[86]

Aumale and his team of reformers were not unaware of the correlations between the moral improvement of the natives and progress of the material order. In his report of January 1848, he explicitly noted the contradictions in building schools to pacify the Arabs, while expropriating their resources and impoverishing their families. The restructuring of native society remained implausible, he suggested, unless the integrity of Muslim rights of property was confirmed. Fundamental corrections to the governing principles in the land policies of the colonial state were needed to buttress the new educational initiatives. The officers of the Arab Bureaux were, of course, familiar with the part of cadastral surveys in reconstituting the conquered territories according to colonial requirements. Their inventories of real assets in the first decade of French rule had been the starting point for the investigations into territorial rights in Algeria, completed by 1839 by Henri-Alexandre Flour de Saint-

Genis, inspector general of the Land Registry and Demesne. Working from the studies of renowned Orientalist scholars such as Abraham Anquetil-Duperron, Ignatius d'Ohsson, and Silvestre de Sacy, Flour de Saint-Genis had recognized two general categories of land in the colony: *makhzan* and *melk*. The former comprised the public estates (beylik) of the deposed Ottoman rulers, as well as the territories of their tributary tribes, including private holdings of communal *ʿarsh* or *sabiqa* lands. *Melk* lands constituted the bulk of individual property in Algeria, maintained primarily as inalienable pious or charitable endowments. The colonial government generally acknowledged native proprietary rights and freedom of transaction in the case of *melk* lands.[87] In 1841, however, as France loosened the restrictions on its colonial occupation of Algeria, Flour de Saint-Genis's classification of the tribal *ʿarsh* was challenged by Doctor Worms, expert on Muslim law, and by Amédée Marion, "his pale imitator." Their refutation of proprietary rights in Islam strengthened the hand of colonialists and speculators lobbying the authorities to dissolve indigenous modes of tenure and appropriate the lands of the Arab tribes.

Doctor Worms—to some, the foremost disciple of the Orientalist scholar Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall; to others, his charlatan plagiarist—advanced the hypothesis that North Africa, having been conquered by the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries, qualified as a tributary Muslim province (*kharaj*), and therefore, according to Quranic law, belonged only to God and his sovereign representatives on earth.[88] By the same rights of conquest, he argued, all *makhzan* lands had reverted to the French state in 1830, and their occupants were consequently guaranteed mere usufructuary (*tasarruf* = *droit de jouissance*) rather than proprietary rights. On this basis, *ʿarsh* deeds held collectively by one or several tribal communities conferred mere rights of tenancy and empowered "public collectivities" (*jamaʿas* = *djemaas*) to transfer and dispose of their hereditary privileges of usufruct, especially when the lands were abandoned or left fallow.[89] Although they elicited condemnation from Flour de Saint-Genis, Édmond Pellissier de Reynaud, and Enfantin, among others, the revisionist theses of Worms and Marion wound their way into official thinking and provided legal sanction for the subsequent reintegration of communal *ʿarsh* lands and inalienable *hubus* to the French public domain in 1843–1844.[90] By early 1842, the *Situation des établissements français de l'Algérie*, published by the Ministry of War, was already adopting their interpretations of Quranic scriptures to confirm the exclusivity of divine and sovereign ownership of Muslim lands:

What we would refer to at home as a confiscation is really, in the case of the indigenes, a repossession, the effect of which is to terminate an essentially revocable concession of usufruct, *the one [right] which the prince, image of God on earth, is able and disposed to withdraw.*[91]

This argument also supplied the legal rationale for the sequestration, or *cantonnement*, of the Algerian tribes. Their unsown lands, according to Worms, proved that nomads occupied more space than needed for their survival and livelihood. The colonial authorities were therefore justified in restricting their access to communal lands. The policy of *cantonnement*, he attested, freed unexploited hectares for European colonization, without harming unjustly or jeopardizing the welfare of the tribes.[92]

The heated polemic between the camps admitting or refuting proprietary rights in Islam boiled over in 1843, with the publication, months apart, of three different verdicts on Algerian land tenure. Worms's second important study on Algeria, published in six installments of the *Journal Asiatique* between September 1842 and March 1844, was contested by the celebrated jurist Louis-Antoine Macarel, commissioned by the Ministry of War in February 1843 to clarify the status of individual property in Islam.[93] Finally, Enfantin's *Colonisation de l'Algérie* transformed the question of land reform in Algeria into the political-economic platform for the symmetrical renewal of Arab and French societies. Land policies became integral to modernizing initiatives, operating in unison with graduated institutions of law, justice, and education, to effect the desired Franco-Arab associations. During his time with the scientific commission, the Father of Saint-Simonism had disputed the universality of rights of conquest in North Africa and proposed, as we have seen, the material development or valorization (*mise en valeur*) of tribal lands as the economic counterpart to moral association with the Arabs. In collective tenure as it existed in North Africa, he envisioned the gateway to a superior regime of mutual ownership by anonymous shareholding societies (*propriété par action*), and the opportunity therefore to evolve France's own notions of individual property toward corporatism. "The beautiful term '*commune*,'" he observed, "applies infinitely better to an Arab *tribe* than to a French *village*."[94]

For Jacques Lambert, the publication of *Colonisation de l'Algérie* marked the birth of "a new colonial doctrine to supplant the liberal doctrine of the eighteenth century."[95] More significantly, whereas the polemics of 1843 clarified the connections between the rights of property and the cultural identity of Algeria, Enfantin's intervention posited land reform as an active agent of modernization and civilization. With

the reshuffling of colonial expertise following the military inquiries of 1846–1847, the views of Enfantin entered the deliberations of the Arab Directorates, where, once again, Urbain took the relay and spearheaded reforms to make the tribesmen masters of their territories. Referring to his own expertise in the matter—though borrowing freely from Macarel's official study—Urbain blamed the specious theories of Worms for squandering the potential rewards of *cantonnement*. In the wake of the expropriations of the late 1840s, conferring rights of property upon the natives appeared to him as an imposing bulwark against the voracious colonial appetite for land, as well as a thoughtful correction to past injustices against them. Urbain's alternative plan to "colonize [the Algerian interior] with the natives themselves" involved transforming nine million Arabs into "landholders" in a superficial area the size of Spain.[96]

The Land Law of June 16, 1851, to be considered concomitantly with the presidential decrees on colonial education, bolstered the leadership of the Central Directorate over the new course in policy making. Like the decrees of 1850, it was enacted to restore tranquility to the natives of Algeria and complete the overthrow of the political regime in force until then. The Land Law, according to Lambert, embodied the colonialist conceptions of Lamoricière and Cavaignac, "both forever flirting with the Saint-Simonians."[97] It confirmed the inalienability of indigenous holdings and rights of usufruct as they were at the time of conquest, and it proposed parceling out collectively held tracts into smaller plots more conducive to individual tenure.[98] Native interests were detached from the concerns of European colonization, and the Ministry of War reserved for itself the right to distribute collective deeds among reconstituted individual owners, with preference given to "families who will have shown themselves worthy [of the benefit of personal property] by the cultivation of their lands." The Ministry of War had switched to upholding proprietary rights in Algeria as the foundation or point of support (*point d'appui*) for the sweeping moral and material transformation of Arab society. The language of the Saint-Simonians now animated its decrees:

> Personal property thus conquered through a radical modification of the social state of the natives, will irrevocably bind [the latter] to our cause by their own interests. Born of labor and the spirit of progress, it will open the way to all [kinds of] social and agricultural improvements; it will be the surest turning point in the assimilation of the two peoples.[99]

With the Land Law of June 1851 in effect, the rate of domainial acquisitions slowed in relation to the immoderate years of 1848–1849. Still,

the surface of European colonization continued to expand in aggregate terms, due in no small measure to the development of capitalist exploitation under the Second Empire. The government of Napoleon III escalated the transfer of public lands to large agricultural concessions and initiated intensive industrial and infrastructural projects, especially in the construction of railways, roads, and mines—enterprises in which Saint-Simonian entrepreneurs such as Henri Fournel and the Brothers Talabot played pioneering roles. Moreover, the campaign of military pacification, having mainly moved inland since the surrender of Abd al-Qadir in 1847, veered once again toward the Mediterranean highlands of Kabylie in the mid-1850s, as the Army of Africa unleashed its power against "the last independent bastion in the heart of Algeria."[100] Finally, the suppression of the Government General in August 1858 undid what gains had been achieved by the law of 1851. The creation of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies coincided with a return to the economic dislocations and negative demographic trends of the early 1840s, at the height of Bugeaud's operations of total conquest.[101]

By 1860, with tribal society in irreversible collapse, the Algerian Directorate subsumed its sociocultural reforms to the imperative of restoring native security and agricultural productivity. With the restoration of the Government General in December 1860, Urbain would intensify the political drive to conform indigenous social groupings to French regulating notions of order and productivity. The reconstitution of indigenous property would become the main prong in his intricate strategy to make Muslim society at once more impervious to colonial predations, yet more permeable to association with the civilizing and industrializing drive of the Europeans. Aumale's military Arabists had intervened in 1846–1847 to contest the theoretical sleight of hand that had neutralized natives rights of property in the soil, but, as will be shown in the following chapter, their own reading of Muslim property laws still failed to respect "time-honored practices in Algeria."[102] The final push by the Arabophiles to impose a uniform and modern aesthetic upon the native mind and landscape would open, in the words of Charles-André Julien, the "most poignant drama in the colonization of Algeria."[103]

CHAPTER SIX

Napoleon, Emperor of the Arabs

> Thus, to raise the Arabs to the dignity of free men, to spread education among them while respecting their religion, to ameliorate their lives by extracting from this earth the treasures Providence has buried therein and which a bad government leaves sterile, such is our mission: we shall not fail.
>
> —Emperor Napoleon III, Algiers, September 19, 1860[1]

> What has been stirring [Algeria] for thirty years and will perhaps stir it for a hundred years, is this capital question: how to infuse it with European life? How to make the conquest durable?
>
> —Auguste-Edmond Vital to Thomas "Ismaÿl" Urbain, November 4, 1864[2]

The rise of indigenous elites able and willing to associate with the cultural regime desired by France was the cornerstone to the educational reforms of July and September 1850. Accordingly, the failure of this new corps of native instructors to manifest itself in the following years drove the projects of the Arabophiles into a logistical dead end and stirred calls to abandon current sterile policies and explore alternative administrative methods. Concomitantly, with Kabylie conquered and Algeria largely pacified by late 1857, the civil and municipal authorities found their second wind and accelerated their campaign to limit the political prerogatives of the Army of Africa. The governor general was pressured to give more attention to issues of European settlement and development and to emphasize the civic attributions of his administration. Official proposals to eliminate the Government General and distribute its dossiers among the relevant Parisian bureaucracies were opposed by the minister of war and resulted in a compromise solution to centralize its functions in a new cabinet dedicated exclusively to Algerian and colonial matters. The transfer of native affairs to the newly founded Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies in Paris

in June 1858 unleashed a new wave of colonial land seizures and violations of Muslim jurisdictions. The ensuing unrest in Algeria prompted the personal intervention of Emperor Napoleon III in September 1860. Napoleon's military advisors reproached the excessive policies of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies, and brought to his attention the former proposals of the Arab Directorates. The Arabophile reformers introduced Napoleon to the rudiments of the associationist project, and promised to salvage the reputation of France in Algeria with economic improvements and an accelerated drive to reconfigure Muslim rights of property. Questions of capitalist development, technical expertise, and infrastructural modernization dominated Napoleon's thinking on Algeria in the 1860s. The projected Arab Kingdom became the space in which to bring to fruition the organizational and cultural course that the Arab Bureaux had charted since the decrees of 1850.

TALE OF TWO TRIALS

On September 12, 1856, at fifteen minutes past three o'clock in the morning on the outskirts of Tlemcen, a dozen Arab horsemen attacked the stagecoach to Oran, killing three of its passengers, including Muhammad Ben Abdallah, agha of the Beni-Snous. Among the suspects was the *khawaja* of the local Arab Bureau, who, upon interrogation by the police, quickly implicated his chief, Captain Auguste Doineau. The subsequent trial of Doineau before the Court of Assizes of Oran on August 6–23, 1857, unearthed a battery of allegations of crimes and procedural improprieties committed by Doineau, ranging from death threats against Ben Abdallah to summary judgments, arbitrary beatings or killings, illegal seizures of native assets, and embezzlement of funds. Blatantly contradictory testimonies by native witnesses, the obvious partiality of the judge, and the contentions between the commanding generals in Oran and Tlemcen, who went so far as to cast mutual aspersion on the faithfulness of each other's wives, all contributed to the sensationalization of the case. Although not proven guilty of the crime, the scandals buzzing about Doineau proved sufficient for the president of the court to condemn the officer to death, much to the outrage of the military authorities.[3]

In the middle of the circus-like atmosphere of the trial, the pent-up political frustrations of the *colons* exploded. Doineau now stood for all the ills of the "dictatorial rule" of the Arab Bureaux. Prosecuting the case against Doineau was the fiery orator and republican advocate Jules Favre, known for his staunch support of the colonialist cause in Algeria and a prominent figure in the liberal opposition to the coup d'état of

December 2, 1851. Favre cast the Arab Bureaux as the enemies of civil rights, colonial development, and local prosperity. He depicted their "regime of the sword" as feudal, violent, and arbitrary—accusations that lent credence to the most exaggerated civilian grievances against the army. Native society itself came under the fire of Favre as he pondered how Doineau was to have resisted the bribes and kickbacks so essential to the customs of the Arabs. Contact with the "rot" of the Orient, he claimed, had corrupted the African officers and accounted for the noticeable deterioration in their professional and moral qualities. How long would the indifferent government allow things to fester? asked the prosecutor. "If we were to judge all the Arab Bureaux by the one in Tlemcen, then we should hasten to eliminate them or profoundly reform them," he concluded to the gleeful clamor from the *colons* gathered in the courthouse.[4] The implications behind Favre's indictment of the military agencies were not lost on the government in Paris: the emperor himself was being impugned by the republican opposition. According to Favre, it was Napoleon's disregard for Algeria that had brought colonial rivalries and corruptions to a head. The colonial swamp needed to be drained. Major corrections in colonial governance were in order, including perhaps the suppression of the military regime altogether.

One year later, Jules Favre was back in court, this time in Paris, defending the Italian nationalist and "born conspirator," Felice Orsini.[5] The trial of the would-be assassin of Napoleon III lacked the antics that had marred the Doineau case, but portended equally grave consequences for the imperial regime. Despite Favre's appeals for leniency, Orsini was sentenced to death after two brief sessions of the Court of Assizes of the Seine on February 25–26, 1858. On the eve of his execution on March 13, the condemned man pleaded with the emperor to heed the final words of a patriot on the steps of the scaffold. "I beseech your Majesty," he wrote, "to return to Italy the independence that its children lost in 1849 by the actions of the French . . . [for] so long as Italy is not sovereign, the tranquility of your Europe and your Majesty will be but a chimera." The attempt on his life and the rising prospects of war in Italy convinced Napoleon that he could no longer pose as the defender of nationalist movements abroad while suppressing civil liberties at home. In the months following the execution of Orsini, the emperor's Italian misadventures would give his opponents much cause to expose and condemn his "personal political agenda." Institutional reforms were in order if Napoleon hoped to shore up his popular appeal at home. Social concessions to the working classes could compensate for the growing alienation of former allies among the conservative and religious elites. The liberalization of the Second Empire was inaugurated with the signing of the free trade agreement with England in January

1860, and sustained through the year with incremental advances toward parliamentary representation.

The liberal turn in the political life of the empire allowed Napoleon to renew his exposure to the socioeconomic doctrines of the Saint-Simonians, communicated to him in his youth by his tutor, Narcisse Vieillard. Their ideas for reorganizing the national economy and polity to satisfy the exigencies of the Industrial Age could only appeal to the author of *L'extinction du paupérisme*. Henri Fournel and the Brothers Pereire and Talabot inspired Napoleon's economic reforms, pushing him to reconcile the working classes to elite authority through labor and welfare reforms as well as the modernization of domestic infrastructures of production and transport. They lectured him on the relations between economic prosperity and political stability. The drive toward a more just and equitable distribution of national wealth implied financial, infrastructural, commercial, and political improvements. The relaxation of freedom of speech and association culminated in May 1864 with the Ollivier Law, which also consecrated the workers' right to strike. Like his Saint-Simonians counselors, Napoleon looked upon France as country where almost everything had yet to be done. He complained to Achille Fould, his minister of state, about agricultural, industrial, commercial, and communication sectors "still in infancy . . . antiquated . . . in need of modernization."[6] Accordingly, the government soon embarked on a massive renovation of its railways, harbors, telegraph lines, banks, and main urban agglomerations. Under the Saint-Simonian emperor, the entire nation, not just Paris, was transformed into a vast public construction site.

Napoleon III was especially fascinated with Michel Chevalier, Prosper Enfantin's former assistant and cellmate, now chair of political economy at the Collège de France. In *Système de la Méditerranée*, his influential treatise on the political economy of the Industrial Age, Chevalier bound France and Algeria in a new logic of development and expansion. Prosperity at home dictated reform in Algeria, and the colonial economy was to be invigorated with extensive capital investments in industrial infrastructure, communication, and agriculture. The emperor's new domestic priorities, his attempts to cultivate the political consensus of France's elites while providing for its less privileged working classes, began to find their echo in Algeria. The project of the Arab Kingdom was thus fashioned as the Second Empire itself turned more liberal. Napoleon's political initiatives to secure indigenous rights of property in Algeria would parallel his domestic legislative campaigns to grant French workers the right to strike and associate. The integrality of Algerian reforms to the modernization and liberalization of the

French polity proper is often overlooked by students of the reign of Napoleon III. Between 1860 and 1867, Algiers, like Baron Haussmann's Paris, was also refurbished into a modern European city.[7] Its squalid Casbah, its own *îlot insalubre*, was slated for demolition to make space for modern avenues, squares, and buildings. Napoleon, however, recognized the utility in conserving the indigenous character of the city and rescued its Arab quarter at the eleventh hour. An embellished Paris, a Europeanized French Algiers, a preserved Muslim Casbah; Napoleon's triptych of urban renewal may well stand as the architectural expression for his overall project for the Arab Kingdom: the establishment of a reduced traditional, pastoral, and artisanal native reserve, encircled and enframed by European culture and industry. The Arab protectorate was not a pure exercise in foreign policy or an attempt to create a separate entity in Algeria. Rather, it was meant to integrate the Arabs of Algeria into the Saint-Simonian emperor's vision of a modern French polity, and the colonial reforms of the 1860s were natural and logical outcomes of the larger political evolution of the imperial regime itself.

THE BASTARD REGIME THAT MUST NOT RULE

> Napoleon: You will be the emperor's lieutenant in Algiers.
> Jerome: I wish to spend four months of the year in Paris.
> Napoleon: In that case, you will be a mere minister in Paris.
> —Napoleon III and Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, Paris, June 1858[8]

> The affairs that relate to Algeria demand almost always the assistance of the different ministries. This mission is fulfilled by the central administration, and it is not without pains that it barely arrives at a solution. Where would one find the will, the initiative, the preoccupation to centralize, study, harmonize these questions *if every minister is entrusted with a specific responsibility*?
> —Field Marshal Jacques-Louis Randon, Ministry of War, May 1856[9]

The successive military subjugation of Kabylie and sensational trial of Doineau pulled Napoleon from his six-year-long disdain for his "republican" North African colony. The final pacification of the rugged mountains of Algeria in July 1857 reignited public calls for an end to the colony's militarized administration.[10] The emperor's coterie of civilian advisors found their sovereign particularly amenable to cleansing the colonial house and bringing the African military to heel in the aftermath of the Doineau hearings. Consulting the pages of the broadsheet *La Colonisation*, edited by a favored and admired publicist, Napoleon

was treated to a litany of administrative errors lurking behind Algeria's unrelenting political instability and economic stagnation. Clément Duvernois's indictment of the Government General of Algeria was his preface for predicting the upcoming demise of France in North Africa. The emperor was entreated to change radically his colonial policies in North Africa or suffer the unhappy fate of England in North America. The "dispensable natives," according to Duvernois, did not warrant the added burdens of specialized laws and martial restraints.[11] To the contrary, the prosperity of Algeria, Napoleon was informed, like that of the United States of America, depended on the extinction of their vile nationality, the dislocation of their tribal cohesiveness, and the elimination of their leadership. The studies of Doctor Worms were resurrected to rationalize the dismantlement of tribal units and the absorption of their surplus or unused lands. Over the next two years, the imperial government would come close to fulfilling the assimilationist objectives of Duvernois, as the restrictions of June 1851 on the exploitation of tribal lands were steadily rescinded. From the perspective of Muslim Algeria, therefore, the period of imperial politics did not open on December 2, 1852, with the consecration of Napoleon III, but on June 24, 1858, with the suppression of the Government General and the transfer of its responsibilities to the incipient Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies.

The foundation of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies altered political parameters in place since 1848. The various regulatory portfolios pertaining to Algeria were detached from the appropriate Parisian ministries—namely, War, Navy, Justice, Finance, Public Instruction, and Interior—and concentrated in the new department.[12] The responsibilities of the defunct Government General were reallocated to prefects in the case of municipal services, and commanding generals in matters related to the security of the state. With military prerogatives maintained strictly for the sake of security in the territories and to ward off disruptions in the collection of Arab taxes, civilian functionaries and constituencies gained significant administrative clout over the natives. General councils (*conseils généraux*) were reinstituted to give European districts a greater say in the determination of municipal budgets and the governance of the colony. The executive powers of colonial prefects were expanded at the expense of the receding military authority. Indigenous instruction, likewise, devolved to the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies, with *madrasas* and public Arab-French schools assigned to the custody of the "specialized functionaries from the Rectorate of the Academy of Algiers."[13]

The minister of Algeria, Prince Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, also moved quickly to facilitate the appropriation of lands by the colonial prefectures and general councils. On February 16–21, 1859, the le-

gal constraints on the acquisition or purchase of indigenous property within the military zones were abrogated.[14] The state was empowered to sequester (*cantonner*) the tribes, take title to their surplus territories, and compensate them with legal recognition of their individual proprietary rights (*melk*) within the newly defined boundaries. Real estate transactions, moreover, no longer required official sanction. Within a year, European ownership of former domainial lands rose sharply from 175,000 hectares to 295,000 hectares in 1859. Concurrently, the area consigned to the civilian jurisdiction more than doubled from 748,995 hectares in August 1859 to 1,854,990 hectares in February 1860, and the number of Muslims living therein increased from 144,298 in 1856, to 358,760 in 1861.[15]

The first responses to the reinitiation of *cantonnement* were felt in early 1859, with an upsurge in individual acts of anti-French violence. These soon swelled into collective defiance in the Arab territories. Intelligence from the bureau circles warned of slumbering Muslim confraternities becoming active again, renewing their calls for holy war and messianic deliverance from the impious French. The minister of war was deluged with reports denouncing the recklessness of the course set by his Algerian counterpart. In March 1859, Prince Jerome, who had yet to set foot in Algeria, resigned his post suddenly, his stature diminished by the colonial unrest and the recriminations of the minister of war. Once again, the reluctant attention of the emperor was drawn by turmoil in the supposedly pacified colony. Napoleon, however, was at a loss for options, hearing mostly ungratifying answers from his councilors of state. His political indecision heightened following the successive publication in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of flagrantly contradictory reviews of his Algerian reforms of 1858. Jules Duval's uncompromising condemnation of military rule in *L'Algérie: Gouvernement, administration, immigration*, printed in April 1859, was swiftly canceled by the disparaging critique in *Une réforme administrative en Algérie*, authored in January 1860 by Albert de Broglie, who had recently returned from a journey to North Africa.[16] Broglie ridiculed the administrative impotence of France's civilian functionaries in Algeria and censured the "anarchical colonization" and methodical spoliation conducted by Prince Jerome. The emperor was intrigued by this account from a respected diplomat and historian, which corroborated with literary verve the harried military updates arriving from remote *cercles de bureaux*. According to Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Une réforme administrative en Algérie* was at the origin of Napoleon's subsequent Algerian innovations, which would culminate with the legislation of April 1863.[17] To this extent, Albert de Broglie stands in parallel with Édouard de Neveu as men of letters whose critical interpretations of the colonial condition, twenty

years apart, provoked a durable reorientation in official policy making. Indeed, Prosper de Chasseloup-Laubat, successor to Prince Jerome, was soon asked to rescind the unsupervised liberty of *colons* to purchase land in the Arab territories, while Napoleon planned his first trip to Algiers to inspect in person the circumstances related by Broglie and the Arab agencies.

Arriving in Algiers on September 17, Napoleon III, by his own accounts, was struck instantly by the base condition of the indigenes, the "rapacity of the settlers," and the open animosity between his prefects and generals. Conversely, the martial pride and stirring devotion of his Arab subjects appeared to mesmerize the emperor, who responded, according to many accounts, with a romanticized impression of his Oriental colony. Or did Algeria reawaken in Napoleon the socialist impulses of his youth? His enthusiasm for modernizing reforms had already earned him the nickname of "Saint-Simon on horseback," and he certainly reverted to the language of Saint-Simonian idealism in acknowledging the inadmissible misfortune of the colony's Muslim subjects after three decades of French rule.[18] "What is civilization," he asked his audience in Algiers, "if not to hold that welfare counts for something, the life of man for a lot, its moral improvement as the greatest good?"[19] Thereafter, Napoleon considered it his primary duty in Algeria to fulfill the true promise of his nation's civilizing mission and bring order, progress, and growth to his Arab subjects. Upon his return to Paris, he eliminated the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies on November 24–25 and reinstated the Government General on December 10, with its authority in the civilian territories exercised through a much reduced director general for civilian affairs. Having taken personal responsibility for the welfare of the natives, the emperor empowered the governor to communicate directly with him. Somehow, the Arabs of Algeria had salvaged the discredited military regime and restored its administrative prominence in the colony.

THE COLONIAL APPRENTICESHIP OF NAPOLEON III

In Paris, still basking in the afterglow of his encounter with the Orient, Napoleon sought avidly to overcome his ignorance of things Algerian. He met repeatedly with his closest councilors and chiefs of staff. In the early going, the emperor's questions were fielded by his half brother, the Duke of Morny; his first equerry, General Émile Fleury; Minister of War Randon; and Frédéric Lacroix in the First Bureau of the Directorate of Algeria. He remained in political apprenticeship through the winter of 1861, listening, inquiring, and discussing as he clarified his thoughts on

Algeria. His directives to Governor General Jean-Jacques Pélissier during this period were tentative and solicitous rather than commanding, and were far too dependent on the personal initiative of the governor in following through the original impulse.[20] A more ill suited individual for the task, however, there was none. The conceited and increasingly senile governor answered the imperial queries with antipathy and incoherence, prompting Napoleon to seek answers from lower-ranking officers in the Army of Africa. Through the offices of Lacroix, Arabist specialists traveled in succession to the Palace of the Tuileries to brief the emperor on conditions on the ground. The sovereign was particularly receptive to their notion of achieving "colonial equilibrium" between the requirements for European development and the vital needs of Arab society. Slowly, the ideological points of reference for colonial reform fell into place. After the radical innovations of 1858, Napoleon now consented to modest confidence-building measures, with the "greatest circumspection applied in allocating the lands reserved for European colonization or for colonization by the natives."[21] Enfantin's old proposal to dissolve the social structures of the great nomadic tribes and settle the Algerian interior with North African peasants had resurfaced in the emperor's official correspondence with Algiers.

In August, the Polytechnicien officer Julien-Charles Pechot handed the emperor a recently published brochure with the provocative title *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*. Its author, Georges Voisin—the pseudonym behind which hid Ismaÿl Urbain—argued, convincingly as far as Napoleon was concerned, that Algeria's system of land tenure constituted the Gordian knot of colonial reforms. *L'Algérie pour les Algériens* raised Napoleon's interest in an imperial protectorate in the military regions, with limited self-rule for the "Algerians" in their assigned territories. On November 1, he apprised the governor general of his support for a protected Arab Kingdom in Algeria. "The Arab element," he wrote to Pélissier, "is the vital element of colonization. Indeed, our African possession is not an ordinary colony, but an Arab kingdom."[22] As Napoleon remarked himself, his letter was inspired by an impulse "quite contrary to the one in force to this day":

> Instead of worrying the Arabs with *cantonnement*, it is better to reassure them by granting them lands. Instead of selling state-owned properties leased by the Arabs, it is necessary to preserve them. Instead of repelling them into the desert, it is necessary to attract them to the fertile plains. Instead of expanding the civil territory, it is necessary to restrict it.[23]

The letter was a personal request by the emperor to suspend the operations of colonial *cantonnement* until he had completely educated himself on the relevant issues. Napoleon had stepped into the executive role

long envisaged by Enfantin, and was now placing his political authority at the head of the experiment to remake the natives into subjects of the imperial crown, with a semidefined territory and a "national" identity still in the making. Despite its unofficial stamp, the imperial letter of November 1861 set in motion the policies of the Arab Kingdom, and in the process, it reshuffled most political alliances in Algeria and France.

The demise of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies had already provoked competing political interests to seek to capitalize on the imperial government's latest political pronouncements or, alternatively, to frustrate the renewed ascendance of the Arab agencies. The magnitude of the ensuing struggle for political influence reflected the firm conviction among officials that French Algeria in 1861 stood at a critical historical juncture. As Napoleon refined his position on the colony, the prevailing political configurations were themselves redefined, with the habitual civil versus military alignments now giving way to coalitions bound together by their common stance with regard to the strategy of the Arab Kingdom. Xavier Yacono explained the waning polarization between military and civil authorities after 1860 in terms of an outright reversal in the policies of the Central Directorates. "The position of the Arab Bureaux," he asserted, "changed to the point of being in 1860 the opposite of what it had been ten years earlier."[24] More precisely, the political trajectory of the Arab agencies after 1861 experienced as much continuity as reversal, the tendency for dissonance and fragmentation having always been latent within a military bureaucracy rarely as monolithic as it was made out to be. As imperial endorsement for the Arab Kingdom raised the stakes for the parties concerned, it triggered among them a struggle for political primacy, which transcended the usual civil-military divide and exposed once again the wide divergences in French colonial priorities. Algerian politics in the 1860s were consumed by the dogmatic contest between "Arabophiles" and "Arabophobes." By 1862, the contest had congealed around three definable poles of power, each with its particular disposition toward the new political orientation: the impetuous Imperial Court, the reserved Ministry of War, and the hostile Government General.[25] The Saint-Simonian family itself, as we shall see, would fracture along the same competing tendencies, the "sons of Enfantin" eventually shedding their fraternal unity to become "mortal enemies." As in 1848–1849, at the threshold of its likely political triumph, the project of colonial association was beset with dissension from within.

A FRACTIOUS FAMILY

When Randon was apprised of Napoleon's intention to carve out a special ministry for Algeria in June 1858, he abdicated from the Government General and voiced his opposition to the initiative in no uncertain terms. The ensuing debacle of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies, however, enabled the old soldier to come in from the cold of political exile in May 1859 and take up the reins anew at the Ministry of War. He now occupied the platform from which to rehabilitate the tarnished power and reputation of the Army of Africa and discredit exhaustively the record of the usurping ministry. The humiliations of 1858 sharpened Randon's resolve to restore the army's decree in colonial decision making. Prefects were demoted to the rank of junior partners of the governor general, whose "sovereign authority, resources, and powers [was recognized] over the tribes and the entire military territory" of Algeria.[26] At the same time, with Doineau and the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies still fresh in his mind, Randon swore to curb all "destabilizing and unrestrained colonial practices," whether committed by military or civilian parties. To this effect, he endorsed the unification of the military chain of command and abridged the autonomous decision-making powers of the Offices of Arab Affairs. Likewise, he remained guarded toward the project of the Arab Kingdom, fearing its potential to unleash an angered colonialist backlash. His support for *cantonnement* had always set Randon at relative odds with his Arabophile contingents, but in the early 1860s, he was expressly loath to rock the boat of military restoration by making public his opposition to the agenda for imperial reforms. Professing to mediate between the needs of the Europeans and those of the indigenes, the minister of war preferred to moderate rather than oppose the "too original and too absolute" ideas of Napoleon III. Still, his commitment to walk the middle ground could lead Randon to intervene decisively to safeguard colonial interests to the detriment of his own military apparatus. In 1864, as we shall see, his objection to Napoleon's centralization of the colonial government resulted in the defeat of the motion and the preservation of the civilian structure.

Although Randon remained largely loyal to his sovereign, the imperial letter of November provoked the defection of Pélissier from the political course set by Paris. As early as May 1861, the governor general, on the counsel of Gustave Mercier-Lacombe, his director for civil affairs, had attempted to preempt the likely reorientation in colonial politics by endowing *cantonnement* with a legal basis.[27] His

Project Decree for the Sequestration of the Natives (*Projet de décret sur le cantonnement des indigènes*) stated the impracticality of native usufructuary rights over *ʿarsh* or *sabiqa* lands and proposed granting the immovable property of the tribes "the same organization, the same legal status, the same freedom of alienation, the same rights, in brief, as in the case of French property, which rests everywhere on authentic titles, [and] draws its principle from individual ownership."[28] In his much delayed response to Napoleon's letter of November 1861, Pélissier reiterated his aversion to the notion of an Arab Kingdom and implored the sovereign to bear in mind the constant numerical threat posed by native populations: "France will not long hold on to Algeria until a number of Frenchmen, balancing that of the Arabs, grows roots in the soil of its conquest."[29] Pélissier's objections to the Arab Kingdom were goaded by Mercier-Lacombe, who exercised a disproportionate influence on the governor. Imbued with exaggerated self-importance, Pélissier relinquished the gritty routines of governance to his civil director, content merely to ratify bills without reading them or consulting Paris. "*L'empereur ici c'est moi*," he once scolded a petitioner, "the one in Paris always says 'yes,' but behind him is someone who says 'no,' and it is I." As a result, Pélissier's dealings with the army's administrative duties were often ambiguous. He periodically acquiesced to measures diluting military oversight to the benefit of municipalities, and he once described his own capacity as "essentially civilian."[30]

The unanticipated dissent of the governor general prompted colonial lobbyists such as Jules Duval and Auguste Warnier to join forces with Mercier-Lacombe and exploit the opportunity to strip the emperor of his new Arab clothes. Warnier's collaboration with the Government General commenced when Mercier-Lacombe approached him for guidance in drafting the Project Decree for the Sequestration of the Natives. During the 1850s, the former member of the scientific commission had distanced himself from Urbain, his Saint-Simonian co-disciple, to emerge in the following decade as the primary advocate for colonial assimilation. His annoyance with the "unbridled Arabophilia" of Urbain and the militarization of the administration since 1849 had led Warnier to break rank and repudiate the desirability of Arab renewal. He was by then, it must be added, a rich landlord and proprietor of an agricultural estate of one thousand hectares in the vicinity of Lake Halloula, a few kilometers from Tipasa. With significant capital invested in local commercial ventures and the development of the colony's railways, the project of the Arab Kingdom appeared to Warnier a disproportionate threat to the long-term viability of French Algeria. He resented as

much Napoleon's handling of Enfantin's apostolate of civilization as he did the sovereign's preposterous intention to make Europeans subjects in a probable Arab Kingdom.[31] By its very presence, the kingdom curtailed the colony's capacity to accommodate large numbers of European settlers and provide them with appropriate lands and resources. "Is it not time we invoked the no less sacred rights of the *colons*?" he asked publicly in 1863. In the 1860s, Warnier's unswerving defense of *cantonnement* and his summons for the unconditional elimination of the special status of Algeria became rallying cries for European landed and capitalist interests as well as factors in the growing doctrinal schism within the family of Saint-Simonians.

Warnier, in many ways, personified the invigorated political, financial, and demographic clout of the *colon* constituency by the late 1850s. He and other colonial publicists rode the crest of the newfound confidence of European Algerians, reassured of their future in North Africa by the annexation of 1848 and aggressively committed to achieving full integration with the metropole or, barring that, independence from it. In addition to the overall amelioration in local demographics and standards of living, the political maturation of colonial society reflected its deepening Gallicization, as attested to by the development of a vigorous and effective Algerian press.[32] Metropolitan attitudes toward the cause of the *colons* also changed in important ways in the 1850s as cultural links between metropole and colony grew stronger. The number of settlers of French extraction had doubled between 1845 and 1856, and the latter finally surpassed the non-Gallic European population of Algeria (Table 6.1).[33] European birth rates also exceeded mortality for the first time in 1855. The transformations in the cultural, economic, and demographic profiles of French Algeria amplified local demands for the "municipalization" of the colonial administration, and by the late 1850s, the local campaign for greater civil rights was effectively joined by metropolitan parties demanding the liberalization of the Second Empire. Metropolitan and colonial critics disputed in concert the unconstitutional powers of the imperial government of Napoleon III and the unwarranted administrative sovereignty of the military *régime du sabre* in Algiers. Their common antagonism toward Napoleon III, although animated by different interests, would subsume the problem of native rights to the question of civil liberties in France and its North African departments. After 1860, the emperor's plans for an Arab realm in Algeria were consistently portrayed by his political opponents as a dictatorial infringement on the natural rights and privileges of the French *colons*.

TABLE 6.1

French Civilians in Proportion to the Total European Population of Algeria, 1836–1861

Year	French	Other European	Total
1836	5,500	9,000	14,500
1841	16,677	20,697	36,374
1845	46,339	48,982	95,321
1856	92,750	74,920	167,670
1861	112,229	80,517	192,746

By the same token, the accommodating attentiveness of Napoleon III to the status of his Arab subjects after his Algerian journey encouraged Fleury and Lacroix to push forward their plan to carve out a special indigenous protectorate for the Arab Bureaux in the Algerian interior. The long-standing opposition of the Arabophile camp to the discredited policies of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies catapulted its leading representatives into the emperor's innermost circle of advisors on indigenous matters. The Arabophile promise to redeem France's civilizing obligations appealed to Napoleon's reforming instincts and his will to atone for the dismal record of the Ministry of Algeria by restituting to their former owners the lands that had been confiscated in the operations of *cantonnement*. During 1861, with his solicitations repeatedly ignored or blocked by the governor general, Napoleon would increasingly throw his weight behind the Arabophiles and adopt their program as his own. With Ferdinand Lapasset on the ground in the Oranais, assisted by Urbain, chief councilor (*conseiller-rapporteur*) in the Government General since December 1860, Lacroix and Fleury redefined the political priorities of France in Algeria. Lapasset's reports from Orléansville and Mostaganem convinced Napoleon that, "for the time being," only the Arab Bureaux were capable of administering the native population.[34] On July 29, 1862, Lapasset was received in the emperor's personal salon at Vichy, and the sovereign listened intently as the general described his conception of an Arab homestead, founded on the inalienable rights of natives over their tribal lands and compatible with the larger economic interests of France. The participation of the Arabs in the development of the Algerian colony, Lapasset insisted, was nothing short of vital. Napoleon described the two-hour interview as a turning point in his Algerian education: "At last, I have met a man who tells me reasonable things about Algeria!" he rejoiced. Shortly after the meeting at Vichy, he commanded Randon to prepare a bill for the

reconstitution of native property and the conveyance of rights of ownership to its occupants under any title whatsoever.

The enthralling turn of events compelled Urbain to finalize his second brochure on native rights. In *L'Algérie française. Indigènes et immigrants*, published anonymously in November 1862, he put the finishing touches on his political proposal to achieve proprietary parity between Algeria's Muslim and European populations and to associate the agricultural-pastoral aptitudes of the "indigenes" to the industrial-commercial interests of the "immigrants."[35] Urbain was now at the apex of his political career, crowning his decades of apostolic dedication to colonial reform with access at last to the highest levels of official decision making and the sympathetic ears of the emperor of France. A few weeks after the publication of *L'Algérie française*, the Imperial Court itself was accused of going native when six Muslim notables from Oran, Algiers, and Constantine were summoned to the castle of Compiègne and feted with the attention due foreign dignitaries. As the North African envoys bent down to kiss the hand of the young Prince Imperial, dressed appropriately in Oriental attire for the occasion, Napoleon dissuaded them and instead invited his Arab and French guests to join in a fraternal accolade. When the Muslim guests related to the French emperor their profound consternation over his government's disputation of rights of property in the colony and equated the operations of *cantonnement* to spoliation and theft, he gave them his word that they would soon find "perfect equality between the indigenes and Europeans" of Algeria.[36] The Europeans, however, received news of the gala with consternation of their own, which soon degenerated into livid attacks in the colonial press against the treacherous emperor who had never invited *colons* to the "*coquetteries*" of his court.

WELL-INTENTIONED CRUELTIES

> Certainly, individual property is the most advanced form [of tenure] and the most favorable for facilitating the developments and improvements of agriculture; but in a society still so irregularly organized as Muslim society, is it not to compromise property by awarding it, with its most independent and most sacred character, to people who are not prepared to receive it? The collective form is an excellent transition in the passage from rights of usufruct to individual property; it is suited to nomadic existence, with its lack of fixed establishments; it is more propitious to the civilizing influence we must exercise; it allows to surmount the resistances and impose the good, whereas individual property, sanctuary of civil

> and political freedom, may be transformed into a fortress where the reactionary man will take refuge to fight against progress and combat civilization.
>
> —Georges Voisin (pseudonym of Ismaÿl Urbain), *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*[37]

> The question of attenuating circumstances must always be raised, so long as liberty and instruction have not enlightened the consciousness. Even when we abandon to the natives the management of their communal interests, we will keep them under the direct tutelage of the State, so as not to leave municipalism as the refuge for the spirit of resistance and of rancor.
>
> —Ismaÿl Urbain, *L'Algérie française*[38]

On February 6, 1863, an increasingly impatient Napoleon issued a second address to the governor general: "Algeria is not a colony proper, but an Arab Kingdom," thundered its opening paragraphs. "The *indigènes* like the *colons* have equal right to my protection, and I am just as well the Emperor of the Arabs as the Emperor of the French."[39] The reading became progressively discomfiting for Pélissier as Napoleon went on to reiterate his commitment to reconstitute the rights of tribes over territories occupied permanently under any title, including traditional rights of usufruct: "We did not come to Algeria to oppress and dispossess [the natives], but to bring them the benefits of civilization." Adding to Pélissier's distress was Napoleon's resort to the vocabulary of the Arabophile camp in composing the letter, with testimonials from Lapasset's correspondence intermingled here and there, and passages from Urbain's anonymous *L'Algérie française* inserted verbatim.[40] "What a happy plagiarism!" wrote a delighted Lacroix to Urbain on February 8, "And glory to you, *cher ami*":

> Read your brochure again and place on the opposite page the Emperor's letter. Never to such a degree has a publicist had the unusual good fortune to see all his ideas adopted and applied at once by a head of State. I think the fact unique in political history.[41]

The emperor himself would come clean upon meeting the anonymous publicist in Algiers in May 1865. "Monsieur Urbain," he would confess, "I pillaged your brochure to write my letter of February 6."

It is not surprising that Napoleon should derive the strongest inspiration from the writings of Urbain. Taken together, *L'Algérie pour les Algériens* and *L'Algérie française* confirmed the intellectual maturation of Enfantin's old disciple and his uncontested political prominence in Arabophile and associationist circles. In the pages of these two seminal

brochures, we find Enfantin's exhausted notion of colonial association reinvented and reinvigorated by Urbain into a sophisticated theoretical and political framework for Muslim enfranchisement and French renewal in Algeria. For Urbain, the way forward in the colony depended on France's ability to jettison the "monotonous uniformity" of assimilation and formulate policies based on the "harmonious multiplicity" of association, which recognized and understood the "attenuating circumstances" needed to reconcile the respective aspirations of Algeria's Arab and European populations:

> For us, the idea of progress implies the multiplicity as well as the unity in human destinies. It is not a question of a Procrustean bed on which we would stretch the nations successively in order to reach a general uniformity for all, with the same religion, the same laws, the same customs and the same habits. No, the dream of universal monarchies and religions belongs no more to our time: association, this is the new formula that will regulate the relations between liberty and authority, of the individual with the collectivity.[42]

Although the "question of attenuating circumstances" had been a mainstay of Saint-Simonian justifications for relative processes and dual structures in Algeria, Urbain proposed to resolve the dilemma of colonial nationality with a reformulation of the juridical dimensions of French citizenship. The annexation of the colony to the French domain in 1848, he attested, had "transformed radically" the personal status of Muslim "Algerians." No longer enemies to be subjugated or foreigners (*étrangers*) to be excluded, they had become mere "rebellious subjects" to be pacified:

> [O]ur regime of rights does not allow in any part of the Empire the existence of a population neither national nor foreign. . . . No, the situation of the Indigenes must not be thus. They are not guests who owe us only duties; [and] they are not foreigners. They all have rights as *régnicoles*. When we appropriated the land, we also accepted the inhabitants; we admitted them into our great political unity.[43]

His use of the term *régnicoles*, evocative of the disputed legal status of non-Catholics in France before the 1787 Edict of Toleration, was meant to extend to the Algerians similar protections and guarantees by the state. Like Calvinists, Lutherans, and, in some cases, Jews in the eighteenth century, the religious status of Algeria's Muslims, their political and intellectual immaturity, precluded the full privileges of natural French citizens (*naturels français*). As *régnicoles*, however, they were entitled to collective public rights, which in time they could parlay into individual civil rights through military service to the nation or by their productive labor and ties to the land:

It is evident that, [whilst] unable to accept all the responsibilities of our advanced social state, they must [still] reap all of its advantages. Due as much to circumspect wisdom on our part as to their own particular repugnance, they cannot participate in the civic and politic equality regulated by our laws. . . . So long as the natives have not made a radical separation between the spiritual and the temporal, so long as their faith and their religious dogma are in contradiction with our Codes, they cannot be invested with the title of French citizens. The Quran must become for them a purely religious text, without influence on civil legislation. This progress is not impossible. Other peoples have come out of the theocratic order and organized themselves under a secular government without nonetheless abdicating their beliefs.[44]

Urbain's proposal to normalize the personal status of Algeria's Muslim *régnicoles* would later inspire the senatus consult of July 14, 1865, which opened the military administration and ranks to natives and assigned to them the legal personality of French subjects.[45] For now, however, having established the historical precedence for customized legal rights for the Muslims of Algeria, he proceeded to earmark the constituent elements in their transformation into imperial *régnicoles*. Urbain was at his most original in his treatment of proprietary rights and civic status, bringing into play the parallels among land tenure, citizenry, and nationality, connecting land reforms to moral renewal, and finding in rights of tenure the bases for the administrative reorganization of both Arab and European societies. To this extent, *L'Algérie pour les Algériens* and *L'Algérie française* stand as the doctrinal bridge between the presidential decrees on education of 1850 and the imperial senatus consults on land and citizenship of 1863 and 1865. The booklets summarized Urbain's plan to integrate the dual cultural institutions created in the 1850s into the political framework of the proposed Arab Kingdom, with its intermediate administrative and legal hierarchies and transitional social and territorial organization. Specifically, just as he looked upon French instruction as the most rational form of learning, Urbain regarded individual property as "the most advanced form of landownership" and "the most favorable" for sociopolitical progress and economic productivity. The privatization of tribal lands, however, had to abide by the same logic to preserve tribal social organization from "brutal, revolutionary methods":

The abolition of collective property in the tribes is the ruin of the herds of sheep in the Tell, and the market for wool; it is the ruin of agriculture for one does not go from one day to the next from the great culture [of the plains] to hoeing and tilling.[46]

Just as Arab-French schools had been a suitable and necessary concession to the ingenuous mentality of the natives, so, too, did the reconsti-

tution of communal lands promise safe passage from the sacred rights of usufruct to the civic rights of individual property. Communal ownership, in Urbain's view, was to act as "an excellent transition . . . from rights of usufruct to individual property," much like dual schools had been designed to serve as provisional guarantees against a rough crossing from traditional to modern curricula of instruction:

> The transformation of collective property into individual property will occur by itself in due time. . . . Property will be modified by successive and individual evolutions, not by sudden revolutions unleashed upon the masses.[47]

The land reforms, therefore, were also to unfold in three successive phases, in line with the operational schedule of the Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction of 1849. In the first phase, colonial claims to tribal lands were abrogated to allow the state to identify the territories belonging traditionally to each *douar*, the "monad" or founding unit of the Arab tribe. The reorganization of rural societies was initiated in the second phase, as collective rights of ownership, now upheld in indivision (*propriétaires incommutables*), were distributed among the constituent *douars* of each tribe.[48] The investment of the *douars* with communal titles to their lands was prelude to their evolution toward transitional administrative units, known as *douar-communes*, "adapted to the circumstance of Arab society" and self-governed by councils, or *djemaas*, in whose name the title would reside. For Urbain, representation by the *djemaas* and the institution of particular budgets were important measures with which to wean the tribes from the control of traditional feudal leaders or the tax-exempt "aristocratic" dignitaries created by the colonial regime. Thus reformed, the *douar-communes* could then prepare to operate on the same footing as French colonial institutions before the final phase, in which the lands of the *douar-communes* were to be further subdivided into individual private lots regulated by French common proprietary laws.

The parameters of Franco-Arab association were now complete: the Muslim *régnicole* occupied an impermanent juridical status between foreigner and French citizen, regulated publicly by *douar-communes*. He held his lands communally, a transitional right of tenure along the way to privatization. His children were to be educated in Arab-French schools, intermediate establishments between old-fashioned *madrasas* and modern *écoles*. Urbain's vision for the Arab Kingdom, in other words, did not entail rigid political separations between natives and Europeans, but rather evanescent boundaries, determined by the changing economic aptitudes and cultural circumstances of each race. In the end, they were to melt into a greater Franco-Arab union. The Arab Kingdom

was only a temporary sanctuary in which to make the sacred, profane; the theocratic, scientific; the collective, particular.

As Enfantin had argued twenty years earlier in *Colonisation de l'Algérie*, the European zone itself was not a finished product. It, too, was to remain under the tutelage of France, its progress toward political assimilation depending on the very evolution of Arab society itself. Urbain, like his mentor, did not anticipate the integration of civilian districts until Arab and European had colonized their respective zones: by agriculture and pastoralism in the case of the former; by labor, industry, and commercial development in the case of the latter.[49] It is not surprising, then, that Enfantin's colonization according to racial-economic aptitudes was faithfully reproduced in the second imperial letter of February 6, 1863. Napoleon reserved the peripheral interior to the pastoral and agricultural traditions of the natives, "enclosed" (*cernés*), "compressed" (*resserrés*), or "enframed" (*encadrés*)—all verbs used intermittently—by a network of modern industrial and technological sectors. In his second imperial letter, Napoleon specified:

> The land of Africa is rather vast; the resources to develop are sufficiently ample for each to find a place there and give a free rein to his activity, according to his nature, his customs and his needs. To the natives: the breeding of horses and cattle, natural tillage of the earth. To European activity and intelligence: the exploitation of forests and mines, works of drainage and irrigation, introduction of sophisticated crops, the import of the industries that precede or always accompany the progress of agriculture.[50]

If the Arab Kingdom was the geographic space in which to perfect the native and allow him to progress "in line with his normal development," it was also the *lieu d'essai* in which Europeans would come to appreciate the "true" Muslims of Algeria. Urbain reserved his greatest praise for the contact zones, where common worksites and associations of interests would raise an "industrial army" of native workers and French workshop leaders. Here, labor was to exert on "made" adults the same influence as education exerted on young minds. By toiling and learning together, antagonisms would disappear, to be replaced with civic equality, cultural tolerance, and freedom of creed. It is worth noting that Urbain wrote *L'Algérie pour les Algériens* in the aftermath of the tragic events of 1860 in Syria and Mount Lebanon, with a surge in treatises asserting the irreconcilability of Christian European civilization and Arab Muslim fanaticism. As the European press debated plans to transfer the Maronites of Mount Lebanon to Algeria, Urbain felt compelled to rebuke the rhetoric of *refoulement*, forced conversion, or extermination and, by the same token, water down colonial fears of a local Syrian crisis.

Algeria's Muslim notability followed the emperor's political evolution with raised hopes and anxieties. The return of the invitees of Compiègne in January 1863 added firsthand substantiation to the implausible accounts read in the press or provided by the local Arab Bureaux. News of upcoming deliverance spread from the cities to the remotest tribes. The second letter was greeted with an outburst of Arab devotion for the French emperor. By the same token, the "excess of furor" on the part of the colonial establishment dampened the joyous mood of the Arabs. The local press countered with "a storm of condemnation" against the "savageophile" emperor, as well as the "renegade" author of the blasphemous Arabophile brochures. European anger then turned on the natives. Unpunished incidents of anti-Arab violence multiplied. Plans for a Friday sermon (*khutba*) in the name of the "sultan" Napoleon were canceled in the wake of threats to torch the offending mosques. Colonial animosity continued to build throughout 1863, orchestrated by the European press in conjunction with civilian functionaries and the tacit approval of Mercier-Lacombe and Pélissier. Still, in the months leading to the promulgation of the senatus consult on April 22, the Arabophile victory seemed anything but Pyrrhic.[51] When Doctor Worms himself recanted publicly his former position on Muslim tenure and *cantonnement*, the ideas of Urbain, Lacroix, and Lapasset seemed destined to prevail at last.[52]

The civil administration in Algiers, however, was not the only pole of opposition to imperial policy. A variety of colonial, even military, interests now united to confront the perceived common threat of imperial Arabophilia. Defense committees were established throughout the departments to countermand a governmental *coup de force*. The colonial press directed its propaganda toward public opinion in France as well as in Algeria. Metropolitan networks were mobilized and alliances forged with the republican opposition to Napoleon III. Charles de Bouzet, the first extraordinary commissioner for Algeria after the fall of the Second Empire, would later recall the turning point that was the second imperial letter: "In Algeria, we are all Republicans and, ever since Napoleon uttered in 1863 the words 'Arab Kingdom,' dogged enemies of the Empire."[53] In April, Warnier and Duval traveled to Paris to lobby the senators prior to the ratification of the imperial decree. Several of Enfantin's former associates appeared before the public hearings to censure the concessions of the senatus consult. Realizing that imperial support for the motion guaranteed its enactment, opponents lobbied to amend its provisions to their advantage. In this, they could also count on the half-spoken antipathy of military celebrities such as Randon and Eugène Daumas toward the more radical premises of the

proposed legislation. Confronted with competing opinions and a deteriorating international arena, the Senate opted for political compromise. Pélissier and the *colons* gained a pivotal concession when the senatus consult withdrew from the "pre-1863 assumptions that *'arsh* was an integral part of Islamic legal tradition," thus allowing the redistribution of *'arsh* lands among the individual members of the *douar* in the form of private plots.[54]

Whereas Urbain had banned the constitution of individual property until the tribes had been made "incommutably masters of their lands," the clauses of the senatus consult were amended to open the door for individual landholders to enter into a "multiplicity of transactions" with European speculators, thereby removing protections against the free market exchange and sale of titles. In May, the administrative procedures for the senatus consult of 1863 endowed the reconstituted *douars* with an intermediate legal identity "analogous to municipal communes," over which the authority of civilian prefects could preside, if European demographics and Arab assimilation so dictated:

> Once invested with the property of their territory, the *douars* must be endowed with a civil personality, capable of compromising and stipulating in the name of the community. . . . This institution . . . will empower the *djemaa* to fulfill, in the exchange or sale of domainial possessions, a role similar to that of the municipal councils in the constituted communes. Later, the Governor General will submit proposals to the Emperor to create in the tribes a municipal organization, adapted to the condition of Arab society and susceptible to complete its evolution according to the pace of material and moral progress and the needs of the populations.[55]

Duval and Warnier applauded the legal revisions as a major triumph for their cause—and with good reason. Despite the military administration's pledge to exercise every "careful initiative in arriving at individual property," by empowering the natives to dispose of their lands, its procedures had facilitated the conversion of traditional communal lands into French statutory units, contributing in the long term to the further destructuring of tribal societies and economies. With privatization, the *douar-communes* were expected to operate as European communes, governed by the same regulations with regards to land transactions. Thus, the administrative procedures provided the legal loophole for the creation of full—fledged municipal communes (*communes de plein exercice*) within Arab districts and the subsequent absorption of the *djemaas* by municipal councils subject to the authority of civilian prefects.[56]

Still, the civil branch of the Government General continued to obstruct the operations of the senatus consult at every turn and, with the

sanction of Pélissier, accelerated the relocations of *cantonnement*. Until early August, when the operations of the senatus consult were launched, the Land Registry and Demesne continued its hindering operations with "revolting cynicism," according to Urbain. Against the backdrop of surging violence and vandalism, with arson and fires decimating farmhouses in the Mitidja and the forests of Constantine, the imperial government sped through a series of measures to transfer tribal landholdings to various *douar-communes*, further fragmenting land units and indigenous kinship groups. Clans and families were attached to and integrated into *douars* reflecting only French delimitations, driven by the logic of European modes of land tenure. A decade of advocating pace and deliberateness in land dealings had led to accelerated and radical transformations in native tenure. No one seemed prepared for the consequences, and the operations of the senatus consult were soon surpassed by events in the remote fringes of the Sahara.

THE LONG CRY OF DELIVERANCE

Starting in February 1864, waves of popular unrest rippled through the southern territories of Algeria. Si Hamza, leader of the confederation of the Awlad Sidi al-Shaykh (Ouled Sidi Cheikh), proclaimed war for the deliverance of his kinsmen "from the collar of slavery and misery." His cry soon spread north to the hinterlands of Oran and engulfed the Tell and the Constantinois.[57] As usual, the colonial authorities pointed fingers at the Muslim brotherhoods in mobilizing the rebellion, but it was more the response of local communities to a variety of colonial intrusions: humiliating military garrisons, onerous taxation, and unnerving cadastral surveys. Despite the promises of the emperor, the disintegration of the great tribes continued in the face of French colonial advances and implantations. Had not the Awlad Sidi al-Shaykh witnessed the disintegration of their trading partners to the north, their lands taken, their chattel decimated, their venerated leaders and holy men scattered to the wind? Coming after months of renewed hope in the imperial reforms, the insurrection was a great shock to the military command, and it responded with overwhelming force in putting down the latest threat to its restored rule. Randon, for one, ascribed the insurrection of 1864 to the pernicious influences of the *zawiyas* and *tolba*, as he announced the end of the politics of appeasement (*adoucissement*) toward "Arabs who should always be made to feel the strong arm of the victor above their heads."[58] Among the Arabist officers, the palpable sense of betrayal on the part of their wards added fuel to the army's vengeful reprisals, re-

ducing the insurgent territories, according to a campaigning soldier, to a barren wasteland (*une vide solitude*).

Even Arabophile officers such as Ferdinand Lapasset and Laurent-Estève Boissonnet questioned the soundness of their expectations and surrendered much of their activism after 1864. Bureau agents with the expertise and acumen of Lapasset had become rare by then, the Arab Bureaux having been depleted of their more capable officers after the dislocations of 1857–1858 as well as the unsettling political situations in Italy, Mexico, and China. Thus, the rebels of 1864 were confronted by a new generation of Arabist captains, far less adept and skilled at managing local crises. Among the higher echelons as well, too many doctrinaires from the generation of 1840 had perished between 1863 and 1865: Marie-Alphonse Bedeau and Frédéric Lacroix in 1863, Prosper Enfantin in 1864, and Georges Fellmann and Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de Lamoricière in 1865. By the time military operations ended in 1866, the rebellious provinces had been depopulated and scorched, the economy of provincial Algeria left in ruins, and an important psychological divide created between Arab society and its military custodians. In the words of Rey-Goldzeiguer:

> If in 1863, the natives accepted the idea of a tactical alliance with the Arabophile clan, after the repression, the door left ajar with such pains by Urbain and Lacroix, was brutally shut. . . . The native masses were forced to choose between progressive assimilation and the loss of their identity on one hand, continuous expulsion with uprisings or massacres as end results, on the other. The revolt of 1864–1865 clarified the choices.[59]

As soon as the revolts were put down, the Arab provinces were afflicted by a series of natural calamities. In 1866, agriculture was ravaged by massive swarms of locusts that returned in 1867 and 1869. In January 1867, a powerful earthquake devastated the Mitidja plain and seemed to usher the harshest drought in three centuries.[60] The winter of 1868 was severe and unforgiving, and when the heavy highland snows melted in the spring, widespread inundations washed away the surviving crops and herds. Cases of starvation among the tribal populations were recorded as early as 1867, but the scale of the famine reached its height in 1868–1869, when the combination of penury and disease caused an estimated 500,000 fatalities.

The impact of the successive disasters was magnified by the inability of weakened and impoverished communities to cope adequately with the dramatic environmental changes. As one would expect, the tribes most affected by famine had been ruined by the insurrection of 1864–1865.[61] Indeed, European districts fared far better than their Arab

counterparts, and some even managed to benefit from the afflictions of the natives, as many were forced as a matter of necessity to sell their lands to speculators at greatly deflated prices. For the colonists, the contrasting conditions in indigenous and European zones demonstrated that the native disaster had been the making of military rule in general and the Arab Bureaux specifically. It is certain that the operations of *cantonnement* and the senatus consult had desolated the rural communities. The dispersal of communal lands had injured the economic core of rural Algeria and cut down the political and social relevance of its remaining leading classes. When the senatus consult certified that only claims relating to *melk* were recognized under the jurisdiction of Muslim law, it contributed to eroding the capacity of rural indigenes to defend their rights of tenure.

Regardless, the events of 1864–1865 strengthened the hands of the proponents of assimilation. While the high command clamored for stricter and more forceful oversight of indigenous affairs, Warnier and Duval led the call to dismantle the Arab Bureaux in favor of immediate assimilation of Algeria's government and institutions. The rationale for the special authority of the Arab Bureaux was undercut as clans migrated to civilian regions in search of food and assistance. Between February and June 1864, the Muslim population of the civilian territories grew from 117,869 to 349,154, of which 62,537 entered urban conglomerations. The migrations diluted the distinct demographic profiles of military and civilian territories and provided Catholic missions, led by Cardinal Charles Lavigerie, founder of the Society of the Missionaries of Africa (White Fathers), with the opportunity to intensify proselytizing among Muslims under the guise of charitable relief and sanitation efforts.[62] With the disappearance by death or migration of their Muslim subjects, the Arab Bureaux lost both the personnel and the funds for the upkeep of their administration, and their indigenous schools fell into desuetude. Increasingly, the associationist principles of the Arabophile faction were ceding ground to measures targeting actively and directly native religious and educational facilities. The death of Lacroix in October 1863 was especially incapacitating for the Arabophile camp. With him vanished, in the words of Lapasset, a highly sensible influence on Marshal Randon and, by consequence, on the course of events. With Lapasset despondent, Lacroix deceased, and Urbain ostracized by the minister of war after September 1864, the capacity of the Arabophile camp to intervene and influence policy making was strongly diminished, and for the time being, Randon had the ear of the emperor.

In late June 1864, Napoleon demanded of his minister of war a decree to centralize the administrative branches in Algeria. With the death

of Pélissier on May 22, the emperor was eager to bring the reluctant civilian departments to heel.[63] But Napoleon had more than administrative reorganization on his mind. He shared with his minister of war his desire to abolish the Civilian Directorate General altogether and "empty the Algerian interior of Europeans." In an effort to mitigate the repercussions of the Saharan revolt and afford greater protections to "a primitive people retreating before civilized populations," the emperor considered stricter separations between Europeans and indigenes. He contemplated restricting European settlements to the coastal plains and redeploying the Army of Africa, along the line of the Atlas Mountains, with small garrisons posted in the main port cities. In the evacuated regions of the Tell, Napoleon imagined a two-tiered zone, with its northern rim reserved for the exclusive command of the Army of Africa, while its southern perimeters were to be settled with "indigenous military colonies." To the south of the Tell, far removed from the regions of European colonization, would lie the "self-administered" realm of the tribes. The associationist vision of the second letter had given way to a racialized partitioning of Algeria, with a strong military buffer between European and Arab populations sequestered in their respective dominions.

With the rationale of *cantonnement* now turned against the European population of Algeria, Randon recoiled, but decided to cede momentarily on the emperor's administrative reforms in order to better resist his sovereign's unfortunate resuscitation of restrained colonial occupation. Randon, in fact, savored the opportunity to dismantle the remnants of Pélissier's coterie in the Government General and return control to the Ministry of War. The imperial decree of July 7, 1864, abolished the Civilian Directorate and returned native groups in the civilian territories—as long as these had not been attached to municipalities or communes—to military administration. In total, 168,748 Muslims were returned to military rule, whereas 180,406—of which 117,869 had been attached to communes—remained under civilian authority.[64] Concurrently, the superficial area of civilian territories was reduced by 838,990 hectares to a total of 1,016,000 hectares.[65] Randon, however, blocked the promotion to governor general of agents too closely aligned with the more fundamental policies of the emperor: Fleury, Édouard de Martimprey, and Urbain were all censured for their "absolute" positions, until Napoleon assented in September to Randon's choice of Marshal Patrice de Mac-Mahon (1808–1893). The minister and governor general now worked in concert to profess Arabophilia in word, while frustrating the emperor's project in deed. As Randon continued to hedge and dodge, Mac-Mahon became increasingly overt in his hostility toward an Arab

Kingdom "more dangerous to us than the [Empire of the] Turks." In December, the governor general proclaimed publicly his consent to the expulsion of three million natives to make way for an equal number of European settlers. The Pélissier-like ring to Mac-Mahon's statement was enough to convince Napoleon III of the need for a second fact-finding trip to Algiers, despite the troubling degradation in France's position in Mexico and on the European diplomatic front.

"I shall return," had quipped the emperor in September 1860 as he boarded his ship to France. He arrived in Algiers on May 3, 1865, five years after his earlier promise, and five years before the Battle of Sedan. Those who had greeted him in the harbor of Algiers in 1860 would not have failed to notice the grave deterioration in the sovereign's physical appearance and health, his once famous energy having been exhausted by the intense pain of the choledocholithiasis that would take his life in 1873.[66] Upon arrival, Napoleon commissioned Urbain to serve as his personal interpreter and consultant. Together, the Creole emperor and mulatto bureaucrat traversed 3,084 kilometers of Algerian territory over thirty-six days in an attempt to breathe life into the project of the Arab Kingdom.[67] The emperor's second journey to Algeria could not have been more different from the first. He was pleasantly surprised by the "progress of colonization" in the last five years and the mutual benefits of economic and capitalist development to the living conditions of Europeans and Arabs. He tried to calm the apprehensions of the *colons*, imploring them to "keep faith in the future" and bind themselves to the earth they cultivated as their "new homeland." To Arab leaders, Napoleon proffered promises of a larger share of the fruits of civilization and a greater voice in their own governance.

For his part, Urbain tried to adapt his reforming ideas to the changing political realities and the emperor's growing commitment to the territorial partitioning of Algeria. The details of the private deliberations between Napoleon and his Arabophile entourage in Algeria may be surmised from the documents the emperor authored upon his return to France: his third letter to the Governor General of June 7 and the lengthier *Lettre sur la politique de la France en Algérie* of June 20. In both, Napoleon upheld the tripartite administrative framework he had outlined to Randon and modified his formula of 1863 to refer to Algeria as "at once, an Arab Kingdom, a European colony, and a French encampment."[68] In the new imperial scheme, the European population was to be concentrated in the coastal plains, under a "simplified" prefectorial administration and dedicated to commercial and industrial development.[69] The operations of the senatus consult were suspended in the southernmost Arab territories, where the traditional social in-

stitutions, leaderships, and land configurations of the tribes were to be restored to their autonomous condition at the time of the Turks. Finally, the dual zone was to be settled with indigenous military colonies, supervised by the Arab Bureaux and governed by specialized structures and agencies. In this realm, the operations of the senatus consult were to be completed with legislative, administrative, and educational reforms that would inhibit the emergence of an autonomous Arab sovereignty in Algeria.

The first set of reforms consisted of integrating the local tribes with the French military and endowing their constitutive *djemaas* and *douar-communes* with statutory protections. The senatus consult of July 14, 1865, fruit of Urbain's elaboration of the imperial *régnicole*, elevated the natives to the legal personality of "subjects." The indigenes were hereafter permitted to serve in the French army, occupy certain positions in the military and civil bureaucracies, and apply for French citizenship upon renunciation of their personal civil status. The legislation of 1865 fulfilled Urbain's ambition to enable the Arabs to transition to French citizenship once they had attained "all the proper features of a modern society," which supposed a "complete development of the sentiment of responsibility and personal initiative."[70] Likewise, Napoleon envisioned the Arab Kingdom as a controlled environment in which contact with the French race was to reinvigorate and propel the Arab. On May 5, he had shared with the Arabs of Algiers the historical precedence of Gallic renaissance under Roman civilization:

> Like you, twenty centuries ago, our ancestors resisted courageously a foreign invasion, and yet from their defeat originated their regeneration. The vanquished Gauls assimilated with the Roman victors, and from the forced union of opposed civilizations with contrary virtues was born, in time, the French nationality. . . . Who knows if the day will not come when the Arab race, regenerated and melded with the French race, will recover a powerful individuality similar to the one which allowed it for centuries to command the meridian shores of the Mediterranean.[71]

The senatus consult of 1865 leaves little doubt that Napoleon did not intend to develop a distinct Arab nationality in Algeria. Nor did he envisage sharing his sovereignty over the Arab Kingdom with Abd al-Qadir, as was widely assumed at the time.[72] This particular hypothesis was only raised by the ingenious journalist and politician Émile de Girardin in an article of *La Presse* of July 23, 1865, written on the occasion of the emir's visit with Napoleon in Paris. The imperial government, in fact, had solicited unsuccessfully Abd al-Qadir to serve as an independent Arab sovereign in Syria since the 1860 massacres of Da-

mascus, and it is likely that General Fleury probed the emir's willingness again in July 1865. For obvious reasons, however, the offer was never extended to the Arab Kingdom in Algeria, and although Abd al-Qadir still declined categorically the overtures of Napoleon III, his presence in the French capital caused panic in Algiers at the prospect of the imminent return of the emir. Colonial fears were revived in November 1869, when the ailing emperor invited Abd al-Qadir to represent him at the inaugural ceremonies of the Suez Canal.

With the second set of reforms, security measures and *mise en valeur* were to be enhanced through the centralization of the military command and tighter controls over the powers of the Arab Bureaux. In his *Lettre sur la politique de la France en Algérie*, the emperor praised the accomplishments of the Arab agencies, but confirmed their status as a "subaltern unit of specialists," the authority of which was to derive directly from the central military command. Bureau officers were to forgo their self-appointed administrative duties and concentrate on establishing direct and permanent relations with native leaders in order to keep the central authorities informed on the "general indigenous state of mind." The Departmental Arab Bureaux were eliminated, and new constitutional guidelines for the military offices were articulated in the circular of March 21, 1867, or Great Charter of the Arab Bureaux. The circular was, according to Yacono, the first attempt since 1844 to define "with great precision" the responsibilities of the Arab Bureaux.[73] As discussed in Chapter 3, the Great Charter of the Arab Bureaux streamlined the military chain of command and the flow of information between the circles and the central command of the army. The reorganization was decreed by a military authority on the defensive after the events of 1864–1866, prepared to withdraw from civil affairs and regroup in the interior in order to preserve its steadfast control over the Arab populations. In response to the growing chorus of recriminations directed against the bureaux from within and without the military administration, the government of Napoleon III stepped in to take stock of the capacities and duties of the specialized administrative units and to institute a stringent code of conduct for them.

Lastly, Napoleon heeded Urbain's appeals to complete "the civilization of the soil" with schools to produce the future native workers, cultivators, and leaders. In the immediate term, greater impulse was to be given to the dual educational institutions with the establishment of a superior Arab-French college and teachers' training school. On May 9, they had visited together the Arab-French College in Algiers, recently restituted to the Government General, and Napoleon had expressed interest in creating similar lyceums in Oran and Constantine. A few

weeks later, the imperial train came across an Arab lieutenant who had been taken prisoner during the seizure of Abd al-Qadir's *smala* before being sent to study in Antoine-François Demoyencourt's Arab College in Paris. Ali Sharif ben Allal related to the emperor how his Parisian education had worsened his condition and isolated him in a cultural no man's land between derogatory Europeans and suspicious Arabs. The brief interview confirmed to the emperor the necessity of the Arab Kingdom as the solution to Ben Allal's dilemma and for the maturation of a new Franco-Arab society, devoid of racism and exploitation.

THE HORIZONS OF COLONIAL EDUCATION

> Everybody understands today that the Government [General] did not seek to create a simple and tiny establishment, a school slightly more elevated than the other schools, where we would only form some Arabs, and even some Frenchmen, for the Translation Service or the secondary administrative functions or as secretaries for the Arab Bureaux. . . . There would be no higher oeuvre here; there would be only a process; it would not be an idea for the future. The Government, it is true, calculates the results of its work from the practical point of view of the administrations and the needs of the State, but also above all from the point of view of civilization and the unification of the two Arabic and French populations.
>
> —Nicolas Perron, Council of Education, June 26, 1862[74]

> The Senatus-Consult has safeguarded indigenous property . . . but there is a civilizing idea at the bottom of the imperial program . . . it is this aspect of the Emperor's Letter, the most important without question, that remains in the dark . . . education, instruction, here are the fundamental levers that will lift the mountain, and make it walk.
>
> —Frédéric Lacroix to Victor Duruy, September 4, 1863[75]

In his principal references to indigenous instruction after the revolts of 1864, Napoleon resorted to the usual homilies regarding continuity in the operations of the traditional *madrasas*, enhanced surveillance of the *zawiyas*, and the extension of French instruction to the tribal areas. The bulk of his attention was reserved to improving the performance of Arab-French schools, the organization of which was to be expanded vertically with secondary-level programs of instruction and institutes of technical or professional training for Muslims, and horizontally with the conversion of communal schools in the French districts to mixed establishments. By the terms of the *Projet d'organisation de l'instruction*

publique musulmane of 1849, higher bilingual instruction for Muslims was not considered a "strict necessity," and accordingly, the July decree provided only rudimentary French lessons for male Muslim adults. Since then, however, General Daumas and his agents had multiplied their requests for the Ministry of War to crown the provisions of the decree with a dual secondary institute to compete, first, with *madrasas* and other indigenous houses of higher learning, and second, with the bilingual programs of the Ministry of Public Instruction and its Imperial (formerly, Royal) Lyceum of Algiers (Lycée Impérial d'Alger):

> To complete the organization [of 1850], we lack a teaching establishment corresponding to our secondary schools, in which, under the direction of French teachers fluent in the language and customs of the natives, the young Muslim generation would receive an education appropriate to its needs, encompassing the sciences it is most likely to use, and leaving aside all which are only necessary for the much more advanced state of civilization in Europe.[76]

The Imperial Arab-French College (Collège Impérial Arabe-Français or Mdersat al-Soultania) was created by imperial decree on March 14, 1857, in the face of the strong misgivings of the minister of public instruction, Gustave Rouland.[77] Its prospectus of 1866 described its mission in the following terms: "to develop, by the European race, the civilization of France in Africa, and at the same time, perfect, improve morally, materially, and progressively the indigenous races until fusion occurs by itself as a result of the reciprocity of values."[78] Governor General Randon, in a throwback to the proposals of Léon Roches of 1844–1845, lobbied initially to admit only the scions of urban notables or insubordinate tribal chiefs.[79] In the end, the state agreed to fund forty-five full scholarships (*bourses entières*), forty-five three-quarter scholarships (*trois-quarts de bourses*), and sixty half scholarships (*moitiés de bourses*).[80] Grants to Muslims were restricted to "the sons of officers, chiefs, and agents having served or still serving the State, and of non-commissioned officers killed or maimed by injuries received in the exercise of their duties." Preference was accorded to orphans of both parents, followed by orphans of fathers. The curriculum offered elementary and advanced classes in the French and Arabic languages, geography and history, mathematics, the physical sciences, natural history, gymnastics, horsemanship, swimming, and drawing. An *imam* was appointed by the Government General to oversee the religious instruction of the Muslim interns. Students having successfully completed the cycle of studies and passed an official examination received a special diploma, equivalent to the French baccalaureate, but limiting future employment to the military departments in Algeria.

On January 1, 1858, the Imperial Arab-French College, under the directorship of the Arabist Nicolas Perron, opened its doors to fifty-five Muslim interns and sixty European "external" students. Urbain would later specify that Europeans were barred from internships in order to avoid "a mixing too intimate" for the tastes of French and Muslim families.[81] The minister of war and the governor general were granted at first significant discretionary powers in determining the profile and responsibilities of the student body and in overseeing the institute's executive Council of Instruction, Administration, and Discipline.[82] With the creation of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies, however, the Imperial Arab-French College was integrated with the Imperial Lyceum of Algiers in October, and its bylaws were amended to fold it into the purview of the Rectorate of the Academy of Algiers.[83] Almost immediately, the attempt to integrate the specialized Arab-French College into the academy's common regimen sparked controversy among the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies, the Ministry of War, and the Ministry of Public Instruction.[84] The rector of the Academy of Algiers, Charles-Lucien Delacroix (1808–1880), once faulted by the minister of war for his ignorance of native temperament and mores, first objected to the attendance of art classes by iconoclast Muslims and suggested at the very least confining activities to linear drawings.[85] The minister of Algeria referred the question to the First Bureau, which reassured Delacroix that figurative art was not prohibited by the Quran, but merely by some of its commentators and exegetes. Moreover, the mission of the Arab-French College, they added, was precisely to form Muslims "sufficiently purified of fanaticism" (*assez dégrossis de fanatisme*). In the margins of the bureau dispatch, an irritated hand noted that even Abd al-Qadir, "the most religious figure we have encountered, allowed himself to be painted; let us not be more rigorous than he!"

Delacroix then turned to the accreditation of the Arab interns. He consented to their future right of entry to "certain jobs in the civil administration of Algeria," but demoted the college's special diploma to a certificate of aptitude. He found it an "enormity" to bestow upon an academic program that "reached barely the level of advanced primary instruction," a diploma equivalent to the French baccalaureate. This was no minor issue, for the concerns of Delacroix undermined the very heart of educational dualism. The special diploma of the Imperial Arab-French College, as far as the rector was concerned, conferred to its European students an unfair advantage over their peers, colonial or metropolitan. Rewarding them with the equivalence of a baccalaureate, he feared, "could only be fatal" to the advanced classes of the Imperial Lyceum of Algiers, with its more demanding curriculum. The minis-

ter of Algeria agreed with Delacroix, and stipulated that the diploma would be awarded to the Muslim interns alone, thereby weakening the college's appeal to European families and institutionalizing the discrimination between its Arab and French components.

By and large, the Imperial Arab-French College resurrected Demoyencourt's Collège Arabe Parisien, and like its Parisian forerunner, it was beset with similar difficulties in finding accommodating natives and qualified instructors. "The Arab chiefs must always be begged to send their children to the College," complained Perron in May 1860, adding that the divisional general of Algiers had had to resort to "a certain moral pressure" to persuade native families to accept the government's grants. "The funds registered with the provincial budgets for foundation of grants," he continued, remained "partly unexhausted for lack of candidates," while competent and bilingual teachers were "as difficult to enlist as ever":

> Perhaps this annoying state of affairs will change when the generation currently formed in the College will demonstrate the advantages to be had from the education received therein. . . . But for the moment, we have three worthless instructors in this position.[86]

The Imperial Arab-French College remained attached to the Prefecture of Algiers until April 1861, when it was restored to the "indispensable supervision and surveillance" of the military authorities.[87] Indigenous attendance thereafter proved more adequate and promising, although the Arab resident-students, according to official reports, continued to shun contact with their European peers. The Algerian Directorate regained its license to recruit instructors and students for the college and to monitor the placement of its graduates in military or civil departments.[88] Ninety-nine and eighty-one natives graduated from the institute in 1865 and 1866, respectively. Despite Urbain's optimistic expectations, they were largely denied access to the colonial polity or economy.

As shown in Table 6.2, of the 180 Arab students in 1865–1866, eventually six were hired by the colonial administration as *qa'id* , *shaykh*, *khawaja*, military interpreter, and machinist; four were enrolled in vocational schools in France (the recently opened Secondary Teachers' Training School in Cluny and the Agricultural School of Thiverval-Grignon near Versailles); five were transferred to learning academies in Algiers (the School of Medicine and Pharmacy of Algiers, the Primary Teachers' Training School, and the Imperial Lyceum of Algiers); and ten were recruited by the military academies of Saint-Cyr and Saumur, which reserved a number of subofficer ranks for North African cadets.

TABLE 6.2

Placement of Native Graduates of the Imperial Arab-French College of Algiers, 1865 and 1866

Year	1865	1866
Students: native/total	99/152	81/141
Recruited by military academies in France	4 École de Cavalerie de Saumur (founded 1814) 2 École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr (1802)	4 École de Cavalerie de Saumur
Enrolled in academies in France	1 École d'Agriculture de Thiverval-Grignon (1826)	3 École Normale de l'Enseignement Secondaire Spécial de Cluny (1866)
Enrolled in academies in Algeria	2 École Préparatoire de Médecine et de Pharmacie d'Alger (1857)	1 Lycée Impérial d'Alger (1848) 2 École Normale Primaire d'Alger (1866)
Employed in colonial agencies	1 *qa'id* 1 military interpreter 1 machinist	2 *shaykhs* 1 *khawaja*
Total	12	13

SOURCE: Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le royaume arabe*.

The remainder were reintegrated into their communities, where, according to Turin, they worked as weavers, blacksmiths, shoemakers, boilermakers, barber's aides, and waiters.[89] Students returning empty-handed to their communities were especially derided:

> Nothing produces a more negative effect than the students re-integrating their tribes, after many years spent in our schools, with nothing to show; targeted by the sarcasm of the entire tribe, they often end up discouraging the most well-intentioned.[90]

Clearly, the fate of Napoleon's interlocutor, Ali Sharif ben Allal, was not exceptional. In *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, Urbain recounted the similar experience of an unnamed Arab graduate of the Imperial Lyceum of Algiers and the military academy of Saint-Cyr, who, despite his naturalization, remained commissioned by the Ministry of War to the regiment of *Chasseurs d'Afrique*.[91] In 1871, the government of the Third Republic would terminate the "inadequate and unwarranted" Imperial Arab-French College.

The complementary creation of a training school for bilingual primary instructors (*école normale primaire*) was delayed by inadequate resources and interministerial quarrels until March 4, 1865.[92] On August 3, the Ministry of War established three-year fellowships of 600 francs

for twenty French and ten Algerian student teachers (*élèves-maîtres*). Six grants were maintained by the Ministry of Public Instruction, six by the Government General, and eighteen by the departmental authorities (Table 6.3). The first training school opened its doors on January 15, 1866, in the Algiers suburb of Mustafa, admitting seven of fourteen European candidates and three of twenty-two Muslim applicants, who ranged in age from sixteen to twenty-two years. The native trainees in the Teachers' School of Algiers (École Normale Primaire d'Alger) were subject to special regulations and consigned to the moral supervision of a bureau-appointed *imam*. Their instruction comprised a full French curriculum, supplemented with "pedagogical lessons on the principles of education and instruction." Of the average weekly course load of thirty-four hours, three were dedicated to Arabic language courses, administered by an extern tutor. At graduation, the trainees were assigned to military or civilian functions according to their demonstrated aptitudes. They were also required to "reimburse" their grant by committing to

TABLE 6.3

Distribution of Grants in the École Normale Primaire d'Alger

a. September 15, 1867

Level	Grantees	European	Native
Third year	10	9	1
Second year	10	7	3
First year	11	10	1
Total	31	26	5

b. July 21, 1868

Level	Grantees	European	Native
Third year	8	8	0
Second year	11	9	2[a]
First year	8	7	1
Total	27	24	3

c. July 21, 1869

Level	Grantees	European	Native
Third year	11	9	2[a]
Second year	8	7	1
First year	10	10	0
Total	29	26	3

SOURCE: AOM 17S/2.
[a]One Muslim and one Jew.

teaching engagements for ten years.[93] In 1888, the École Normale Primaire d'Alger was transferred to the Algerine commune of Bouzaréa, where it remained in operation until 1962.

At the end of the academic year of 1866, one European trainee was turned away and two natives held back.[94] Thus, in 1867, the directors of the training school could recommend but one Arab student teacher for second-year funding—well below the recommended criterion of promoting at least three native instructors per year. He and three European colleagues were eventually assigned to Arab-French schools in the military territories, while the remaining trainees were placed with the civilian director of instruction. Over the next two years, the number of Arab fellows continued to decline for a variety of academic, medical, or personal reasons. Their performance, according to the annual reports of the Rectorate of the Academy of Algiers, left "much to be desired" and dragged the quality of this flagship colonial institution to the level of training schools in "the least developed departments in France." In 1868, three Muslim students lost their funding, and a Jewish trainee was reclassified as "native" in an attempt to pad the number of non-European students. The government then decreed a stipend to the attending Muslims and the establishment of an annex school (École Annexe d'Application) in which to train applicants before their entry to the Teachers' Training School. The École Annexe d'Application was attended by 100 and 130 native trainees in 1868 and 1869, respectively, but the administration continued to grapple with the same problem of relevance as the Imperial Arab-French College: of its five Arab graduates between 1866 and 1869, one was admitted to the Primary School (École Primaire) of Versailles, a second joined the cavalry school at Saumur, and the remaining three returned to their families. By late 1870, Muslim enrollments had dropped to nil, and the École Annexe d'Application was subsequently shut down.

As to conditions in the *madrasas* and *zawiyas* in the 1860s, it is difficult to ascertain the number operating, often covertly, in the different regions of Algeria.[95] Inspection reports produced profiles only for the establishments detected by the military command. Yet, the tabulation of the recorded instances when *madrasas* and *zawiyas* were visited by officers of Arab affairs between 1847 and 1871 generates a statistical distribution that correlates well with general legislative and political developments in the colony, and which may be guardedly considered as representative of broader patterns in native "private" education.[96] Figure 6.1 shows that the overall number of officially recognized *madrasas* and *zawiyas* in the three Algerian departments declined steadily in the




FIGURE 6.1 Muslim Schools Inspected by the Arab Bureaux, 1848–1870

1850s, but experienced a mild recovery in the early 1860s, which was soon dashed by the revolts of 1864–1866.

The condition of Muslim institutions of learning, in other words, was slightly ameliorated by the presidential decree of September 30, 1850, especially in the province of Algiers, whereas, in Constantine, the promulgation of the decree appears to have halted their precipitous decline. The improving trends deteriorated after 1856, no doubt in conjunction with the beginnings of *cantonnement*, the conquest of Kabylie, and the assimilationist policies of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies. The restoration of the Government General and the suspension of *cantonnement* in 1860 provided more favorable environments for *madrasas* and *zawiyas*, although their recovery remained slight in relation to the early 1850s and soon began to founder in the wake of the demographic and economic dislocations of 1864–1866.

Table 6.4a further suggests that the declining fortunes of the *madrasas* and *zawiyas* between 1856 and 1861 coincided as well with the most aggressive phase in the campaign to establish Arab-French schools: forty-eight of the total sixty-one dual schools, or 82 percent, were founded between 1856 and 1867. The restoration of military rule in 1860–1861 renewed the government's emphasis on dual education at

TABLE 6.4

Arab-French Schools, 1850–1873

a. Aggregate Numbers

Years	Opened	Closed	Converted	Remaining
1850–1855	11	2	3	6
1856–1861	17	2	0	21
1862–1867	31	5	2	45
1868–1871	2	5	3	39
1872–1873	0	19[a]	7	13
Total	61	33	15	13

b. Province of Algiers

Years	Opened	Closed	Converted	Remaining
1850–1855	5	2	1	2
1856–1861	14	1		15
1862–1867	12	1	2	24
1868–1871	0	0	1	23
1872–1873	0	14	7	2
Total	31	18	11	2

c. Province of Oran

Years	Opened	Closed	Converted	Remaining
1850–1855	4	0	0	4
1856–1861	0	0	0	4
1862–1867	7	1	0	10
1868–1871	2	0	1	11
1872–1873	0	5	0	6
Total	13	6	1	6

d. Province of Constantine

Years	Opened	Closed	Converted	Remaining
1850–1855	2	0	2	0
1856–1861	3	1	0	2
1862–1867	12	3	0	11
1868–1871	0	5[a]	1	5
1872–1873	0	0	0	5
Total	17	9	3	5

SOURCE: AOM 71MI/147: Instruction publique indigène.
[a]Includes three schools destroyed during the Great Revolt of 1871.

the expense of Muslim instruction and initiated another drive to create Arab-French establishments, with forty-three schools opening between 1860 and 1867. The aggregate numbers in Table 6.4a, however, do not adequately convey the variations at regional levels. Table 6.4b, for example, indicates that the province of Algiers witnessed a sustained effort to

found Arab-French institutions after 1856, with twenty-six of the total thirty-one units, or 84 percent, founded in a span of eleven years. However, while the province provided the most viable platform overall for Arab-French schools under military administration, it also witnessed the largest number of closures after 1871, with fourteen discontinued in 1872–1873 and seven converted into communal schools. By then, only two Arab-French schools remained in operation in the heavily Europeanized province. The data from the province of Oran (Table 6.4c) reveal a less concerted, more timid regional effort on the part of the Ministry of War, with only thirteen establishments opened overall. Here again, the greatest activity coincided with the restoration of military rule after 1860, especially during the years 1862–1867, with the opening of seven of the total thirteen dual schools. Interestingly, no Arab-French schools were discontinued in the province prior to 1871.

Likewise, in the province of Constantine, the greatest number of Arab-French schools was introduced in the 1860s, with twelve of the total seventeen, or 71 percent, opening between 1862 and 1867. Of the total number of dual schools in the province, five remained in operation by 1873, with six closed due to insufficient attendance, three transferred to municipal control, and three destroyed during the insurrection of 1871. The data in Table 6.4a–d, when taken in conjunction with the statistical distributions in Figure 6.1, corroborate that the political shift toward the municipalization of colonial schools began in the twilight of Napoleon's imperial reign and was only accelerated with the institution of the Third Republic. In the long term, the pressures of colonial municipalities proved as important as native resistance in undercutting the reforms of the Arabophiles. More than a decade separates the inspection reports reproduced in Tables 5.1 and 6.5, and their near-identical observations are, at first sight, emblematic of the futility of the educational efforts of the Arab Directorate. Yet, by their very static nature, the reports attest to the ability of the natives to consistently neutralize the cultural initiatives of France.

Indeed, by late 1866, with indigenous instruction at an obvious impasse, the imperial government began to backtrack. With mounting pressure on Paris to streamline the colonial administration, curb the powers of the military, and promote corporate or capitalist development, Napoleon gambled on a final effort to reconcile the divergent interests among the regular military authority, the civilian and *colon* establishments, and his Muslim subjects.[97] The imperial decree of December 27, 1866 (*Organisation communale*), partitioned Algeria into three administrative zones: civilian communes (*communes de plein exercice*), mixed communes (*communes mixtes*), and subdivisional communes

TABLE 6.5

Annual School Inspection Report from the Circle of Laghouat, December 19, 1865

Tribe	Laghouat
Site where classes are held	Djemaa (mosque)
Instructors	Si Mohammed ben Lechkram Abdel Kader ben Moulana Mohammed Ben Aïssa
Number of schools	17
Courses offered	Reading and writing, verses of the Quran, elements of calculus.
Observations on the manner in which the teachers conduct their classes	The teaching *tolba* have more fanaticism than erudition. All their knowledge is limited to the interpretation of the Quran, and there is no need to add that most interpret it in ways hardly favorable to our ideas. Because hatred of the Christians is an innate feeling in these Arabs, the *tolba* exploit gladly to gain some merit in the eyes of the parents, from whom they try to obtain a little money. All are in a state neighboring ignorance; so you should not believe it to be real fanaticism. It is mostly out of necessity rather than conviction that they steer their sermons in the spirit that we indicated. Their method of instruction, we must admit, is as intelligent as possible. They address only the memory of the children and try to make them retain the greatest number of verses.
Observations on the students, their aptitude and their progress	The zeal of the pupils leaves much to be desired. The parents show themselves to be indifferent to the progress their children may make. These two reasons make it so that Muslim instruction is very retarded (*très arriérée*). The pupils show signs of intelligence and are very precocious. Those who are destined for the judiciary show a little more diligence and are sent as soon as they are able to read and write to a *zawiya*, where they are taught the notions of Muslim law. Because only exercises of memorization are practiced in the schools, the intelligence of most is not sufficiently developed to enable them to apply the law with discernment, when they are later called upon to do so.

SOURCE: AOM 71MI/147.

(*subdivisionnaires*).[98] Civilian communes were freed from military oversight, administered directly by prefects, and allowed to establish and fund public communal schools within their jurisdictions. Mixed communes, containing Europeans in small numbers, were administered by municipal commissions presided over by the commanding officer of the circle or annex. In these districts, mixed schools substituted for communal institutions. Lastly, the subdivisional communes encompassed the

reconstituted *douars* of the senatus consult of 1863. These were to be administered directly by regional military commanders with the assistance of a council of indigenous notables (*djemaa*) until finalization of the communal organization decree.

The multiplication of full-fledged communes, and the extension of civilian territories in the wake of the communal organization decree, proved fatal to the dual establishments. Several became enclosed within municipal boundaries and quickly lost their funding from public coffers. Shortly after the promulgation of the Great Charter of the Arab Bureaux, the gubernatorial circular of October 14, 1867, authorized the transfer of Muslim students to municipal schools. On May 20, 1868, Governor Mac-Mahon ordered the integration of communal Arab-French establishments and any municipal schools with Muslim students in order to create therefrom a single fiscal and administrative entity, known as the mixed school (*école mixte*).[99] Almost immediately, the number of Muslim students in the mixed schools declined, whereas that of Europeans multiplied.[100] With civilian powers on the ascendance, the very understanding of colonial assimilation was changed. The *colon* establishment, now confident in its supremacy in Algeria, resisted attempts to adapt its colonial institutions to metropolitan standards. By early 1869, the minister of war was effectively soliciting—and the minister of public instruction rejecting—the application of metropolitan law to "everything that appertained to primary [indigenous] instruction."[101]

From the perspective of Algiers, the fall of the Second Empire in 1870–1871 was merely as an emphatic conclusion to a political regime already condemned by its own incoherence. The conversion of Arab-French schools stands as the concrete expression of the ideological death of colonial association and the triumph of assimilation as understood by the *colons*. By 1869, the Arab Kingdom, too, was a dead letter, its main proponent ravaged by illness and incapacitated by diplomatic reversals in Europe and Mexico. Likewise, the Arabophile camp, grievously weakened by the death of Lacroix and the events of 1864–1866 and deprived of the patronage of the emperor, fell prey to internal squabbling. If Urbain remained steadfast to the ideals of association, several of his collaborators, frustrated with the failure of the Arabophile project and increasingly unsure of the benefits of military protection for the Arabs, began to articulate an alternative vision or lend their support to the *colons*. By the same token, sensing the retreat of the imperial guard, the *colons* pressed their advantage with sustained political and journalistic campaigns, culminating with a string of daily extraordinary parliamentary sessions on March 7–10, 1870, to determine the fate of the colonial administration. "Algeria does not give us the chance to breathe,"

lamented Cabinet Minister Émile Ollivier. On March 9, the Legislative Assembly, on the initiative of Jules Favre, voted overwhelmingly to dissolve the special regime in Algeria. The ball was now in Napoleon's court, but his regime had only months to live. As the April 7 headlines of the *Echo d'Oran* celebrated the "Waterloo of the Arab Kingdom," few readers would have predicted that France was on the threshold of a second Napoleonic *fin de règne*.

Another Napoleon, Another Waterloo

> The narratives of the late nineteenth century are full of fantasies about an empire united not by force but by information.
>
> —Thomas Richards, *Imperial Archive*[1]

> If one assumes, following romanticism, that the Self is the opposite of the Other, or, following positivism, that the Self and Other are the same but at different stages, then other ways of viewing cultural difference are closed in advance.
>
> —Peter Gran, "Studies of Anglo-American Political Economy"[2]

> The colonial empire is the conservatory, in the old colonies, or the resurgence in the new ones, of all sorts of structures from the Ancien Régime. —Jean Frémigacci, "L'État colonial français"[3]

The value of French Algeria to the national interest and psyche appreciated considerably in the aftermath of the collapse of the Second Empire in late 1870. Confronted with military occupation and territorial dismemberment at the hands of Germany, the provisional government passed emergency measures to consolidate its control in the metropole and overseas possessions. The Third Republic's drive to liquidate the remnants of the defeated imperial regime, while facing down armed Prussians and Communards, afforded the settler constituencies the leeway to seize the levers of power in Algiers and push for legislative acts to ensure their exclusive political and economic rights in the colony.[4] The debacle at Sedan signaled a *fin de règne* for the Arab Kingdom as well. Within weeks of Napoleon's surrender, the commanding generals in Algeria were placed under the authority of the departmental prefects, the operations of the senatus consult of 1863 were abrogated, and 500,00 hectares of tribal lands were slated for transfer to the colonial domain.[5]

In March 1871, the bash agha Muhammad al-Muqrani, grand officer

of the Legion of Honor, joined forces with Shaykh El-Haddad, leader of the Sufi Rahmaniya order, and mobilized 250 communities against the oncoming colonial onslaught. "You know it, I have already told you that I cannot accept to be the agent of the civilian government," explained al-Muqrani to General Augeraud in his declaration of war.[6] By mid-August, troop reinforcements from France had forcefully extinguished the anticolonial insurgency, capturing or killing its principal leaders, along with 20,000 Arabs and Kabyles. The vengeful republic then ordered the general sequestration of the remaining Arab territories and imposed reparations of thirty-six million gold francs on the surviving tribes. With the African generals cowed and the old tribal confederations reduced to a leaderless "dust of men," there was little to curb the colonial appetite for Muslim lands. The Warnier Law of July 26, 1873, subjected all real estate transactions to metropolitan regulations, and two years later a decree called for the political and administrative integration of the colony with "immediate and absolute" extension of French civil laws and standards. In the process, the functions of the Arab Directorate were parceled out to analogous civilian departments, and the operations of the bureaux were relegated to regular army units in the *Section des affaires indigènes*. Finally, in August 1881, the remaining military responsibilities over indigenous affairs were centralized in the general headquarters of the XIX Army Corps and then allocated to pertinent metropolitan ministries.

In the years immediately following the demilitarization of the Government General, public officials and political theorists grappled with redefining the objectives and scope of the faltering civilizing mission in Algeria. Whereas the military regime was largely blamed for the mismanagement of the native populations, the latter were punished severely for the ensuing political insecurity. In the post-1871 balance of power in Europe, the irredentist leaders of the Third Republic looked adversely upon any hint of concession to Muslim jurisdictions in Algeria and to the reckless squandering of precious assets on indigenous communities deemed unable to make rational use of them. With the nation requiring every available resource to counter the confirmed demographic, industrial, and military superiority of a unified Germany, the integration (*rattachement*) of French Algeria became essential to the long-term goal of reclaiming the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. At the instigation of the colonialist establishment, and with its blessings, Paris abandoned all premise for Franco-Arab stewardship in its North African colony and confined its quest for integration to its European sectors. The debate on sound colonial policy was rekindled, and the administrative doctrines and theories of the 1830s and 1840s were revisited and reinterpreted to reflect the new political realities in France and Algeria.

In his editorial for *L'Algérie* of May 26, 1844, Prosper Enfantin had clarified the three political decisions available to France with regard to the fate of the colony's natives: their annihilation, expulsion (*refoulement*), or administration.[7] He condemned strongly the iniquity of the first two choices and endorsed the third as the surest means to attain a fair balance (*juste milieu*) between colonialist and indigenous interests. We know from the preceding chapters that Enfantin had penned his article at the cusp of the associationist era in colonial policy making in Algeria, as Saint-Simonian and Arabist officers were beginning to institute dual and transitional practices with which to govern the subjugated Arab populations. Thirty years later, in paragraphs strikingly evocative of Enfantin's, the well-known economist and prolific author Paul Leroy-Beaulieu attempted similarly to advise his government on a steadfast course of action in the colonies. He denounced the immoral and illogical policies of expulsion and association (*abstention*), respectively, and thus confined his country's options to the inevitable pursuit of colonial assimilation (*fusionnement*) in Algeria. "What should have been done with [the] 2,500,000 [natives]?" he asked his readers:

> Three opinions presented themselves: either push the natives back beyond the Atlas, cast them even into the Sahara, or fuse them with the European population by imposing upon them, forcibly or by propaganda, our customs, our laws, and perhaps even our religion, or respect all their customs, make all their property inviolable, and stay the Europeans from frequent contact with them; these three systems may be defined in three words: expulsion, fusion, abstention. . . . Of the three choices from which one must choose, the first is unjust. . . . The third, which entails complete respect for the customs, traditions, and mores of what has been called the Arab nationality, if applied with logic, would necessitate that our army and settlers quit Algeria. . . . Thus, there remains only the second option, the fusion of the indigenous element with the European.[8]

However, Leroy-Beaulieu was quick to qualify that his endorsement of colonial fusion was predicated on forgoing the unattainable and undesirable absorption of native habits and beliefs, and focusing on policies that aimed, at maximum, to harmonize the economic and social interests between Algeria's European and Arab populations:

> When we speak of the fusion of the indigenous element with the European element, we do not mean a complete melding of the first with the second, so that there remains no distinction in [their] external or intimate mores and habits. We are making only an allusion to a state of things where two populations of different origin would be placed under the same economic and social regime, would obey the same general laws, and would follow, in the realm of production, the same impulsion: there will remain, of course, for a long time still and maybe forever, differences of creed and custom; but there will be, from the economic, political, and social perspective, an identity of interests and circum-

stance; and, all things considered, this [identity] is the sole harmony that is indispensable from the point of view of peace, of prosperity, and of civilization.[9]

Written in the context of the recent political triumph of Algeria's *colons*, Leroy-Beaulieu's first edition of *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes* catered to the latter's insistence on a separate and unequal coexistence with the local Muslims. Their influential lobby cheered republican policies of integration to the extent that they freed the *colons* from military oversight and handed them the levers and rewards of colonial exploitation. In the aftermath of the Crémieux Decree of October 1870, which naturalized Algeria's Jewish minority, colonialist hardliners raised the specter of political secession to induce Parisian legislators to discount the Muslims from a similar legal amendment and to regulate them instead with the discriminatory clauses of the *Code de l'Indigénat*. With the legal and fiscal exceptions of the *Code de l'Indigénat* firmly in place by 1879, the administrative assimilation of Algeria could proceed with minimal regard for the resident Muslim majority.

Indeed, the main assimilationist instrument enacted in the 1880s, the Naturalization Law of June 1889, granted automatic citizenship to Algeria's diverse European groups of non-French origin. The sudden increase in the population of newly naturalized Frenchmen (*néo-français* = Neo-French) exacerbated intercommunal tensions and raised the level of secessionist agitation in Algiers to unprecedented intensity. The "Neos" vaunted their distinct colonialist identity and found their hero in Musette's caricature of the anti-Arab and anti-Semite *colon*, Cagayous.[10] In the 1890s, and especially at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, a handful of Neo leaders, such as Max Régis, real-life counterpart to Cagayous, would stake their political careers on the local appeal of anti-Semitism and colonial separatism. Régis's electoral platform promised to make Algeria a "New Cuba," released from a mother country enfeebled by Jewish interests or conspiracies and emasculated by liberal sensitivities.

The colonists' sway over Algerian public policy prevailed unchecked until 1892, when Jules Ferry, then presiding over the senatorial commission of inquiry, first indicted their disproportionate political influence and forcibly preserved privileges. Remarkably, in his critique of Algerian affairs, Ferry, champion of republicanism, suggested restoring to the colony's governor general an executive authority "above local influences and the license of elected bodies."[11] His evocation of the past protective and associative policies of Napoleon III reignited the public debate on the legitimate civilizing obligations of France, dormant somewhat since the national traumas of 1870–1871. The jurist Arthur Gi-

rault stepped into the fray to settle the question of Franco-Algerian relations in his *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*. Like Leroy-Beaulieu before him, Girault recapitulated the familiar triad of available options for dealing with colonized natives:

> The question of knowing the type of political and economic rapports to be established between [the colony] and the mother country constitutes the fundamental problem that dominates all colonial legislation. Yet, in this matter, three distinct conceptions are possible. Each is summarized in one of the following formulas: subjection (*assujettissement*), autonomy, assimilation.[12]

Girault, as previously illustrated, voiced his full support for a new commitment to a reformed politic of assimilation in France's colonial possessions. His immensely popular treatise did much to solidify the reputation of the doctrine of assimilation as the signet of France's particular cultural genius and the summit of its sociopolitical values. In the years since the initial publication of Leroy-Beaulieu's *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, however, the interpretation of assimilation had further narrowed to become synonymous with placating French Algerians and trivializing the legal status of the Muslim natives. "The assimilation of the colonies," Girault now acknowledged, "is so minutely concerned with the *indigènes*, that in Algeria the *refoulement* of the latter is precisely demanded by the colonists who seek to assimilate the country completely with France."[13]

With considerations of territorial integrity, strategic security, and economic advance uppermost in the minds of republican officials, political economists such as Leroy-Beaulieu and Girault invoked national grandeur and interest to justify abandoning former concerns with cultural variation in colonial policy making. It was "an old delusion," they reasoned, to pay respect to the indigenous identity of France's North African departments without raising cries for independence from Arab nationalists or from European separatists. Moreover, novel sociological and ethnographic theories concerning the fundamental differences between races, civilizations, and mentalities—theories elaborated appropriately in the context of French Algeria—deemed assimilation a dangerous and superfluous undertaking. In the age of competitive nationalisms and social Darwinism, the Gallicization of the colonies had to obey the laws of natural selection, and was expected primarily to bolster the Third Republic's political and economic standing among the great powers. Accordingly, colonial policy making by the late 1890s began to subsume the cultural objectives of the civilizing mission to initiatives of economic infrastructural improvement (*mise en valeur*). Increasingly, the debate on colonial affairs pitted assimilationists who had lost sight of the natives against critics who hoped to facilitate French

rule with "culture-neutral" plans for economic development. In the process, the latter, knowingly or not, recycled some former Saint-Simonian precepts for controlled association in Algeria.

To illustrate, Leroy-Beaulieu himself acquired in time a pronounced Saint-Simonian disposition toward colonial modernization. In subsequent editions of *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, he made telling amendments to his original theses concerning native governance. By the time the sixth edition was published in 1908, he had rescinded decisively his earlier support for colonial fusion, and introduced a new option with which to achieve "economic reconciliation without cultural combination" in Algeria.[14] *Fusionnement*, he had concluded, was simply unattainable, and he now defined the civilizing mission as a standalone project for economic production and development:

> The prospect, however, for the fusion of the indigenous element with the European element, so that there remains no distinction in [their] external or intimate mores and habits, appears, upon reflection, to be a chimera. When we witness, after many centuries, despite religious similarities, [and] often the same mode of living, the Czechs confronting the Germans in Bohemia, or the Flemings confronting the Walloons in Belgium, we may well ask if it is not foolish enterprise to seek the fusion, even if incomplete, of the native Muslims with the Europeans. All that we can hope for is reciprocal toleration by the two populations for their respective beliefs, conceptions of life and customs, as well as agreeable cooperation by one and the other with the general economic oeuvre. Juxtaposed, drawn together (*rapprochées*), and, as much as possible, reconciled without being combined, the two races would freely unite their efforts for the sake of production and progress; it is the sole harmony that is indispensable to peace, to prosperity, and to civilization.[15]

To bolster his newfound argument with historical evidence, Leroy-Beaulieu maligned the disastrous consequences of the Warnier Law for Arab landownership and bemoaned the "absurd act of fanaticism or chauvinism to suppress in 1871 the Arab-French colleges in Algiers and Constantine." He wrote in favor of a return to the land operations of the senatus consult of 1863 and recommended resurrecting both the idea of an Arab homestead and dual public instruction for the natives. He acknowledged explicitly his debt to the views of the "very competent and very impartial" Ismaÿl Urbain, although he described him merely as correspondent for the *Journal des Débats*.[16] Thus did Leroy-Beaulieu join the growing number of government officials with direct colonial experience who had begun, in the first years of the new century, to deny any possibility of absorbing native cultures and to advocate openly for a reconsideration of past dealings with indigenous institutions. In 1906, for example, the minister of colonies, Georges Leygues, had labeled his nation's policies of integration "an error to be renounced forever," and,

more notably, in 1910, Jules Harmand, former high commissioner to French Indochina, published his antiassimilationist *Domination et colonisation*, in which he accused the current colonial practices of violating the "spirit of true colonization" and endangering France's "identity and liberty of action."[17]

According to Jean Frémigacci, Harmand's tract consummated France's formal rupture with its colonial tradition of assimilation, as the "antiassimilationist discourse assumed an official and ritual character" after 1910.[18] Yet, aside from formal or official catalysts to the reorientation in colonial policy making, the return to antiassimilationist measures after 1910 was equally motivated by recent developments within colonized societies themselves. In the decade before the Great War, educated Gallicized natives (*évolués*) undermined increasingly the racial, cultural, and even visual boundaries of the colonial order by appropriating for their own ends the language and patterns of universalism and egalitarianism. Francophone deputies from Guadeloupe and Senegal and *Jeunes Algériens* from North Africa defied France to live up to its civilizing claims by fully integrating the class of *évolués* to the one and indivisible republic. Later, with the recruitment and mobilization of tens of thousands of young native men during the Great War, and with their meaningful contributions in sweat and blood to the war effort, liberal metropolitan parties began to look more intently at conditions in the colonies.

In November 1915, Georges Leygues and Georges Clemenceau, respectively the president of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Chamber and the president of the Senate, sent Prime Minister Aristide Briand an initiative for the extensive overhaul of colonial regimes, which suggested, among other things, a Crémieux-like decree, or naturalization without renunciation of personal status, for France's Muslim subjects. Two years later, with Clemenceau in power, the government debated the possibility of legal naturalization and greater representation for its loyal Muslims. Metropolitan enthusiasm and support for colonial reforms passed quickly, however, with the surrender of the Central Powers in late 1918. In the end, Clemenceau's conciliatory gestures toward the colonies had merely served to exacerbate the expectations of the *évolués*, as well as the anxieties of a French population indisposed to adulterate its national sovereignty and identity. Postwar policy makers abjured all talk of political suffrage and representation in the colonies, and hoped to deflect the frustrated demands of the *évolués* by raising the living standards of the natives and promoting with them a community of economic interests. Thus, when the Jonnart Law was finally promulgated in diluted form on February 4, 1919, the restrictions upon indigenous naturalization, though eased, were largely retained.

The postwar direction in French colonial thinking was encapsulated in Louis Vignon's *Un programme de politique coloniale*.[19] Its emphasis on "positive" colonial policies, respectful of the original character and social environment of the natives, delivered a faint echo of the nineteenth-century discourse of Algeria's Saint-Simonians. Once more, associative policies were formulated as tactics to ward off the integration of the natives and to deny them the benefits of modern civilization on the argument that impulsive reforms would prove harmful to their traditional ways and sensibilities. Finally, in 1923, the minister of colonies, Albert Sarraut, restated central elements from Enfantin's *Colonisation de l'Algérie* and promulgated economic development, or *mise en valeur*, as the preferred avenue for the moral, intellectual, and social amelioration of native populations.[20] There was little that was fundamentally new to Sarraut's blueprint for attaining Franco-Muslim entente through economic reform. Already by 1857, leading Arabophiles, such as Urbain, had also become convinced that economic opportunities alone would overcome the political rivalries and civilizational differences between Muslims and Europeans. In early 1862, he assured Frédéric Lacroix that he had stumbled at last upon the solution to the contradictions of the colonial regime:

> Political economy alone can solve the Algerian question by creating enough wealth through the division of labor, so that the victor will be content without the vanquished being exploited and impoverished. It will be superb.[21]

From the perspective of the fundamental operations of the Arab Directorates in Algeria until 1870, therefore, the doctrine of assimilation appears more the exception than the rule in inspiring France's colonial practices. Contested vigorously through the 1830s and shoved aside and supplanted in the 1840s, the rationalities of assimilation enjoyed but a brief undisputed interlude after 1870, before surrendering ground once more to the ideological regime of colonial association by the turn of the century. Vestiges of the Saint-Simonian ideas for controlled association survived the abortion of Napoleon III's Arab Kingdom in 1870 and resurfaced later in the works and routines of twentieth-century colonial administrators such as Harmand, Sarraut, Joseph Gallieni, and Hubert Lyautey.

Seen through this lens, the high tide of assimilation in Algeria between 1870 and 1890 seems rather a temporary distortion in colonial policy making, produced by the combined eagerness of the leaders of the Third Republic to compensate for the disaster at Sedan and of the European *colons* to secure their local supremacy and settle scores with the Arab Bureaux and their native wards. At the outcome of the power struggles of the 1870s, the representatives of colonial interests were able

to capitalize on the liberal expectations of the Third Republic to censure the "failed" record of the former military regime in Algeria. In the wake of the unmitigated political triumph of the settlers, the doctrine of colonial assimilation was modified and rehabilitated as the natural corrective to the debilitating reactionary policies of the reviled Arabophiles. With the founding of the procolonial University of Algiers in 1879, the historical narrative and memory of the *colons* was formalized in the institutional rewriting of the first four decades of French rule as a series of ills or misfortunes resulting from the Army of Africa's insistence on preserving the autonomy of a primitive and irredeemable society.

At one level, then, the legacy of 1870–1890 lingers on in historical representations of colonial assimilation as the doctrinal adjunct to the liberal imperialism of the Third Republic, whereas, conversely, the formative input of military rule in amplifying France's colonial theories is relegated to a convenient oblivion. In other words, the unwarranted emphasis on the assimilationist fiber of France has detracted equally from analyzing French Algeria as an archaic and autocratic reincarnation of the ancien régime, ruled by decree in the name of a small landowning nobility of settlers and to the detriment of a large disenfranchised Muslim Third Estate. As Frémigacci astutely notes, the "falsely modernist" debate between assimilation and association has served to conceal from historical view France's creation in the colonies of authoritarian states "all different from the democratic Republic that had triumphed at home . . . [and] with very strong analogies to the detested monarchical Ancien Régime."[22]

Finally, the artificial controversy between assimilation and association has perpetuated the tendency to disregard the mythical substance of the two doctrines and their negation of their very stated objectives. The notion of assimilation, when taken literally, precludes the very existence of a separate colonial administration, and similarly, the rules of exception that are inherent and indispensable to any colonial regime must, by definition, render impractical or impossible the application of republican laws in the colony. By the same argument, and as shown in the preceding chapters, the political interventions by the army's Arabist officers and Saint-Simonian doctrinaires in the name of colonial association in the 1840s did not imply a decentering of French assumptions. They appropriated native affairs on the excuse that the metropolitan lens prohibited comprehending Algeria on its own terms, but their reorganization of the fields of social and scientific knowledge in the 1840s continued to subscribe to the dominant imperatives of colonial sovereignty and political security.[23] With greater access to the natives, they expected to enhance policy making, and although the quality of the gathered intelligence improved markedly after 1844, their project for

association still remained predicated on establishing the locally French as normative through claims of European universality. To illustrate, the senatus consults of April 1863 and July 1865, authored by the government's foremost experts on Algeria, proposed to normalize the status of the Muslims on condition that they admit the inferiority of their customs and institutions. Such inconsistencies on the part of policy makers and advisors like Urbain, who otherwise exhibited a high degree of expertise and familiarity with Muslim conventions and beliefs, were conditioned by the political requirements of the civilizing mission and by France's own sociocultural exigencies.

Likewise, the project of the Arab Kingdom provided an early example of the contradictions of colonial rule in the age of the modern nation-state. Napoleon III sought to erect an Arab state at the very moment when political processes in France and Algeria were confirming the necessity of cultural, religious, and linguistic homogeneity to the essential identity of the nation. The consolidation of a French Algerian society by the 1860s became an obstacle for coexistence with an Arab kingdom or nationality, as well as a constant challenge to metropolitan notions of selfhood. The settlers consciously appropriated the very label "Algerian" to rule out the emergence of an independent Arab identity, but also to assert their own political and cultural autonomy with regard to their trans-Mediterranean compatriots. In this instance, their policies tended to concur with the Saint-Simonian view that different societies and races were best governed with institutions and laws of their own making.

Indeed, it has been argued by Frémigacci, among others, that General Charles de Gaulle ushered in the era of decolonization when he abolished the *Code de l'Indigénat* in 1946 to bring the Muslim subjects of the waning French empire under common law. When he was returned to power in 1958 in the midst of the Algerian war of liberation, the general was soon confronted with the impossibility of maintaining the colony without throwing one of the "nations," French or Arab, into the sea. Either French Algeria would be purified of its non-Europeans, or the colonial territory in its entirety would become the "Arab Kingdom." One hundred years had elapsed since Napoleon III had similarly concluded that any independent existence for the Arab natives of North Africa was simply incompatible with the notion of *Algérie française*.

Appendices

Chronology, 1830–1870

June 14, 1830	French troops land at Sidi Ferruch.
July 5, 1830	Husayn Dey surrenders the Casbah of Algiers to Marshal Bourmont.
July 25–30, 1830	Popular resistance to the July ordinances leads to the abdication of King Charles X and the enthronement of Louis-Philippe I.
1831	Duke of Rovigo organizes an Arab cabinet, staffed by his personal secretary, a handful of interpreters, and a local Arab notable with the designation of *Agha des Arabes*. The responsibilities of the cabinet are to "dispense with all diplomatic affairs concerning the indigenous populations."
June 10, 1831	Gubernatorial decree attaches beylical lands to the French domains and enables confiscation of lands belonging to Algerians.
April 1832	Revolt of the *muqaddam* Muhyi al-Din ibn Hashim, father of Abd al-Qadir, begins.
November 1832	Abd al-Qadir ibn Muhyi al-Din assumes leadership of the Algerian uprising.
February 1833	Lamoricière is entrusted with expanding the personnel of the Arab cabinet and streamlining its responsibilities to include the collection and classification of all documentation concerning indigenous affairs and to provide the commanding military authorities with a database of information concerning Arab society and culture. The result is the Special Bureau of Arab Affairs (*Bureau particulier des affaires arabes*) under the leadership of the *Agha des Arabes*, now selected from the corps of bilingual French officers.
June 28, 1833	Guizot Law on primary education is enacted.

February 26, 1834	Peace agreement between General Desmichels and Abd al-Qadir proclaims a truce between the two parties, the submission of the province of Oran to the French, and the promulgation of free trade. In a secret clause, Desmichels recognizes the sovereignty of Abd al-Qadir over the Oran region, refers to him as the Commander of the Faithful (*amir al-mu'minin*), grants him a commercial monopoly at the port of Arzew, and commits France to providing Abd al-Qadir with aid.
July 22, 1834	Royal ordinance organizes the "French possessions in the north of Africa" and places them under the authority of the Ministry of War. It also appoints a governor general, directly responsible to the minister of war, a civil intendant, as well as a general prosecutor and a director of finance.
September 1, 1834	Ministerial order confers upon Algeria a regime of legislation by decree rather than civil law, to be executed by the minister of war upon the recommendations of the governor general.
November 18, 1834	Gubernatorial decree creates the Provisional Directorate of Arab Affairs.
November 1836	A French force is defeated before Constantine. General Clauzel is dismissed, and Lieutenant General Bugeaud is appointed governor general of Algeria.
April 15, 1837	Amendments to the decree of November 18, 1834, create a temporary Directorate of Arab Affairs (*Direction des affaires arabes*) under the command of Pellissier de Reynaud and directly attached to the governor general.
May 27–30, 1837	Treaty of Tafna signed by Bugeaud and Abd al-Qadir recognizes the latter as the sovereign of two thirds of the *makhzan* and establishes peaceful coexistence between his "Arab state" and the French coastal installations.
October 13, 1837	Constantine falls to French forces.
August 21, 1839	Royal ordinance sanctions the sequestration of Algerian *hubus*.

November 1839	Hostilities with Abd al-Qadir are renewed.
August 16, 1841	Gubernatorial circular reorganizes the Directorate of Arab Affairs and establishes a Central Division of Arab Affairs (*Division centrale des affaires arabes*).
March 23, 1843	Ministerial order transfers the remaining *hubus* to the public domain.
May 16, 1843	Duke of Aumale captures the *smala* of Abd al-Qadir.
February 1, 1844	Ministerial order regulates the Arab Bureaux.
August 14, 1844	Bugeaud is victorious over the sultan of Morocco at the battle of Wadi Isly.
October 1, 1844	Royal ordinance stipulates that the inalienability of the *hubus* does not safeguard their lands, buildings, or assets from confiscation by colonial authorities. Moreover, uncultivated lands within specified areas are classified as vacant unless title deeds are provided.
April 18, 1845	Royal ordinance creates three separate administrative zones that institutionalize the separation among settlers, soldiers, and natives: civil territories (*communes de plein exercice*), where large concentrations of settlers live under French common law; mixed territories (*communes mixtes*), ruled by the military administration with limited internal self-government for their European residents; and Arab territories, governed exclusively by the Bureaux of Arab Affairs.
September 1847	Directorate of civilian affairs is created in each of the three provinces where the civil law on communes (*Loi du 18 Juillet 1837*) was in effect in urban centers.
December 23, 1847	Abd al-Qadir surrenders to the Duke of Aumale.
February 1848	Revolutionary uprisings in France lead to major political reforms: the abdication of Louis-Philippe is followed by the formation of a republican provisional government, by general elections for a National Assembly (April), and by a new constitution proclaiming the Second Republic (November).

March 4, 1848	Provisional government declares Algeria an integral part of the French domain, and measures are taken to assimilate the colony administratively.
August 16–20, 1848	Executive order attaches the portfolios of justice, public instruction, finance, and religious institutions to the relevant Parisian ministries.
November 4, 1848	Constitutional amendments declare Algeria a territory of France and transform its provinces into departments, with their own general and municipal councils. Article 21 enables French Algerians to elect representatives to the National Assembly. The members of the councils are elected by French Algerians and are administered by prefects and subprefects. The constitution does not alter the administrative organization of military territories. Article 109 maintains the "special" legal status of Algeria.
December 10, 1848	Louis-Napoleon becomes president of France.
December 16, 1848	Bill presented by the settlers to the National Assembly in Paris suggests that private property does not exist in Algeria as a result of its conquest by the Arabs in the seventh century. According to Islamic law, the state owns conquered lands and the resident tribes are merely collective tenants. The assembly decrees that landownership is of two kinds: private property (*melk*) and communal property (*'arsh*). This partition enables the government to confiscate the traditional grazing lands of the tribes or restrict their movements to the poorest lands (*cantonnement*).
March 15, 1850	Falloux Law on freedom of instruction is enacted.
July 14, 1850	Presidential decree creates Arab-French schools.
September 30, 1850	Presidential decree organizes Muslim schools.
June 16, 1851	First metropolitan legislation on land tenure establishes the inalienability of European and indigenous property, but recognizes the ownership of the French state over all collectively held territories (*'arsh*).

August 4, 1851	Bank of Algeria is created and an Algerian currency is issued.
December 2, 1851	Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte stages a successful coup d'état.
January 14, 1852	Civil liberties are suppressed in the wake of the coup d'état of December 2. French Algerians are no longer able to elect representatives to the assembly. *Bureaux arabes départementaux* are created in the civilian territories with prerogatives similar to their military counterparts.
December 2, 1852	Louis-Napoleon declares himself emperor of France (Napoleon III) "by the grace of God and the will of the Nation."
October 1, 1854	Gubernatorial decree creates judicial circumscription staffed by government-appointed *qadis* throughout Algeria. Its intent is to terminate the duality embodied in the decree of August 20, 1848.
1857	French conquest and annexation of Kabylie.
March 14, 1857	Imperial decree creates the Collège Impérial Arabe-Français.
June 24, 1858	Imperial decree creates the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies, eliminates the Government General, and transfers administrative offices and services to Paris. The authority of the prefects is expanded, and the general councils are reestablished.
February 10, 1860	Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies is eliminated and the Government General restored under the authority of Marshal Pélissier. Offices and services return to Algiers. The governor general exercises his authority in the civilian and military territories through a director of civilian affairs and the army's military chief of staff, respectively.
April 22, 1863	In reaction to the colonial policy of *cantonnement*, a senatus consult declares the tribes of Algeria as owners of all lands they traditionally and permanently occupy under any title whatsoever. By dividing the traditional lands

	among newly constituted *douars*, however, the legislation encourages the further dismantling of Algerian society and economy and guarantees the successful opposition of the settlers to the implementation of its provisions. Moreover, the senatus consult enables the development of full-fledged municipalities (*communes de plein exercice*) in the military territories and places Arab-French schools within these communes under the authority of the municipal councils.
July 7, 1864	Imperial decree militarizes the colonial administration. The civilian directorate is eliminated, and the authority of the prefects is suborned to that of the division generals.
March 4, 1865	Imperial decree and ministerial order, respectively, create the Teachers' Training School of Algiers (École Normale Primaire) and establish fellowships for twenty French and ten Algerian student teachers (*élèves-maîtres*).
July 14, 1865	Senatus consult stipulates that whereas Algerians are permitted to serve in the French army and civil bureaucracy, they cannot become citizens of France without renouncing their Muslim or Jewish civil status.
March 21, 1867	Gubernatorial circular (*Circulaire Mac-Mahon*) renames the Central Division of Arab Affairs as the Central Political Bureau.
May 20, 1868	*Bureaux arabes départementaux* are eliminated. The military territories are organized into communes: mixed, where there are European settler communities; and subdivisional, where there are Muslim communities.
September 4, 1870	Provisional Government of National Defense proclaims the Third Republic following the surrender of the French army at Sedan.
October 24, 1870	Administration of Algeria passes to a civilian governor general under the authority of the minister of the interior.

APPENDIX TWO

Ministers and Administrators, 1830–1871

A. GOVERNMENT GENERAL OF ALGERIA

Commanders in Chief

Bourmont, Louis-Auguste-Victor de, comte de Ghaisne
July 5–August 12, 1830

Clauzel, Bertrand
August 12, 1830–February 21, 1831

Berthezène, Pierre
February 21–December 6, 1831

Savary, Anne Jean Marie René, duc de Rovigo
December 6, 1831–April 29, 1833

Avizard, Antoine (interim)
March 3–April 29, 1833

Voirol, Théophile (interim)
April 29, 1833–July 27, 1834

Governors General

Drouet d'Erlon, Jean-Baptiste
July 27, 1834–July 8, 1835

Clauzel, Bertrand
July 8, 1835–January 13, 1837

Rapatel, Paul-Marie (interim)
January 13–April 3, 1837

Damrémont, Charles-Marie
April 3–October 12, 1837

Valée, Sylvain-Charles
October 12, 1837–December 18, 1840

Schramm, Jean-Paul (interim)
December 18, 1840–February 22, 1841

Bugeaud, Thomas-Robert, duc d'Isly
December 29, 1840–September 27, 1847

Lamoricière, Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de (interim)
September 1, 1845–June 29, 1847

Bar, Jean- François de (interim)
June 29–July 6, 1847

Bedeau, Marie-Alphonse (interim)
July 6–September 27, 1847

Henri d'Orléans, duc d'Aumale
September 27, 1847–February 24, 1848

Cavaignac, Louis-Eugène
February 25–April 29, 1848

Changarnier, Nicolas
April 29–June 22, 1848

Marey-Monge, Guillaume Stanislas (interim)
June 22–September 9, 1848

Charon, Viala
September 9, 1848–November 4, 1850

Hautpoul, Alphonse Henri d'
November 4, 1850–April 23, 1851

Pélissier, Jean-Jacques, duc de Malakoff (interim)
April 23–December 11, 1851

Randon, Jacques-Louis
December 11, 1851–June 25, 1857

Renault (interim)
June 25, 1857–June 24, 1858

Ministers of Algeria and the Colonies

Bonaparte, Jerome Napoleon
June 24, 1858–March 25, 1859

Chasseloup-Laubat, Prosper de
March 25, 1859–November 24, 1860

Governors General

Pélissier, Jean-Jacques, duc de Malakoff
November 24, 1860–May 22, 1864

Martimprey, Édouard de (interim)
May 22–September 1, 1864

Mac-Mahon, Patrice de, duc de Magenta
September 1, 1864–July 26, 1870

Durrieu, Louis
July 27–October 23, 1870

Walsin-Esterhazy, Jean
October 23–24, 1870

Lichtlin, Valentin-Auguste
October 28–November 16, 1870

Extraordinary Commissioners

Bouzet, Charles de
November 16, 1870–February 8, 1871

Lambert, Alexis
February 8–March 21, 1871

B. MINISTERS OF WAR

Bourmont, Louis-Auguste-Victor de—Field Marshal
August 8, 1829–July 31, 1830

Gérard, Maurice-Étienne—General
July 31–November 27, 1830

Soult, Jean-de-Dieu, duc de Dalmatie—Field Marshal
November 27, 1830–July 18, 1834

Gérard, Maurice-Étienne—Field Marshal
July 18–October 29, 1834

Gautier, Henride Rigny, comte—Vice Admiral
October 29–November 10, 1834

Bernard, Simon—General
November 10–18, 1834

Mortier, Édouard, duc de Trévise—Field Marshal
November 18, 1834–March 12, 1835

Gautier, Henri de Rigny, comte—Vice Admiral
March 12–April 30, 1835

Maison, Nicolas-Joseph, marquis—Field Marshal
April 30, 1835–September 6, 1836

Bernard, Simon—General
September 6, 1836–March 31, 1839

Despans-Cubières, Amédée—General
March 31–May 12, 1839

Schneider, Virgile—General
May 12, 1839–March 1, 1840

Despans-Cubières, Amédée—General
March 1–October 29, 1840

Soult, Jean-de-Dieu, duc de Dalmatie—Field Marshal
October 29, 1840–November 10, 1845

Saint-Yon, Alexandre Moline de—General
November 10, 1845–May 9, 1847

Trézel, Alphonse—General
May 9, 1847–February 24, 1848

Bedeau, Marie-Alphonse—General
February 24–25, 1848

Subervie, Jacques Gervais—General
February 25–March 20, 1848

Cavaignac, Louis-Eugène—General
March 20–April 5, 1848

Arago, François
April 5–May 11, 1848

Charras, Jean-Baptiste—Colonel
May 11–17, 1848

Cavaignac, Louis-Eugène—General
May 17–June 28, 1848

Lamoricière, Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de—General
June 28–December 20, 1848

Rullière, Joseph—General
December 20, 1848–October 31, 1849

Hautpoul, Alphonse Henri d', comte—General
October 31, 1849–October 22, 1850

Schramm, Jean-Paul de—General
October 22, 1850–January 9, 1851

Saint-Jean d'Angély, Auguste de—General
January 9–24, 1851

Randon, Jacques-Louis—General
January 24–October 26, 1851

Saint-Arnaud, Armand-Jacques Leroy de—General/Field Marshal
October 26, 1851–March 11, 1854

Vaillant, Jean-Baptiste Philibert—Field Marshal
March 11, 1854–May 5, 1859

Randon, Jacques-Louis—Field Marshal
May 5, 1859–January 20, 1867

Niel, Adolphe—Field Marshal
January 20, 1867–August 13, 1869

Rigault, Charles de Genouilly
August 13–21, 1869

Leboeuf, Edmond—General/Field Marshal
August 21, 1869–July 20, 1870

Dejean, Pierre Charles, vicomte—General
July 20–August 9, 1870

Cousin-Montauban, Charles, comte de Palikao—General
August 9–September 4, 1870

Le Flô, Auguste—General
February 11–June 5, 1871

C. MINISTERS OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

Guernon-Ranville, Martial de
November 18, 1829–July 31, 1830

Bignon, Louis-Pierre
August 1–11, 1830

Broglie, Victor de
August 11–November 2, 1830

Mérilhou, Joseph
November 2–27, 1830

Barthe, Félix
November 27, 1830–March 13, 1831

Bachasson, Camille, comte de Montalivet
March 13, 1831–April 27, 1832

Barthe, Félix
April 27–30, 1832

Amédée Girod de l'Ain, Louis
April 30–October 11, 1832

Guizot, François
October 11, 1832–November 10, 1834

Teste, Jean-Baptiste
November 10–18, 1834

Guizot, François
November 18, 1834–February 22, 1836

Pelet de la Lozère, Joseph, comte
February 22–September 6, 1836

Guizot, François
September 6, 1836–April 15, 1837

Salvandy, Narcisse-Achille de
April 15, 1837–March 31, 1839

Parant, Narcisse
March 31, 1839–May 12, 1839

Villemain, Abel-François
May 12, 1839–March 1, 1840

Cousin, Victor
March 1–October 29, 1840

Villemain, Abel-François
October 29, 1840–February 1, 1845

Salvandy, Narcisse-Achille de
February 1, 1845–February 24, 1848

Carnot, Hippolyte
February 24–July 5, 1848

Vaulabelle, Achille Tenaille de
July 5–October 13, 1848

Freslon, Alexandre Pierre
October 13–December 1, 1848

Saint-Georges, Pierre Marie de
December 1–20, 1848

Falloux, Alfred de, comte
December 20, 1848–October 31, 1849

Parieu, Félix Esquirou de
October 31, 1849–January 24, 1851

Buffet, Louis (interim)
February 10–20, 1849

Dufaure, Jules (interim)
July 28, 1849–August 3, 1849

Lanjuinais, Victor (interim)
August 18, 1849–October 31, 1849

Baroche, Pierre (interim)
September 2, 1850–September 20, 1850

Giraud, Charles
January 24–April 10, 1851

Crouseilhes, Marie-Jean Dombidau de
April 10–October 26, 1851

Rouher, Eugène (interim)
August 18, 1851

Giraud, Charles
October 26–December 3, 1851

Fortoul, Hippolyte
December 3, 1851–June 7, 1856

Vaillant, Jean-Baptiste Philibert—Field Marshal
July 1–August 13, 1856

Rouland, Gustave
August 13, 1856–June 23, 1863

Billault, Adolphe (interim)
August 29–September 30, 1860

Vaillant, Jean-Baptiste Philibert—Field Marshal (interim)
September 30–October 10, 1860

Duruy, Victor
June 23, 1863–July 17, 1869

Behic, Louis Armand (interim)
August 13, 1864

Bourbeau, Louis Olivier
July 17, 1869–January 2, 1870

Segris, Émile Alexis
January 2–April 14, 1870

Richard, Maurice (interim)
April 14–May 15, 1870

Mège, Jacques Philippe
May 15–August 10, 1870

Brame, Jules Louis Joseph
August 10–September 4, 1870

Simon, Jules
September 5, 1870–May 17, 1873

APPENDIX THREE

Directorate of Arab Affairs

A. CENTRAL AGENCIES

Agha des Arabes
1831

Cabinet Arabe
1832

Bureau Particulier des Affaires Arabes
(Lamoricière; Marey-Monge)
1833; 1834–1837

Division des Affaires Arabes
(Pellissier de Reynaud)
1837–1839

État-Major Général
1839–1841

Direction des Affaires Arabes
1841–1867

Bureau Politique Central
1867–1870

B. DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS

1. Algiers

Count of Alton
July 1832–June 1833

Voirol
October 1834

Rapatel
December 1834–April 1837

Damrémont
May 1837–July 1837

Négrier (interim)
1837

Bro (interim)
1837

Négrier (interim)
1837

Rullière
November 1837–January 1840

Corbin
1840

Schramm
March 1840–April 1840

Parchappe
1840

Changarnier
1840

Baraguey d'Hilliers
1841

Duvivier
April 1841–May 1841

De Bar
1841–1847

Changarnier
1848

Saint-Arnaud (interim)
1848

Levasseur
1848–1849

Blangini
1849–1851

Camou
1852–1854

Yusuf
1855–1864

Wimpffen
1865–1868

Pourcet
1869–1870

Neveu
1870–1871

Savaresse (provisional)
1871

2. *Oran*

Damrémont
January 1831

Faoudas
August–September 1831

Boyer
September 1831–April 1833

Desmichels
April 1833–April 1835

Trézel
April–July 1835

D'Arlanges
July 1835–August 1836

Létang
August 1836–January 1837

De Brossard
January–September 1837

Auvray
December 1837–January 1838

Rapatel
January–September 1838

Gueheneuc
September 1838–August 1840

Lamoricière
August 1840–January 1848

Cavaignac
January–June 1848

Pélissier
June 1848–January 1855

Forey (interim)
1855

Montauban
January 1855–November 1857

Martimprey
November 1857–February 1859

Esterhazy
February 1859–January 1860

Deligny
January 1860–April 1869

Wimpffen
June 1869–August 1870

Esterhazy
September–October 1870

3. Constantine

Trézel
1837–1838

Castellane
1838

Négrier
1838

Galbois
1838–1841

Négrier
1841–1843

Baraguey d'Hilliers
1843

Duke of Aumale
1843–1844

Bedeau
1844–1847

Saint-Arnaud
1847–1850

De Salles
1851

Mac-Mahon
1852–1855

Maissiat
1855–1857

Gastu
1857–1859

Desvaux
1859–1864

Périgot
1864–1870

APPENDIX FOUR

Biographical Index

Bedeau, Marie-Alphonse (1804–1863). Graduated from the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr in 1823 and enjoyed a relatively brief career in Algeria from 1841 to 1848, during which time he co-authored with Lamoricière the pamphlet *Projets de colonisation pour les provinces d'Oran et de Constantine*.

Bellemare, Alexandre (1818–1885). Began his career in Algeria in 1842 as an interpreter for the Central Directorate of Arab Affairs. In 1846, he was transferred to the Office of Algerian Affairs in the Ministry of War and returned to the colony in the capacity of secretary to the Consultative Council in December 1860. He is best known for his biography of Abd al-Qadir, *Abd-el-Kader: Sa vie politique et militaire*.

Berbrugger, Adrien (1801–1869). Arrived in Algeria in 1834 in the capacity of secretary to General Clauzel. As librarian and historian of the French expeditionary forces, he was able to secure the public and private Algerian manuscripts that form the bulk of the Arabic archives of Algiers. In 1856, he founded the Algerian Historical Society and the Orientalist journal *Revue Africaine*.

Blangini, Jean-Baptiste (1796–1852). Commanded the subdivision of Médéah in 1848 and the division of Algiers in 1848–1849.

Boissonnet, Laurent-Estève (1811–1901). Graduated from the École Polytechnique in 1830 and joined the Army of Africa in 1840. He was promoted to the Directorate of Indigenous Affairs of Constantine in 1844 and later served as staff officer to the Duke of Aumale (1847) before rising to the rank of colonel (1867). In 1857, he founded the Historical Society of Algiers and joined the Arabophile camp of Urbain.

Bonaparte, Jerome Napoleon (1822–1891). Nephew of Napoleon I and cousin to Napoleon III, he was the imperial heir until the birth of

the Prince Imperial in 1856. His appointment to Algiers was therefore partly driven by the emperor's desire to distance him from Paris and the Imperial Court.

Bugeaud, Thomas-Robert (1748–1849). An outright and forceful advocate of military colonization, he had perhaps the greatest impact on France's policies in Algeria in the two decades following the conquest of Algiers. As governor general from 1840 to 1847, he transformed France's military policy from restrained to total occupation, waged a scorched-earth war against Abd al-Qadir, and defeated the sultan of Morocco at the river Isly.

Carette, Ernest (1808–1890). Graduated from the École Polytechnique in 1830 and joined the army as a lieutenant two years later. He arrived in Algeria in 1835 and participated in the scientific commission of 1842. Carette's many historical and ethnographic works on the Kabyle populations of Algeria are still considered seminal to the study of precolonial and early colonial Algeria.

Changarnier, Nicolas (1793–1877). Graduated from the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr in 1815 and distinguished himself in Algeria on the battlefield of Mansurah in November 1836. His memoirs were edited by Henry d'Estre and published in 1930 as *Campagnes d'Afrique, 1830–1848: Mémoires du Général Changarnier.*

Chanzy, Alfred (1823–1883). Served in the Arab Bureaux from 1843 to 1856 and was divisional director of Arab affairs (Constantine) in 1856. He returned to the military administration in 1858 and commanded the Sidi Bel Abbès-Tlemcen subdivision from 1864 to 1870. He was governor general of Algeria from 1873 to 1879.

Daumas, Eugène (1803–1871). Graduated from the École de Cavalerie de Saumur in 1827 and arrived in Algeria with General Clauzel. While serving as an officer in the *Bureaux arabes* in the 1830s, he was promoted to the rank of general. In 1841, he was appointed director of Arab affairs and director of Algerian affairs in the Ministry of War after April 1850. Daumas was typical of the early bureau specialists in that he combined a successful military career with exceptional erudition and scholarship. His fluency in Arabic allowed him to greatly influence France's initial administrations in Algeria. He published several books, articles, and pamphlets on Algerian culture and society. In 1855, he was named honorary president of the Permanent Commission on Algeria, and, in 1858, he was elected president of the Société de Géographie de Paris, in which capacity he contributed a range of scholarly articles on Algeria. Daumas concluded his "Algerian" career as state councilor from 1854 to 1857 and, finally, senator from 1857 to 1870.

Duval, Jules (1813–1870). Arrived in Algeria in 1847 and soon began to work in the colonialist press, namely, *L'Écho d'Oran*. A staunch supporter of colonial interests, he collaborated with Warnier in shaping colonial and metropolitan opinions through his publications and was elected to the municipal council of Oran in 1858. The partnership of Duval and Warnier would constitute the primary political and intellectual opposition to the Arabophile policies of Napoleon III.

Enfantin, Prosper (1786–1864). Studied at the École Polytechnique and became the leader of the Saint-Simonian movement after the death of its founder. He arrived in Algeria in 1839, where he was able to exercise great influence on cultural policy making through his participation in the scientific commission and through his Saint-Simonian publication *L'Algérie*.

Fellmann, Georges (1800–1865). Served for fifteen years in the Directorate of Algeria, in the capacity of *sous-chef*, then *chef de bureau*, until the revolutions of 1848. He was instrumental in laying the foundations of the colonial administration in the 1830s and in instituting the administrative separation of civil and military powers.

Fleury, Émile (1815–1884). A main proponent of the Arabophile program, he served in the Algerian Spahis from 1837 to 1848 and became the aide-de-camp and first equerry to Louis-Napoleon in 1852. In 1866, he was appointed grand equerry and remained among the closest advisors of the emperor on colonial policy. He served as a conduit between the Imperial Court and the Arabophile camp until 1869.

Hanoteau, Adolphe (1814–1897). Graduated from the École Polytechnique in 1835 and arrived in Algeria in 1845, where he served in the Arab Bureaux from 1853 until 1866. He commanded the circles of Fort Napoléon (1866–1870) and Dellys (1870–1871).

Hautpoul, Alphonse Henri d' (1789–1865). Graduated from the École des Mines de Fontainebleau in 1803 and fought in Napoleon's campaigns in Germany, Prussia, Poland, Spain, and Portugal. He retained his military rank of colonel under the Restoration. He campaigned again in Spain in 1823, before being elected as deputy of the department of Aude in 1830. He was recalled to duty in March as director of the administration of war and promoted to lieutenant general after the campaigns against Abd al-Qadir in 1841–1842. The leaders of the Second Republic nominated him Peer of France and decreed his retirement in April 1848, but he was recalled by Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte to serve as minister of war in October 1849.

He was forced to resign again in October 1850 after the incidents at Camp Satory and was dispatched to Algeria as governor general.

Lacroix, Frédéric (1811–1863). An accomplished historian of Roman North Africa, he served as the director of civilian affairs and then as prefect of Algiers from 1848 to 1849. Appointed director of Algerian affairs in Paris, he befriended Urbain in 1848 and collaborated closely with him on the project for an Arab Kingdom. Lacroix was critical in relaying the ideas of Urbain to the emperor and augmenting the Arabophile agenda with his unique intellect and erudition. He authored several anticolonialist pamphlets, the most remarkable of which, *L'Algérie et la Lettre de l'Empereur*, was published anonymously a few months before his premature death in October 1863.

Lamoricière, Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de (1806–1865). Considered one of the most accomplished students and graduates of the École Polytechnique, he arrived in Algeria in 1830 as a captain and, by 1841, had risen to the rank of general. An accomplished Arabist and committed Saint-Simonian, Lamoricière was instrumental in founding and shaping the Offices of Arab Affairs.

Lapasset, Ferdinand (1817–1875). Graduated from the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr and served in the Arab Bureau of Ténès from 1845 to 1851, where he succeeded Charles Richard as *chef de bureau* for the subdivision of Orléansville. A leading Arabophile figure, Lapasset was a principal contributor to the senatus consult of 1863 and produced several pamphlets on the social transformation and sedentarization of Algerians.

Martimprey, Édouard de (1808–1883). Involved with the Office of Arab Affairs from 1835 to 1848. He commanded the province of Oran from 1856 to 1859 and served as lieutenant governor general of Algeria from 1860 to 1864 and as interim governor general in 1864.

Mercier-Lacombe, Gustave (1815–1872). Began his colonial career in 1841 as the personal secretary of General Bugeaud. In 1844, he joined the civil administration as secretary general of the Directorate of the Interior; was promoted to assistant director of the interior and public works for the province of Oran in 1845, and served as director of civil services in 1847. From 1849 to 1853, he served as secretary to the governor general before returning to France, where he held the post of prefect of the departments of Var and Vienne (1853–1860). He returned to Algeria in 1860 to serve as Pélissier's director general of civilian affairs and prefect of Algiers until 1864.

Neveu, Édouard de (1809–1871). Graduated from the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr in 1832 and participated in the scientific

commission of 1840–1842 as head of the army's geodesic service in Algeria. He joined the Arab Bureaux in 1845.

Pélissier, Jean-Jacques (1794–1864). Arrived in Algeria with the expeditionary corps of General Bourmont. From 1839 to 1855, he was successively chief of staff in Oran (1840) and Algiers (1842), subdivisional commander of Mostaganem (1845), and divisional commander of Oran (1848). In 1851, he was appointed interim governor general. Pélissier distinguished himself in the Crimea and was promoted to marshal in 1855 and rewarded with the title of Duke of Malakoff in 1856. He returned to Algeria as governor general in 1860 and held the post until his death in 1864.

Pellissier de Reynaud, Édmond (1798–1858). Landed in Algeria with the expeditionary force in 1830 and achieved the rank of captain by the time he was appointed director of Arab affairs in 1837. As a long-serving officer of the *Bureaux arabes* and an accomplished Arabist, Pellissier de Reynaud was included in the scientific commission of 1840–1842. His principal work, *Annales algériennes*, is still considered a seminal and essential reference for the early decades of French activities in Algeria. His views on Arab and Islamic culture were instrumental in setting the tone for the moderate paternalistic policies of the Arab Bureaux.

Randon, Jacques-Louis (1795–1871). Known as the "Conqueror of Kabylie," he arrived in Algeria in 1837 and remained until 1848, when he was appointed director of Algerian affairs in Paris and then minister of war in 1851. He was governor general of Algeria until 1858 and served again as minister of war from 1859 to 1867. Randon displayed throughout his career a subtle understanding of political realities in France and Algeria and pursued his objective of a strong and centralized military command in the colony with an indomitable energy. After Napoleon III, he was perhaps the individual with the greatest influence on Algerian politics in the 1850s and 1860s.

Richard, Charles (1815–18??). Graduated from the École Polytechnique and sailed to Algeria in 1836. He served in the Arab Bureau of Bougie from 1841 until his appointment as *chef de bureau* of Orléansville in 1843. He authored several theoretical pamphlets on the subject of native administration and was a principal proponent of the policies of forced sedentarization. He supported *cantonnement* and the privatization of communal (*'arsh*) lands, but opposed the imperial project of the Arab Kingdom.

Urbain, Thomas "Ismaÿl" (1812–1884). A quadroon from French Guyana, he traveled to Egypt with his mentor Enfantin in 1833, where he gained fluency in Arabic, changed his name, and converted to Islam. In 1837, he joined Bugeaud's corps of interpreters and began to contribute essays on indigenous conditions to Parisian journals. He was transferred in 1841 to the Directorate of Algerian Affairs of the Ministry of War, but returned to Algeria in 1842 as the interpreter of the Duke of Aumale and Bedeau. Urbain was transferred once again to the Ministry of War in 1845 in the capacity of head of the Political Bureau, where his immediate superior Daumas, the director of Algerian affairs, would appropriate many of his findings and theses without giving him due. Urbain was highly critical of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies and published two anonymous pamphlets against colonization that, while making him infamous in colonist circles, would bring him to the attention of Napoleon III. After 1861, Urbain was the closest imperial advisor on indigenous policy making, and a principal architect of the senatus consult of 1863.

Vaillant, Jean-Baptiste Philibert (1790–1872). Graduated from the École Polytechnique in 1807 and served with Pélissier in the Algerian campaigns of 1830. He served as minister of war from 1854 to 1859, before being recalled to the Imperial Court in 1860.

Warnier, Auguste (1810–1875). Arrived as an army doctor in Algeria in 1834 and served in the Office of Arab Affairs from 1837 to 1839. He was selected to participate in the scientific commission of 1842 and continued to specialize in Arab affairs during the 1840s and 1850s. As a large proprietor, stockholder, and investor in Algeria, Warnier distanced himself from the Arabophile camp during the 1860s and became an ardent advocate of European landed and capitalist interests in the colony. He helped found several colonialist journals, including *L'Algérie*, *L'Atlas*, and *L'Afrique*.

APPENDIX FIVE

Project for the Organization of Muslim Public Instruction, June 5, 1849

Central Directorate of Arab Affairs
Government General of Algeria
Algiers, 5 June 1849

PROJECT OF ORGANIZATION: PROVISIONS RELATING TO INDIGENOUS INSTRUCTION IN ALGERIA

A credit of 40,000*f* is appropriated in the line item for indigenous education in the budget of the Ministry of War of 1849 (Chapter XXIX, Article 1, §10). The purpose herein is to determine the allocation of this sum, proportionate to the needs of each province, and with regards to the educational establishments which advisedly may be created there, their number, their importance, the personnel they will comprise, and the incentives to be provided to extant schools.

According to the information gathered in the various accounts and periodic reports, the majority of the *madrasas* (secondary Muslim schools), formerly very well attended, has disappeared, and the collapse of Arab learning is complete in Algeria. Nevertheless, a few *zawiyas* still exist in different regions: in them, religious texts or jurisprudential treatises are studied and more or less explained. Beyond the cities, primary education, though less neglected, has also declined since the conquest.

Today, the most prudent policy, and the most favorable to our interests, counsels us to repair education among the natives by introducing, with the necessary precautions, modifications to which it will likely respond. It is important that we take control of [indigenous] public instruction, impart a regular progression to it, and offer it in a broad way not only to the inhabitants of the cities, but even to children in tribes where there are no schools.

The French authority must strive, without further delay, to exert direct action on the indigenous teaching staff, and it is already desired that Arab professors in *madrasas*, *shaykhs* and *tolba* in *zawiyas*, and even the humblest instructors who will submit to our influence, be protected, honored, and adequately remunerated. Thus, little by little, will our influence over education be secured, and in the long run accepted by the most zealous Muslims.

To stay within the limits of our current resources, and avoid granting the restored Muslim curricula an extension exceeding that which is strictly necessary, we will confine ourselves to maintaining one *madrasa* per province. Extant *zawiyas* will be preserved and supervised, without however augmenting whatever revenues they may still enjoy. We will endeavor to offer primary education as widely as possible, but teaching *tolba* must remain entirely in the custody of the *douars* or indigenous villages where they are employed.

Two professors will be named in each *madrasa*, and will receive compensation:

—a professor of literature (*nahuww*)
—a professor of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and theology (*hadith*, *tawhid*, etc.)

From amongst them, we will have to choose for each province a devoted and energetic man to serve as Inspector of the Zawiyas. The appointment of an indigenous agent to fulfill this post will remain necessary for a long time still. It is sound policy that it be so, but our efforts must tend towards diminishing his importance in time through the gradual involvement of a European who will by principle avoid presenting himself in any official capacity. This way of transitioning will later allow us to entrust to Europeans exclusively the inspection and monitoring of all Muslim schools.

As soon as this result may be obtained, it will become less difficult to modify Arab instruction by introducing good methods to it, extending

its scope of studies, without however eliminating or changing any of its disciplines.

Once we have instructed Muslim Algerians in their own sciences, from which we will have taken care to subtract all that could maintain them in their notions of religious intolerance, it will become useful to spread among them the usages of the French language, and initiate them in the knowledge constituting the subject-matter of teaching in our higher primary schools.

We will thus try to establish wherever an Arabic chair exists already, and if possible within the *madrasas* themselves, an Arab-French school to admit, preferably, young people belonging to indigenous notable families, as well as all natives who exhibit signs of intelligence, of happy disposition, and who have already attained a certain level of education.

The program of teaching in these schools will include:

1. the French language;
2. the fundamental operations of arithmetic;
3. some concepts of geography and history;
4. the first elements of the natural sciences.

To place within the reach of the natives these various courses which we will be able to conduct only in the Arabic language, very concise elementary works will be written and published in Algiers. These works will also be distributed in the *madrasas*.

Rewards for the pupils who have most fruitfully followed the course will sustain emulation [by their peers]. Selecting candidates for the positions of *qadi*, *khawaja*, etc. from among [the classes] whose students have been sufficiently formed, will assuredly become the best encouragement of all, and we must not lose sight of the fact that the purpose of the Arab-French schools, as of the *madrasas*, is precisely to form individuals able to fulfill these important functions.

The primary schools of each province will be visited periodically by an Inspector of Indigenous Public Instruction who, in exercising some dexterity, may try to bring the teaching *tolba* to adopt better methods, and overcome the abhorrence in which they hold all that deviates from their antiquated routines.

The chiefs of the Arab Bureaux will facilitate for the inspectors of Muslim schools the accomplishment of their valuable mission.

They will exercise, by themselves or by agents under their command, a continual monitoring of the primary schools. We must avoid with the most scrupulous care to make recourse to Jewish agents, whose interventions would not be accepted by the Arabs.

The chiefs and officers of the Arab Bureaux will obligate the *aghas*, *qa'ids* or *shaykhs* of the tribes to use their influence in order to convince the heads of families to allow their children to receive the first elements of instruction.

Each *qadi* will supervise more expressly the schools within his jurisdiction. By his charge, a list of these schools with the names of their teachers and the number of pupils entrusted to each will be drawn up monthly and rendered to the chief of the Arab Bureau.

Every six months, an officer of the Arab Bureau assisted by the *qadi* of the same bureau, or by a *khawaja*, will undertake an inspection of the tribes in order to certify for himself the progress of primary education [therein]. He will cite his observations in the periodic reports.

Small prizes should be granted to the *tolba* who will have shown proof of intelligence and zeal, as well as to the pupils whose rapid progress is notable.

Duwars or villages with less than 20 houses or *gourbis* occupied by *fellahs* or well-to-do residents may be joined with the neighboring *duwar* or village for the upkeep of the schoolmaster, so long as this is not prohibited by distance.

Each resident head of household with or without school-age children will contribute in proportion to his fortune and resources towards the remuneration of the teacher. Subject to the approval of the commander of the subdivision or circle, the chief of the Arab Bureau will annually determine by tariffs the monthly subscription due from each category of inhabitant, and will notify the tribes.

Here is the standard [to apply]:

Fellah (farmer) cultivating 1 plough (10 hectares)	50¢
Fellah cultivating ½ plough (5 hectares)	25¢
Khammès (sharecropper) cultivating ½ plough (5 hectares)	15¢

A *touïza* (tilling and harvesting chores) will be performed by the inhabitants on a surface of 2 to 5 hectares in favor of the schoolmaster who will provide the kernels of seed.

As to the land, it will be possible and easy to obtain it by voluntary and free transfer or by leasing, depending on whether the locals are owners of the lands which they cultivate and their camps are located therein, or whether they have only simple rights of usufruct. Several schoolmasters enjoy some resources of their own; they own lands, herds, work tools, and employ *khammès*. In these diverse circumstances, the officer charged with fixing the remuneration for the teachers will have to ensure for each of them the bare necessity, and then the adequate payment for his care and zeal.

Finally, we must examine whether it is advisable to grant tax exemptions to them, or whether the advantages just indicated are sufficient for their livelihood, or for the well-being to which they are entitled.

On this subject, as in all that relates to the advantages to grant the teachers, the provincial commanders can address to the Governor General of Algeria proposals to substitute for the stipulations in the project relating only to the military territories. In the cities, other provisions will be taken.

Instruction in the 1st degree will comprise:

—Reading
—Writing
—Familiarity with the numbers known as *Khas Ulhindi*, used in Europe, and of those known by the name of *Elr'bari*, which are particular to the Arabs.

A commission will be created in Algiers to create and print the elementary works referred to above, and at the same time reading and calculation tables in the Arabic language. A sufficient number of these tables, which should necessarily be adhered to small planks, will be sent to the

three provinces so that at least one specimen arrives at each school in existence at the time of dispatch.

The *tolba* who would like to teach should address the Commander of the Circle or Subdivision who, after having ascertained their morality and aptitude, will give them a diploma signed with his hand and stamped with his seal. The teachers currently in exercise must also possess a diploma indicating the site where they are employed and all successive changes of residence that the chief of the Arab Bureau will have authorized.

Source: AOM 22S/1.

APPENDIX SIX

Presidential Decree of July 14, 1850

Ministry of War
Paris, 14 July 1850

DECREE
IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,
. . .

Considering the importance of facilitating the propagation of the French language among the Muslim population of Algeria;

Considering that public schools and classes in which the French language is either taught to children or to adults, exist already in several cities; and that it is at the same time necessary to bolster these establishments and extend them to cities where their utility is recognized;

On the proposals of the Minister of War;

DECREES:
FRENCH MUSLIM SCHOOLS

Chapter 1: Primary Schools

1. Schools for Boys

Article 1
A primary school for the dual teaching of Arabic and French to Muslim children will be established in the cities of Algiers, Constantine, Bône, Blidah, and Mostaganem. The establishment of these schools will be widened successively to cities where their public utility is recognized by the Governor General upon the recommendations of the Prefect.

Article 2
Primary education is free. It includes:

—the reading and writing of Arabic;
—the elements of the French language; the reading and writing of French;
—the elements of arithmetic, and the system of legal weights and measures.

Article 3
The personnel of each school will consist of a French Director and a Muslim adjunct teacher selected from among the *Tolba*.

Article 4
The Directors and adjunct teachers will be nominated by the Governor General on the recommendations of the Prefect. They may be suspended by the Prefect; [but] they are revoked by the Governor General.

Article 5
No individual may be appointed Director without the Brevet of Ability required of primary instructors, and without a Certificate of Aptitude for teaching the Arabic language delivered by the military interpreters' jury of examination.

The assistant Masters are introduced by the consulted Prefect, *Mufti* or *Qadi*.

Article 6
The Directors will receive a fixed stipend of 1,200*f*, and the adjunct teachers of 600*f*.

They will moreover have allocated to them:

1. an annual gratuity to be determined by the Governor General, but never to exceed half the fixed salary;
2. a monthly remuneration of one franc per pupil and distributed accordingly: two thirds to the Director and one third to the adjunct teacher.

2. Schools for Girls

Article 7
A primary school for girls will be established in the cities of Algiers, Constantine, Oran, and Bône. This institution will be extended successively to cities where its public utility is recognized by the Governor General upon the recommendations of the Prefect.

Article 8
Instruction is free. It includes:

—the reading and writing of Arabic;
—the reading and writing of French; the elements of the French language; and the elements of arithmetic;
—needlework.

Article 9
The personnel of each school will consist of a female French Director and a female Muslim teaching aide.

Article 10
The nomination, suspension and revocation of the Directors and teaching aides are subject to the conditions listed in Article 4 above.

The provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 are also applicable to the Directors.

Article 11
The Directors will receive a fixed stipend of 1,000*f*, and the teaching aides of 500*f*.

The provisions of the last two paragraphs of Article 6 will apply to them.

Chapter 2: Schools for Adults

Article 12
Instruction in French for indigenous adults will be established in the cities of Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and extended successively to cities where its public utility will be recognized by the Governor General upon the recommendations of the Prefect.

This instruction is free, it is entrusted to the Professors of the Public Lectures in Arabic in cities where such classes are given, and in the other cities, to teachers designated by the Governor General in accordance with Article 4 above.

These teachers must meet the conditions required by Paragraph 1 of Article 5.

Article 13
An allowance from 600 to 1,000 francs is allocated to the Professor or the Teacher.

Article 14
Instruction includes the elements of the French language, of arithmetic, of history and geography. Classes will be held at least three times per week.

Article 15
Gratuities may be granted by the Prefect to pupils who distinguish themselves by their assiduity, their dedication and their progress.

Chapter 3: Surveillance and Inspection

Article 16
The primary schools for boys are placed under the surveillance of a local Committee established in each city and composed:

—of the Mayor or the Justice of the Peace in the cities where municipalities are not instituted;
—of the *Mufti* or *Qadi*, and a civil servant designated by the Prefect.

Article 17
Primary schools and the schools for adults will be inspected by a civil servant or a French Officer selected for each locality by the Prefect and assisted by an indigenous civil servant.

Article 18
The schools for girls are supervised and inspected by the Lady Inspectors designated by the Prefect.

Article 19
The primary schools for girls and boys and the schools for adults are placed under the authority of the Prefect. Every three months, the Prefect will address to the Governor General a report on the state of these various establishments. The report will be transmitted to the Minister of War.

Chapter 4: Examination Juries and Brevets of Aptitude

Article 20
The Governor General will set up in the chef-lieu of each province a Jury of Examination responsible for bestowing to the young natives the brevets noting their aptitude.

Article 21
The Brevets are of three degrees:

—the Brevet of the 3^{d} degree is awarded to candidates knowing how to speak French;
—the Brevet of the 2^{d} degree to those who are able to read and write in French;
—the Brevet of the 1st degree to those who have acquired the subject-matters listed in Article 14.

Article 22
The jobs to which natives can apply will be given by preference to the candidates holding the Brevet of the highest degree.

Chapter 5: General Dispositions

Article 23
A Ministerial ruling will determine:

—the choice of textbooks intended for instruction in the schools established in accordance with the present Decree;

—the age of admission of the pupils in these schools and the age at which they will graduate.

Article 24
Prefectural Decrees will determine opening and closing hours for the classes, the amount of the gratuities to be granted in accordance with Article 15, and what generally pertains to the internal routine and the discipline of the schools.

Article 25
All expenditures relating to the Personnel and the material of the establishments instituted in accordance with the present Decree are incurred by the Departmental Budget, and for the localities outside the Departments, by the local and municipal Budget.

Article 26
The attributions conferred to the Prefect by this Decree are exercised in military territory by the Commanding Divisional General.

Article 27
The Minister of War is in charge of the execution of this Decree.

Completed at the Élysée National on 14 July 1850
Signed: Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte

Minister of War
Signed: Hautpoul

Source: AOM F^{80}/1572.

APPENDIX SEVEN

Presidential Decree of September 30, 1850

Ministry of War
Paris, 30 September 1850

DECREE

IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,

. . .

Considering the importance of placing all Muslim institutions of public instruction under the surveillance and supervision of the Government;

Considering the decline of the schools where once was dispensed higher Muslim learning, which alone can provide candidates for the functions of *Mufti*, *Qadi*, *Imam*, *Khawaja* and other positions reserved for the natives in the Administrative Services of Algeria;

On the recommendations of the Minister of War;

DECREES:

Chapter 1: Primary and Secondary Instruction

Article 1
Primary and secondary education in Muslim schools are placed under the high surveillance of the Governor General, who will exercise it through the intermediary of the Prefects in the civil territories, and the Commanding Divisional Generals in the military territories.

No modifications will be brought to existing conditions and to the modes of instruction currently in use.

Article 2
An annual fund allocated to the Budget of the State will be earmarked for the gratuities to teachers who will have distinguished themselves and to the most deserving pupils. The Governor General of Algeria will decree the distribution of these funds upon the recommendations of the Commanding Divisional Generals and the Prefects. He will give an account of this to the Minister of War.

Chapter 2: Muslim Schools of Higher Education

Article 3
A school of higher education (*Madrasa*) will be established, at the expense of the State, in the cities of Médéah, Tlemcen and Constantine, in order to form the candidates for positions in the administrations of indigenous Religious Affairs, Justice, Public Instruction, and the Arab Bureaux.

Article 4
Instruction in the schools of higher education is free and includes:

—a course of grammar and literature (*nahuww*);
—a course of law and jurisprudence (*fiqh*);
—a course of theology (*tawhid*).

Article 5
The personnel of each school will consist of:

—a Director, also in charge of one of the three courses above, who will receive a stipend of 2,100*f*;

—two Professors with stipends of 1,500–3,000*f*;
—a *wakkaf* (unskilled laborer) with a stipend of 600*f*.

Article 6
The Directors and Professors of the Muslim schools of higher education are named by the Minister of War upon the recommendations of the Governor General of Algeria. The *wakkaf* is named by the Commanding Divisional Generals upon the recommendation of the school Director.

Article 7
Each school of higher education will be opened near one of the mosques to which were attached *Madrasas*.

A subsidy of 100*f* per annum will be granted to the ten most deserving students of each school. They will also be given housing in the establishment, if the conditions of the locale allow it.

Article 8
The schools of higher education are placed under the surveillance of the Commanding Provincial Generals. This surveillance will be exercised through the intermediary of the Arab Bureaux.

Article 9
The schools of higher education will be inspected each year by one of the French Officers attached to Arab Affairs and by one of the Professors of the Public Lectures in Arabic, to be designated by the Governor General of Algeria.

Article 10
Expenditures related to the creation of the Muslim schools of higher education will be incurred by the Budget of War.

Article 11
The Minister of War is in charge of the execution of this Decree.

Completed at the Élysée National
on 30 September 1850 Minister of War
Signed: Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte Signed: Hautpoul

Source: AOM 22S/1.

Notes

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. Arthur Girault, *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Paris: L. Larose et L. Tenin, 1907), 1:89: "L'autonomie convient à des Anglo-Saxons. Nous, Français, nous sommes des Latins. L'influence de Rome a pétri nos esprits pendant des siècles. Nous ne pouvons nous soustraire à cette obsession et ce serait forcer notre nature que de sortir de la voie qu'elle nous a tracée. Nous ne savons faire, et par suite nous ne devons faire, que de l'assimilation."

2. Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 23.

3. Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, 3:74–77. My use of the colonial terminologies of "indigenous," "native," and "tribal" to refer to the Muslim or Jewish populations of Ottoman and French Algeria is intended to convey the conceptual and semantic standards of the period and to reflect the changes in the vocabulary of the French authorities over time. Designated as "Moors," "Arabs," "Berbers," or "Kabyles" in the initial years of the French conquest, the Muslims of North Africa were by the late 1830s lumped into the catch-all category of "natives" or "*indigènes*" for the remainder of the period under review. Only in Arabist circles in the early 1860s were they tentatively rehabilitated as "Arabs" or "Muslims" in conjunction with the colonial reforms of Emperor Napoleon III and in negation of the local Kabyle identity. By then, the term "Algerian" was beginning to show up in references to the European settlers and institutions of the colony. To my knowledge, Thomas Urbain was unique in ascribing the ideologically charged term of "Algerians" to the natives, while redefining the European settlers in French Algeria as "immigrants."

4. Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, 13.

5. Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, 3:76–77.

6. Ibid., 1:91.

7. Five revised and expanded editions of *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale* followed the original between 1903 and 1936. Among other contemporary treatises critical of colonial assimilation were Alfred Fouillée, "Le caractère des races humaines et l'avenir de la race blanche," *Revue des*

Deux Mondes 124 (July 1, 1894): 76–107; A. Arnaud and H. Méray, *Les colonies françaises, organisation administrative, judiciaire, politique et financière* (Paris: Challamel, 1900); Joseph Chailley-Bert, *Dix années de politique coloniale* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1902); Arthur Girault, "Des rapports politiques entre métropole et colonies. Rapport préliminaire à la Session de Londres du 26 mai 1903," in *Institut Colonial International, Comte rendu de la Session tenue à Londres les 26, 28 et 29 mai 1903* (Brussels: Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale, 1903): 371–418; Jules Harmand, *Domination et colonisation* (Paris: Flammarion, 1910); and Charles Régismanset, *Questions coloniales, 1900–1912* (Paris: Larose, 1912).

8. Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, 8–9.

9. In addition to Betts, Martin D. Lewis and Rudolf von Albertini have depicted the 1890s as the start of a concerted attack on the ideas of assimilation. Collectively, their works perpetuate the notion of association as a novel concept in French colonial theory, with Jules Harmand regularly receiving credit for having coined the term in 1910. See Martin D. Lewis, "One Hundred Million Frenchmen: The "Assimilation" Theory in French Colonial Policy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 2 (1962): 129–53; and Rudolf von Albertini, *Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919–1960* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1982).

10. See Henry Laurens, *Le royaume impossible: La France et la genèse du monde arabe* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1990), 20–22; and Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard, and Françoise Vergès, *La République coloniale*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Hachette Littératures-Pluriel, 2006), 90–91.

11. See, for example, Ann Laura Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31 (1989): 134–61; and Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, 1–56 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

12. See Bancel, Blanchard, and Vergès, *La République coloniale*; Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); and Sudhir Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of the Modern French Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

13. Michael Brett, for example, argues against assimilation in the field of colonial legislation in "Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The Senatus-Consulte of 14 July 1865," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 51, no. 3 (1988): 440–61.

14. "I view the propagation of [French] education and of our language as the most efficient means to give progress to our domination in this land [Algeria]," in AOM F^{80}/1843, Intendance Civile, *Rapport Lepescheux*, March 1832; or: "One of the most effective means to achieve the complete pacification of Algeria, must be to propagate and popularize knowledge of the French language

among the natives," in AOM F^{80}/1572, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport au Président de la République*, ca. 1848.

15. Louis Vignon, *Un programme de politique coloniale: Les questions indigènes* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1919).

16. M. M. Knight, "French Colonial Policy—The Decline of Association," *Journal of Modern History* 5, no. 2 (1933): 208–24, 208.

17. See, for example, the essays in Catherine Coquio, ed., *Retours du colonial? Disculpation et réhabilitation de l'histoire coloniale française* (Paris: L'Atalante, 2008). For the law in question, see Assemblée Nationale, Douzième législature, *Proposition de Loi no. 0667 visant à la reconnaissance de l'œuvre positive de l'ensemble de nos concitoyens qui ont vécu en Algérie pendant la période de la présence française* (March 5, 2003).

18. For a description of the implications of "unbounding colonialism" to historical analyses, see Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 4.

19. For examples and discussions of the historiographical focus on the period of high imperialism, see Raymond Betts, "The French Colonial Frontier," in *From the Ancien Régime to the Popular Front*, ed. Charles Warner, 127–43 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); James Cooke, *New French Imperialism, 1880–1910: The Third Republic and Colonial Expansion* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973); Henri Brunschwig, "The Origins of the New French Empire," in *Imperialism and Colonialism*, ed. G. H. Nadel and P. Curtis, 111–22 (New York: Macmillan, 1968); and C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, "Center and Periphery in the Making of the Second French Colonial Empire, 1815–1920," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 16, no. 3 (1988): 9–34. For different interpretations of the political, economic, and ideological considerations of high imperialism, see A. G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," *Journal of African History* 27, no. 2 (1986): 360–91; Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan, 1961); and C. W. Newbury and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, "French Policy and the Origins for the Scramble for West Africa," *Journal of African History* 10, no. 2 (1969): 170–75. For an overview of the complications associated with the periodization of colonial systems in general, see Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1997), 27–38. See also the exposition of the various theories, meanings, and uses of "new imperialism" in Bernard Semmel, *The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

20. For Sandra Halperin, for example, the great wave of European imperialism was spurred by the depression and agrarian distress of 1873–1876, in *War and Social Change in Modern Europe: The Great Transformation Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 141.

21. According to Stoler and Cooper, the rise of modern forms of colonialism was an essential ingredient in the material and cultural making of bourgeois Europe, see Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 16.

22. Thomas Richards, *The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire* (London: Verso, 1993), 3.

23. The concept of "modern imperialism" was first used in France in the 1830s before gaining wider currency in Europe in the 1870s and becoming popularized in journalistic writings following the European partition of the African continent in the 1880s. See "Imperialism" in *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, ed. D. R. Woolf, 2 vols., 1:451b–454b (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998).

24. While strategic competition with British interests in the western Mediterranean basin loomed large in the decision to seize Algiers, it was not the immediate catalyst. Rather, the action of the French government was initiated primarily as an outlet for growing popular disaffection with domestic political, economic, and social conditions. See, for example, Lahouari Addi, "Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the Imagination of France," in *Franco-Arab Encounters: Studies in Memory of David C. Gordon*, ed. L. Carl Brown and Matthew Gordon, 93–105, 94 (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1996).

25. AOM F^{80}/10, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport sur la colonisation de l'ex-Régence d'Alger par Mr de la P.*, November 1833.

26. Michael Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796–1814: Cultural Imperialism in a European Context?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 3.

27. Anne Levallois, *Les écrits autobiographiques d'Ismayl Urbain, 1812–1884. Homme de couleur, saint-simonien et musulman* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005).

28. Ibid., 39.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 10.

2. Georges Voisin [Ismaÿl Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens* (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1861), 11: "Ainsi donc aucune nation, aucune religion ne peut avoir l'orgueil de se poser comme le modèle et le type du progrès; personne ne peut dire: Ma loi politique, mon organisation sociale, mes mœurs, représentent pour l'humanité la dernière expression du progrès; tous ceux qui ne prennent pas exemple sur moi et ne me suivent pas sont condamnés à la barbarie, à l'immobilité."

3. In Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1), I diagram the military administration in Algeria and the chain of command from the Ministry of War in Paris to the Government General in Algiers. The principal personalities in the following account operated on three levels of the military organization. At the lowest levels were the various agencies responsible for administering indigenous affairs between 1831 and 1870. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to them as the Offices of Arab Affairs or more commonly as the "Arab Bureaux." The intermediate level was occupied by the Central Directorate of Arab Affairs (Arab Directorate) of the Government General of Algeria. It centralized the operations of the various

Arab Bureaux and reported directly to the governor general and to the highest authority in the administration of the natives: the First Bureau of the Directorate of Algerian Affairs (Algerian Directorate) in the Ministry of War. To avoid confusion or repetition, I will only distinguish between the two directorates, Algerian or Arab, when necessary and will otherwise conflate them as the Central Arab Directorates.

4. According to Denise Brahimi, only in the 1860s did the imperial government attempt to unify its colonial action with the doctrine of association. See "L'Algérie coloniale, histoire d'une impossible fusion," in *L'orientalisme des saint-simoniens*, ed. Michel Levallois and Sarga Moussa, 223–36 (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2006).

5. Rafe Blaufarb, *The French Army, 1750–1820* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 183.

6. Jean Bouvier, "Les traits majeurs de l'impérialisme français avant 1914," *Le Mouvement Social* 86 (1974): 3–24.

7. See the historical overviews in J. W. Fück, "Islam as an Historical Problem in European Historiography Since 1800," in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, 303–14 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); and L. Carl Brown, "France and the Arabs: An Overview," in *Franco-Arab Encounters: Studies in Memory of David C. Gordon*, ed. L. Carl Brown and Matthew Gordon, 1–31 (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1996).

8. Henry Laurens, *Le royaume impossible: La France et la genèse du monde arabe* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1990), 16.

9. Vivant Denon, *Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Égypte, pendant les campagnes du général Bonaparte*, vol. 1 (London: M. Peltier, 1802), 136.

10. For a distinctive treatise on the epistemological legacy of French Orientalism in the field of North African studies, see Jean-Claude Vatin, "Le Maghreb de la méconnaissance à la reconnaissance," in *Connaissances du Maghreb: Sciences sociales et colonisation*, ed. Jean-Claude Vatin, 11–21 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984).

11. Edmund Burke III, "The Sociology of Islam: The French Tradition," in *Islamic Studies: A Tradition and Its Problems*, ed. Malcolm H. Kerr, 73–88 (Malibu, CA: Udena Publications, 1980).

12. For discussions of the implications of the occupation of Egypt for France's own modernity and its historical identification with ancient and classical civilizations, see David Wengrow, "Forgetting the *Ancien Régime*: Republican Values and the Study of the Ancient Orient," in *Views of Ancient Egypt Since Napoleon Bonaparte: Imperialism, Colonialism, and Modern Appropriations*, ed. David Jeffreys, 179–93 (Portland, OR: Cavendish Publishing, 2003); and Michael Mann, "Dealing with Oriental Despotism: British Jurisdiction in Bengal, 1772–1793," in *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India*, ed. Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann, 29–48 (London: Anthem Press, 2004).

13. Denis Diderot, "Supplément au voyage de Bougainville," in *Œuvres complètes de Diderot. Revues sur les éditions originales, comprenant ce qui a été*

publié à diverses époques et les manuscrits inédits conservés à la Bibliothèque de l'Ermitage. Notices, notes, table analytique, ed. Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneur, 20 vols., 2: 247 (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1875–1877): "Ordonner, c'est toujours se rendre le maître des autres en les gênant."

14. Quoted in Paul de Rémusat, *Mémoires de Madame de Rémusat 1802–1808*, 10th ed., 3 vols. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1880), 1:274: "En Égypte, je me trouvais débarrassé du frein d'une civilisation gênante. Je rêvais toutes choses et je voyais les moyens d'exécuter tout ce que j'avais rêvé. Je créais une religion, je me voyais sur le chemin de l'Asie, parti sur un éléphant, le turban sur ma tête et dans ma main un nouvel Alcoran que j'aurai composé à mon gré."

15. Michael Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796–1814: Cultural Imperialism in a European Context?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Broers's masterful study of Napoleonic policies in Italy is the inspiration for the title of the current chapter.

16. Ibid., 15.

17. Proclamation to the Army of the Orient, 4 Messidor, Year VI (June 22, 1798), reprinted in Henry Laurens, *L'expédition d'Égypte, 1798–1801* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 58–59.

18. Rémusat, *Mémoires de Madame de Rémusat,* 1:252, 1:274.

19. Broers, *Napoleonic Empire in Italy*, 5.

20. Alain Grosrichard, *The Sultan's Court: European Fantasies of the East* (London: Verso, 1998), 21–23.

21. Henry Laurens, *Les origines intellectuelles de l'expédition d'Égypte. L'orientalisme islamisant en France (1698–1798)* (Istanbul: Isis, 1987).

22. Proclamation to the Army of the Orient, 4 Messidor, Year VI (June 22, 1798), reprinted in Laurens, *L'expédition d'Égypte*, 58–59.

23. Bourrienne, quoted in Shmuel Moreh, trans., *Napoleon in Egypt: Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of the French Occupation, 1798* (New York: Markus Wiener, 2005), 149.

24. Donald M. Reid, "French Egyptology and the Architecture of Orientalism: Deciphering the Facade of Cairo's Egyptian Museum," in *Franco-Arab Encounters: Studies in Memory of David C. Gordon,* ed. L. Carl Brown and Matthew Gordon, 35–69, 47 (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1996).

25. Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 18.

26. See Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

27. For the impact of American revolutionary ideals on the expansion of the United States, see Kenneth Pomeranz, "Empire and 'Civilizing' Missions, Past and Present," *Daedalus* 34, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 34–45.

28. Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 5–6.

29. Quoted in Nabila Oulebsir, "Rome ou la Méditerranée? Les relevés d'architecture d'Amable Ravoisié en Algérie, 1840–1842," in *L'invention scien-*

tifique de la Méditerranée: Égypte, Morée, Algérie, ed. Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, 239–71, 239 (Paris, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1998): "L'Afrique est redevenue le patrimoine de la civilisation."

30. Quoted in Marcel Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1941), 94–95.

31. Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, 1–56, 18 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). For Sandra Halperin, the imperialist *élan* of the Bourbons stemmed from the threat to their social order of a new revolutionary or Napoleonic *levée en masse*. See her *War and Social Change in Modern Europe: The Great Transformation Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Mommsen likewise defined the renewed imperial drive as "convenient for deflecting the attention of the rising middle classes from the constitutional issues they should have been coping with," quoted in V. G. Kiernan, *Imperialism and Its Contradictions* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 104.

32. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1789–1848* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 110–13.

33. Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 12. In 1833, François Guizot, minister of public instruction, and Victor Cousin, councilor of the state for education, considered the school as the most important medium in the process of civilization because it generated progress through the edification of the greatest number. Guizot, specifically, looked to primary education as the means to govern the minds of his countrymen in a France that had been destabilized by the Revolution. See Romain Durand, *La politique de l'enseignement au XIXe siècle: L'exemple de Versailles* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2001), 51–52.

34. Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 3.

35. See the discussion of "double colonialism" in Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 485–96.

36. Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 212.

37. AOM F^{80}/1747, *Du djehad, ou de la guerre sacrée des Musulmans*, n.d.

38. For a biography of Abd al-Qadir, see Bruno Étienne, *Abdelkader: Isthme des isthmes. Barzakh al-barazikh* (Paris: Hachette Littératures-Pluriel, 2003).

39. Quoted in Barrie M. Ratcliffe, "Saint-Simonism and Messianism: The Case of Gustave d'Eichthal," *French Historical Studies* 9 (1976): 484–502, 494n48: "On nous a dit que nous ferions bien de nous retirer chacun dans notre famille pour y reprendre nos fonctions de l'ancien monde, pour redevenir négociants, médecins, ingénieurs. . . . Cette vie mesquine, cette vie étroite, cette vie sans poésie était pour nous un insupportable fardeau. Nous rêvions de quelque chose de mieux, quelque chose de grand. . . . Nous n'avons plus les joies du

guerrier; nous n'avons plus de croisade à faire, de nouveau monde à découvrir; le temps est passé des expéditions napoléoniennes; nous n'avons plus ni solennités, ni temples, ni tournois, ni chants, ni fêtes."

40. For a brief, but in parts error-prone, account of the Saint-Simonians in the Levant, see Armand Pignol, "Les saint-simoniens et l'Orient," in *D'un Orient l'autre: Les métamorphoses successives des perceptions et connaissances*, ed. Marie-Claude Burgat, 2 vols., 1:181–91 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1991).

41. Although Saint-Simon is primarily associated with the École Polytechnique, his ideas were equally popular in the École de Médecine in Paris and the École d'Application in Metz, as well as in journalistic circles. In 1830, the foremost liberal newspaper *Le Globe* became an organ of Saint-Simonism and was widely disseminated in Algeria. Paul-François Dubois, co-founder of the journal with Pierre Leroux, was also director of the École Normale in Paris from 1840 to 1850.

42. See Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie*, 26–27; and Georg Iggers, *The Cult of Authority: The Political Philosophy of the Saint-Simonians* (The Hague: Nijhof, 1970), xxxviii.

43. *Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin publiées par les membres du conseil institué par Enfantin pour l'exécution de ses dernières volontés; et précédées de deux notices historiques*, 47 vols. (Paris: E. Dentu, 1865–1878), 18:165.

44. *Le Globe*, January 25, 1831.

45. Françoise Mayeur, *Histoire générale de l'enseignement et de l'éducation en France: Vol. 3, De la Révolution à l'École républicaine (1789–1930)* (Paris: Perrin, 1981), 104–5; and Françoise Mayeur, *L'éducation des filles en France au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1979), 84–112.

46. *Le Globe*, "Organisation Scientifique," June 1–3, 1831. See also Auguste Comte, "Considérations sur le pouvoir spirituel," *Le Producteur: Journal de l'Industrie, des Sciences et des Beaux-Arts* 1 (1825): 596–616.

47. "Note du Père Enfantin sur la civilisation de l'Asie, 19 Août 1827," in *Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, 13:167–68. See also *Le Globe*, November 10, 1831.

48. Comte, "Considérations sur le pouvoir spirituel."

49. Auguste Blanqui, quoted in Philippe Régnier, "Le mythe oriental des saint-simoniens," in *Les saint-simoniens et l'Orient: Vers la modernité*, ed. Magali Morsy, 29–49, 31 (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1989).

50. Dominique Bagge, *Les idées politiques en France sous la Restauration* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952), 408–17.

51. Though generally attributed to Comte, Arthur John Booth makes a compelling argument in support of Saint-Simon's paternity for the "law of three estates." See his *Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism: A Chapter in the History of Socialism in France* (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1871). See also Auguste Comte, "Considérations philosophiques sur les sciences et sur les savants," *Le Producteur: Journal de l'Industrie, des Sciences et des Beaux-Arts* 1 (1825): 289–305, 349–74, and 450–69.

52. Prosper Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie* (Paris: P. Bertrand, 1843), 116–17 (original emphasis).

53. See Alain Messaoudi, "Associer l'érudition à une approche sensible de l'Orient arabe? Les saint-simoniens entre *Revue de l'Orient* et *Revue orientale*," in *L'orientalisme des saint-simoniens*, ed. Michel Levallois and Sarga Moussa, 173–93 (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2006).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Charles Richard, *Étude sur l'insurrection du Dahra 1845–1846* (Algiers: Besancenez, 1846), 7–8: "Quand on veut conquérir, dans le vrai sens du mot, un pays, il y a deux espèces de conquêtes à exécuter: celle du terrain, qui est la conquête matérielle, et celle du peuple, qui est la conquête morale. La première s'exécute par les armes et ne dure, quelquefois, que l'espace de quatre ou cinq grandes batailles . . . ; la seconde s'exécute par les idées, et celle-là peut durer des siècles."

2. Quoted in Dominique Bagge, *Les idées politiques en France sous la Restauration* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952), 1.

3. Paul Azan, *L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852* (Paris: Plon, 1936).

4. AOM F^{80}/1670, *Ordre du jour adressé aux troupes de l'expédition en rade de Toulon le 10 mai 1830*. See also AOM F^{80}/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Ordonnance du Roi portant réorganisation de l'administration générale et des provinces de l'Algérie*, April 15, 1845.

5. Charles-Louis Lesur, *Annuaire historique universel pour 1830, Première partie* (Paris: Fantin, 1830), 6. For accounts of French military preparations in 1829–1830, see A. M. Perron, *La conquête d'Alger ou relation de la campagne d'Afrique, comprenant les motifs de la guerre, les détails des préparatifs de l'expédition et des évènements qui ont précédé le débarquement, la composition de l'armée de terre et de l'armée navale, les noms des officiers supérieurs, et un précis des opérations militaires* (Paris: H. Langlois, 1830).

6. The port of Algiers, it must be recalled, had been under French naval blockade since 1827. On the extent of France's relations with the North African polities in the early nineteenth century, see Eugène Plantet, *Correspondance des deys d'Alger avec la cour de France, 1579–1833* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1889); Pierre Boyer, *La vie quotidienne à Alger à la veille de l'intervention française* (Paris: Hachette, 1964); and Lucette Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa Before the French Conquest, 1790–1830*, trans. Kenneth J. Perkins (New York: Africana Publishing, 1977). Ottoman Turks and Algerians were equally ignorant of French ways in 1830. According to Boyer, the initial encounter between Frenchmen and Arabs was characterized by mutual aloofness: the former, perturbed by the contrast between their preconceptions of North Africa and its realities, retreated into indifference toward the native populations, whereas the latter reciprocated with a disregard for French cultural initiatives.

7. For an assessment of French analyses and maps produced in anticipation of the invasion of the Ottoman Regency of Algiers, see the Ministry of War's

Aperçu historique, statistique et topographique sur l'État d'Alger à l'usage de l'Armée expéditionnaire d'Afrique avec plans, vues et costumes, publié par ordre de Son Excellence le ministre de la Guerre (Paris: Piquet, 1830); and *Bulletin des sciences géographiques, économie publique, voyages, rédigé par M. Thomas, VIe Section du Bulletin Universel, publié sous les auspices de Monsieur le Dauphin par la Société pour la Propagation des Connaissances Scientifiques et Industrielles, et sous la direction de M. le Baron de Ferussac*, vol. 22 (Paris: Au bureau central du Bulletin et chez Arthus Bertrand, 1830). Pierre Boyer reminds us of French cartographers who in the 1770s still derived maps of North Africa from the sixteenth-century geographical descriptions and charts of Leo Africanus, in *La vie quotidienne à Alger*, 9–10. Patricia Lorcin mentions the influence of classical literature in the intellectual preparation for the conquest of Algiers, specifically the writings of Thomas Shaw (1694–1751), Abbé Raynal (1713–1796), Claude Savary (1750–1788), Constantin-François Volney (1757–1820), and Franz Gall (1758–1828), in *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 102–8.

8. Paul de Raynal, *L'expédition d'Alger, 1830: Lettres d'un témoin publiées avec une introduction et des notes par Augustin Bernard* (Paris: Société d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritimes et Coloniales, 1930). William Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers, Political, Historical, and Civil; Containing an Account of the Geography, Population, Government, Revenues, Commerce, Agriculture, Arts, Civil Institutions, Tribes, Manners, Languages, and Recent Political History of That Country* (Boston: Cummings, Hilliard, 1826), translated by Thomas-Xavier de Bianchi as *Esquisse de l'État d'Alger* (Paris: Ladvocat, 1830). Raynal later earned literary fame as the publisher and editor of the notebooks and letters of Joseph Joubert. Bianchi was the royal secretary and interpreter for Oriental languages and had accompanied La Bretonnière on his mission to Algiers in July–August 1829. See "Relation de l'arrivée dans la rade d'Alger du vaisseau de S.M. la Provence sous les ordres de M. le comte de La Bretonnière, commandant les forces navales du roi dans ces parages; excursion dans la ville et les environs d'Alger et détails sur l'insulte faite au pavillon du roi par les Algériens, le 3 aout 1829, par M.-X. Bianchi," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* 13, no. 86 (June 1830): 267–82.

9. "Du territoire et de la ville d'Alger. Résultat probable d'une expédition contre cette ville," *Revue des Deux Mondes* 1, ser. 2 (January–March 1830): 146–61.

10. The French public was equally starved for news about the expedition. In Toulon, when Jean Toussaint Merle, special secretary to Marshal Louis-Auguste-Victor de Bourmont, learned with alarm that his superior had not bothered to acquire a printing press to disseminate military bulletins or reports, he rode frantically to Marseille to procure the necessary accessories and personnel. Within days of the landings at Sidi-Ferruch, Merle set up his printing press on the beachhead, and on June 29, he published the first issue of *L'Estafette d'Alger, Journal de l'Armée Expéditionnaire et de la Méditerranée, Politique, Militaire, Industriel, Historique et Maritime*, with which he

hoped to quench the public's "intense impatience" for updates from Africa. See Gabriel Esquer, "Les débuts de la presse algérienne: Jean Toussaint Merle et 'L'Estafette de Sidi Ferruch,' " *Revue Africaine* 70 (1929): 254–318.

11. For biographies of the eight members of the commissions of 1833 and the summaries they produced, see AOM F^{80}/9, Ministère de la Guerre, *État de distribution du volume des Procès-verbaux de la Commission d'Afrique à envoyer aux autorités à Alger*, May 31, 1834.

12. AOM F^{80}/10, Ministère de la Guerre, *Note sur les détails d'administration militaire que la Commission d'Alger sera appelée à examiner*, December 1833.

13. AOM F^{80}/1, *Ordonnance royale du 22 juillet 1834*. The syntheses of the commission reports and the record of the official deliberations that preceded their legal adoption are available in AOM F^{80}/1671.

14. Charles-André Julien is more disparaging of the intellectualism of the officer corps of the Army of Africa, preferring to describe them as "informed" rather than "learned" (*pas des savants mais des sachants*). Nevertheless, he does acknowledge the exceptional aptitudes and practical knowledge of key officers, mostly the Polytechniciens who served in disproportionate numbers in the Directorate of Arab Affairs. See his *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 270–341.

15. Roger Owen describes the same "twofold process" in the case of British India in "Anthropology and Imperial Administration," in *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, ed. Talal Asad, 223–43 (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1973).

16. My brief overview of the Ottoman Regency of Algiers is derived from Henri-Delmas de Grammont, *Histoire d'Alger sous la domination turque, 1515–1830* (Paris: Bouchène, 2002); Eugène Vaysettes, *Histoire de Constantine sous la domination turque, 1517–1837* (Paris: Bouchène, 2002); Farid Khiari, *Vivre et mourir en Alger. L'Algérie ottomane aux XVIe–XVIIe siècles: Un destin confisqué* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002); Mahfoud Kaddache, *L'Algérie durant la période ottomane* (Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1998); Boyer, *La vie quotidienne à Alger*; Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*; Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord: Des origines à 1830* (Paris: Payot, 1994); and John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

17. When necessary, I have given the Arabic or Turkish original terms, followed by their French spelling.

18. Tal Shuval, "The Ottoman Algerian Elite and Its Ideology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32 (2000): 323–44.

19. See the works of Isabelle Grangaud, *La ville imprenable: Une histoire sociale de Constantine au 18e siècle* (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2002); Tal Shuval, *La ville d'Alger vers la fin du XVIIIe siècle: Population et cadre urbain* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1998); and Nacereddine Saidouni, *L'Algérois rural à la fin de l'époque ottomane, 1791–1830* (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 2001).

20. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 2.

21. For example, Khiari, *Vivre et mourir en Alger*, 197–215.

22. Richard Lawless, "The Concept of Tell and Sahara in the Maghreb: A Reappraisal," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, no. 57 (1972): 125–37.

23. French attitudes toward Arab nomadic societies owed much to direct observations undertaken by Napoleon's Orientalists in the Sinai between 1798 and 1801. See Sarga Moussa, "La rencontre des Bédouins dans les 'Observations sur la topographie de la presqu'île de Sinaï' de Coutelle," in *L'invention scientifique de la Méditerranée: Égypte, Morée, Algérie*, ed. Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, 207–21 (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1998).

24. See *Procès verbaux et rapports de la Commission d'Afrique*, 2 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1834); and Claude Antoine Rozet, *Voyage dans la Régence d'Alger, ou Description du pays occupé par l'armée française en Afrique*, 3 vols. (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1833).

25. "[Arab society today] is the image of ours in the era of anarchic feudalism at the end of the tenth century," in Charles Richard, *Du gouvernement arabe et de l'institution qui doit l'exercer* (Algiers: Bastide, 1848), 13–14. See also Eugène Daumas, *Mœurs et coutumes de l'Algérie, Tell, Kabylie, Sahara* (Paris: Sindbad, 1988).

26. AOM 22S/1, Armée d'Afrique, *Lettre du Lieutenant Général gouvernant la province de Constantine*, February 12, 1847. The economic development of nomadic territories concerned the commission for the scientific exploration of Algeria of 1840 and was one of the foundations of the "Kabyle myth." See, for example, the related volumes in *Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie pendant les années 1840, 1841, 1842, publiée par ordre du Gouvernement et avec le concours d'une commission académique* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1844–1867), especially the seminal fourth and fifth volumes by Ernest Carette, *Études sur la Kabilie proprement dite*, 2 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848).

27. For colonial assessments of Muslim education in the regency and French Algeria, see Ernest de Salve-Villedieu, *Instruction publique en Algérie* (Algiers: Jourdan, 1878); Ernest Fourmestraux, *L'instruction publique en Algérie, 1830 à 1880* (Paris: Librairie Algérienne et Coloniale, 1880); and Louis Rinn, *Note sur l'instruction publique musulmane en Algérie*, XIXe Corps d'Armée, Service Central des Affaires Indigènes (February 1882).

28. The *hubus*, North Africa's designation for Muslim *awqaf* (sing. *waqf*), are created by legal act, whereby the owner withdraws a property (*melk*) or part of it from its original commercial or profitable functions in order to bequeath a share of its rent or revenues to pious or charitable institutions. The owner retains rights of usufruct over the former *melk*, but these are to be distributed by law to the designated individual or establishment. The resulting endowment is thereby no longer regulated by Quranic laws of succession (*al-fara'id*) and is rendered inalienable and indivisible. On Muslim land categories and laws in French Algeria, see John Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

29. Abdelhafid Khellout, "Pour ou contre l'école? Approche socioculturelle du problème de l'enseignement en milieu rural algérien" (PhD diss., Institut de Psychologie de l'Université de Constantine, 1979), 20.

30. For example, AOM F^{80}/447, Bureaux Arabes, *Division d'Alger, Subdivision d'Orléansville: Inspection générale de 1852*. According to Louis Rinn, alms comprised the main source of income for primary-level teachers (*tolba*), but were prohibited at the secondary level of education, in *Note sur l'instruction publique musulmane en Algérie*.

31. Although very few studies have been undertaken on female education in the Ottoman Regency, Abdelhafid Khellout in "Pour ou contre l'école?" and Fanny Colonna in *Instituteurs algériens, 1883–1939* (Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1975) agree with the assessment of Eugène Daumas in *Mœurs et coutumes* that literacy before 1830 was almost exclusively male, except for the daughters of urban notables and elites.

32. For a synthesis of the various social and cultural functions of rural *zawiyas*, see Khellout, "Pour ou contre l'école?" 47–53.

33. Houari Touati, *Entre Dieu et les hommes: Lettrés, saints et sorciers au Maghreb, 17e siècle* (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1994); and Christian Décobert, "L'institution du waqf, la baraka et la transmission du savoir," in *Modes de transmission de la culture religieuse en Islam*, ed. Hassan Elboudrari, 25–40 (Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1993).

34. See, for example, Nabila Oulebsir, "Rome ou la Méditerranée? Les relevés d'architecture d'Amable Ravoisié en Algérie, 1840–1842," in *L'invention scientifique de la Méditerranée: Égypte, Morée, Algérie*, ed. Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, 239–71 (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1998). Jacques Frémeaux has studied the value of Algeria's "familiar" Roman past as an essential epistemological standpoint for French scientific investigations of the nineteenth century. See "Le Maghreb fantasmique: Souvenirs de Rome et présence française au Maghreb, essai d'interprétation," in *Connaissances du Maghreb: Sciences sociales et colonisation*, ed. Jean-Claude Vatin, 29–46 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984).

35. AOM 1I/14, Intendance Civile, January 17, 1838: "Instruits, les maures seront plus aptes à nous servir, et les diverses administrations ne tarderont pas à reconnaître l'immense avantage qu'il y aura pour elles à employer des indigènes sachant lire et écrire le français."

36. The parliamentary debate continued in one form or another until at least 1836–1837, and the question of retaining Algiers was raised repeatedly between August 3, 1830, and June 10, 1833. See, for example, the sessions of August 11–15, 1831, or March 20–25, 1832, in *Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: Recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des Chambres françaises: 2e série, 1800–1860*, ed. Jérôme Mavidal et al., vol. 69, 128–240 (Paris: Librairie Administrative de Paul Dupont, 1862–). See also Jean-Baptiste Flandin, *De la Régence d'Alger. Solution de ces questions: Doit-on conserver cette régence? Peut-on la coloniser? Comment?* (Paris: Anselin, 1834).

37. By February 1831, the Army of Africa had been reduced in size to 15,784 men, including untrained volunteers, and renamed the Division of the Corps of Occupation of Africa (*Division du corps d'occupation d'Afrique*), an awkward designation that reflected its uncertain colonial future.

38. See historical review in AOM 1I/14, Intendance Civile, *Instruction publique*, January 17, 1838.

39. For a history of the Government General of Algeria, see Jacques Lambert, *Manuel de législation algérienne* (Algiers: Librairie des Facultés, 1952). For examples of civil-military rivalries, see Camille Rousset, *Les commencements d'une conquête: L'Algérie de 1830 à 1840* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1900).

40. Richard Holroyd, "The Bourbon Army, 1815–1830," *Historical Journal* 14 (1971): 529–52.

41. Bagge, *Les idées politiques en France sous la Restauration*, viii.

42. Gaston Pinet, *Histoire de l'École polytechnique* (Paris: Baudry, 1887).

43. Antoine Picon, *Les saint-simoniens: Raison, imaginaire et utopie* (Paris: Éditions Belin, 2002); and L. Pearce Williams, "Science, Education and Napoleon I," *Isis* 47 (1956): 369–82.

44. Françoise Mayeur, *Histoire générale de l'enseignement et de l'éducation en France: Vol. 3, De la Révolution à l'École républicaine (1789–1930)* (Paris: Perrin, 1981), 70–84 and 477–485.

45. "Our old court still hopes to revisit its former glory days; it spins its wheels in muck, while the people move ahead," in Pinet, *Histoire de l'École polytechnique*, 138.

46. See "Lettre d'un habitant de Genève à ses contemporains," in *Œuvres de Saint-Simon* (Paris: Capelle, 1841), 3–67.

47. For an analysis of the considerable influence of the Saint-Simonian doctrine at the École Polytechnique, see Gaston Pinet, "L'École polytechnique et les saint-simoniens," *La Revue de Paris*, May 15, 1894, 73–96.

48. Quoted in Sébastien Charléty, *Histoire du saint-simonisme* (Paris: Gonthier, 1896), 45.

49. Saint-Amand Bazard, *Doctrine de Saint-Simon: Exposition: Première année, 1828–1829* (Paris: Au bureau de l'Organisateur et chez A. Mesnier, 1829); and *Doctrine de Saint-Simon: Exposition: Deuxième année, 1829–1830* (Paris: Au bureau de l'Organisateur et du Globe, 1830). Bazard, the senior cofounder of Saint-Simonism, spearheaded its doctrinal development until his schism with his peer Enfantin and subsequent resignation from the movement in November 1831.

50. Quoted in Barrie M. Ratcliffe, "Saint-Simonism and Messianism: The Case of Gustave d'Eichthal," *French Historical Studies* 9 (1976): 484–502, 494n48.

51. The various proposals are in AOM F^{80}/1843. For the projects of Costes and Jomard, see Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, *Jomard: Lettre au Ministre*, January 8, 1831; Ministère de la Marine et des Colonies, *Costes: Lettre au Ministre*, January 17, 1831; Ministère de la Guerre, *Costes: Lettre au Ministre*, January 27, 1831; Ministère de la Guerre, *Minute de la lettre écrite*, January 31, 1831; and Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport fait au Ministre*, October 30,

1831. For a biography of the captivating Jomard and his experiences with the Egyptian School of Paris, see Yves Laissus, *Jomard, le dernier Égyptien, 1777–1862* (Paris: Fayard, 2004). Marcel Emerit verifies that Enfantin had Jomard in mind as titular head of his Oriental institute, in *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1941), 95. For a history of the Society for Elementary Instruction, see Ferdinand Buisson, ed., *Nouveau dictionnaire de pédagogie et d'instruction primaire* (Paris: Hachette, 1911).

52. The Society for Elementary Instruction was dedicated to "spreading basic enlightenment to the lower rungs of French society, and imparting upon them the intellectual and moral education most appropriate to their needs," in *Bulletin mensuel de la Société pour l'instruction élémentaire publié par la société formée à Paris pour l'amélioration de l'enseignement élémentaire*, July 1815.

53. AOM F^{80}/1843, Ministère de la Guerre, *Note pour le Ministre*, January 29, 1831.

54. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 160. All matters relating to public instruction were placed under the purview of the relevant ministry by royal ordinance on August 15, 1815. See, for example, AOM F^{80}/1566, Ministère de la Guerre, *Sur la surveillance des maisons d'éducation des filles et notamment de celles tenues par des communautés religieuses*, November 13, 1847.

55. AOM F^{80}/580, Gouvernement Général, November 27, 1848.

56. AOM F^{80}/1, *Arrêté ministériel du 1 septembre 1834*. The civil intendant—later, director of the interior—exercised considerable power in the civil administration of Algeria. A colonial prefect, he controlled all aspects of the legal system and oversaw his territory's finances, including the collection of taxes and tariffs and the regulation of prices. The provisioning of armed forces, the construction and maintenance of roads and canals, and the exploitation of mines and other natural resources also fell under his authority.

57. The recommendations of Lepescheux were synthesized by Genty de Bussy in AOM F^{80}/1843, Intendance Civile, October 20, 1832. See also AOM 1I/14, Intendance Civile, *Écoles d'enseignement mutuel*, August 30, 1833. Lepescheux, according to Emerit, was influenced by Saint-Simon and came increasingly into contact with Prosper Enfantin in the 1840s, in *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie*, 96 and 163.

58. Genty de Bussy's stipulations are highly reminiscent of Lord Macaulay's speech of February 2, 1835, on Indian education: "Whoever knows [the English] language has ready access to all the vast intellectual wealth, which all the wisest nations of the earth have created and hoarded in the course of ninety generations." Full text available in H. Sharp, ed., *Bureau of Education: Selections from Educational Records I, 1781–1839* (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1965), 107–17.

59. AOM 1I/14, Intendance Civile, December 9, 1837.

60. Pierre Genty de Bussy, *De l'établissement des Français dans la Régence d'Alger, et des moyens d'en assurer la prospérité; suivi d'un grand nombre de pièces justificatives*, 2 vols. (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1839), 2:205. In the early nine-

teenth century, language in European scientific and intellectual thought was largely considered to be indicative of the stages of human evolution and "national" development. The most important proponent of these views in France was Georges Cuvier (1769–1832). See his *Le règne animal distribué d'après son organisation pour servir de base à l'histoire naturelle des animaux et d'introduction à l'anatomie comparée*, 4 vols. (Paris: Deterville, 1817). One need only examine the linguistic treatises of bureau chiefs Charles-Henri Brosselard (1816–1889) and Ernest Carette (1808–1890) to detect the influence of Cuvier's ideas on the military Arabists. See Charles-Henri Brosselard, *Dictionnaire Français-Berbère (dialecte écrit et parlé par les Kabaïles de la division d'Alger), ouvrage composé par ordre de M. le ministre de la Guerre* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1844); and Ernest Carette, *Rapprochement d'une inscription trouvée à Constantine et d'un passage des Actes des martyrs fournissant une nouvelle preuve de l'identité de Constantine et Cirta* (Paris: Institut de France, Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1843); and Carette, *Études sur la Kabilie proprement dite*.

61. Genty de Bussy, *De l'établissement des Français*, 2:200.

62. AOM F^{80}/1562, Ministère de la Guerre, April 24, 1831.

63. Mayeur, *Histoire générale de l'enseignement et de l'éducation en France*, 334–47; and François Guizot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps*, 8 vols. (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1858–1867).

64. AOM F^{80}/1842, Intendance Civile de la Régence, *École d'enseignement mutuel d'Alger: État de situation au 15 décembre 1833*.

65. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 158.

66. The papers and correspondence of Genty de Bussy can be found in AOM 1E/84 [18MI/30–31], Intendance Civile, 1832–1834.

67. For other examples, see AOM 22S/2, Intendance Civile, January 7, 1835.

68. Quoted in Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 90. For information on Hamdan Khodja, see *Le miroir. Aperçu historique et statistique sur la Régence d'Alger* (Paris: Sindbad, 1985).

69. AOM F^{80}/1572, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapports trimestriels: Instruction publique indigène*.

70. Casimir Frégier, *Les juifs algériens: Leur passé, leur présent, leur avenir juridique, leur naturalisation collective* (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1865). A detailed comparison of the respective responses of Algeria's Muslim and Jewish communities to these early educational policies is beyond the scope of this book and would necessarily involve a close examination of general criteria, such as class distinctions and the respective states of Muslim and Jewish education in Algeria before the conquest, as well as a consideration of local issues, such as the impact of France's requisition of religious buildings and their conversion to schools, on the overall reluctance of Muslims to attend such institutions in the company of non-Muslim students. See AOM F^{80}/1564, Ministère de la Guerre, *Communication de trois pièces relatives à la difficulté qu'éprouve l'autorité française à attirer dans nos écoles les enfants de la nation juive*, May 19, 1843. The intendance also funded a school for Jewish girls in Algiers in March 1836;

see AOM F^{80}/1564, Intendance Civile, *Extrait de la délibération du Conseil Municipal dans sa séance du 24 février 1836*.

71. AOM F^{80}/1671, Ministère de la Guerre, *Arrêté réglant les attributions du Gouverneur général, des chefs d'administration civile et du conseil d'administration*, September 1, 1834; F^{80}/1676, Comité Consultatif de l'Algérie, *Rapport sur le projet de loi relatif à l'organisation administrative de l'Algérie*, June 19, 1850; and Claude Bontems, *Manuel des institutions algériennes: De la domination turque à l'indépendance* (Paris: Cujas, 1976), 171–88.

72. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 114–18.

73. AOM F^{80}/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Note sur les attributions des gouverneurs des colonies avant et depuis la révolution de 1830*, June 12, 1834.

74. AOM F^{80}/1671, Ministère de la Guerre, *Envoi des arrêtés ministériels qui règlent les attributions du Gouverneur général, des chefs de service et du conseil d'administration, et des formes de l'administration civile et municipale des possessions françaises dans le nord de l'Afrique*, September 6, 1834.

75. AOM F^{80}/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Projet d'ordonnance de l'organisation générale du gouvernement dans les possessions françaises du nord de l'Afrique*, June 1834. Articles 14, 29, and 32 of the *Ordonnance royale du 22 juillet 1834* correspond to Articles 9, 24, and 27 of the *Arrêté ministériel du 1 septembre 1834*.

76. For examples of opinions on the colonization of Algeria, see Victor-Armand Hain, *À la nation, sur Alger* (Paris: Chez tous les marchands de nouveautés, 1832); and Pierre Guiral, "La presse française et la conquête de l'Algérie (1830–1848)," *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire Moderne* 12, no. 19–20 (1962): 7–13; or Pierre Guiral, "L'opinion marseillaise et les débuts de l'entreprise algérienne (1830–1831)," *Revue Historique* 214, no. 1 (1955): 9–34. On Vialar and Tonnac, see Georges Goyau, "La charité française dans l'Algérie conquise: Premiers colons," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1, 1930, 92–124.

77. Gaëtan de la Rochefoucauld in the Chamber of Delegates, April 29, 1834, in *Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: Recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des Chambres françaises: 2e série, 1800–1860*, ed. Jérôme Mavidal et al., vol. 89, 486 (Paris: Librairie Administrative de Paul Dupont, 1908).

78. Arthur de Gobineau, *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1884).

79. See Eugène Bodichon, "La disparition des musulmans soumis au pouvoir et au contact des chrétiens," *Revue de l'Orient, de l'Algérie et des colonies* 10 (1851): 35–40. In the metropole, the influence of Eugène Bodichon was exerted through his contacts with the liberal journal *Le National* and its co-editor, Adolphe Thiers.

80. See, for example, the reports accompanying the *Recensement quinquennaux* in AOM F^{80}/709. All figures must be regarded as approximations tracing demographic trends rather than hard and accurate figures.

81. Xavier Yacono, "Peut-on évaluer la population de l'Algérie vers 1830?" *Revue Africaine* 98, no. 3–4 (1954): 277–307.

82. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 403.

83. *Cantonnement* consisted of confiscating the traditional grazing lands of Algerian nomadic and pastoral communities and of restricting their movements to lands less favorable to European agriculture and farming. The policy increased dramatically the share of arable lands in European hands and drove Algerians away from the region of colonization altogether (*refoulement*). See Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 70–71.

84. AOM F^{80}/1843, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, *Salvandy: Lettre au Ministre de la Guerre*, April 19, 1838.

85. AOM 1I/14, Intendance Civile, December 9–30, 1837; and Gouvernement Général, January 3–February 5, 1838.

86. The word *"scrupules"* replaces the deleted original *"susceptibilités."*

87. AOM 1I/14, Intendance Civile, *Lettre du Principal du Collège d'Alger*, September 7, 1837.

88. AOM 1I/14, Intendance Civile, June 2, 1837.

89. AOM 1I/14, Gouvernement Général, January 3, 1838. Lepescheux also proposed to the military Directorate of Arab Affairs that professors willing to teach in Algeria be made employees of the colonial administration to "ensure to these a more secure career and brighter professional prospects," in AOM F^{80}/1843, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport fait au Ministre*, April 9, 1839.

90. Rifaat al-Tahtawi was sent by Mehmet Ali Pasha to Paris in 1826 to study European sciences and French administrative and educational methods and to serve as the *imam* for the Egyptian cadets training at the Paris military academy. Al-Tahtawi's account of his five-year stay in Paris, titled *Takhlis al-ibriz fi talkhis Baris* (*The Refinement of the Gold in a Comprehensive Depiction of Paris*—translated as *The Gold of Paris*), was published in 1834. See also "Extrait d'une lettre adressée par M. le Cheykh Refah, ancien élève de la mission égyptienne en France à M. Jomard, membre de l'Institut, etc.," *Journal Asiatique*, vol. 8 (July–December 1831): 534–35. For background on the Egyptian Mission to Paris, see Alain Silvera, "The First Egyptian Student Mission to France Under Muhammad Ali," in *Modern Egypt: Studies in Politics and Society*, ed. Elie Keddourie and Sylvia Haim, 1–22 (London: Frank Cass, 1980). On the Egyptian School in Paris, see Edme Jomard, "École Égyptienne de Paris," *Nouveau Journal Asiatique*, vol. 2 (July–December 1828): 96–116; and Laissus, *Jomard, le dernier Égyptien*, 303–47. On the professional and personal connections between Jomard and Demoyencourt, see Ibid., 274–85.

91. AOM 22S/2, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport au Roi*, May 11, 1839.

92. AOM F^{80}/1571, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport fait au Ministre*, April 16, 1839.

93. For examples of Algerian misgivings, see AOM 22S/2, Intendance Civile, *Sur les effets produits par la publicité donnée à la formation d'un Collège Arabe en France*, July 11, 1839; and AOM 1I/14, Direction des Finances, *Lettre au Ministre de la Guerre*, July 19, 1839.

94. Fourmestraux, *L'instruction publique en Algérie*, 11.

95. AOM F^{80}/1572, Ministère de la Guerre, *Compte rendu de l'éducation des jeunes indigènes en France*, January 12, 1846.

96. Yvonne Turin, *Affrontements culturels dans l'Algérie coloniale: Écoles, médecines, religion, 1830–1880* (Paris: Maspéro, 1971), 62–70.

97. Abd al-Qadir ibn Muhyi al-Din al-Hasani al-Jazairi, leader (*muqaddam*) of the Sufi Qadiriyya confraternity, entered politics in response to the collapse of Ottoman rule in western Algeria in 1830. He united local clans in opposition to French expansion and was recognized by the respective Desmichels and Tafna treaties of 1834 and 1837 as sovereign commander (*emir* = *amir al-mu'minin*) of the Algerian Tell and Oranais. War with France was resumed in November 1839 and ended in December 1847 with the surrender of the emir and his exile to France until 1852, and then to Damascus, where his defense of the local Christians during the civil unrest of 1860 earned him political rehabilitation in France and the French Legion of Honor. For a recent and comprehensive biography of Abd al-Qadir, see Bruno Étienne, *Abdelkader: Isthme des isthmes. Barzakh al-barazikh* (Paris: Hachette, 1994).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Auguste Comte, "Considérations sur le pouvoir spirituel," *Le Producteur: Journal de l'Industrie, des Sciences et des Beaux-Arts* 1 (1825): 596–616, 614: "[C]et état d'anarchie . . . a été non seulement un résultat inévitable de la décadence de l'ancien système social, mais encore une condition indispensable à l'établissement du nouveau. . . . [S]'il présente une monstruosité révoltante lorsqu'on le conçoit comme état permanent . . . , il n'en est plus du tout ainsi en ne l'envisageant que comme état purement transitoire."

2. For the report of Dutrône, see AOM F^{80}/1846, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, *Notes verbales communiquées à la Commission par M. Dutrône*, November 21, 1834. See also the singular attempt to address and rectify "the many errors concerning Algerians and Muslims that prevail among Europeans," in AOM F^{80}/10, Commission d'Afrique, *Note sur la Régence d'Alger par Mr Marey, Chef d'escadron au 1er Régiment des Chasseurs d'Afrique*, November 10, 1833.

3. In 1837, this office would become the First Bureau of the Directorate of Algerian Affairs, as outlined in Figure 3.1. Information on the colorful philanthropist, social reformer, and prize cattle breeder Henri Dutrône (1796–1867) is partial and fragmentary, but he is likely to have been active in French Freemason and philhellenic circles. In her *Nouvelle biographie normande* (Paris: Picard, 1886), 324, Noémi Noire Oursel mistakenly lists him as two separate individuals, but claims that he had directed French educational institutions in the Morea (Peloponnese) after 1827. An enthusiastic supporter of revolutions and independence movements everywhere, Dutrône became famous for his duel in 1826 against General Livron, military advisor to Mehmet Ali Pasha's expeditionary forces in the Morea and chaperone to the first Egyptian scientific mission to France. In more peaceful times, Dutrône presided over the Society for Sobriety in Amiens, where he also founded associations for abstinence and for the prohibition of dueling. See also *L'Ami de la Religion: Journal Ecclésiastique, Politique et Littéraire*, vol. 81 (Paris: Librairie Ecclésiastique d'Adrien

Le Clere et Cie, 1834), 268 and 619; John Gideon Millingen, *The History of Duelling: Including Narratives of the Most Remarkable Personal Encounters That Have Taken Place from the Earliest Period to the Present Time* (London: Richard Bentley, 1841), 287; Ernest Daudet, *Le procès des ministres, 1830* (Paris: Quantin, 1877), 230–33; *La France littéraire*, vol. 1 (Paris: Bureaux de la France littéraire, 1836), 254; and Michel Chevalier, *Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord* (Brussels: Wouters, 1844), 242.

4. See Archives de l'Académie des sciences, DG2 (Commission scientifique de l'Algérie), "Rapports de la Commission chargée de rédiger les instructions pour l'exploration scientifique de l'Algérie," *Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l'Académie des sciences*, July 23, 1838; and *Lettre du Ministre de la Guerre au secrétaire perpétuel de l'Académie des sciences*, August 22, 1838. See also *Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie pendant les années 1840, 1841, 1842, publié par ordre du Gouvernement et avec le concours d'une commission académique*, 39 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1844–1867). For alphabetical lists of the personnel of the scientific exploration, see AOM F^{80}/1593–1598.

5. Patricia Lorcin examines the political and intellectual consequences of the commission findings, albeit from the vantage point of racial categorizations, in *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 41–52. The reports of the various commissions are available as follows: AOM F^{80}/9–10, Commission d'Afrique, 1833–1834; F^{80}/1590–1599, Commissions scientifiques, 1837–1842; and F^{80}/1699–1715, Commissions relatives à l'organisation de l'Algérie, 1845–1847.

6. Thomas Urbain was slated to join the scientific commission, but his appointment was denied by Governor General Valée in November 1839. See Michel Levallois, *Ismaÿl Urbain (1812–1884): Une autre conquête de l'Algérie* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001), 287.

7. The process of translating scientific exploration into academic and public "texts" is described by Daniel Nordman, "L'exploration scientifique de l'Algérie: Le terrain et le texte," in *L'invention scientifique de la Méditerranée: Égypte, Morée, Algérie*, ed. Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, 71–95 (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1998).

8. Marcel Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1941), 85–93.

9. Prosper Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie* (Paris: P. Bertrand, 1843), 146. See also Philippe Régnier, "Enfantin et la 'Colonisation de l'Algérie,'" in *L'orientalisme des saint-simoniens*, ed. Michel Levallois and Sarga Moussa, 131–55 (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2006).

10. Enfantin to Arlès-Dufour, June 17, 1840, in *Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin publiées par les membres du conseil institué par Enfantin pour l'exécution de ses dernières volontés; et précédées de deux notices historiques*, 47 vols. (Paris: E. Dentu, 1865–1878), 31:134–35.

11. Philippe Régnier, "Le mythe oriental des saint-simoniens," in *Les saint-simoniens et l'Orient: Vers la modernité*, ed. Magali Morsy, 29–49 (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1989).

12. For example, AOM F^{80}/1566, Ministère de la Guerre, *Sur la surveillance des maisons d'éducation*, November 13, 1840.

13. See the influence of *La colonisation de l'Algérie* on Generals Lamoricière and Marie-Alphonse Bedeau in their *Projets de colonisation pour les provinces d'Oran et de Constantine* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1847).

14. See the concerns of the Ministry of War regarding the investigative mission in late 1842 of Artaud, inspector general for the Ministry of Public Instruction, in AOM F^{80}/1562, Ministère de la Guerre, October 3, 1842.

15. Quoted in Paul Azan, *L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852* (Paris: Plon, 1936), 467: "Bien des gens en France ont peine à se figurer des officiers au teint hâlé, à la longue barbe, palissant sur des livres, se livrant à des recherches scientifiques ou à des passe-temps littéraires. Rien n'est pourtant plus exact: c'est même l'un des caractères particuliers à cette Armée d'Afrique, où l'intelligence et les choses de l'esprit ont une part si grande."

16. Quoted in Victor Demontès, *La colonisation militaire sous Bugeaud* (Paris: Larose, 1918), 25: "Il est des armées qui ont pu inscrire dans leurs annales des batailles plus mémorables que les vôtres. Il n'en est aucune qui ait livré autant de combats et qui ait exécuté autant de travaux."

17. I base my overview of the formative history of the Arab Bureaux on the following works: Édmond Pellissier de Reynaud, *Annales algériennes*, rev. ed., 3 vols. (Paris: J. Dumain, 1854); Arthur Girault, *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*, 5th ed. (Paris: Sirey, 1927); Arsène Berteuil, *L'Algérie française: Histoire, mœurs, coutumes, industrie, agriculture*, 2 vols. (Paris: Dentu, 1856); François Guizot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps*, 8 vols. (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1858–1867); Victor Foucher, *Les Bureaux arabes en Algérie* (Paris: Panckoucke, 1857); Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964); Jacques Frémeaux, *Les Bureaux arabes dans l'Algérie de la conquête* (Paris: Denoël, 1993); Kenneth J. Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons: French Military Administration in the Colonial Maghrib, 1844–1934* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1981); Xavier Yacono, *Les Bureaux arabes et l'évolution des genres de vie indigènes dans l'ouest du Tell algérois (Dahra, Chélif, Ouarsenis, Sersou)* (Paris: Larose, 1953); Claude Bontems, *Manuel des institutions algériennes: De la domination turque à l'indépendance* (Paris: Cujas, 1976); and Claude Collot, *Les institutions de l'Algérie durant la période coloniale, 1830–1962* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1987). For brief biographical entries for the military officers and political agents who played influential roles in colonial policy making and indigenous instruction, see Appendix 4.

18. AOM 1E/47 [18MI/21–22], Duc de Rovigo, *Correspondance politique*, November 8, 1831–March 3, 1833.

19. AOM 1E/54 [18MI/22], Lieutenant-Général Avizard, *Correspondance politique*, April–May 1833.

20. AOM F^{80}/3, Ministère de la Guerre, *Organisation administrative*, March 1833.

21. AOM 2EE/1 [18MI/1], *Registre de la correspondance du Général Bugeaud*, January 12, 1841.

22. See "Arrêté du Gouverneur général du 16 août 1841 rétablissant la direction des Affaires arabes," in Pierre de Ménerville, *Dictionnaire de la législation algérienne. Code annoté et manuel raisonné des lois, ordonnances, décrets, décisions et arrêtés publiés au Bulletin Officiel des actes du Gouvernement*, 3 vols. (Paris: Cosse et Durand, 1853), 1:59.

23. AOM F^{80}/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Arrêté ministériel organisant les bureaux arabes*, February 1, 1844.

24. In practice, the staff of the Arab Bureaux often deviated from ministerial prescriptions to suit particular local circumstances. For example, Bontems found a staff of eleven French officers and thirty-three Algerians in the first-class bureau of El-Asnam in 1852, in *Manuel des institutions algériennes*, 225–26.

25. Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, 39–82.

26. Charles Richard, *Du gouvernement arabe et de l'institution qui doit l'exercer* (Algiers: Bastide, 1848), 26.

27. In AOM F^{80}/441, October 14, 1853; and Jules Duval, *L'Algérie: Tableau historique, descriptif et statistique, avec une carte de la colonisation algérienne* (Paris: Hachette, 1859). For another example, see AOM 1HH/53, *Revue Africaine*, December 28, 1855. The Saint-Simonian and Fourierist Jules Duval, partisan of the colonization of Algeria through "the association of labor, capital, and talent," founded, with the support of General Lamoricière, the phalansterian agricultural colony Union de Saint-Denis-du-Sig near Oran. An ardent opponent of the Arabophile policies of Napoleon III, he was, with Auguste Warnier, one of the harshest critics of the military regime and Arab Bureaux, which he denounced consistently from his positions as editor of the *Echo d'Oran*, as delegate to the province's General Council from 1858 to 1861, and, later, as committee secretary to the *Société de Géographie de Paris* and a regular contributor to the influential *Journal des Débats*. See *Bulletin de la Société de géographie, rédigé avec le concours de la section de publication par les Secrétaires de la Commission centrale* (Paris: Delagrave, January–June 1876), 353–67.

28. Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, 62.

29. Collot, *Les institutions de l'Algérie*, 39. For another list of the full obligations of bureau agents, see Yacono, *Les Bureaux arabes et l'évolution des genres de vie indigènes*, 16–17.

30. For detailed expositions of the responsibilities and activities of the Arab Bureaux between 1845 and 1857, see the annual *Rapports d'ensemble* in AOM F^{80}/446–506.

31. Georges Voisin [Ismaÿl Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens* (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1861), 144.

32. Alphonse Daudet, *Aventures prodigieuses de Tartarin de Tarascon*, 23rd ed. (Paris: Dentu, 1883), 213.

33. Bontems, *Manuel des institutions algériennes*, 231.

34. AOM F^{80}/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Ordonnance du Roi portant réorganisation de l'administration générale et des provinces de l'Algérie*, April 15, 1845.

35. The colony's Europeans were liable only for French taxes and were exempt from all imposts on property. Kabyles, especially after 1858, were liable only for the *corvée* and the *lazima*—a significantly lighter levy than the Arab *'ushr*. It has been calculated that Muslim Algerians in the 1890s were contributing between 80 and 85 percent of the tax levies, whereas Arab territories received only 8 percent of the public expenditures.

36. For the Charter of the Arab Bureaux, see Ménerville, *Dictionnaire de la législation algérienne*, 1:82–84. For a complete historical overview of the Departmental Bureaux, see Pierre Boyer, "La création des Bureaux arabes départementaux: Contribution à l'étude de notre politique musulmane en Algérie," *Revue Africaine* 97, no. 434–435 (1953): 98–131.

37. Charles-Robert Ageron, *Politiques coloniales au Maghreb* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), 56–57.

38. See "Circulaire du Gouverneur général du 21 mars 1867," in Ménerville, *Dictionnaire de la législation algérienne*, 2:293–313.

39. The Central Political Bureau was staffed with a chief superior officer, a director-officer (*sous-chef*), four first-class adjunct bureau chiefs, an interpreter, an archivist, three French secretaries, two *khawajas*, and three *shawishs*. Divisional offices received a director-officer, a first-class bureau chief, a second-class bureau chief, two first-class adjunct officers, an interpreter, an archivist (civilian or military), two secretaries, a *khawaja*, and two *shawishs*. Subdivisional offices employed a first-class bureau chief, a first-class adjunct officer, a second-class adjunct officer, an interpreter, two secretaries, a *khawaja*, and a *shawish*. Finally, second-class bureaux and annexes were staffed with a second-class bureau chief, two second-class adjunct officers, an interpreter, a secretary, a *khawaja*, and a *shawish*.

40. AOM 8H/29, Affaires Indigènes, *Organisation Administrative*, February 18, 1881; and Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, 20.

41. *Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, 5:6 and 5:41: "Loin de prêcher l'insurrection et la révolte, nous présenterons le seul moyen d'empêcher les actes de violence dont la société pourrait être menacée et auxquels elle échapperait difficilement si la puissance industrielle continue à rester passive au milieu des factions qui se disputent le pouvoir. . . . L'EPOQUE ACTUELLE EST UNE EPOQUE DE TRANSITION."

42. "IXe Article, Les oisifs et les travailleurs. Fonctions politiques selon les oisifs. Fonctions politiques selon les travailleurs," in *Économie politique et politique: Religion saint-simonienne. Articles extraits du Globe* (Paris: Au bureau du Globe, 1831): 85–95, 94: "Nous ne prétendons rien faire d'un seul coup, nous sommes les hommes du progrès, nous voulons des évolutions, et non des révolutions sociales: aussi ne nous bornons-nous pas, comme les révolutionnaires, à critiquer ce qui est, nous indiquons aussi ce qui doit être."

43. Voisin [Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 16: "Tout peuple est perfectible, à la condition de chercher le progrès dans la ligne de son développement normal, à la condition de lier pour lui le passé au présent et à l'avenir. Le progrès est une évolution et non une révolution."

44. After 1848, the proportion of students from the upper bourgeoisie rose dramatically to 60 percent. See Frémeaux, *Les Bureaux arabes dans l'Algérie de la conquête*, 38–42.

45. Robert Fox, *The Culture of Science in France, 1700–1900* (Aldershot, UK: Variorum, 1992), 442–73. The two-year program of study at the École Polytechnique, which students entered at the age of sixteen, stressed the physical and military sciences, but also offered courses on history, geography, literature, and the arts.

46. Gaston Pinet, *Histoire de l'École polytechnique* (Paris: Baudry, 1887). With the restoration of the Bourbons, the École Polytechnique was stripped of its military status. It reverted to the Ministry of War following the collapse of Charles X in 1830.

47. Pierre Chalmin, *L'officier français de 1815 à 1870* (Paris: M. Rivière, 1957), 391.

48. Prosper Enfantin, "Organisation scientifique," *Le Globe*, June 1, 1831.

49. Fox, *The Culture of Science in France*, 464.

50. Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 99.

51. Perkins has described military education in early-nineteenth-century France as "a program of indoctrination," in *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, 39, whereas Lorcin has preferred to regard it as a process of "sensitization," in *Imperial Identities*, 97.

52. Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie*, 126.

53. Yacono, *Les Bureaux arabes et l'évolution des genres de vie indigènes*, 136.

54. Compare, for instance, the similarities between Charles Richard's pamphlets, *Du gouvernement arabe et de l'institution qui doit l'exercer* (Algiers: Bastide, 1848) or *De la civilisation du peuple arabe* (Algiers: Dubos, 1850), and the executive orders issued by the Government General in AOM 22S/1, Bureaux Arabes, *Division d'Alger*, March 2, 1847.

55. Richard, *De la civilisation du peuple arabe*, 23.

56. Auguste Comte, *Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société*, May 1822, reprinted under the same title (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1970).

57. Richard, *Du gouvernement arabe et de l'institution qui doit l'exercer*, 39. Accordingly, the Arab Bureaux later produced reports entitled "Surveillance de l'état d'esprit des indigènes," concerned exclusively with monitoring the opinions and utterances of local Algerian leaders. See, for example, AOM 71MI/147, Ministère de la Guerre, Division d'Alger, *Rapport Blangini*, July 12, 1849.

58. Richard, *De la civilisation du peuple arabe*, 31–32, n1.

59. Richard, *Du gouvernement arabe et de l'institution qui doit l'exercer*, 53–54.

60. Ferdinand Lapasset, *Aperçu sur l'organisation des indigènes dans les territoires militaires, et dans les territoires civils* (Algiers: Dubos, 1850), 39. Compare to Richard, *Du gouvernement arabe et de l'institution qui doit l'exercer*, 53.

61. Richard, *De la civilisation du peuple arabe*, 25–34. The five intermediate degrees of historical development to assimilation are "indigenous feudalism" (*féodalité indigène*) in its unstable and stable phases, or the indirect administration of the natives through local leaders; "French feudalism" (*féodalité française*), or the direct administration of the natives by the Arab Bureaux and "key to the edifice" of assimilation; "aristocratic communalism" (*commune aristocratique*), or the administration of the natives by the new indigenous elites formed, trained, and appointed by the bureaux; "democratic communalism" (*commune démocratique*), or the election of indigenous leaders by limited suffrage; and "democratic civilization" (*civilisation démocratique*), or the transformation of the Arab Bureaux into a civilian organization.

62. Ibid., 22–23. Compare to the Fellmann report of October 8, 1845, in AOM F^{80}/1571, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport fait au Ministre Soult-Berg*; and to AOM, 22S/1, Bureaux Arabes, Division d'Alger, March 2, 1847: "European civilization developed over several centuries; we may spare the Arab many delays and enable him to traverse centuries in a few years, but this must be done without his cognizance; he must not notice the distance he has traveled until he has reached the end [of the process]."

63. Comte, "Considérations sur le pouvoir spirituel." Comte, a disciple of Saint-Simon, took the basics of the "sociology" of his mentor and articulated a positivist philosophical and political theory. His two seminal works, *Cours de philosophie positive*, published between 1830 and 1842, and *Système de politique positive*, published between 1851 and 1854, were also widely disseminated and studied in the military academies.

64. Auguste Comte, *System of Positive Polity*, 4 vols. (New York: B. Franklin), 3:46–55 and 3:375–76.

65. For the role of military personnel in the spread of culture and knowledge abroad, and the development of French sciences, see Lewis Pyenson, *Civilizing Mission: Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expansion, 1830–1940* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 9–10.

66. Ghita Ionescu, ed., *The Political Thought of Saint-Simon* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 120.

67. Quoted in Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie*, 291.

68. Richard, *De la civilisation du peuple arabe*, 29–30.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. "Rapport du 24 mai 1847, au nom de la commission de la Chambre chargée d'examiner le projet de loi relatif aux crédits extraordinaires demandés pour l'Algérie," in Alexis de Tocqueville, *Études économiques, politiques et littéraires*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1878), 436–37: "La société musulmane, en Afrique, n'était pas incivilisée; elle avait seulement une civilisation arriérée et imparfaite. Il existait dans son sein un grand nombre de fondations pieuses, ayant pour objet de pourvoir aux besoins de la charité ou de l'instruction publique. Partout nous avons mis la main sur ces revenus en les détournant en partie de leurs anciens usages; nous avons réduit les établissements charitables,

laissé tomber les écoles, dispersé les séminaires. Autour de nous les lumières se sont éteintes, le recrutement des hommes de religion et des hommes de loi a cessé; c'est-à-dire que nous avons rendu la société musulmane beaucoup plus misérable, plus désordonnée, plus ignorante et plus barbare qu'elle n'était avant de nous connaître."

2. AOM F^{80}/1087, Ministère de la Guerre, *Arrêté Ministériel*, March 23, 1843; and Gouvernement Général, *Nécessité d'appliquer aux établissements qui sont encore administrés par des oukils, les dispositions de l'arrêté ministériel du 23 mars 1843*, June 30, 1848.

3. See "Ordonnance Royale relative au droit de propriété en Algérie," in Adrien Carpentier, *Codes et lois pour la France, l'Algérie et les colonies: Ouvrage contenant sous chaque article des codes de nombreuses références aux articles correspondants et aux lois d'intérêt général, les arrêts de principe les plus récents, la législation algérienne et coloniale, et donnant en outre la concordance des lois et décrets entre eux et les principaux traités internationaux relatifs au droit privé*, 13th ed. (Paris: Marchal et Billard, 1909), 401a–402b.

4. Émile Larcher, *Traité élémentaire de législation algérienne*, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1923), 3:36.

5. Assia Djebar, "L'amour, la fantasia," *Callaloo* 16 (1993): 1–14.

6. AOM 1EE/11 [18MI/84], *Registre de correspondance ministérielle*, 1844–1845.

7. See AOM F^{80}/1108, Ministère de la Guerre, December 9, 1841; AOM F^{80}/1087, Direction des Finances et du Commerce, *Envoi d'un état des immeubles affectés aux établissements religieux*, March 11, 1847; and the relevant amendments to the order of 1843 in AOM F^{80}/1087, Ministère de la Guerre, *Arrêté Ministériel*, October 3, 1848.

8. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1882). The figures in Table 4.3 reflect the amount of productive land that was bound over to colonization, which is only a fraction of the aggregate lands transferred to the French public domain during the period in question. The numbers for the European population of Algeria are derived from aggregates found in CAOM F^{80}/709 and must be considered with two important caveats: they pertain only to residents of the civilian territories and thus exclude military personnel, although the latter, especially the officer corps, were often landowners themselves.

9. Tocqueville, *Études économiques, politiques et littéraires*, 423–84. See also Cheryl Welch, "Colonial Violence and the Rhetoric of Evasion: Tocqueville on Algeria," *Political Theory* 31 (2003): 235–64.

10. In *L'Algérie: Courrier d'Afrique, d'Orient et de la Méditerranée*, no. 27, May 26, 1844.

11. Eugène Daumas, *Exposé de l'état actuel de la société arabe, du gouvernement et de la législation qui la régit* (Algiers: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1844).

12. For a discussion of the relationship between the emir and the sultan of Morocco, see Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and Its Interpretations in Pre-*

Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations During the French Conquest of Algeria (London: Routledge, 2002).

13. Eugène Daumas, *Exposé de l'état actuel de la société arabe, du gouvernement et de la législation qui la régit*, 15.

14. For the input of Ismaÿl Urbain to the *Exposé* , see Michel Levallois, *Ismaÿl Urbain (1812–1884): Une autre conquête de l'Algérie* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001), 405–16.

15. See, for example, AOM 22S/1, Armée d'Afrique, Province de Constantine, February 12, 1847.

16. Édouard de Neveu, *Les khouan: Ordres religieux chez les musulmans de l'Algérie* (Paris: Guyot, 1845).

17. Edmund Burke III, "The Sociology of Islam: The French Tradition," in *Islamic Studies: A Tradition and Its Problems*, ed. Malcolm H. Kerr, 73–88 (Malibu, CA: Udena Publications, 1980).

18. Henry Laurens analyzes French understandings of Abd al-Qadir and Arabism in Algeria in *Le royaume impossible: La France et la genèse du monde arabe* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1990), 55–75.

19. Édouard de Neveu, *Les khouan: Ordres religieux chez les musulmans de l'Algérie*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Guyot, 1846), 8–9.

20. For Bugeaud's views on total occupation and warfare, see AOM F^{80}/1674, Gouvernement Général, *Bugeaud au Ministre de la Guerre*, November 26, 1841. On the institutionalization of the *razzia* and scorched-earth warfare, see Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 174–78 and 316–23; and Charles-André Julien, ed., *Les techniciens de la colonisation (XIXe–XXe siècles)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947).

21. On millenarian movements, see Peter von Sivers, "The Realm of Justice: Apocalyptic Revolts in Algeria, 1849–79," *Humaniora Islamica* 1 (1973): 47–60; Michael Adas, *Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements Against the European Colonial Order* (Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); and Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

22. Ferdinand Quesnoy, *L'Armée d'Afrique depuis la conquête d'Alger* (Paris: Jouvet, 1888).

23. Neveu, *Les khouan*, 2nd ed., 194.

24. Ibid., 196.

25. The mixed territories were eliminated on December 9, 1848, when the civilian territories were reconfigured into departments headed by prefects.

26. Claude Bontems, *Manuel des institutions algériennes: De la domination turque à l'indépendance* (Paris: Cujas, 1976), 190–94 and 242–44; and Claude Collot, *Les institutions de l'Algérie durant la période coloniale, 1830–1962* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1987), 35–36.

27. AOM F^{80}/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Ordonnance du Roi portant réorganisation de l'administration générale et des provinces de l'Algérie*, April 15, 1845. Before 1845, there were no "civilian" territories to speak of; the authority

of the colonial prefects was limited to the cities of Algiers, Oran, and Bône and to the smaller communes that received European settlers.

28. AOM F^{80}/1571, Ministère de la Guerre, *Ordre du Ministre porté sur la feuille d'analyse du 24 août 1845, au sujet d'une dépêche de Mr Demoyencourt, chef d'institution, transmise à la Direction des affaires de l'Algérie (1er bureau) sous le no. 342 du timbre rouge*, August 30, 1845.

29. AOM F^{80}/1571, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport fait au Ministre Soult-Berg*, October 8, 1845.

30. AOM F^{80}/1566, *Rapport sur l'état de l'instruction primaire en Algérie pendant le premier semestre de l'exercice 1846*: "Quant aux instituteurs indigènes actuellement en fonction, nous n'avons aucun espoir de les attacher à notre cause. Imbus de leurs faux principes, animés d'une haine implacable contre les chrétiens, et aveuglés par le fanatisme, ils s'efforceront toujours d'éloigner de nous la génération naissante, et ce n'est cependant que sur elle que nous pouvons compter aujourd'hui."

31. Fellmann's concluding note on educational programs tailored to meet sociohistorical development and intellectual merit was a primary tenet of the Saint-Simonian understanding of "functional and social" instruction. The latter did not merely apply to education the authoritarian slogan, "To each according to his capacities," but was also advanced as the means to control the creation of a national labor force in the service of the general interest. In the colonial context, therefore, it was only natural for the Saint-Simonians to propose a program of instruction that used as its starting block the perceived levels of maturity and aptitude among the natives. "Les saint-simoniens sont partisans d'un classement des individus par sélections successives, suivant les aptitudes; la spécialisation serait progressive jusqu'au moment où la Société, jugeant les élèves suffisamment préparés, donnerait à chacun d'eux la fonction à laquelle il est propre," in Marcel Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1941), 291.

32. AOM F^{80}/1675, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport de Mr le Maréchal Bugeaud sur les moyens d'affermir et d'utiliser la conquête de l'Algérie*, January 15, 1844. For Bugeaud's views on indigenous administration and military colonization, see his *Œuvres militaires du Maréchal Bugeaud, Duc d'Isly, réunies et mises en ordre par Weil, ancien Capitaine de Cavalerie* (Paris: L. Baudoin, 1883), 247–48. See also Bugeaud's proposal for military colonization and his assault on the project of Lamoricière in AOM F^{80}/1791, Gouvernement Général, *Rapport au Ministre de la Guerre*, November 26, 1841; and *Lettre au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères*, August 19, 1844.

33. AOM I1/14, Ministère de la Guerre, March 19, 1845. The special relationship between the two men began in 1840, when the governor general entrusted Roches with a diplomatic mission to Tunis and Cairo to secure a legal injunction (*fatwa*) from the *'ulama* of Qayrawan and al-Azhar prohibiting Algerian Muslims from waging war against the French. For an uneven but rare account of the activities of Roches in Algeria and Morocco, see Yūsuf Munāṣriyyah, *Muhimmat Liyūn Rūsh fī al-Jazā'ir wa al-Maghrib, 1832–1847* (Algiers: al-Mu'assasah al-Waṭaniyyah lil-Kitāb, 1990).

34. AOM 23S/1, Gouvernement Général (also available in AOM F^{80}/1732, Ministère de la Guerre), *Fondation d'un Collège arabe à Alger, rapport adressé à Mr le Maréchal Bugeaud, Gouverneur général par l'interprète principal de l'Armée d'Afrique Léon Roches*, June 10, 1844.

35. Bugeaud, April 17, 1845, quoted in Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 223.

36. AOM 23S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, September 8, 1845 (original emphasis).

37. AOM F^{80}/1566, Ministère de la Guerre, *Note sur l'Instruction Publique*, n.d.

38. Paul Azan, *L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852* (Paris: Plon, 1936), 387–407. For an analysis of the complex relations between the Directorate of Arab Affairs and the Government General of Algeria during this period, see Xavier Yacono, *Les Bureaux arabes et l'évolution des genres de vie indigènes dans l'ouest du Tell algérois (Dahra, Chélif, Ouarsenis, Sersou)* (Paris: Larose, 1953), 80–93.

39. For a detailed exposition of the competing colonial methods of Bugeaud, Bedeau, Lamoricière, and Enfantin, see Victor Demontès, *La colonisation militaire sous Bugeaud* (Paris: Larose, 1918).

40. François Joseph Lucien de Montagnac, *Lettres d'un soldat: Neuf années de campagnes en Afrique. Correspondance inédite du Colonel de Montagnac, publiée par son neveu* (Paris: Plon, 1885), 492.

41. *L'Algérie: Courrier d'Afrique, d'Orient et de la Méditerranée*, no. 108, July 12, 1845. See also no. 123, September 26, 1845.

42. The political difficulties of Bugeaud are related authoritatively by François Guizot in *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps*, vol. 7 (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1865), 118–238 and 518–44.

43. Enfantin to Carette, August 25, 1845, quoted in Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie*, 145.

44. Prosper Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie* (Paris: P. Bertrand, 1843), 483. AOM F^{80}/1676, Comité Consultatif de l'Algérie, *Rapport sur le projet de loi relatif à l'organisation administrative de l'Algérie*, June 19, 1850; Collot, *Les institutions de l'Algérie*, 38; and Kenneth J. Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons: French Military Administration in the Colonial Maghrib, 1844–1934* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1981), 194.

45. Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie*, 137–55.

46. Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie*, 192–93.

47. Urbain to Enfantin, January 25, 1844, quoted in Levallois, *Ismaÿl Urbain*, 442.

48. See Alexis de Tocqueville's assessment of Lamoricière's personality, ambitions, and views on civilian colonization in *De la colonie en Algérie* (Paris: Éditions Complexe, 1988), 82–93. See also Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 325–26.

49. Demontès, *La colonisation militaire sous Bugeaud*, 562.

50. Armand-Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, *Lettres du maréchal de Saint-Arnaud*, 2 vols. (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1855), 2:71.

51. Léon Christophe Louis Juchault de Lamoricière, "Études préparatoires pour la colonisation de la province d'Oran: no.1, Lettre d'envoi du projet a M. le Gouverneur général de l'Algérie," in Léon Christophe Louis Juchault de Lamoricière and Marie-Alphonse Bedeau, *Projets de colonisation pour les provinces d'Oran et de Constantine* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1847), 9–34.

52. In *Du gouvernement arabe et de l'institution qui doit l'exercer* (Algiers: Bastide, 1848), 33: "L'analyse exacte de l'arabe est un dédale ténébreux, qui n'est jamais éclairé que par des faibles lueurs accidentelles, et dans lequel il est presque impossible de marcher sans faux pas."

53. The reports produced by the great inquiries are available in AOM 22S/1. Here, I refer primarily to Direction des Affaires Arabes, Province de Constantine, *Rapport Bedeau*, February 12, 1847; Affaires Arabes, Province d'Oran, *Rapport de Lamoricière*, August 4, 1847; Armée d'Afrique, Direction Divisionnaire des Affaires Arabes, *Rapport Changarnier*, December 29, 1847; and Emile Keller, *Le Général de Lamoricière: Sa vie militaire, politique et religieuse*, vol. 1 (Paris: Dumaine, 1874). The reports of Blangini are in AOM F^{80}/511, Ministère de la Guerre, *Division d'Alger: Rapports des bureaux arabes*, 1849. Urbain's survey is in Vincennes, Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, H229, Direction des Affaires d'Algérie, *Administration de M. le lieutenant général Moline de Saint-Yon, résumé depuis le 10 novembre 1845 jusqu'au 31 décembre 1846*. The proposals for the comprehensive administrative reorganization submitted by the Directorate of Arab Affairs between January 1846 and July 1847 are contained in AOM F^{80}/441.

54. AOM 22S/1, Gouvernement Général, *Extrait du Registre du Conseil de Gouvernement*, December 24, 1849.

55. Quoted in Yvonne Turin, *Affrontements culturels dans l'Algérie coloniale: Écoles, médecines, religion, 1830–1880* (Paris: Maspéro, 1971), 119–20.

56. Ferdinand Lapasset, *Aperçu sur l'organisation des indigènes dans les territoires militaires, et dans les territoires civils* (Algiers: Dubos, 1850), 40.

57. James Malarkey, "The Dramatic Structure of Scientific Discovery in Colonial Algeria: A Critique of the Journal of the Société Archéologique de Constantine, 1853–1876," in *Connaissances du Maghreb: Sciences sociales et colonisation*, ed. Jean-Claude Vatin, 137–60 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984).

58. AOM 22S/1, Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, *Envoi des délibérations du Conseil de Gouvernement relatives à l'instruction publique indigène*, February 23, 1850 (original emphasis).

59. Abd al-Qadir's message is reproduced in Joseph Nil Robin, *Notes historiques sur la Grande Kabylie de 1838 à 1851* (Alger: Jourdan, 1905), 141–42.

60. Tocqueville, *De la colonie en Algérie*, 88: "On ne peut dissimuler que l'officier qui une fois a adopté l'Afrique, et en a fait son théâtre, n'y contracte bientôt des habitudes, des façons de penser et d'agir très dangereuses partout, amis surtout dans un pays libre. Il y prend l'usage et le goût d'un gouvernement dur, violent, arbitraire et grossier. C'est là une éducation que je ne me soucie pas de généraliser et de répandre."

61. The letter is preserved in AOM 22S/1, Gouvernement Général, *Nécessité de l'intervention du Gouvernement dans la direction de l'instruction publique des indigènes*, January 15, 1848.

62. Ibid.

63. Friedrich Engels, "The June Revolution: The Course of the Paris Uprising," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, July 2, 1848.

64. Charles Forbes René, Comte de Montalembert, *Œuvres polémiques et diverses de M. le comte de Montalembert, l'un des quarante de l'Académie Française*, vol. 3 (Paris: J. Lecoffre, 1868), 618–20.

65. AOM F^{80}/1676, Comité Consultatif de l'Algérie, *Rapport sur le projet de loi relatif à l'organisation administrative de l'Algérie*, June 19, 1850.

66. Lamoricière, quoted in Turin, *Affrontements culturels*, 160.

67. AOM 1S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Arrêté du Pouvoir exécutif*, August 16, 1848.

68. Article 109 declared Algeria a French territory governed by the laws of said Constitution. The legislative rights of the *colons* were later abrogated following the coup d'état of Louis-Napoleon in January 1852.

69. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 351.

70. AOM 71MI/147, Ministère de la Guerre, Division d'Alger, *Rapport Blangini*, July 12, 1849.

71. AOM, 1I/14, *Lettre au général commandant la division d'Oran*, November 16, 1847. As the responsibilities and scope of activities of the Arab Bureaux increased, the biweekly reports were replaced in 1850 by monthly abstracts, in addition to the usual quarterly overviews and annual reports.

72. Levallois, *Ismaÿl Urbain*, 555–59.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Ferdinand Lapasset, *Aperçu sur l'organisation des indigènes dans les territoires militaires, et dans les territoires civils* (Algiers: Dubos, 1850), 1–2: "Puisqu'après vingt ans de conquête, nous voulons enfin nous occuper du peuple vaincu, de son gouvernement, n'abordons pas cette grande question avec nos idées françaises; en un mot, ne cherchons pas à administrer les musulmans comme nous voudrions, mais comme ils désirent l'être; n'appliquons pas à tout le monde et, comme une panacée universelle, nos mœurs et nos institutions. Les unes et les autres *seraient repoussées dans ce pays*."

2. Charles Richard, *De la civilisation du peuple arabe* (Algiers: Dubos, 1850), 7: "Mais qu'est ce que cela veut dire: gouverner le peuple arabe? gouverner quoi, quels éléments? Je vais essayer de vous le dire, et vous verrez si, dans l'état actuel des choses, appliquer à ce peuple notre forme sociale, tout d'une pièce, cela ne revient pas à battre la mer avec une verge."

3. Quoted in Anne Levallois, *Les écrits autobiographiques d'Ismayl Urbain, 1812–1884. Homme de couleur, saint-simonien et musulman* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005), 46.

4. For documentation relating to the Oran Plot and other political factions operating in Oran between 1848 and 1850, see AOM F^{80}/580; 589; 591; 631; and M/E175.

5. In the national presidential campaign of 1848, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte (5,434,000 votes) represented the conservative reactionaries and the Party of Order. He ran against General Louis-Eugène Cavaignac (1,448,000), running alongside Alphonse de Lamartine (17,000) on the moderate Republican ticket, as well as Alexandre Ledru-Rollin (370,000) for the Democrats, and François-Vincent Raspail (36,000) for the Socialists. With Napoleon's victory over Cavaignac, George Sand commented in her *Correspondance* that France had settled for "the rusty sword of empire" over "the bloody saber of Algeria."

6. For Lamoricière's manipulation of the electoral process in Oran, see his correspondences with Director of Civil Affairs Charles Garbé and Governor General Charon in AOM F^{80}/591, Ministère de la Guerre, November 12–15, 1848. For Bugeaud's hostility to the colonizing methods of Lamoricière, see Bugeaud, *Observations de M. le Maréchal gouverneur général sur le projet de colonisation présenté pour la province d'Oran par M. le lieutenant-général de Lamoricière* (Algiers: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1847).

7. Quoted in Paul Azan, *L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852* (Paris: Plon, 1936), 466.

8. Armand-Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, *Lettres du maréchal de Saint-Arnaud*, 2 vols. (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1855), 2:200.

9. AOM 71MI/147, Ministère de la Guerre, Division d'Alger, *Rapport Blangini*, July 12, 1849: "Nous sommes convaincus que ce serait entrer dans une funeste voie que de confier la surveillance, et notamment l'inspection publique des écoles, à un Européen."

10. AOM 71MI/147, Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, *Rapport du Capitaine Péchot, Chef du bureau arabe d'Alger, sur l'instruction des indigènes*, August 31, 1849: "Aujourd'hui que l'œuvre de la conquête est terminée, il importe de rétablir sur un nouveau pied les études musulmanes, de nous en emparer, et de leur donner une direction convenable afin de civiliser les populations que nous avons à administrer."

11. AOM 22S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Projet d'organisation de l'instruction publique musulmane*, June 5, 1849. For the full text of the proposed bill, see Appendix 5.

12. Yvonne Turin, *Affrontements culturels dans l'Algérie coloniale: Écoles, médecines, religion, 1830–1880* (Paris: Maspéro, 1971), 157.

13. AOM 22S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Projet d'organisation de l'instruction publique musulmane*, June 5, 1849.

14. AOM 22S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Projet d'organisation de l'instruction publique musulmane*, June 5, 1849.

15. Richard, *De la civilisation du peuple arabe*, 9.

16. AOM 22S/1, Gouvernement Général, *Secrétariat Général: Budget de la guerre: Exercice 1849*.

17. AOM F^{80}/1679, Ministère de la Guerre, *Relevé des dépenses faites en Algérie de 1830 à 1866 pour les divers services militaires, avec indications de l'effectif auquel ces dépenses se rapportent*, 1867.

18. AOM F^{80}/1731, Gouvernement Général, *Secrétariat Général: Instruction Publique, écoles arabes-françaises*, February 4, 1865.

19. Georges Voisin [Ismaÿl Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens* (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1861), 41.

20. AOM 22S/1, Armée d'Afrique, Direction Divisionnaire des Affaires Arabes, December 29, 1847.

21. This and the following quotes are derived from Blangini's instructions of July 12, 1849, in AOM 71/MI/147, Bureaux Arabes, Division d'Alger, as well as the various *Rapports sur le projet de 1849* in Bureaux Arabes, Cercle de Dellys, August 1; Division d'Alger, August 5–16; and Cercle d'Orléansville, August 14.

22. In 1856, Auguste Lodoyer would outline to the Government General of Algeria his plans for a technical school in Algeria and spark a fascinating debate concerning the benefits of nonacademic vocational versus liberal arts curricula in the pages of the newspaper *L'Akhbar*. See Turin, *Affrontements culturels*, 265–67. The first and only *arts et métiers* school for natives was opened in 1866 in Fort Napoléon.

23. AOM 71/MI/147, Bureaux Arabes, Division d'Alger, August 5–16.

24. Édouard de Martimprey, "Études préparatoires pour la colonisation de la province d'Oran: No. 2, Mémoire sur l'état de la propriété territoriale dans les tribus," in *Projets de colonisation pour les provinces d'Oran et de Constantine présentés par MM. les Lieutenant généraux de La Moricière et Bedeau* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1847), 35–36: "Admettons qu'on est d'accord sur les principes, nous espérons qu'on va se mettre à l'œuvre; mais là encore, au moment de passer de la théorie à la pratique, plusieurs questions de la plus grande importance se présenteront. L'existence de la population musulmane sur le sol à envahir; les droits divers dont elle y jouit et qu'il faudra régler par des désintéressements, sa déportation sur d'autres lieux choisis, pour arriver à la libre disposition de la terre . . . : toutes ces questions demanderont du temps, cet élément précieux, qui, s'il nous manquait, changerait un avenir fondé sur mille sacrifices, mais riche d'espérances, en une catastrophe."

25. See AOM F^{80}/1572, Ministère de la Guerre, *Décret Présidentiel*, July 14, 1850; and AOM 22S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Décret Présidentiel*, September 30, 1850. For the full text of the bills, see Appendices 6 and 7.

26. AOM F^{80}/1571, Ministère de la Guerre, *Projet de règlement sur les Écoles arabes-françaises*, January 1850.

27. AOM 22S/2, Gouvernement Général, *Arrêté sur les écoles musulmanes-françaises de jeunes filles*, January 24, 1850.

28. See AOM F^{80}/1572, Ministère de la Guerre, *Daumas: Lettre au Gouverneur Général*, July 22, 1850.

29. AOM 22S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Appui au projet de décret sur l'instruction publique musulmane*, September 1850.

30. Lapasset, *Aperçu sur l'organisation des indigènes*, 44.

31. For one example, see AOM 71/145, Rectorat de l'Académie d'Alger, *Lettre au Préfet*, November 18, 1867. For an overview of civilian efforts in the area of female instruction, see the annual *États de situation des écoles de filles* in AOM F^{80}/1844, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Cultes, 1851–1858; and Ministère de l'Algérie et des Colonies, 1858–1860.

32. The Prefectures of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine administered the Arab-French schools within their jurisdictions according to their own regulations. See, for example, AOM F^{80}/1572–1573, Préfecture de Constantine, *Arrêté portant réglement de l'école de jeunes filles musulmanes à Constantine*, July 18, 1851; and *Arrêté portant réglement de l'école primaire de garçons de Constantine*, August 18, 1851; as well as subsequent notification of the governor general of amendments to the decree of July 14, 1850, by the Prefecture of Algiers, September 2, 1851. AOM F^{80}/1852 details the extent of the involvement of Catholic schools in the civilian territories and their experiences in the 1850s.

33. AOM 22S/2, Inspecteur de l'Instruction Publique, *Lettre à Mr le Directeur de l'Intérieur*, January 22, 1846. See also Direction de l'Intérieur et des Travaux Publics, *Rapport au Conseil Supérieur d'Administration*, February 13, 1846.

34. AOM 22S/2, Ministère de la Guerre, *Note*, n.d.

35. Raymond Grew and Patrick Harrigan, *School, State, and Society: The Growth of Elementary Schooling in Nineteenth-Century France: A Quantitative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 121–46. Finally, in 1867, all communes with more than five hundred inhabitants were required to maintain such schools. See also Françoise Mayeur, *L'éducation des filles en France au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1979), 84–112.

36. Charles Richard, *Du gouvernement arabe et de l'institution qui doit l'exercer* (Algiers: Bastide, 1848), 59–60.

37. Ibid.

38. AOM 22S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Urbain: Lettre au Ministre*, April 1850.

39. AOM 22S/2, Ministère de la Guerre, *Allix: Lettre au Ministre*, February 28, 1846: "La plus puissante de toutes les influences en Afrique comme en Europe et plus qu'en Europe, c'est la femme. Si vous convertissez à notre civilisation mille jeunes filles indigènes prises dans toutes les classes de la société et dans toutes les races de la Régence, ces jeunes filles devenues, par la force des choses, les épouses privilégiées des hommes les plus importants de leur classe, vous garantissent à jamais la soumission du pays et seront le gage irrécusable de son assimilation future."

40. AOM 22S/2, Direction de l'Intérieur et des Travaux Publics, *Instruction Primaire*, July 10, 1845; and Gouvernement Général, Direction des Affaires de l'Algérie, November 20, 1845.

41. AOM 22S/2, Ministère de la Guerre, *Allix: Lettre au Ministre*, February 28, 1846.

42. AOM F[80]/1732, *Note explicative sur l'institution de Madame Allix en faveur des jeunes filles musulmanes*, March 5, 1846.

43. Bellemare's assessments of the project are handwritten in the margins of Allix's letter of February 28, 1846.

44. Ellen M. Rogers, *A Winter in Algeria, 1863–4* (London: Sampson Low, Son, and Marston, 1865), 192–93.

45. AOM 1I/14, Préfecture d'Alger, April 24, 1855.

46. AOM 22S/2, Ministère de la Guerre, *Demande d'un rapport sur l'établissement de Madame Allix*, August 10, 1850.

47. See, for example, the inspection report for 1853 by Madame Zoepfller in AOM 22S/2, Préfecture d'Alger, *Sur l'établissement de Madame Allix*.

48. AOM 22S/2, Préfecture d'Alger, *Au sujet de Madame Luce, Directrice de l'école de jeunes filles musulmanes*, December 18, 1851.

49. See AOM 22S/2, Direction de l'Intérieur et de la Colonisation, August 8, 1846.

50. AOM 22S/2, Gouvernement Général, *École arabe-française des jeunes filles à Alger, enquête et rapport*, September 12, 1861.

51. AOM 22S/2, Gouvernement Général, *École arabe-française des jeunes filles à Alger, enquête et rapport*, September 12, 1861.

52. AOM 22S/2, Préfecture d'Alger, Bureau arabe départemental, *Réorganisation de l'école arabe française de jeunes filles*. See also AOM 22S/3, Gouvernement Général, *Note au Préfet de Constantine: L'arrêté de 1865 n'est pas applicable aux écoles de filles*, March 17, 1866.

53. AOM 22S/2, Gouvernement Général, *École arabe-française des jeunes filles à Alger, enquête et rapport*, September 12, 1861.

54. Rogers, *A Winter in Algeria*, 197–98.

55. AOM 16H/1, Gouvernement Général, Affaires Arabes, May 31, 1849: "Un des premiers mystères à pénétrer c'est celui qui enveloppe encore aujourd'hui l'organisation des sectes religieuses auxquelles nous avons constamment vu jouer le rôle principal dans les révoltes depuis les conquêtes, et qui par la solidarité qui unit leurs membres épars dans tous les pays musulmans forment les obstacles les plus sérieux que nous ayons à vaincre pour nous établir convenablement dans le pays."

56. AOM 71MI/147, Gouvernement Général, *Bureaux arabes: Cercle de Ténès* , August 20, 1849: "L'importance majeure qui existe pour tout gouvernement est de surveiller l'instruction publique et d'empêcher que la direction qui lui est donnée ne répande dans les masses des sentiments hostiles."

57. AOM F[80]/1572, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport à Mr le Président de la République*, 1850.

58. AOM 22S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Appui au projet de décret sur l'instruction publique musulmane*, September 1850.

59. Turin, *Affrontements culturels*, 203.

60. AOM 24S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, March 20, 1851.

61. AOM 24S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport fait au Ministre*, January 17, 1855.

62. AOM 22S/1, Gouvernement Général, *Rapport au Ministre de la Guerre*, December 21, 1850; and *Mesures tendant à assurer l'exécution des Articles 1 et 2 du décret du 30 Septembre 1850*, March 1851, reproduced verbatim in Alphonse Henri d'Hautpoul, *Du Ministère de la guerre en 1850 et de l'Algérie en 1851, par le général de division d'Hautpoul* (Paris: Librairie militaire J. Dumaine, 1851).

63. Turin, *Affrontements culturels*, 184.

64. Hautpoul, *Du Ministère de la guerre en 1850 et de l'Algérie en 1851*, 114.

65. Ibid., 140.

66. For an analysis of the impact of the Falloux Law on primary education, see Grew and Harrigan, *School, State, and Society*, 95–100. Falloux instituted a High Council for Education, consisting of seven clergymen (four Catholic), three representatives from private education, nine government officials, and eight lay teachers. Enrollment in ecclesiastical schools between 1854 and 1867 increased from 21,000 to 57,000 students, whereas nearly 7,000 new private schools for girls were founded, 6,000 of which were run by nuns. In Algeria, private instruction and the establishment of private institutions of learning were not accorded to Muslims until 1944 under very strict conditions.

67. AOM 22S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Lettre au Gouverneur Général: Le projet de circulaire sur l'instruction primaire musulman n'est pas approuvé*, May 14, 1851.

68. AOM 22S/1, Gouvernement Général, *Lettre à Mr le Ministre de la Guerre*, May 14, 1851, and February 19, 1852.

69. Quoted in Turin, *Affrontements culturels*, 225: "Moins les Arabes, en général, étudieront, moins ils seront fanatiques, plus ils seront faciles à diriger. Cette manière de voir n'est peut-être pas très morale, mais elle est conforme à nos intérêts."

70. AOM 22S/1, Gouvernement Général, *Au sujet de l'instruction primaire chez les Arabes*, January 29, 1852.

71. Voisin [Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 42.

72. AOM F^{80}/1572, Bureaux Arabes, Cercle de Milianah, *Chanzy: Rapport sur les écoles musulmanes*, December 31, 1851.

73. AOM F^{80}/1572, Bureaux Arabes, Cercle de Teniet el-Had, *Sériziat: Rapport sur les écoles françaises et musulmanes*, 3rd trimester, 1852.

74. For example, see the periodic *Rapports Analytiques* for each *cercle* or *arrondissement* prepared, respectively, by the military and departmental bureaux, in AOM 71/MI/147 and F^{80}/510–521.

75. AOM F^{80}/1572, Bureaux Arabes, Cercle d'Orléansville, *Rapport trimestriel sur la M'dersa*, December 31, 1851.

76. See AOM F^{80}/1572, Ministère de la Guerre, *Arrêté Ministériel*, June 22, 1854; and *Lettre au Gouverneur Général*, September 20, 1854.

77. AOM F^{80}/1572, Gouvernement Général, *Lettre aux Préfets d'Alger, de Constantine et d'Oran*, July 31, 1854.

78. For a summary, see AOM F^{80}/1572, Gouvernement Général, *Extrait du Registre des délibérations du Conseil de Gouvernement, séance du 4 Avril*

1856: Proposition d'assujettir les instituteurs musulmans à l'obtention d'un diplôme, April 4, 1856.

79. Jacques-Louis Randon, *Mémoires du maréchal Randon*, 2 vols. (Paris: Lahure, 1875–1877).

80. AOM F^{80}/1572, Gouvernement Général, *Circulaire gubernatoriale No. 171*, October 6, 1857; and *Conditions d'exercice de la profession d'instituteur surveillant des écoles*, October 6, 1857. Templates of certificates and diplomas conferred upon Algerian graduates of *madrasas* are preserved in AOM F^{80}/1572 and 24S/1, respectively.

81. AOM F^{80}/1572, Gouvernement Général, *Circulaire gubernatoriale No. 171*, October 6, 1857.

82. AOM F^{80}/1572, Direction Divisionnaire des Affaires Arabes, *Rapport trimestriel au Gouverneur Général*, March 19, 1858. For an example from the civilian territories, see AOM F^{80}/1572, Préfecture d'Alger, Bureau arabe départemental, *Rapport sur la situation des M'sids du département d'Alger au 31 Décembre 1857*.

83. AOM F^{80}/1572, Bureaux Arabes, Cercle de Dellys, *Résultat de l'inspection des écoles primaires pour le premier trimestre 1858*, February 9, 1858; and *Renseignement et résultat de l'inspection des écoles primaires pour le deuxième trimestre 1858*, July 14, 1858.

84. See AOM 24S/1, *Rapport Bresnier: Inspection des medersa dans les divisions de l'Algérie*, March 25, 1858; and Gouvernement Général, *Au sujet des écoles supérieures musulmanes*, May 15, 1858. The Collège Impérial Arabe-Français will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

85. See AOM F^{80}/447, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport Chanzy*, 1852; and Turin, *Affrontements culturels*, 265 and 280.

86. "Proclamation aux Arabes et Kabyles," quoted in Pierre de Ménerville, *Dictionnaire de la législation algérienne. Code annoté et manuel raisonné des lois, ordonnances, décrets, décisions et arrêtés publiés au Bulletin Officiel des actes du Gouvernement*, 3 vols. (Paris: Cosse et Durand, 1853), 25: "[Occupez-vous], avec activité et intelligence, d'agriculture et de commerce; établissez des villages, bâtissez de bonnes maisons en pierre et couvertes en tuiles, pour n'avoir pas tant à souffrir des pluies et du froid en hiver, de la chaleur en été; faites de beaux jardins et plantez des arbres fruitiers de toute espèce, surtout l'olivier greffé et le mûrier, pour faire de la soie. . . . Quand vous aurez bien médité ces conseils d'ami et que vous serez entrés dans la pratique des choses que je vous ai recommandées, je vous en dirai d'autres, toujours pour votre bien, car nous vous aimons comme des frères, et nous sommes affligés toutes les fois que vous nous forcez à vous faire du mal."

87. For more detailed analyses of the constitution of the colonial public domain and the categorizations of Algerian *hubus*, *melk*, and *'arsh*, see AOM F^{80}/1807, Sénat, *Exposé des motifs d'un projet de Sénatus-Consulte*, March 9, 1863; John Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 1–36; Émile Larcher, *Traité élémentaire de législation algérienne*, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1923), 5–24; and Miriam Hoexter, "Le contrat de quasi-alié-

nation des awqāf à Alger à la fin de la domination turque: Étude de deux documents de 'anā,' " *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 47 (1984): 243–59.

88. Dr. Worms, "De la constitution territoriale des pays musulmans," *Revue de Législation et de Jurisprudence* [Paris], ser. 2, vol. 15 (January–June 1842): 42–92; and "Communication de M. le Docteur Worms, médecin de l'école militaire de Saint-Cyr relativement au rapport fait par M. Macarel au nom de la Commission de l'Algérie sur la propriété territoriale dans les pays musulmans," *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques* [Paris], 1er semestre 1843, 155–86.

89. Byron Cannon, "Perceptions of the Algerian *Douar-Commune* and Reactions to the *'Arch* Land Law 1863–1881," in *Connaissances du Maghreb: Sciences sociales et colonisation*, ed. Jean-Claude Vatin, 369–85 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984). See also Xavier Yacono, *Les Bureaux arabes et l'évolution des genres de vie indigènes dans l'ouest du Tell algérois (Dahra, Chélif, Ouarsenis, Sersou)* (Paris: Larose, 1953), 150–51. For the opposition of Urbain to this "arbitrary interpretation" of Islamic tenurial law, see *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 96–102.

90. For the polemics involving Enfantin, see Amédée Marion, Juge au siège de Bône, *Lettre sur la constitution de la propriété en Algérie, adressée à M. Enfantin, membre de la Commission scientifique de l'Algérie*, August 1, 1841; Henri-Alexandre Flour de Saint-Genis, "Lettre à M. le directeur de la Revue de Législation et de Jurisprudence en réponse à M. Worms sur la constitution territoriale du pays musulman," and Édmond Pellissier de Reynaud, "Lettre à M. Marion, Juge au siège de Bône, sur la constitution de la propriété en Algérie," in *Revue de Législation et de Jurisprudence* [Paris], ser. 2, vol. 16 (July–December 1842). See also "Constitution de la propriété foncière," in Édmond Pellissier de Reynaud, *Annales algériennes*, rev. ed., 3 vols. (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1854), 3:358–73.

91. Quoted in A. G. Rozey, *Mémoire aux Chambres législatives: Esquisse rapide et historique sur l'administration de l'Algérie depuis 1830 et sur la direction qu'y donne le General Bugeaud. Quelques observations sur les attaques dirigées contre la propriété et contre les colons. Mesures à adopter pour assurer la colonisation* (Marseille: Marius Olive, 1842), 31–32 (original emphasis).

92. AOM F^{80}/522, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport Warnier sur les propriétés particulières de Constantine*, 1841. For the opposition of Urbain to this "arbitrary interpretation" of Muslim tenurial law, see *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 96–102.

93. See "Recherches sur la constitution de la propriété territoriale dans les pays musulmans et subsidiairement en Algérie par M. le docteur Worms," *Journal Asiatique* [Paris], ser. 3, vol. 16 (August–September 1842): 225–82; ser. 4, vol. 1 (October 1842): 321–98, (February 1843): 126–78, and (April 1843): 285–341; ser. 4, vol. 3 (January–February 1844): 61–90 and (March 1844): 160–86. See also Louis-Antoine Macarel, "Sur la constitution et l'état de la propriété dans l'Algérie à l'époque de la conquête des Français," in *Commission de colonisation de l'Algérie* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1843).

94. Prosper Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie* (Paris: P. Bertrand, 1843), 146 (original emphasis).

95. Jacques Lambert, *Manuel de législation algérienne* (Algiers: Librairie des Facultés, 1952), 434–35.

96. Voisin [Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 113–21.

97. Lambert, *Manuel de législation algérienne*, 436.

98. See "Loi sur la constitution de la propriété privée en Algérie," in Adrien Carpentier, *Codes et lois pour la France, l'Algérie et les colonies: Ouvrage contenant sous chaque article des codes de nombreuses références aux articles correspondants et aux lois d'intérêt général, les arrêts de principe les plus récents, la législation algérienne et coloniale, et donnant en outre la concordance des lois et décrets entre eux et les principaux traités internationaux relatifs au droit privé*, 13th ed. (Paris: Marchal et Billard, 1909), 452a–453b. The royal ordinance of July 21, 1846, had stipulated that legal recognition of property ownership was based exclusively on the presentation of verifiable deeds.

99. Minister of War Vaillant, May 17, 1854, quoted in Yacono, *Les Bureaux arabes et l'évolution des genres de vie indigènes*, 101.

100. Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 391–92.

101. See, for example, AOM F^{80}/446, Bureaux Arabes, Cercle de Dellys, *Compte rendu des détails du service des affaires arabes pendant l'année 1852*; and AOM F^{80}/1678, Ministère de la Guerre, *Analyse des rapports présentés pour l'année 1859 par les Commandants des bureaux arabes de la province d'Oran*, n.d.

102. See Cannon, "Perceptions of the Algerian *Douar-Commune*"; Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria*, 3–12; Charles-Robert Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans et la France, 1871–1919*, 2 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 1:67–73; and Douglas Johnson, "Algeria: Some Problems of Modern History," *Journal of African History* 5 (1964): 221–42.

103. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine,* 404.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Quoted in Georges Voisin [Ismaÿl Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens* (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1861), 1: "Ainsi, élever les Arabes à la dignité d'hommes libres, répandre sur eux l'instruction, tout en respectant leur religion, améliorer leur existence en faisant sortir de cette terre tous les trésors que la Providence y a enfouis et qu'un mauvais gouvernement laisserait stériles, telle est notre mission: nous n'y faillirons pas."

2. Quoted in André Nouschi, *Correspondance du Docteur A. Vital avec I. Urbain, 1845–1874: L'opinion et la vie publique constantinoises sous le Second Empire et les débuts de la Troisième République* (Paris: Larose, 1959), 129–130: "Ce qui s'agite pour [l'Algérie] depuis trente ans et qui s'agitera peut-être pendant cent ans, c'est cette question capitale: Comment lui infuser la vie européenne? Comment rendre la conquête durable?"

3. The sentence was later commuted to life in prison. The proceedings of the trial are found in Jules Favre, *Plaidoyers politiques et judiciaires*, 2 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1882), 1:503–20.

4. Ibid., 1:507.

5. Ibid., 1:580–87.

6. *Le Moniteur*, January 15, 1860.

7. As prefect of the department of the Seine from 1853 to 1870, Georges-Eugène Haussmann (1809–1891) oversaw and directed the massive renovation and embellishment of the French capital in the 1860s.

8. Quoted in Jacques Lambert, *Manuel de législation algérienne* (Algiers: Librairie des Facultés, 1952), 162: "Napoléon: Vous serez lieutenant de l'Empereur à Alger.—Jérôme: Je veux passer quatre mois de l'année à Paris.—Napoléon: Puisque c'est ainsi, vous ne serez plus que ministre à Paris."

9. AOM F^{80}/1677, Ministère de la Guerre, *Observations sur le projet de décret concernant le Gouvernement et l'administration de l'Algérie*, May 18, 1856 (original emphasis): "Les affaires qui sont du ressort de l'Algérie demandent presque toujours le concours des différents ministères. Cette mission est remplie par l'administration centrale et ce n'est pas sans peine qu'elle parvient à arriver à une solution. Où serait cette volonté, cette initiative, cette sollicitude pour centraliser, étudier, harmoniser ces questions *alors que chaque Ministre aurait une responsabilité particulière*?"

10. For examples of contemporaneous civilian and *colon* objections to the continued militarization of the Algerian Government General, see AOM F^{80}/1677, Direction des Affaires Civiles, *Note sur le classement de l'administration des Arabes*, July 17, 1858; and M. Mignucci, *Mémoire sur la colonisation de l'Algérie*, August 14, 1858. Rey-Goldzeiguer has analyzed the various factors contributing to Napoleon's initial indifference toward Algerian politics and to his sudden change of mind in 1857–1858. See Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le royaume arabe: La politique algérienne de Napoléon III, 1861–1870* (Algiers: Société Nationale d'Édition et de Diffusion, 1977), 122–36. *Colon* interests also seized upon the Doineau trial of 1856–1857 to denigrate the record of the Arab Bureaux and their "abuses of power." For a synopsis of the Doineau affair, see Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 339–41.

11. Clément Duvernois, *L'Algérie, ce qu'elle est, ce qu'elle doit être: Essai économique et politique* (Algiers: Dubos, 1858), 125–32. See also Charles-Robert Ageron, *Politiques coloniales au Maghreb* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), 52.

12. For an overview of the reorganization of ministerial portfolios concerning Algeria, see AOM F^{80}/1677, Ministère de l'Algérie et des Colonies, *Tableau indiquant les attributions actuellement exercées par les différents pouvoirs pour l'administration de l'Algérie avec indication des modifications à apporter dans le but de simplifier l'expédition des affaires*, July 1858. For a discussion of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies, see Claude Bontems, *Manuel des institutions algériennes: De la domination turque à l'indépendance* (Paris: Cujas, 1976), 50–57.

13. See AOM 1I/25, Ministère de l'Algérie et des Colonies (anciennement de Guerre), *Lettre au Préfet d'Alger*, August 10, 1858; F^{80}/1679, *Coup d'œil sur les institutions actuelles de l'Algérie*, n.d.; and "Décret Impérial sur l'organisation administrative de l'Algérie," in Adrien Carpentier, *Codes et lois pour la France, l'Algérie et les colonies: Ouvrage contenant sous chaque article des codes de nombreuses références aux articles correspondants et aux lois d'intérêt général, les arrêts de principe les plus récents, la législation algérienne et coloniale, et donnant en outre la concordance des lois et décrets entre eux et les principaux traités internationaux relatifs au droit privé*, 13th ed. (Paris: Marchal et Billard, 1909), 571b–572a.

14. See AOM F^{80}/1805, Ministère de l'Algérie et des Colonies, *Rapport à l'Empereur: Suspension du décret du 16 Février 1859*, May 3, 1859.

15. Ageron, *Politiques coloniales au Maghreb*, 54.

16. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 15, 1859, May 15, 1859, and January 1–15, 1860.

17. Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le royaume arabe*, 30–31n1.

18. The expression "Saint-Simon on horseback" is from Adolphe Guéroult. See Éric Anceau, *Napoléon III: Un Saint-Simon à cheval* (Paris: Tallandier, 2008).

19. Imbert de Saint-Amand, *L'apogée de Napoléon III, 1860* (Paris: Dentu, 1899), 299.

20. Letter to Pélissier, March 3, 1861.

21. AOM F^{80}/1679, *Note sur l'administration des indigènes musulmans en territoire civil*, April 18, 1861.

22. The letter is available in AOM F^{80}/1679 and is reproduced in Georges Spillmann, *Napoléon III et le royaume arabe d'Algérie* (Paris: Académie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, 1975), 26–27.

23. Ibid.

24. Xavier Yacono, *Les Bureaux arabes et l'évolution des genres de vie indigènes dans l'ouest du Tell algérois (Dahra, Chélif, Ouarsenis, Sersou)* (Paris: Larose, 1953), 161.

25. The three "clans" within the administration of Algeria are outlined and described by Rey-Goldzeiguer in *Le royaume arabe*, 80–88.

26. AOM F^{80}/1678, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport à l'Empereur: Mesures concernant l'organisation administrative de l'Algérie*, October 6, 1863.

27. For the attitude of Mercier-Lacombe toward Pélissier, see AOM F^{80}/1678, Corps Législatif, *Scéance du 11 Juin 1861: Discours de M. Mercier-Lacombe*, 9–11.

28. AOM F^{80}/523, Gouvernement Général, "Projet de rapport à l'Empereur," in *Projet de décret sur le cantonnement des indigènes* (Algiers: Imprimerie Bourget, 1861). For similarities between the positions of Pélissier and the *colon* constituency on *cantonnement*, see AOM F^{80}/1805, Gouvernement Général, *Cantonnement des indigènes: Projet du Conseil Supérieur*, October 10, 1861; and Gouvernement Général, *Cantonnement des indigènes Projet définitif présenté par le Gouiverneur Général*, November 28, 1861.

29. For Pélissier's reply of November 25, 1861, see Spillmann, *Napoléon III et le royaume arabe*, 28–30.

30. Quoted in Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 421.

31. Auguste-Hubert Warnier, *L'Algérie devant le Sénat* (Paris: Debuisson, 1863).

32. Conversely several promilitary and Arabophile journals such as *L'Africain* disappeared after 1867. See Vital's letters to Urbain dated November 27, 1866, and February 18, 1868, in Nouschi, *Correspondance*, 194–95 and 239–40.

33. For an overview of the French citizenry in Algeria, see Alain Lardillier, *Le peuplement français en Algérie de 1830 à 1900: Les raisons de son échec* (Versailles: Éditions de l'Atlanthrope, 1992).

34. Lapasset to Fleury, October 1, 1860, quoted in Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le royaume arabe*, 84.

35. Ismaÿl Urbain, *L'Algérie française. Indigènes et immigrants* (Paris: Séguier, 2002).

36. Lacroix to Urbain, quoted in Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le royaume arabe*, 183–85. The notables were Si Taher ben Mahyidin, bash agha of the Bani Sliman; Bu Alim ben Sharifa, bash agha of the Djendel; Ismaÿl Ould al-Mazari, agha of Tiaret; Qaddur ben Mukhfi, agha of El-Bordj; Si al-Hadj Muhammad ben Hadj Ahmad el-Muqrani, agha of Medjana; and Si Muhammad Saïd ben Ali Sharif, member of the General Council of Constantine.

37. Voisin [Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 124: "Certainement la propriété individuelle est la forme la plus avancée et la plus favorable pour faciliter les développements et les perfectionnements de l'agriculture; mais dans une société encore si irrégulièrement organisée que la société musulmane, n'est ce pas compromettre la propriété que de l'attribuer, avec son caractère le plus indépendant et le plus sacré, à des hommes qui ne sont pas préparés à le recevoir? La forme collective est une excellente transition pour passer du droit de jouissance à la propriété individuelle; elle est appropriée à l'existence nomade, au défaut d'établissements fixes; elle est plus propice à l'influence civilisatrice que nous avons à exercer; elle permet de surmonter les résistances et d'imposer le bien, tandis que la propriété individuelle, sanctuaire de la liberté civile et politique, peut se transformer en une forteresse où l'homme rétrograde se retranchera pour lutter contre le progrès et combattre la civilisation."

38. Urbain, *L'Algérie française*, 87: "La question des circonstances atténuantes doit toujours être posée, lorsque la liberté et l'instruction n'ont pas éclairé les consciences. Même en abandonnant aux Indigènes la gestion de leurs intérêts communaux, on les gardera sous la tutelle de l'État, de manière à ne pas laisser à l'esprit de résistance et de rancune le municipalisme pour refuge."

39. AOM F^{80}/1806, *Lettre de l'Empereur à son Excellence le Maréchal Duc de Malakoff, Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie*, February 6, 1863.

40. Emerit demonstrates graphically the direct influence of Urbain's *L'Algérie française* on the imperial letter. See Marcel Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1941), 270–73.

41. Quoted in Urbain, *L'Algérie française*, 26–27.

42. Voisin [Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 10–11.

43. Urbain, *L'Algérie française*, 51.

44. Ibid., 52–53.

45. The senatus consult of July 14, 1865, solidified the legal distinction between colonial citizens and subjects. Article 1 stipulated that although Algerian Muslims were allowed to serve in the French army and civil bureaucracy, they could not become citizens of France without first renouncing their respective civil and personal status: "The Muslim native is French; nevertheless he will continue to be governed by Muslim law. He can be called upon to serve in the armies, he can be called upon to fulfill civil functions and jobs in Algeria. He can on his request be allowed to enjoy the rights of a French citizen; in which case he will be governed by the civil and political laws of France."

46. Urbain to Lacroix, March 14, 1863, quoted in Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le royaume arabe*, 208.

47. Voisin [Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 125–26.

48. John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 75. See also Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 426–27.

49. Voisin [Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 154–58.

50. AOM F^{80}/1806, *Lettre de l'Empereur à son Excellence le Maréchal Duc de Malakoff, Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie*, February 6, 1863.

51. The senatus consult is available in AOM F^{80}/1806, *Constitution de la propriété en Algérie dans les territoires occupés par les Arabes: Sénatus-Consulte du 22 Avril 1863* (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1863). For a description of the phases of implementation of the senatus consult, see AOM F^{80}/1806, Ministère de la Guerre, *Instructions générales pour l'exécution du Sénatus-Consulte du 22 Avril 1863 et du Règlement d'administration publique du 23 Mai suivant, relatifs à la constitution de la propriété en Algérie dans les territoires occupés par les Arabes*, June 11, 1863. The series of legislative acts concerning Algerian property ratified between 1863 and 1865 is tabulated in AOM F^{80}/1807, *Chronologie des actes administratifs concernant la propriété en Algérie dans les territoires occupés par les Arabes*, n.d. The documents relating to the province of Oran are unfortunately lost.

52. See *Journal des Débats Littéraires et Politiques*, March 11, 1863; and *Le Temps*, April 15, 1863, 2.

53. "Enquête sur les actes du gouvernement de défense nationale: Rapport sur l'Algérie," in *Annales de l'Assemblée Nationale*, vol. 26 (Paris: Imprimerie et Librairie du Journal Officiel, 1875), 760.

54. Byron Cannon, "Perceptions of the Algerian *Douar-Commune* and Reactions to the *'Arch* Land Law 1863–1881," in *Connaissances du Maghreb: Sciences sociales et colonisation*, ed. Jean-Claude Vatin, 369–85, 372–73 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984).

55. AOM F^{80}/1806, Ministère de la Guerre, *Réglement d'administration publique du 23 Mai suivant, relatifs à la constitution de la propriété en Algérie dans les territoires occupés par les Arabes*, May 23, 1863.

56. Claude Collot, *Les institutions de l'Algérie durant la période coloniale, 1830–1962* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1987), 9; Bontems, *Manuel des institutions algériennes*, 286–93; and Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le royaume arabe*, 636.

57. AOM F^{80}/1860, Gouvernement Général, *Rapport sur l'insurrection de l'Algérie en 1864*, December 12, 1864.

58. AOM F^{80}/1679, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport sur l'insurrection de l'Algérie en 1864*, n.d.

59. Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le royaume arabe*, 313.

60. Vital to Urbain, June 1, 1869, quoted in Nouschi, *Correspondance*, 287.

61. Ageron, *Politiques coloniales au Maghreb*, 76.

62. See AOM F^{80}/1860, Gouvernement Général, *Note sur la délimitation nouvelle des territoires des trois provinces de l'Algérie*, January 27, 1865.

63. See Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 430.

64. AOM F^{80}/1860, Gouvernement Général, *Note sur la délimitation nouvelle des territoires des trois provinces de l'Algérie*, January 27, 1865.

65. Ageron, *Politiques coloniales au Maghreb*, 66n2 and 67.

66. For a contemporary account of the emperor's sojourn in North Africa, see Octave Tessier, *Napoléon III en Algérie* (Paris: Challamel, 1865).

67. Napoleon also traveled 6,491 kilometers by sea. René de Saint-Félix, *Le voyage de S.M. Napoléon III en Algérie et la régence de S.M. l'Impératrice, mai–juin 1865, rédigé d'après les documents officiels* (Paris: E.P. de l'Isère, 1865), 107–8.

68. Letter to Mac-Mahon, June 7, 1865.

69. Spillmann, *Napoléon III et le royaume arabe*, 61–69.

70. Urbain, *L'Algérie française*, 87.

71. Saint-Félix, *Le voyage de S.M. Napoléon III en Algérie*, 107–8.

72. Charles-Robert Ageron settles the controversy convincingly in "Un mythe politique français: Abd el-Kader souverain d'un 'royaume arabe' d'Orient," in *Politiques coloniales au Maghreb*, 93–108.

73. Yacono, *Les Bureaux arabes et l'évolution des genres de vie indigènes*, 83–84.

74. Quoted in Emerit, *Les saint-simoniens en Algérie*, 295–96: "Tout le monde comprend aujourd'hui que le Gouvernement n'a pas voulu créer qu'un simple et infime établissement, une école un peu plus élevée que les autres écoles, où l'on se formerait des Arabes, et même des Français, que pour l'interprétât, ou pour les fonctions secondaires administratives ou des secrétaires de bureaux arabes. . . . Il n'y aurait pas là une œuvre assez élevée; il n'y aurait qu'un procédé; ce ne serait pas une idée d'avenir. Le Gouvernement, il est vrai, calcule les résultats de son œuvre au point de vue pratique des administrations et des besoins de l'État, mais aussi surtout au point de vue de la civilisation et de l'unification des deux populations arabe et française."

75. Quoted in Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le royaume arabe*, 269: "Le sénatus-consulte a sauvegardé la propriété indigène . . . mais il y a au fond du programme impérial une pensée de civilisation . . . c'est ce côté de la Lettre de l'em-

pereur, le plus important sans contredit, qui reste dans l'ombre . . . l'éducation, l'enseignement, voilà le levier fondamental qui soulèvera la montagne et la fera marcher."

76. AOM 23S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport fait à l'Empereur: Création d'un collège Impérial arabe-français à Alger*, January 1857.

77. AOM 23S/1, *Décret portant organisation d'un Collège Impérial Arabe-Français, Mdersat el Soltani, d'Alger*, March 14, 1857. For the reservations of the minister of public instruction, see *Lettre au Ministre de la Guerre*, April 30, 1857.

78. Archives Nationales, F17/7679, July 26, 1866.

79. AOM 23S/1, Inspecteur Général de l'Instruction Publique, *Lettre au Ministre de la Guerre*, November 20, 1855.

80. See Yvonne Turin, *Affrontements culturels dans l'Algérie coloniale: Écoles, médecines, religion, 1830–1880* (Paris: Maspéro, 1971), 279.

81. Voisin [Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 41. A full internship (*pension*) cost 800 francs payable in advance by trimester.

82. AOM 23S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Rapport fait au Ministre, Quatre Arrêtés à rendre en exécution du décret qui constitue à Alger un Collège Impérial Arabe-Français*, April 21, 1857. For examples of the nature of the interventions by the governor general, see AOM 23S/2, Collège Impérial Arabe-Français, *Registre des délibérations du Conseil d'Instruction et de Discipline*, 1858–1866. For organizational structure and bylaws of the Imperial College, see *Réglement pour l'administration du Collège Impérial Arabe-Français* (Algiers: Dubos, 1862).

83. AOM 23S/1, *Collège Impérial Arabe-Français: Décret d'institution du 14 Mars 1857; modifications proposées par le recteur*, October 30, 1858.

84. The following discussion is derived from AOM 23S/1, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Cultes, May 7, 1857; Académie d'Alger, *Instruction Publique*, November 2, 1859; Ministère de l'Algérie et des Colonies, *Minute de la lettre écrite au Ministre de l'Instruction Publique et des Cultes*, August 17, 1860; Gouvernement Général, Intendance Militaire de la Division d'Alger, November 5, 1861; and F80/1844, Académie d'Alger, *Rapport semestriel*, May 18, 1860.

85. AOM 22S/1, Ministère de la Guerre, *Lettre écrite au Gouverneur Général*, March 7, 1853.

86. AOM F80/1844, Académie d'Alger, *Rapport semestriel*, May 18, 1860.

87. AOM 23S/1, Gouvernement Général, *Intendance Militaire de la Division d'Alger*, November 5, 1861.

88. AOM 23S/1, Gouvernement Général, *Armée d'Afrique: Division d'Alger*, March 25, 1861, and October 29, 1861. See also *Réglement pour l'administration du Collège Impérial Arabe-Français* (Algiers: Dubos, 1862).

89. Turin, *Affrontements culturels*, 262.

90. AOM I1/16, Bureaux Arabes, *Cercle de Teniet el-Had*, 1867, quoted in Turin, *Affrontements culturels*, 295–96.

91. Voisin [Urbain], *L'Algérie pour les Algériens*, 159.

92. AOM F^{80}/1731, Ministère de la Guerre, *Décret Impérial*, March 4, 1865; Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, *Projet d'organisation de l'École Normale Primaire d'Alger*, July 28, 1865; and Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, *Arrêté Ministériel*, August 3, 1865.

93. AOM F^{80}/1680, Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, *Situation de l'Empire: Instruction Publique*, November 16, 1867; and *Situation de l'Empire: Instruction Publique*, November 26, 1868. For the ministerial order, see AOM F^{80}/1731, Ministère de la Guerre, August 3, 1865. See also AOM 17S/1, Académie d'Alger, *École Normale Primaire: Conditions d'admission et programme d'examen* (Algiers: Boyer, 1868).

94. The following discussion is based on the annual reports filed with the Academy of Algiers in AOM 17S/2, Académie d'Alger, *École Normale Primaire: Rapport du Directeur à la Commission de surveillance sur les élèves et la discipline, année scolaire, 1866–1867*, September 15, 1867; *année scolaire, 1867–1868*, July 21, 1868; *année scolaire, 1868–69*, July 20, 1869; and *année scolaire, 1870–1871*, July 21, 1871.

95. Léon, for example, estimates that 2,000 *zawiyas* were in operation in Algeria between 1865 and 1880. See Antoine Léon, *Colonisation, enseignement et éducation: Étude historique et comparative* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991), 120.

96. The following data are gleaned from AOM 71MI/147: Instruction publique indigène, and the periodic reports of the Arab Bureaux for Algiers, Oran, and Constantine in Bureaux Arabes, Series I, J, K.

97. Spillmann, *Napoléon III et le royaume arabe*, 61–69.

98. AOM F^{80}/1681, Commission de l'Algérie, *Administration municipale en territoire militaire: Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 10 Juin 1869*.

99. AOM F^{80}/1680, Gouvernement Général, *Arrêté d'organisation*, May 20, 1868; and Collot, *Les institutions de l'Algérie*, 9.

100. See statistical tables in AOM F^{80}/1731, Gouvernement Général Civil de l'Algérie, Direction Générale des Affaires Civiles et Financières, *Question des écoles communales*, July 13, 1871.

101. See AOM F^{80}/1731, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, *Lettre au Ministre de la Guerre*, February 25, 1869; Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie, *Lettre au Ministre de l'Instruction Publique*, March 23, 1869; and Ministère de la Guerre, *Instruction publique en Algérie*, June 23, 1869.

NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. Thomas Richards, *The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire* (London: Verso, 1993), 1.

2. Peter Gran, "Studies of Anglo-American Political Economy: Democracy, Orientalism, and the Left," in *Theory, Politics and the Arab World: Critical Responses*, ed. Hisham Sharabi, 228–54, 230 (New York: Routledge, 1990).

3. Jean Frémigacci, "L'État colonial français, du discours mythique aux réalités 1880–1940," *Matériaux pour l'Histoire de Notre Temps* 32–33 (1993):

27–35, 28: "L'empire colonial est le conservatoire, dans les vieilles colonies, ou la résurgence dans les nouvelles, de toutes sortes de structures de l'Ancien régime."

4. For a brief examination of the rise of the Colonist Party (*Parti colonial*) in the 1860s and its political platforms, see Antoine Léon, *Colonisation, enseignement et éducation: Étude historique et comparative* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991), 69–85.

5. See "Décret relatif à l'organisation politique de l'Algérie" of October 24, 1870.

6. "Enquête sur les actes du gouvernement de défense nationale: Rapport sur l'Algérie," in *Annales de l'Assemblée Nationale*, vol. 26 (Paris: Imprimerie et Librairie du Journal Officiel, 1875), 671.

7. Prosper Enfantin, "Les colons et l'armée," *L'Algérie: Courrier d'Afrique, d'Orient et de la Méditerranée*, no. 27, May 26, 1844.

8. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1874), 325–26.

9. Ibid., 326.

10. The Cagayous series was written by the journalist Auguste Robinet and published under the pseudonym Musette between 1894 and 1908.

11. Quoted in Henry Laurens, *Le royaume impossible: La France et la genèse du monde arabe* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1990), 74.

12. Arthur Girault, *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Paris: L. Larose et L. Tenin, 1907), 48.

13. Ibid., 51.

14. See Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, 6th ed. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908), 500–25.

15. Ibid., 502.

16. Ibid., 521.

17. Quotes are from Frémigacci, "L'État colonial français," 28.

18. Ibid.

19. Louis Vignon, *Un programme de politique coloniale: Les questions indigènes* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1919).

20. Albert Sarraut, *La mise en valeur des colonies françaises* (Paris: Payot, 1923). See also H. de la Martinière, "La question indigène en Algérie," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, March 15, 1922, 326–51, and April 1, 1922, 659–84.

21. Urbain to Lacroix, January 4, 1862, quoted in Ismaÿl Urbain, *L'Algérie française. Indigènes et immigrants* (Paris: Séguier, 2002), 17.

22. Frémigacci, "L'État colonial français," 27.

23. In his thirty-year correspondence with Urbain, Auguste Vital rarely mentioned the subject of indigenous instruction, whereas questions relating to political and social insecurity were prevalent.

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